Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE CLIFTON TERRELL, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN A175811 FRANCISCO, (San Francisco City and County Respondent; Super. Ct. No. 2019001) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest. Clifton Terrell filed a petition in the superior court for appointment of counsel and discovery to aid him in seeking a writ of habeas corpus under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1 (the Racial Justice Act); Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)), 1 alleging a special circumstance finding of murder during an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) was sought and imposed against him on the basis of race. (§ 1473, subd. (e).) The trial court denied Terrell’s petition in both respects. Terrell then filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court and we issued an order to show cause. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 In denying Terrell’s petition, the trial court concentrated on perceived imprecisions in two disparity reports the petition relied on, focusing in particular on ambiguities that the petition’s allegations dispelled. In doing so, the court failed to heed the Legislature’s recent admonition that the Racial Justice Act’s “threshold to secure counsel is extremely low” and “should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.” (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).) We grant the petition before us and issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Terrell’s habeas petition, appoint counsel for Terrell, and conduct a new hearing to consider such discovery as his new counsel elects to pursue. I. BACKGROUND Early one morning in 2001, A.S. and Hunter McPherson were walking home from a friend’s house when Terrell pointed a gun at each of them and tried to rob them. (People v. Terrell (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375.) A.S. gave Terrell her purse, but McPherson refused to hand over his wallet. (Ibid.) Terrell shot McPherson, who died in the hospital a few hours later. (Ibid.) In 2005, a jury found Terrell guilty of McPherson’s murder (§ 187) and found true a special circumstance allegation of murder during an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), as well as an allegation that Terrell personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). (People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1373, 1379.) The jury also found Terrell guilty of robbery of A.S. (§ 212.5, subd. (c)) and attempted robbery of McPherson (§§ 664/212.5, subd. (c)) and found allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of both crimes to be true (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). (People v. Terrell, at pp. 1373, 1379.) 2 At trial, Terrell testified that “[h]is mother is ‘Mexican and Indian,’ and his father is Black.” (Id. at p. 1378.) While the record does not reflect McPherson’s race, we may infer from Terrell’s allegations that he was White, which the District Attorney confirms. For McPherson’s murder, the trial court sentenced Terrell to life without the possibility of parole and imposed a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the allegation of personal use of a firearm resulting in death. (People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379.) The court imposed a concurrent term for the robbery of A.S. and stayed sentencing as to the attempted robbery of McPherson. (Ibid.) Terrell appealed and we upheld his conviction. (Id. at p. 1373.) In 2025, Terrell filed a petition in the superior court to “challenge his felony-murder special circumstances allegation found true under [section] 190.2(a)(17).” The petition claimed that “statistical evidence for charging and conviction rates in San Francisco County under . . . § 190.2(a) show significant racial disparities” establishing that his “conviction was sought and obtained on the basis of race under . . . § 745(a)(3) or § 745(a)(4)” of the Racial Justice Act. Specifically, Terrell alleged that Black people constitute 53 percent of those sentenced to life without parole in San Francisco and receive that sentence at 16.8 times the rate of White people, as demonstrated by a report attached as an exhibit to his petition (the Skelton report). Citing a second exhibit (the Carney report), Terrell further alleged that “in felony- murder prosecutions in San Francisco from 2011-2021[,]” a Black defendant was “more than three times more likely to be charged with [a] special circumstances allegation” when the victim of his or her crime was White. Terrell alleged that both of the San Francisco-specific disparities he identified “are consistent with statewide racial disparities in the number of 3 Black people serving [life without parole] sentences and the disproportionate number of people serving [such] sentences when” their crime’s victim was White. The District Attorney filed an informal response to Terrell’s petition, and Terrell submitted an informal reply. In an order filed in January 2026,2 the trial court denied Terrell’s petition in its entirety, finding that Terrell failed to “ ‘plead[] a plausible allegation of a violation’ ” of the Racial Justice Act supporting the appointment of counsel because “he allege[d] a violation . . . in too conclusory and broad a manner.” The court reasoned that the statistics Terrell cited were “too broad because they relate to San Francisco County [life without parole] sentences in general [(the Skelton report)] and to special circumstances in general (with no county specified) [(the Carney report)], with no showing or allegation regarding Petitioner’s specific offense and conduct.” Based on similar reasoning, the court also found Terrell had failed to establish good cause for discovery by “ ‘advanc[ing] a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial Justice Act “could or might have occurred” in his case.’ ” The court continued to emphasize that the Carney report did not itself indicate that the data it addressed was specific to San Francisco or “isolate the particular special circumstance allegation charged in [Terrell]’s case.” 2 On the same date that the trial court issued its ruling, Terrell filed an “[a]mendment” to his petition consisting of a declaration by an attorney who supervised the compilation of the data analyzed in the Carney report. (Boldface omitted.) The attorney confirmed that the data was from San Francisco. Several days later, Terrell filed a second “[a]mendment” setting forth argument about the opinion in People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 707. (Boldface omitted.) It is unclear whether the trial court ever reviewed these documents. Since they are immaterial to our disposition, we need not address them any further. 4 II. DISCUSSION A. Governing Legal Principles 1. The Goals and Structure of the Racial Justice Act The Legislature passed the Racial Justice Act with bold and unequivocal aims: “ ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)” (People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 944–945 (Wilson); see also Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (f) [finding and declaring that the Racial Justice Act should be interpreted in light of the “bold, concerted, and ongoing efforts” required to correct racial bias in the criminal legal system].) To those ends, the statute prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) “[F]our numbered [paragraphs or] subparts within section 745, subdivision (a) . . . describe different means of proving that the state exercised its criminal sanctions power” in violation of this proscription. (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 163 (Young).) The statute enshrines a “broad scheme, which covers every stage of the prosecutorial process—from investigation through charging, trial, conviction, and sentencing . . . .” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) It responds to “direct evidence of discriminatory intent (i.e., an exhibition of ‘bias or animus’ or use of ‘racially discriminatory language’ (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(2))[)]” or “proof of racial bias against a group of which defendant is a member based on harsher treatment of his group vis-à-vis others of a different race (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)–(4)).” (Id. at pp. 163–164.) As relevant here, a violation may be established where “[t]he defendant was charged or convicted of a more 5 serious offense than defendants of other races” who “engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the . . . prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race” in the relevant county. (§ 745, subd. (a)(3).) A violation is also established where the defendant received a longer or more severe sentence than “similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense” by nature of their race (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A)) or the race of their victim (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B)), again within the relevant county. Among other changes, the Legislature “amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of” claims under the Racial Justice Act. (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 945.) The new subdivision authorizes a habeas petition “after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745 . . . .” (§ 1473, subd. (e).) It provides for the appointment of counsel to indigent petitioners where “either the petition pleads a plausible allegation” of such a violation “or the State Public Defender requests counsel be appointed.” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5).) “Newly appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment.” (Ibid.) A petitioner or petitioner’s counsel also may file a motion for discovery under section 745, subdivision (d), “in preparation to file a petition” or in connection with one that is pending. (§ 1473, subd. (e)(2).) If a habeas petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Id., subd. (e)(7)(B).) If the court finds a violation, it must impose one or more of the statutory remedies. (Id., subd. (e)(8).) 6 As multiple courts have observed, the Racial Justice Act “contemplates escalating evidentiary burdens on a defendant seeking relief at the various stages of the process.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 61 (Gonzales); see also McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 44 (McIntosh) [distinguishing “separate and distinct inquiries” associated with a request to obtain appointed counsel and a request for an order to show cause]; Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160– 161.) The burden to obtain counsel is merely to plead a plausible allegation of a violation. (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5).) “The burden at the discovery stage is a good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of [a] . . . violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gonzales, at p. 61.) In analyzing the statute, it is important to bear in mind that the higher showings required at later stages “inform[] what is required”—and what is not required—“for the lesser showing[s]” that warrant discovery and the appointment of counsel. (Id. at p. 41) 2. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation We review purely legal issues “ ‘such as the proper interpretation and application of a statute . . . de novo.’ ” (In re Lynex (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 756, 766 (Lynex).) The same standard applies to our review of the sufficiency of a pleading in a special criminal proceeding. (See People v. Perlas (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 826, 831–832 [petition to revoke parole]; see also Harmon v. Superior Court (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1236, 1249 [Racial Justice Act habeas petition is a special proceeding].) In interpreting a statute, our central task “ ‘ “is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning,” ’ ” 7 which we generally must follow “ ‘ “unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, [we] may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616–617.) “ ‘ “[W]e consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 617.) In applying these principles to the Racial Justice Act, we give “considerable weight” to the Legislature’s detailed uncodified findings and statements of intent, given their specificity and because they were “voted upon by the entire legislative body, enrolled and signed by the Governor . . . .” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.) B. Analysis The District Attorney contends that Terrell is not entitled to appointed counsel or discovery because his allegations do not address “individuals who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated . . . .” She maintains that it does not suffice to allege a “disparity in charging rates based on the victim’s race[,]” as reflected in the Carney report, because the statute defines as violations charging disparities based on the defendant’s race and sentencing disparities based on the victim’s race, but not charging disparities based on the victim’s race. She also deems inadequate alleged racial disparities in the proportions of individuals serving life without parole sentences, as reflected in the Skelton report, absent details about the specific “crimes for which these individuals were convicted” and “statistical, case 8 specific, or” other facts that show the “county population [is] the proper baseline” for this analysis. As we will explain, the District Attorney’s arguments are better addressed to later stages of this litigation. Taken together, Terrell’s allegations plead a plausible violation of the Racial Justice Act entitling him to appointed counsel. With counsel’s assistance and the benefit of discovery that counsel obtains, Terrell will face higher burdens as the matter proceeds. 3 1. The Showing Required for Appointment of Counsel As our discussion in section II(A)(1) reflects, for indigent defendants who seek appointed counsel, section 1473, subdivision (e) requires at least “two separate and distinct inquiries . . . during the informal pleading stage of habeas corpus proceedings[,]” (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44): first, whether the defendant is entitled to counsel, and last, after any requests for discovery and to amend the petition are resolved, whether the defendant is entitled to an order to show cause (ibid.). Although both “require an assessment of the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court’s review . . . before deciding whether to appoint counsel is not identical to its [prima facie] review before deciding whether to issue an [order to show cause].” (Ibid.) “With clear language,” the statute “limits the inquiry before the 3 We deny Terrell’s request for judicial notice of the Attorney General’s response to the petition for writ of mandate filed in Mooring v. Superior Court (No. A175785), which the District Attorney opposes, and we likewise deny the District Attorney’s alternative request that we take judicial notice of all filings in that case. Our colleagues’ unpublished order in that case has no precedential value and should not be relied on (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a)), and “the Attorney General’s position . . . in a different case is not relevant to our decision.” (Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1, 23, fn. 12.) 9 appointment of counsel to an assessment of the facial sufficiency” of the “allegations in the petition” to plausibly allege a violation. (Id. at pp. 44–45.) 4 The Legislature made this even clearer when it amended section 1473, subdivision (e) effective January 1, 2026, “emphasiz[ing] the ‘extremely low’ showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel.” (Lynex, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) The Legislature found and declared that despite this “extremely low” bar, “courts have denied counsel to litigants raising [Racial Justice Act] claims far more than they have appointed counsel.” (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).) Accordingly, “[t]he Legislature reaffirm[ed] that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by [McIntosh], and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.” (Ibid.) Alongside these findings and declarations, the Legislature amended the statute, which had previously required a petitioner to “allege[] facts that would establish a violation” of the Racial Justice Act in order to obtain appointed counsel (§ 1473, former subd. (e), added by Stats. 2024, ch. 495, § 8), to instead require a petitioner to “plead[] a plausible allegation of a violation” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5)). 4 McIntosh analyzed statutory language superseded by the amendments that govern our case, which required a petitioner to “ ‘allege[] facts that would establish a violation’ ” of the statute to obtain appointed counsel. (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) It contrasted this standard with the higher showing required to establish a prima facie showing, which the statute continues to define as the production of “facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred[,]” meaning “more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(2), italics added; see McIntosh, at p. 44.) 10 Lynex deemed this new language ambiguous, and we agree. 5 (Lynex, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) Given the Legislature’s finding that courts were too frequently denying requests for counsel based on what was intended to be an “extremely low” and “minimal” standard, we conclude that the current standard for appointment of counsel is no more stringent than the old one—and is to some degree more lenient. (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).) With that understanding, we hold that a petition is not required to allege facts that would suffice to prove or allege a prima facie violation under a particular paragraph of the Racial Justice Act, but need only set forth allegations establishing a “plausible” theory that the state sought, obtained, or imposed a conviction or sentence on the basis of race in “violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745 . . . .” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5); Lynex, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 774–776 [the Racial Justice Act standard for appointment of counsel is lower than a prima facie showing]; cf. McDaniel, 5 The District Attorney’s position that the new standard is unambiguous and does not require consideration of the uncodified findings and statements of intent is hard to reconcile with her characterization of the standard as “novel” and her failure to offer a concise explanation of what it means. She attempts to define the standard by interpreting case authority concerning Racial Justice Act discovery, but that authority supports a lenient reading of the standard and emphasizes the Legislature’s statements of intent. (See, e.g., McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 247 (McDaniel) [“imperfect data should not automatically be deemed insufficient to trigger” discovery, “particularly in light of the Legislature’s broad intent to combat racial bias. (Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) § 2(i) [‘racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable’][)].”].) The District Attorney also relies on California and federal case authorities addressing statistical claims of discrimination under several other statutes. While the principles discussed in these opinions may be relevant to later stages of Racial Justice Act litigation, we do not find these authorities pertinent to an understanding of the minimal allegations needed to secure appointed counsel. 11 supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [good cause for discovery under the Racial Justice Act is established with “ ‘a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation . . . could or might have occurred’ ”].) A direct fit between the allegations and evidence that would show a violation of a specific paragraph—or even a prima facie, substantial likelihood of a violation—is not required at this juncture. (See Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [Racial Justice Act “defendants may pursue different theories supported by different kinds of proof[,]” and evidence supporting “a theory of violation under one [paragraph] may be corroborative of the evidence supporting another theory of violation under a different [paragraph]”].) As in the discovery context, determinations concerning eligibility for court-appointed counsel consider the numbered paragraphs not as isolated violations, but as pathways that “ ‘[might] work in tandem’ ” to collectively reveal “ ‘that the state exercised its criminal sanctions power “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” in violation of section 745, subdivision (a).’ ” (Gonzales, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. at pp. 60–61.) Viewed this way, a facially plausible Racial Justice Act allegation need not “cognizably constitute a violation of at least one of the available [paragraphs of section 745, subdivision (a)] in its entirety[,]” as the District Attorney argues. To so hold would disturb the statute’s escalating evidentiary burdens by improperly elevating the standard to obtain counsel. It would also unreasonably demand that self-represented litigants produce the missing legal analyses that necessitate their requests for counsel in the first instance, a result similar to the “catch-22” recognized by Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at page 162, in the discovery context. “Preventing a defendant from obtaining information about charging decisions without first presenting that same evidence in a discovery motion is the type of a catch-22 12 the [Racial Justice] Act was designed to eliminate.” (Ibid.) This reasoning applies equally, if not more so, to requests for counsel to assist in presenting the merits of a Racial Justice Act claim. 6 People v. Jimenez (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 1104 (Jimenez), a recent opinion by the Sixth Appellate District, drew the line between plausible allegations and prima facie evidence of a violation. Jimenez held that the defendant did not make a prima facie showing of a disparity in life without parole charging under section 745, subdivision (a)(3), by submitting two types of evidence. First, the defendant submitted evidence of a disparity in the populations of young adult Latinx versus White individuals serving such sentences relative to their shares of the general population in Santa Clara County, but the court of appeal held only the population “charged with or convicted of murder” was similarly situated for purposes of the prima facie analysis. (Id. at p. 1117; see also id. at pp. 1118–1122.) Next, the defendant identified “discrete occurrences of less serious outcomes for White murder defendants,” but the court of appeal held this did not show a systematic disparity absent a “complementary sample” of White murder defendants who received the more serious outcome and “corresponding samples for Latinx defendants.” (Id. at p. 1117; see also id. at pp. 1122, 1124–1125.) Despite these deficiencies in the defendant’s prima facie showing, the court of appeal concluded that he had “pleaded a ‘plausible allegation’ of [a Racial Justice Act] violation sufficient to entitle him to appointment of [habeas] counsel . . . .” (Id. at p. 1130.) The identification of individual comparator White 6 This interpretation also honors section 1473, subdivision (e), which authorizes newly appointed counsel to request relevant evidence and amend petitions that were filed before their appointment. These provisions entitle the initial Racial Justice Act pleadings of self-represented litigants to fine- tuning after legal representation is obtained. (§ 1473, subds. (e)(2), (5).) 13 murder defendants, coupled with the disparity in young adult Latinx individuals serving life without parole sentences relative to their share of the general county-level population, was enough to entitle the defendant to counsel. We turn to the allegations at issue here. C. Terrell Alleged That the Data Underlying the Carney Report Was From San Francisco and Concerned Felony Murder We first address the trial court’s repeated emphasis on asserted imprecisions in the Carney report that were clarified by allegations in Terrell’s petition. The court’s written order indicated that the Carney report gave “no indication as to what county” its statistics applied to, and that it wasn’t “county-specific.” It further characterized the report as addressed to “special circumstances in general.” Terrell’s petition, however, explained that the report’s statistics involved “disproportionate charging” in “felony-murder prosecutions in San Francisco[.]” The trial court’s evaluation of the Carney report was improper given the “clear” limitation of the entitlement to counsel inquiry “to an assessment of the facial sufficiency of the . . . petition . . . .” (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 44–45.) Because Terrell’s petition alleged that the Carney report data was from San Francisco, the court was bound to accept his allegation at this early juncture (at least insofar as nothing in the report contradicted it). 7 Likewise, the petition alleged that the Carney report concerned felony murder prosecutions—which is consistent with the report’s description of the data it analyzed as addressing “felony murder” and “robbery murder” charging. The court erred by finding Terrell had to do more 7 In her return, the District Attorney concedes that the data was from San Francisco. 14 to support these allegations. At this point in the proceedings, the court must accept the petitioner’s allegations on their face. D. Terrell Is Entitled to Counsel Considering the Carney and Skelton reports in light of the allegations in Terrell’s petition as we must, we conclude that Terrell pleaded a plausible allegation of a violation of the Racial Justice Act entitling him to appointed counsel. 8 He does so on two theories, which may develop into alternative or consistent approaches to his case: one based on his victim’s race and one based on his own race. Citing the Carney report, which professes to address “felony . . . and robbery murder eligible cases[,]” Terrell alleges that in San Francisco, Black defendants with White victims are over three times more likely to be charged with felony or robbery murder than Black defendants with non-White victims. When it comes to sentencing, the Racial Justice Act expressly defines such a disparity based on the victim’s race as a violation. (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B).) While it is true that the Carney report addresses charging rather than sentencing disparities among Black defendants with victims of different races, it is certainly plausible that such disparities would carry through to sentencing.9 This is what Terrell alleges by citing the Carney 8 To the extent that People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2026) 124 Cal.App.5th 10—which addresses a defendant’s entitlement to discovery under the Racial Justice Act—conflicts with our decision here, we respectfully disagree with its analysis. 9 The statute addresses circumstances where the defendant received a longer or more severe “sentence” than similarly situated individuals “convicted of the same offense.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B).) In our view, this language encompasses circumstances, like those alleged here, where a defendant receives a more severe “sentence” of life without parole for the substantive offense of murder. This is consistent with legislative history materials that describe “life without parole” as the type of “longer or more 15 report as support for an “increased likelihood of being convicted and sentenced to a special circumstances allegation.” Such a disparity remains a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(B) even though the Carney report also appears to show that “non-Black” defendants with White victims are charged with felony or robbery murder at an even higher rate than Black defendants, arguably undermining any allegation of a violation of subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 745. But, notably, the Carney report does not specify what percentage of “non-Black” defendants reflected in the data were White: the group may be dominated by other non-White defendants charged at rates similar to Black defendants, so that a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(A) remains plausible as well. In those circumstances, Terrell’s allegations based on the Carney report would be consistent with and perhaps supportive of his allegation, based on the Skelton report, that in San Francisco Black defendants are sentenced to life without parole at 16.8 times the rate of White defendants relative to their representation in the general population, and his allegation that the disparities reflected in both reports are consistent with statewide racial disparities. 10 severe sentence[]” the statute was intended to address. (See, e.g., Assem. Ash Kalra, Fact Sheet on Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).) 10 As the District Attorney points out in a footnote to her return, the data analyzed in the Carney report does not appear to cover the years during which Terrell was prosecuted and sentenced. And the Skelton report is arguably overinclusive, analyzing data for defendants sentenced from 1977 to 2021. In our view, these circumstances should be addressed at a later stage of the litigation: at this stage, the reports in combination suffice to support a plausible allegation that the disparities they reflect existed at the time Terrell was prosecuted and sentenced. (See McDaniel, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 244 [“challenges to the ‘methodologies used in the data and statistics’ or arguments regarding ‘overbreadth’ are” generally more “appropriately addressed at later stages ‘when the burden is higher’ ”].) 16 We again emphasize the “extremely low” and “minimal” showing required at this juncture, and express no opinion as to whether Terrell’s allegations would satisfy a prima facie showing of a violation of section 745 on any of the theories he alleges. The Racial Justice Act will impose “escalating evidentiary burdens” as his petition proceeds (Gonzales, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 61)—but Terrell is entitled to the assistance of counsel in attempting to meet them. E. Counsel May Amend Terrell’s Petition and Motion for Discovery When the trial court appoints counsel for Terrell, counsel may amend Terrell’s petition and file a new or amended motion for discovery. (§ 1473, subds. (e)(2), (5).) Hence, as a changed approach to the case could impact the good cause analysis for discovery, and because trial courts are better positioned to weigh the relevant considerations than courts of appeal working with a limited record, we leave it to the trial court to address this issue in the first instance once counsel is appointed and ready to proceed. (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) III. DISPOSITION Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to (1) vacate its January 16, 2026 order denying Terrell’s petition under the Racial Justice Act, (2) appoint counsel to assist Terrell with his claims, (3) conduct a new hearing on Terrell’s discovery motion or amended discovery motion, and (4) conduct any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 17 _________________________ SMILEY, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ HUMES, P. J. _________________________ BANKE, J. Terrell v. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco / A175811 18 Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court Trial Judge: Hon. Teresa M. Caffese Counsel: Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Chloe Dominique Smith and Nisha Kashyap for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Brooke Jenkins, District Attorney, Maria Shih, Kathleen McBride and Peter Cownan, Assistant District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest. 19