Marriage of Ramirez and Cervantes CA5

Filed 10/23/26 Marriage of Ramirez and Cervantes CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of NATOSHA RAMIREZ and ROBERT CERVANTES. NATOSHA RAMIREZ, F089184 Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 21CEFL01955) v. OPINION ROBERT CERVANTES, Respondent. THE COURT* APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jennifer Hamilton, Judge. Central California Legal Services, Inc., and Cheri-Lynn Wortham for Appellant. Tipton Legal and Samantha H. Williamson for Respondent. -ooOoo- * Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and Sandhu, J.  Natosha Ramirez obtained a three-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her then husband Robert Cervantes in September 2021, which protected herself and the couple’s two children. Ramirez sought to renew the DVRO in July 2024. After a hearing, the trial court denied her request to renew the DVRO, finding that she did not establish an objectively reasonable fear of future abuse by Cervantes. On appeal, Ramirez argues the trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in evaluating her renewal request. We agree with Ramirez and reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider its decision consistent with the legal standard. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Ramirez and Cervantes were married from October 2016 to May 2021. They have two children together, who were one year old and four months old at the outset of this case. On May 17, 2021, Ramirez filed for a domestic violence restraining order against Cervantes alleging physical and emotional abuse of herself and the children and seeking protection for all of them. Ramierz also sought a child custody and visitation order, requesting that the children’s visits with Cervantes be supervised. On September 17, 2021, the parties stipulated to a three-year domestic violence restraining order protecting Ramirez and the children. The parties further agreed Ramirez would have sole legal and physical custody of the children and Cervantes would have agency-supervised visits. Cervantes was ordered to complete a 52-week batterer intervention program and a parenting program and participate in individual counseling. The DVRO contained personal conduct orders that prohibited Cervantes from, among other things, keeping Ramirez and the children under surveillance or blocking their movements, and required Cervantes to stay at least 100 yards away from Ramirez and the children, except for brief and peaceful contact with Ramirez and peaceful contact with the children as required for court-ordered visitation. 2. The July 2024 Child Custody and Visitation Order On July 10, 2024, a family court hearing was held concerning child custody and visitation.1 According to the minute order of the hearing, the parties participated in a mediation and were able to reach a partial agreement. Ramirez voiced her concerns to the family court regarding the children while in Cervantes’s care. While the family court stated it heard her concerns, it found it was in the children’s best interest to have significant contact with each parent. The court found Cervantes rebutted the Family Code section 30442 presumption and adopted the parties’ partial agreement regarding child custody and visitation while making orders in the areas of disagreement. The order on child custody and parenting time was filed the same day. The order granted Ramirez sole physical custody of the children, with the children residing with Cervantes every other weekend and one night per week. Exchange of the children was ordered to occur at the police station. Cervantes was ordered to enroll in a basic co- parenting program for separated parents, and the parents were ordered to enroll in an on- line application program to assist in communication and co-parenting.3 1 The hearing was held before the Honorable Steven M. Crass. 2 Family Code section 3044, subdivision (a) establishes “a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child, pursuant to Sections 3011 and 3020. This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.” To rebut the presumption, the perpetrator of domestic violence must demonstrate that giving physical or legal custody of the child to the perpetrator is in the child’s best interest and the court must balance the factors enumerated in the statute. (§ 3044, subd. (b).) 3 On April 8, 2026, we issued an order granting Cervantes’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of the July 2024 minute order and the order on child custody and parenting, which he filed around the same time as his respondent’s brief. While we took judicial notice of the orders, we stated that nothing in the order constituted a determination on the relevance of the documents. In her reply brief, Ramirez argues we should not consider these orders because they were not before the trial court. The record shows, however, that the trial court took judicial notice of the documents at the hearing on the renewal request; therefore, they were before the trial court. While, as Ramirez 3. Rameriz’s Request to Renew the Restraining Order On July 31, 2024, Rameriz filed a request to renew the DVRO. Rameriz alleged that she was afraid or worried that Cervantes might abuse her in the future because there was no place to hide from him, as he had access to her workplace and he knew where she lived and what kind of car she drove. Rameriz further alleged Cervantes told her that if things did not change between them there would be a murder-suicide, and he choked her, publicly pushed her into walls, threw things at her face, and threw things at her while pregnant. Ramirez was afraid he would kill her because she got the restraining order and she had no reason to believe that he would not do so if the restraining order ended. Rameriz alleged Cervantes violated the restraining order on July 22, 2021, by driving directly at her while she was loading the children into the car following a visitation exchange. Rameriz claimed Cervantes would sit in his car and watch her pack the children up following visits and only left after they did. On the day of Cervantes’s first weekday visit with the children, Cervantes drove the same way home as Rameriz, even though she left before him. Rameriz asserted Cervantes violated the restraining order in this way two to five times, and similar violations occurred on July 24, 2021, October 22, 2021, May 9, 2022, and July 10, 2024. On August 16, 2024, Rameriz filed a declaration in which she asserted that she had multiple sclerosis and according to her neurologist, whose letter was attached to the declaration, she cannot be under extremely stressful conditions. Rameriz asserted that seeing Cervantes caused her extreme stress. Ramirez filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of her request to renew the restraining order. Ramirez argued the restraining order should be permanently points out, the correct way to make documents that were filed in the trial court part of the appellate record is by motion to augment rather than a request for judicial notice (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1013–1014), Ramirez did not oppose our taking judicial notice of the documents before we granted the request. 4. renewed because Cervantes physically and emotionally abused her and the children, he violated the restraining order several times, he continued to abuse her through “litigation abuse and the custody and visitation order,” and after visits with Cervantes, the children were returned to her with bruises, and they were unbathed and wearing dirty clothes. Ramirez further argued there was not a change of circumstances that warranted denial of her renewal request because: (1) the abuse was severe and included child abuse and physical and emotional abuse of Ramirez; (2) Ramirez had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder for which she was receiving treatment; (3) Cervantes violated the restraining order several times despite participating in various classes; and (4) he “continue[d] to use bullying tactics during court proceedings to get the results he desire[d].” Ramirez asserted her fear was reasonable and there was a future probability of abuse. Ramirez filed a supplemental declaration on October 31, 2024. Ramirez explained the emotional and physical abuse Cervantes inflicted on her and the children during their relationship. The physical abuse included hitting or pushing Ramirez without warning, throwing one of the children into his crib, dumping a baby bathtub full of water onto Ramirez and throwing the empty tub at her head, slapping and pushing Ramirez, choking Ramirez until she passed out, and muting their babies cries by covering the baby’s mouth or putting him on his stomach. The verbal abuse included calling Ramirez a “moron” and a “stupid bitch,” saying “you little fucker” to their child, and making “racial slurs about [her] skin color.” Ramirez explained in the declaration that she filed the original request for a DVRO after she escaped from Cervantes’s abuse with the help of advocates on a domestic violence hotline. Ramirez asserted that after the restraining order was issued, Cervantes violated it several times by driving by her and honking while she rode her bike, entering and exiting the wrong driveway at the visitation agency, and watching she and the children get on and off the bus. Ramirez stated that during the July 2024 custody and 5. visitation mediation she “was bullied into agreeing to the current custody order” because Cervantes took classes, even though the children were not safe with him. Ramirez asserted the children came home with bruises, were improperly dressed and dirty, and they were late. Ramirez was filing a request for order to modify the custody and visitation order, and a hearing was scheduled for January 13, 2025. Ramirez was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder related to the abuse she suffered, and she was attending therapy to manage the trauma. Ramirez requested a lifetime renewal of the restraining order due to the significant abuse she suffered and her fear that Cervantes would carry out his threat to kill her if she were not protected. The Hearing on Ramirez’s Renewal Request The hearing on the request to renew the DVRO was held on November 13, 2024, with both parties testifying.4 According to the minute order of the hearing, by agreement of counsel for the parties, the trial court took judicial notice of the July 10, 2024 custody and visitation order, as well as the family court’s findings as stated in the minute order of that hearing. During her testimony, Ramirez confirmed that everything in her renewal request and supplemental declaration was true and correct. She testified about the abuse she endured during the marriage, including being choked, pushed, hit, called names and racial slurs, and sexually assaulted. In addition, on several occasions Cervantes threatened to kill her and commit murder-suicide. Ramirez testified that she witnessed Cervantes abuse their children and he destroyed her property and put holes in the walls. Ramirez asserted that the abuse resulted in significant injuries, including bruises, lacerations, and 4 The hearing was not reported or electronically recorded. Ramirez prepared a proposed settled statement, which the trial court certified was an accurate summary of the testimony and other evidence relevant to Ramirez’s appeal and settled the statement. The testimony recited above is from the settled statement. 6. surgery on her wrist. She was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder related to the abuse and was in treatment. Ramirez testified that during the child custody and visitation mediation, Cervantes bullied her into agreeing to overnight visits with the children, but she did not want him to have those visits and did not believe the children were safe in his care. After his visits, the children often returned to her with bruises, and she filed police reports about the ongoing child abuse. Ramirez testified Cervantes violated the restraining order several times by honking at her, following her and the children, and watching them get on and off the city bus. She filed police reports about the restraining order violations. Ramirez was afraid of Cervantes and believed she would be in danger if the court denied her request to renew the restraining order. Ramirez entered into evidence transcripts of two videos, along with the videos themselves, and a text message. In “Video 1,” Cervantes admitted he was physically abusive to his wife three times; he choked her, pushed her “really hard in public,” and choked her again. He also admitted that he abused his son when he lost his temper and threw him into his crib. In “Video 2,” Cervantes admitted to his parents that he hit Ramirez when she was pregnant, threw the baby into his crib too roughly, threw the baby’s empty bathtub and hit Ramirez, choked her twice, pushed her against a wall, and could not let his anger go. His mother responded that he needed counseling; he said he was trying to get a counseling appointment, and he had to cancel two prior appointments. Cervantes admitted his conduct had “pretty negative mental consequences for” Ramirez. In the text message, Cervantes apologized for hitting Ramirez and said he was sorry if she felt he ignored what he did to her or he belittled or minimized how upsetting it was for her. Cervantes testified on direct examination that he completed the batterer’s intervention program, parenting class, and counseling. He testified he had not committed any acts of domestic violence while the restraining order was in effect, the domestic 7. violence occurred during the parties’ marriage, and they were no longer in a relationship. He denied honking at Ramirez, although he admitted he went out of the wrong exit at the visitation center, which he said was an error and not an intentional violation of the restraining order. Cervantes testified there were no inappropriate conversations on the parenting application that he and Ramirez used to communicate about the children. On cross-examination, Cervantes invoked his Fifth Amendment right when asked about the domestic violence alleged in Ramirez’s supplemental declaration.5 He admitted he was the individual in the two videos Ramirez entered into evidence. He also admitted to the domestic violence, including choking Ramirez, child abuse in her presence, pushing her, hitting her when she was pregnant, hitting her with the baby bath, and promising to attend counseling but failing to go. Ramirez’s attorney objected to Cervantes’s refusal to answer any questions about the domestic violence allegations in Ramirez’s supplemental declaration, arguing that he testified fully on direct examination but then “took the Fifth” when the questions were asked. According to the settled statement, the trial court denied the attorney’s request to strike Cervantes’s testimony and failed to make a negative inference from Cervantes “taking the Fifth.” The minute order of the hearing, however, stated that the court struck “any testimony occurring to the implementation of the request for a renewal of [the] restraining order.”6 Cervantes offered the following three exhibits into evidence, which the trial court received: (1) a December 28, 2022 certificate of completion of the batterer’s intervention 5 The minute order of the hearing stated that on cross-examination, Cervantes “wishe[d] to exercise his 5th amendment right to one of the questions” by Ramirez’s attorney. 6 On appeal, Ramirez acknowledges the minute order indicates the court struck Cervantes’s testimony “related to the implementation of the request for renewal of restraining order.” 8. program; (2) an April 13, 2023 certificate of completion of the parenting class; and (3) a letter from his counselor.7 The trial court announced its ruling from the bench. The minute order of the hearing stated the court heard the parties’ testimony and reviewed the court’s file and the exhibits submitted by the parties. The minute order contains the court’s findings. The court stated it did not find by a preponderance of the evidence that Ramirez entertained a “ ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse,” and the evidence did not demonstrate it was “more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” The court summarized Ramirez’s testimony, stating she testified that there was abuse during the marriage, including (1) child abuse, (2) physical abuse of her such as choking, slapping, grabbing, twisting her arms and wrists, and (3) emotional abuse, including racial slurs, threats of murder- suicide, and demeaning statements. The abuse during the marriage caused Ramirez to fear him, and she testified that Cervantes violated the restraining order. The trial court summarized Cervantes’s testimony as follows: (1) he completed a 52-week batterer’s intervention program and counseling; (2) he did not violate the restraining order, but rather accidentally went out the wrong exit, and he denied honking at Ramirez while she was on the bicycle; (3) he did not have any inappropriate communication with Ramirez on the parenting application; and (4) he did not commit an act of domestic violence during the restraining order period and the parties were no longer in a relationship. The trial court found a change of circumstances that warranted denial of the request to renew the restraining order and there was insufficient evidence to renew the order based on the following: (1) Cervantes had not engaged in abusive behavior since 2020; (2) he addressed the past abusive behavior; and (3) there had not been any issues 7 The exhibits are not in the appellate record. 9. concerning the exchange of the children or communication on the parenting application. Accordingly, the court terminated the restraining order.8 DISCUSSION Ramirez contends the trial court considered improper factors when it found there was insufficient evidence to renew the restraining order. She asserts that despite her undisputed testimony of the physical and emotional abuse she and the children suffered and of her fear of Cervantes and that she would be in danger if the trial court did not renew the DVRO, the trial court mistakenly believed it could not find she entertained a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. She argues the trial court improperly determined circumstances had changed because the parties were no longer in a relationship, Cervantes addressed the past abusive behavior by completing his court- ordered programs and counseling, and there had been no further incidents of abusive behavior. We agree that reversal is required because the trial court improperly weighed the evidence. A. Standard of Review “We generally review an order denying a request to renew a DVRO for abuse of discretion.” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 178 (Michael M.).) If it is necessary to review factual findings, we refrain from reweighing evidence and consider whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292, 319 [reviewing court prohibited from reweighing facts in assessing whether substantial evidence exists]; Navarro v. Cervera (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 229, 8 In the section of the settled statement that addresses the trial court’s findings, the statement stated the following findings were relevant to the appeal: (1) that Ramirez “had not met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the restraining order should be renewed because the parties were no longer being in a relationship;” (2) “there had been no abuse since the restraining order was issued;” (3) Cervantes “completed a batterer’s intervention program”; and (4) “the Court failed to make a negative inference based on [Cervantes] taking the Fifth.” 10. 238 [factual findings in DVRO renewal reviewed for substantial evidence]; M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145 [reviewing court declines to reweigh evidence in determining propriety of DVRO].) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner” ’ [citation] or ‘when its ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399.) Our Supreme Court has emphasized: “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) “But the question whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its discretion is a question of law requiring de novo review.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) “If the court’s decision to deny a renewal request is influenced by an erroneous understanding of the law, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law.” (Ibid.) “The trial court’s order ‘is presumed to be correct, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent. [Citation.] It is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.’ ” (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509.) B. Applicable Legal Framework The stated purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, §§ 6200–6460),9 is to “prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) 9 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 11.  As relevant here, the DVPA defines domestic violence as “abuse” perpetrated against “[a] spouse or former spouse,” and “[a] child of a party .…” (§ 6211, subds. (a) & (e).) The DVPA authorizes courts to issue restraining orders based on “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The DVPA defines the term “abuse” broadly. The definition includes causing or attempting to cause bodily injury; sexual assault; and placing a person in “reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(1)–(a)(3).) The definition also includes “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to [s]ection 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Section 6320 in turn authorizes courts to enjoin conduct including “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, … harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls, … destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly,” or “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) In addition, “ ‘disturbing the peace’ ” is defined as conduct that “destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) Thus, under the DVPA, courts may enjoin conduct that destroys a person’s calm and tranquility. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1498 [“former husband’s alleged conduct in destroying the mental or emotional calm of his former wife by accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential e-mails” would constitute abuse within the meaning of DVPA].) In short, the definition of abuse encompasses a wide range of conduct and is “not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) When a trial court has issued a DVRO after notice and hearing, it has broad authority to renew the DVRO. A DVRO may be renewed “either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since 12. the issuance of the original order.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).)10 Imminent danger of abuse is not required either. (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) Instead, to warrant renewal, the protected party must demonstrate “a reasonable apprehension that ‘abuse will occur at some time in the future if the protective order is allowed to expire.’ ” (Ibid.; Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 397 [a trial court should renew a protective order only if “ ‘it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a “reasonable apprehension” of future abuse’ ”].) There must be a showing that “ ‘ “it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension genuine and reasonable.” ’ ” (Navarro v. Cervera, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 237–238.) In evaluating whether there is a reasonable apprehension of future abuse, the trial court is to consider the “ ‘findings and facts’ ” on which the DVRO was based as well as “ ‘any significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order.’ ” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180, quoting Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290–1291.) Indeed, the evidence and findings on which the original DVRO was based “ ‘often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof’ ” to justify renewal of the DVRO. (Michael M., at p. 180.) Relevant to whether a significant change of circumstances exists is whether “ ‘the restrained and protected parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the order.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether 10 Section 6345, subdivision (a) provides that a DVRO shall have an initial duration not exceeding five years, but “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order…. The request for renewal may be brought at any time within the three months before the expiration of the orders.” 13. it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with job opportunities.’ ” (Ibid.) “A DVRO renewal may not be denied solely on the ground that no additional abuse has occurred since the issuance of the original DVRO.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.) “ ‘The key consideration for the court is not the type or timing of abuse, but whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future abuse.’ ” (Ibid.) When a renewal of a DVRO is sought, “the restrained party is not permitted ‘to challenge the truth of the evidence and findings underlying the initial order.’ ” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333.) Similarly, appellate courts are not permitted to review “issues that could have been raised in an appeal from the original restraining order.” (Malatka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1084.) C. Analysis Ramirez contends that because the physical and emotional abuse of herself and the children that supported issuance of the restraining order was severe, the prior violence alone affirms a reasonable fear of future abuse, and the trial court was required to renew the restraining order absent a significant change of circumstances. Ramirez argues that in finding circumstances had significantly changed such that Ramirez’s fear of future abuse was unreasonable, the trial court improperly relied on the absence of further abuse after the restraining order issued and Cervantes’s completion of the court-ordered counseling and programs. The trial court’s minute order states the applicable legal standard—whether the evidence demonstrated “it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” Under Ritchie, a protected party seeking renewal is not required to prove that future violence is more likely than not to occur; rather, the risk of future abuse need only be such that the party’s apprehension or fear is genuine and reasonable. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) 14.  While the trial court stated the correct legal standard, we agree with Ramirez that it did not give sufficient weight to the prior abuse and misapplied the factors it was required to weigh when determining whether there was a significant change of circumstances. The court recounted Ramirez’s testimony about the abuse, but it placed little weight on it. Rather, the court appeared to focus on whether there was recent abuse and found circumstances had changed based largely on the absence of domestic violence since the restraining order was issued, which is not required to renew the restraining order. (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 180, 181 [renewal of a DVRO “may not be denied solely on the ground that no additional abuse has occurred since the” original DVRO was issued; “a showing of recent abuse is not required to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of future abuse”]; § 6345, subd. (a).) The trial court’s narrow focus on the absence of domestic violence prevented it from exercising its discretion. (G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 427.) On the facts of this case, the effectiveness of the initial restraining order was “a good reason for seeking its renewal.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Ramirez sought the initial restraining order after suffering serious acts of physical abuse not only to herself but also to their children, as well as emotional abuse which, as stated in Ritchie, is often enough to provide the necessary proof. (Id. at p. 1291.) As Cervantes admitted, that abuse included choking and pushing Ramirez, abusing their children in Ramirez’s presence, hitting Ramirez when she was pregnant, and hitting Ramirez with an object. Ramirez further testified she was subjected to emotional abuse, including racial slurs, threats of murder-suicide, and demeaning statements.11 The abuse was so severe 11 Cervantes asserts that because the parties stipulated to the DVRO, a trial was never held, formal evidence was not introduced, and the trial court did not make specific findings. The fact that Cervantes stipulated to the entry of a DVRO, rather than Ramirez proving she was entitled to one, is irrelevant; in either event, the court must find prior abuse before it can issue a restraining order. (C.C. v. D.V. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 101, 110 [“[b]y stipulating to the issuance of a one-year [restraining order after hearing], the 15. that it caused Ramirez to suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder which required her to seek counseling. A person asking for renewal of a restraining order is not required to prove that the order has been ineffective. (G.G. v. G.S., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 426.) “A court order may change behavior, but that does not mean it has solved the problem. The underlying issue may remain, even if the order has been followed.” (Ibid.) The trial court seemed to believe that the underlying issue had been resolved because the parties were no longer in a relationship and Cervantes completed his court-ordered programs and counseling. The parties, however, shared children, which required continued contact, and there is nothing in the record to show circumstances had changed so significantly such that Cervantes had “moved on with [his life] so far that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has diminished.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) “The trial court must apply the Ritchie framework to determine whether a reasonable person, having experienced the abuse described above, would have a reasonable apprehension that the abusive behavior would resume after the order’s expiration.” (G.G. v. G.S., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 427.) Since we conclude the trial court did not exercise its discretion by applying the legal standards articulated in Ritchie and its progeny, we need not consider Ramirez’s arguments that the court abused its parties effectively agreed [that the party to be restrained] had committed an act of domestic violence and—having accepted their stipulation and issued the [order]—the court necessarily found likewise”]; accord, People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364 [noting that a no contest plea in a criminal case has the same effect as a guilty plea, despite it resting on the defendant’s admission].) Accepting Cervantes’s position would mean that no restraining order resting on a stipulation could be renewed and would provide a blueprint for precluding renewals, which would contravene the intent of permitting them in the trial court’s discretion. 16. discretion12 or erred when it failed to draw a negative inference from Cervantes’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right.13 DISPOSITION The order denying the request to renew the DVRO is reversed. The matter is remanded and the trial court is directed to hold a new hearing and reconsider the request for renewal consistent with the legal framework outlined above. Ramirez is awarded her costs on appeal. 12 The parties dispute whether the trial court found Cervantes did or did not violate the DVRO. There was conflicting evidence on this point, with Ramirez testifying that Cervantes violated the restraining order several times and Cervantes denying he intentionally violated the order. Cervantes asserts that his testimony at the hearing aligned with his testimony at the July 2024 child custody hearing, where the family court found he rebutted the section 3044 presumption. While we need not resolve the trial court’s findings on this point, we note that Cervantes’s rebuttal of the section 3044 presumption in the family law custody matter had no bearing on the issues in these proceedings to renew the DVRO as the issues in the two matters are “very different.” (In re Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 539 [rebuttal of section 3044 presumption concerns whether giving a parent sole or joint custody of the children is detrimental to their best interest, while renewal of a DVRO concerns whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future abuse; because the issues are different, issue preclusion does not apply].) 13 We note, however, that under Evidence Code section 913 “ ‘no inference may be drawn from an exercise of a privilege either on the issue of credibility or on any other issue…’ ”; therefore, a trier of fact may not make an adverse inference from a witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 131.) A defendant, however, may waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by voluntarily providing testimony in his own defense, but only on issues covered by his affirmative evidence. (Brown v. United States (1958) 356 U.S. 148, 154–155 [“the breath of [the defendant’s] waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination”].) 17.