Terrell v. Super. Ct.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA175811
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CLIFTON TERRELL,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN A175811
FRANCISCO,
(San Francisco City and County
Respondent;
Super. Ct. No. 2019001)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Real Party in Interest.
Clifton Terrell filed a petition in the superior court for appointment of
counsel and discovery to aid him in seeking a writ of habeas corpus under the
California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1 (the Racial
Justice Act); Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)), 1 alleging a special circumstance
finding of murder during an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) was
sought and imposed against him on the basis of race. (§ 1473, subd. (e).) The
trial court denied Terrell’s petition in both respects. Terrell then filed a
petition for writ of mandate in this court and we issued an order to show
cause.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
In denying Terrell’s petition, the trial court concentrated on perceived
imprecisions in two disparity reports the petition relied on, focusing in
particular on ambiguities that the petition’s allegations dispelled. In doing
so, the court failed to heed the Legislature’s recent admonition that the
Racial Justice Act’s “threshold to secure counsel is extremely low” and
“should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.” (Stats. 2025,
ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).)
We grant the petition before us and issue a writ of mandate directing
the trial court to vacate its order denying Terrell’s habeas petition, appoint
counsel for Terrell, and conduct a new hearing to consider such discovery as
his new counsel elects to pursue.
I. BACKGROUND
Early one morning in 2001, A.S. and Hunter McPherson were walking
home from a friend’s house when Terrell pointed a gun at each of them and
tried to rob them. (People v. Terrell (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375.) A.S.
gave Terrell her purse, but McPherson refused to hand over his wallet.
(Ibid.) Terrell shot McPherson, who died in the hospital a few hours later.
(Ibid.)
In 2005, a jury found Terrell guilty of McPherson’s murder (§ 187) and
found true a special circumstance allegation of murder during an attempted
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), as well as an allegation that Terrell
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). (People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1373, 1379.) The
jury also found Terrell guilty of robbery of A.S. (§ 212.5, subd. (c)) and
attempted robbery of McPherson (§§ 664/212.5, subd. (c)) and found
allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of both
crimes to be true (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). (People v. Terrell, at pp. 1373, 1379.)
2
At trial, Terrell testified that “[h]is mother is ‘Mexican and Indian,’ and his
father is Black.” (Id. at p. 1378.) While the record does not reflect
McPherson’s race, we may infer from Terrell’s allegations that he was White,
which the District Attorney confirms.
For McPherson’s murder, the trial court sentenced Terrell to life
without the possibility of parole and imposed a consecutive term of 25 years
to life for the allegation of personal use of a firearm resulting in death.
(People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379.) The court imposed a
concurrent term for the robbery of A.S. and stayed sentencing as to the
attempted robbery of McPherson. (Ibid.) Terrell appealed and we upheld his
conviction. (Id. at p. 1373.)
In 2025, Terrell filed a petition in the superior court to “challenge his
felony-murder special circumstances allegation found true under [section]
190.2(a)(17).” The petition claimed that “statistical evidence for charging and
conviction rates in San Francisco County under . . . § 190.2(a) show
significant racial disparities” establishing that his “conviction was sought and
obtained on the basis of race under . . . § 745(a)(3) or § 745(a)(4)” of the Racial
Justice Act. Specifically, Terrell alleged that Black people constitute 53
percent of those sentenced to life without parole in San Francisco and receive
that sentence at 16.8 times the rate of White people, as demonstrated by a
report attached as an exhibit to his petition (the Skelton report). Citing a
second exhibit (the Carney report), Terrell further alleged that “in felony-
murder prosecutions in San Francisco from 2011-2021[,]” a Black defendant
was “more than three times more likely to be charged with [a] special
circumstances allegation” when the victim of his or her crime was White.
Terrell alleged that both of the San Francisco-specific disparities he
identified “are consistent with statewide racial disparities in the number of
3
Black people serving [life without parole] sentences and the disproportionate
number of people serving [such] sentences when” their crime’s victim was
White.
The District Attorney filed an informal response to Terrell’s petition,
and Terrell submitted an informal reply. In an order filed in January 2026,2
the trial court denied Terrell’s petition in its entirety, finding that Terrell
failed to “ ‘plead[] a plausible allegation of a violation’ ” of the Racial Justice
Act supporting the appointment of counsel because “he allege[d] a violation
. . . in too conclusory and broad a manner.” The court reasoned that the
statistics Terrell cited were “too broad because they relate to San Francisco
County [life without parole] sentences in general [(the Skelton report)] and to
special circumstances in general (with no county specified) [(the Carney
report)], with no showing or allegation regarding Petitioner’s specific offense
and conduct.” Based on similar reasoning, the court also found Terrell had
failed to establish good cause for discovery by “ ‘advanc[ing] a plausible
factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial
Justice Act “could or might have occurred” in his case.’ ” The court continued
to emphasize that the Carney report did not itself indicate that the data it
addressed was specific to San Francisco or “isolate the particular special
circumstance allegation charged in [Terrell]’s case.”
2 On the same date that the trial court issued its ruling, Terrell filed an
“[a]mendment” to his petition consisting of a declaration by an attorney who
supervised the compilation of the data analyzed in the Carney report.
(Boldface omitted.) The attorney confirmed that the data was from San
Francisco. Several days later, Terrell filed a second “[a]mendment” setting
forth argument about the opinion in People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 707. (Boldface omitted.) It is unclear whether the trial
court ever reviewed these documents. Since they are immaterial to our
disposition, we need not address them any further.
4
II. DISCUSSION
A. Governing Legal Principles
1. The Goals and Structure of the Racial Justice Act
The Legislature passed the Racial Justice Act with bold and
unequivocal aims: “ ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice
system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining
convictions or in sentencing.’ (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)” (People v.
Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 944–945 (Wilson); see also Stats. 2025, ch. 721,
§ 1, subd. (f) [finding and declaring that the Racial Justice Act should be
interpreted in light of the “bold, concerted, and ongoing efforts” required to
correct racial bias in the criminal legal system].) To those ends, the statute
prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or
seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) “[F]our numbered [paragraphs or]
subparts within section 745, subdivision (a) . . . describe different means of
proving that the state exercised its criminal sanctions power” in violation of
this proscription. (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 163
(Young).)
The statute enshrines a “broad scheme, which covers every stage of the
prosecutorial process—from investigation through charging, trial, conviction,
and sentencing . . . .” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) It responds
to “direct evidence of discriminatory intent (i.e., an exhibition of ‘bias or
animus’ or use of ‘racially discriminatory language’ (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(2))[)]”
or “proof of racial bias against a group of which defendant is a member based
on harsher treatment of his group vis-à-vis others of a different race (§ 745,
subd. (a)(3)–(4)).” (Id. at pp. 163–164.) As relevant here, a violation may be
established where “[t]he defendant was charged or convicted of a more
5
serious offense than defendants of other races” who “engaged in similar
conduct and are similarly situated, and the . . . prosecution more frequently
sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who
share the defendant’s race” in the relevant county. (§ 745, subd. (a)(3).) A
violation is also established where the defendant received a longer or more
severe sentence than “similarly situated individuals convicted of the same
offense” by nature of their race (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A)) or the race of their
victim (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B)), again within the relevant county.
Among other changes, the Legislature “amended section 1473, which
identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a
subdivision governing the litigation of” claims under the Racial Justice Act.
(Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 945.) The new subdivision authorizes a
habeas petition “after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a
criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation
of subdivision (a) of Section 745 . . . .” (§ 1473, subd. (e).) It provides for the
appointment of counsel to indigent petitioners where “either the petition
pleads a plausible allegation” of such a violation “or the State Public
Defender requests counsel be appointed.” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5).) “Newly
appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment.”
(Ibid.) A petitioner or petitioner’s counsel also may file a motion for discovery
under section 745, subdivision (d), “in preparation to file a petition” or in
connection with one that is pending. (§ 1473, subd. (e)(2).) If a habeas
petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Id.,
subd. (e)(7)(B).) If the court finds a violation, it must impose one or more of
the statutory remedies. (Id., subd. (e)(8).)
6
As multiple courts have observed, the Racial Justice Act “contemplates
escalating evidentiary burdens on a defendant seeking relief at the various
stages of the process.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th
Supp. 36, 61 (Gonzales); see also McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 33, 44 (McIntosh) [distinguishing “separate and distinct
inquiries” associated with a request to obtain appointed counsel and a
request for an order to show cause]; Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160–
161.) The burden to obtain counsel is merely to plead a plausible allegation
of a violation. (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5).) “The burden at the discovery stage is a
good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the
burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of [a] . . . violation by
a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gonzales, at p. 61.) In analyzing the
statute, it is important to bear in mind that the higher showings required at
later stages “inform[] what is required”—and what is not required—“for the
lesser showing[s]” that warrant discovery and the appointment of counsel.
(Id. at p. 41)
2. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation
We review purely legal issues “ ‘such as the proper interpretation and
application of a statute . . . de novo.’ ” (In re Lynex (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
756, 766 (Lynex).) The same standard applies to our review of the sufficiency
of a pleading in a special criminal proceeding. (See People v. Perlas (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 826, 831–832 [petition to revoke parole]; see also Harmon v.
Superior Court (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1236, 1249 [Racial Justice Act habeas
petition is a special proceeding].)
In interpreting a statute, our central task “ ‘ “is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning,” ’ ”
7
which we generally must follow “ ‘ “unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, [we] may
consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608,
616–617.) “ ‘ “[W]e consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to
every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 617.) In applying these principles to the
Racial Justice Act, we give “considerable weight” to the Legislature’s detailed
uncodified findings and statements of intent, given their specificity and
because they were “voted upon by the entire legislative body, enrolled and
signed by the Governor . . . .” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)
B. Analysis
The District Attorney contends that Terrell is not entitled to appointed
counsel or discovery because his allegations do not address “individuals who
have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated . . . .” She
maintains that it does not suffice to allege a “disparity in charging rates
based on the victim’s race[,]” as reflected in the Carney report, because the
statute defines as violations charging disparities based on the defendant’s
race and sentencing disparities based on the victim’s race, but not charging
disparities based on the victim’s race. She also deems inadequate alleged
racial disparities in the proportions of individuals serving life without parole
sentences, as reflected in the Skelton report, absent details about the specific
“crimes for which these individuals were convicted” and “statistical, case
8
specific, or” other facts that show the “county population [is] the proper
baseline” for this analysis.
As we will explain, the District Attorney’s arguments are better
addressed to later stages of this litigation. Taken together, Terrell’s
allegations plead a plausible violation of the Racial Justice Act entitling him
to appointed counsel. With counsel’s assistance and the benefit of discovery
that counsel obtains, Terrell will face higher burdens as the matter proceeds. 3
1. The Showing Required for Appointment of Counsel
As our discussion in section II(A)(1) reflects, for indigent defendants
who seek appointed counsel, section 1473, subdivision (e) requires at least
“two separate and distinct inquiries . . . during the informal pleading stage of
habeas corpus proceedings[,]” (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44):
first, whether the defendant is entitled to counsel, and last, after any
requests for discovery and to amend the petition are resolved, whether the
defendant is entitled to an order to show cause (ibid.). Although both
“require an assessment of the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court’s review
. . . before deciding whether to appoint counsel is not identical to its [prima
facie] review before deciding whether to issue an [order to show cause].”
(Ibid.) “With clear language,” the statute “limits the inquiry before the
3 We deny Terrell’s request for judicial notice of the Attorney General’s
response to the petition for writ of mandate filed in Mooring v. Superior
Court (No. A175785), which the District Attorney opposes, and we likewise
deny the District Attorney’s alternative request that we take judicial notice of
all filings in that case. Our colleagues’ unpublished order in that case has no
precedential value and should not be relied on (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1115(a)), and “the Attorney General’s position . . . in a different case is
not relevant to our decision.” (Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1, 23, fn. 12.)
9
appointment of counsel to an assessment of the facial sufficiency” of the
“allegations in the petition” to plausibly allege a violation. (Id. at pp. 44–45.) 4
The Legislature made this even clearer when it amended section 1473,
subdivision (e) effective January 1, 2026, “emphasiz[ing] the ‘extremely low’
showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel.” (Lynex, supra,
118 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) The Legislature found and declared that despite
this “extremely low” bar, “courts have denied counsel to litigants raising
[Racial Justice Act] claims far more than they have appointed counsel.”
(Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).) Accordingly, “[t]he Legislature
reaffirm[ed] that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not
require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by [McIntosh], and should be
construed as a minimal pleading requirement.” (Ibid.) Alongside these
findings and declarations, the Legislature amended the statute, which had
previously required a petitioner to “allege[] facts that would establish a
violation” of the Racial Justice Act in order to obtain appointed counsel
(§ 1473, former subd. (e), added by Stats. 2024, ch. 495, § 8), to instead
require a petitioner to “plead[] a plausible allegation of a violation” (§ 1473,
subd. (e)(5)).
4 McIntosh analyzed statutory language superseded by the
amendments that govern our case, which required a petitioner to “ ‘allege[]
facts that would establish a violation’ ” of the statute to obtain appointed
counsel. (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) It contrasted this
standard with the higher showing required to establish a prima facie
showing, which the statute continues to define as the production of “facts
that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of
subdivision (a) occurred[,]” meaning “more than a mere possibility, but less
than a standard of more likely than not.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(2), italics added;
see McIntosh, at p. 44.)
10
Lynex deemed this new language ambiguous, and we agree. 5 (Lynex,
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 770.) Given the Legislature’s finding that courts
were too frequently denying requests for counsel based on what was intended
to be an “extremely low” and “minimal” standard, we conclude that the
current standard for appointment of counsel is no more stringent than the old
one—and is to some degree more lenient. (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1, subd. (b).)
With that understanding, we hold that a petition is not required to
allege facts that would suffice to prove or allege a prima facie violation under
a particular paragraph of the Racial Justice Act, but need only set forth
allegations establishing a “plausible” theory that the state sought, obtained,
or imposed a conviction or sentence on the basis of race in “violation of
subdivision (a) of Section 745 . . . .” (§ 1473, subd. (e)(5); Lynex, supra,
118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 774–776 [the Racial Justice Act standard for
appointment of counsel is lower than a prima facie showing]; cf. McDaniel,
5 The District Attorney’s position that the new standard is
unambiguous and does not require consideration of the uncodified findings
and statements of intent is hard to reconcile with her characterization of the
standard as “novel” and her failure to offer a concise explanation of what it
means. She attempts to define the standard by interpreting case authority
concerning Racial Justice Act discovery, but that authority supports a lenient
reading of the standard and emphasizes the Legislature’s statements of
intent. (See, e.g., McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228,
247 (McDaniel) [“imperfect data should not automatically be deemed
insufficient to trigger” discovery, “particularly in light of the Legislature’s
broad intent to combat racial bias. (Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) § 2(i) [‘racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is
intolerable’][)].”].) The District Attorney also relies on California and federal
case authorities addressing statistical claims of discrimination under several
other statutes. While the principles discussed in these opinions may be
relevant to later stages of Racial Justice Act litigation, we do not find these
authorities pertinent to an understanding of the minimal allegations needed
to secure appointed counsel.
11
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 241 [good cause for discovery under the Racial
Justice Act is established with “ ‘a plausible factual foundation, based on
specific facts, that a violation . . . could or might have occurred’ ”].) A direct
fit between the allegations and evidence that would show a violation of a
specific paragraph—or even a prima facie, substantial likelihood of a
violation—is not required at this juncture. (See Young, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [Racial Justice Act “defendants may pursue different
theories supported by different kinds of proof[,]” and evidence supporting “a
theory of violation under one [paragraph] may be corroborative of the
evidence supporting another theory of violation under a different
[paragraph]”].) As in the discovery context, determinations concerning
eligibility for court-appointed counsel consider the numbered paragraphs not
as isolated violations, but as pathways that “ ‘[might] work in tandem’ ” to
collectively reveal “ ‘that the state exercised its criminal sanctions power “on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” in violation of section 745,
subdivision (a).’ ” (Gonzales, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. at pp. 60–61.)
Viewed this way, a facially plausible Racial Justice Act allegation need
not “cognizably constitute a violation of at least one of the available
[paragraphs of section 745, subdivision (a)] in its entirety[,]” as the District
Attorney argues. To so hold would disturb the statute’s escalating
evidentiary burdens by improperly elevating the standard to obtain counsel.
It would also unreasonably demand that self-represented litigants produce
the missing legal analyses that necessitate their requests for counsel in the
first instance, a result similar to the “catch-22” recognized by Young, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at page 162, in the discovery context. “Preventing a
defendant from obtaining information about charging decisions without first
presenting that same evidence in a discovery motion is the type of a catch-22
12
the [Racial Justice] Act was designed to eliminate.” (Ibid.) This reasoning
applies equally, if not more so, to requests for counsel to assist in presenting
the merits of a Racial Justice Act claim. 6
People v. Jimenez (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 1104 (Jimenez), a recent
opinion by the Sixth Appellate District, drew the line between plausible
allegations and prima facie evidence of a violation. Jimenez held that the
defendant did not make a prima facie showing of a disparity in life without
parole charging under section 745, subdivision (a)(3), by submitting two types
of evidence. First, the defendant submitted evidence of a disparity in the
populations of young adult Latinx versus White individuals serving such
sentences relative to their shares of the general population in Santa Clara
County, but the court of appeal held only the population “charged with or
convicted of murder” was similarly situated for purposes of the prima facie
analysis. (Id. at p. 1117; see also id. at pp. 1118–1122.) Next, the defendant
identified “discrete occurrences of less serious outcomes for White murder
defendants,” but the court of appeal held this did not show a systematic
disparity absent a “complementary sample” of White murder defendants who
received the more serious outcome and “corresponding samples for Latinx
defendants.” (Id. at p. 1117; see also id. at pp. 1122, 1124–1125.) Despite
these deficiencies in the defendant’s prima facie showing, the court of appeal
concluded that he had “pleaded a ‘plausible allegation’ of [a Racial Justice
Act] violation sufficient to entitle him to appointment of [habeas] counsel
. . . .” (Id. at p. 1130.) The identification of individual comparator White
6 This interpretation also honors section 1473, subdivision (e), which
authorizes newly appointed counsel to request relevant evidence and amend
petitions that were filed before their appointment. These provisions entitle
the initial Racial Justice Act pleadings of self-represented litigants to fine-
tuning after legal representation is obtained. (§ 1473, subds. (e)(2), (5).)
13
murder defendants, coupled with the disparity in young adult Latinx
individuals serving life without parole sentences relative to their share of the
general county-level population, was enough to entitle the defendant to
counsel.
We turn to the allegations at issue here.
C. Terrell Alleged That the Data Underlying the Carney Report
Was From San Francisco and Concerned Felony Murder
We first address the trial court’s repeated emphasis on asserted
imprecisions in the Carney report that were clarified by allegations in
Terrell’s petition. The court’s written order indicated that the Carney report
gave “no indication as to what county” its statistics applied to, and that it
wasn’t “county-specific.” It further characterized the report as addressed to
“special circumstances in general.” Terrell’s petition, however, explained that
the report’s statistics involved “disproportionate charging” in “felony-murder
prosecutions in San Francisco[.]”
The trial court’s evaluation of the Carney report was improper given
the “clear” limitation of the entitlement to counsel inquiry “to an assessment
of the facial sufficiency of the . . . petition . . . .” (McIntosh, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 44–45.) Because Terrell’s petition alleged that the
Carney report data was from San Francisco, the court was bound to accept
his allegation at this early juncture (at least insofar as nothing in the report
contradicted it). 7 Likewise, the petition alleged that the Carney report
concerned felony murder prosecutions—which is consistent with the report’s
description of the data it analyzed as addressing “felony murder” and
“robbery murder” charging. The court erred by finding Terrell had to do more
7 In her return, the District Attorney concedes that the data was from
San Francisco.
14
to support these allegations. At this point in the proceedings, the court must
accept the petitioner’s allegations on their face.
D. Terrell Is Entitled to Counsel
Considering the Carney and Skelton reports in light of the allegations
in Terrell’s petition as we must, we conclude that Terrell pleaded a plausible
allegation of a violation of the Racial Justice Act entitling him to appointed
counsel. 8 He does so on two theories, which may develop into alternative or
consistent approaches to his case: one based on his victim’s race and one
based on his own race.
Citing the Carney report, which professes to address “felony . . . and
robbery murder eligible cases[,]” Terrell alleges that in San Francisco, Black
defendants with White victims are over three times more likely to be charged
with felony or robbery murder than Black defendants with non-White
victims. When it comes to sentencing, the Racial Justice Act expressly
defines such a disparity based on the victim’s race as a violation. (§ 745,
subd. (a)(4)(B).) While it is true that the Carney report addresses charging
rather than sentencing disparities among Black defendants with victims of
different races, it is certainly plausible that such disparities would carry
through to sentencing.9 This is what Terrell alleges by citing the Carney
8 To the extent that People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2026)
124 Cal.App.5th 10—which addresses a defendant’s entitlement to discovery
under the Racial Justice Act—conflicts with our decision here, we respectfully
disagree with its analysis.
9 The statute addresses circumstances where the defendant received a
longer or more severe “sentence” than similarly situated individuals
“convicted of the same offense.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(B).) In our view, this
language encompasses circumstances, like those alleged here, where a
defendant receives a more severe “sentence” of life without parole for the
substantive offense of murder. This is consistent with legislative history
materials that describe “life without parole” as the type of “longer or more
15
report as support for an “increased likelihood of being convicted and
sentenced to a special circumstances allegation.” Such a disparity remains a
violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(B) even though the Carney report
also appears to show that “non-Black” defendants with White victims are
charged with felony or robbery murder at an even higher rate than Black
defendants, arguably undermining any allegation of a violation of subdivision
(a)(4)(A) of section 745.
But, notably, the Carney report does not specify what percentage of
“non-Black” defendants reflected in the data were White: the group may be
dominated by other non-White defendants charged at rates similar to Black
defendants, so that a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(A) remains
plausible as well. In those circumstances, Terrell’s allegations based on the
Carney report would be consistent with and perhaps supportive of his
allegation, based on the Skelton report, that in San Francisco Black
defendants are sentenced to life without parole at 16.8 times the rate of
White defendants relative to their representation in the general population,
and his allegation that the disparities reflected in both reports are consistent
with statewide racial disparities. 10
severe sentence[]” the statute was intended to address. (See, e.g., Assem. Ash
Kalra, Fact Sheet on Assem. Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).)
10 As the District Attorney points out in a footnote to her return, the
data analyzed in the Carney report does not appear to cover the years during
which Terrell was prosecuted and sentenced. And the Skelton report is
arguably overinclusive, analyzing data for defendants sentenced from 1977 to
2021. In our view, these circumstances should be addressed at a later stage
of the litigation: at this stage, the reports in combination suffice to support a
plausible allegation that the disparities they reflect existed at the time
Terrell was prosecuted and sentenced. (See McDaniel, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 244 [“challenges to the ‘methodologies used in the data
and statistics’ or arguments regarding ‘overbreadth’ are” generally more
“appropriately addressed at later stages ‘when the burden is higher’ ”].)
16
We again emphasize the “extremely low” and “minimal” showing
required at this juncture, and express no opinion as to whether Terrell’s
allegations would satisfy a prima facie showing of a violation of section 745
on any of the theories he alleges. The Racial Justice Act will impose
“escalating evidentiary burdens” as his petition proceeds (Gonzales, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 61)—but Terrell is entitled to the assistance of
counsel in attempting to meet them.
E. Counsel May Amend Terrell’s Petition and Motion for Discovery
When the trial court appoints counsel for Terrell, counsel may amend
Terrell’s petition and file a new or amended motion for discovery. (§ 1473,
subds. (e)(2), (5).) Hence, as a changed approach to the case could impact the
good cause analysis for discovery, and because trial courts are better
positioned to weigh the relevant considerations than courts of appeal working
with a limited record, we leave it to the trial court to address this issue in the
first instance once counsel is appointed and ready to proceed. (Young, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
III. DISPOSITION
Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to (1) vacate its
January 16, 2026 order denying Terrell’s petition under the Racial Justice
Act, (2) appoint counsel to assist Terrell with his claims, (3) conduct a new
hearing on Terrell’s discovery motion or amended discovery motion, and
(4) conduct any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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_________________________
SMILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
BANKE, J.
Terrell v. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco /
A175811
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Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Teresa M. Caffese
Counsel:
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Chloe
Dominique Smith and Nisha Kashyap for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Brooke Jenkins, District Attorney, Maria Shih, Kathleen McBride and Peter
Cownan, Assistant District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
19