Doe v. County of San Bernardino CA4/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketE085516
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 Doe v. County of San Bernardino CA4/2
See concurring opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085516
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2131751)
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Jeffrey Erickson,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Collins & Collins, Christie B. Swiss, Chandler A. Parker, Kristine T. Busch;
Miller Barondess and Nadia A. Sarkis for Defendant and Appellant.
Keane Law, Christopher J. Keane; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Andrew
N. Chang for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
As a child, plaintiff and respondent John Doe lived with his surrogate
grandparents. Plaintiff’s mother (Mother) would sometimes stay with them but would
also leave plaintiff in the care of his surrogate grandparents for significant periods of
time. While living with his surrogate grandparents, plaintiff befriended Jeremie Cox,
who was a neighbor working for the County of San Bernardino’s Sheriff’s Department as
a bailiff. Cox would invite plaintiff to his home to play video games, watch television,
and spend time together. In August 2014, plaintiff moved into Cox’s home with
Mother’s permission. When plaintiff was 21 years of age, he reported that Cox had
subjected him to repeated acts of sexual abuse. Cox was criminally charged with
committing numerous sexual offenses involving plaintiff, and Cox pled no contest to at
least 10 such offenses.
In 2021, plaintiff filed a civil suit against the County of San Bernardino (the
County) as well as other named defendants. As against the County, plaintiff alleged that
county employees, including Cox, failed to report Mother for suspected neglect as
required under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.
(CANRA)) and alleged the failure to file such a report was a substantial factor in causing
the subsequent sexual abuse perpetrated by Cox. The case was tried before a jury,
resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff against the County in excess of $27 million.
The County appeals, arguing (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict on the element of proximate causation; (2) there was insufficient evidence
2
to support a finding that specific county employees breached a duty of care; and (3) the
trial court erred by refusing several of the County’s requested jury instructions. Upon
review of the trial record, we agree with the County on the first issue. Because this
conclusion requires reversal of the judgment, it is unnecessary for us to reach the
remaining issues raised by the parties in this appeal.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Operative Complaint
At the time of trial, the operative pleading was the Second Amended Complaint
(SAC).1 According to the SAC, the County employed multiple individuals considered
mandated reporters under CANRA, including individuals who worked in the San
Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, as well as a social worker. The SAC alleges
that the identified employees of the County breached a mandatory duty under CANRA
when they failed to file a report of suspected child neglect.
Specifically, the SAC alleges that the identified employees of the County
reasonably should have known of the following facts that triggered a mandatory duty to
report Mother for child neglect: (1) Mother had abandoned plaintiff by leaving him in
the care of an unrelated adult; (2) Mother had neglected plaintiff by failing to provide
him with any financial support for food, clothing, or shelter and instead permitted other
adults such as Cox to make those provisions; (3) Mother had abandoned plaintiff by
1 The record shows that plaintiff filed prior pleadings naming additional
defendants in this action. However, the named defendants other than the County were
dismissed at the pleading stage, and the factual allegations of the complaint were
narrowed as the result of pleading challenges brought by the County.
3
leaving him in the care of others for unspecified periods of time to engage in suspected
drug use; (4) Mother had neglected plaintiff by failing to make proper arrangements for
his education; (5) Mother had neglected plaintiff by failing to provide adequate
supervision or permission for plaintiff to visit sheriff’s facilities or ride in sheriff’s
vehicles; (6) Mother had neglected plaintiff by permitting him to work for sheriff’s
deputies without proper compensation; and (7) Mother had neglected plaintiff by
permitting him to travel across state lines on vacations with Cox, an unrelated adult. The
SAC alleges that the failure of County employees to report Mother for suspected child
neglect was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff to be subject to sexual abuse
perpetrated by Cox.
4
B. Relevant Evidence at Trial2
1. Plaintiff’s Testimony
Plaintiff testified that he lived with his grandparents3 for most of his childhood
until 2014. His grandparents would provide him with food, clothing, school supplies, and
other necessities of life. Mother would sometimes live with them but would also
frequently leave plaintiff in the care of his grandparents for weeks or months at a time.
Sometime in 2012, plaintiff met Cox, who lived about a block away from
plaintiff’s grandparents. During this first encounter, Cox caught plaintiff vandalizing an
abandoned property and told plaintiff that he would issue a citation if plaintiff did not
take steps to fix the vandalism. Following this incident, Cox began inviting plaintiff to
his home to play video games. Plaintiff and Cox developed a friendship in which
2 Because we resolve this appeal based upon the County’s argument that there
was insufficient evidence to support the element of proximate cause, we summarize only
the evidence relevant to this disposition. Thus, our summary will omit the witness and
expert testimony directed only to the issue of the existence and breach of a mandatory
duty by the County. Further, under the applicable substantial evidence standard of
review, “we accept all evidence that supports the judgment” and “disregard contrary
evidence.” (Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co., Inc. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
284, 299; Burlesci v. Petersen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065 [We “must accept the
evidence most favorable to the plaintiff as true and disregard conflicting evidence.”].)
Thus, we omit the County’s competing expert testimony on the issue of causation from
our summary, as expert opinion unfavorable to plaintiff on the issue is disregarded under
our standard of review, and plaintiff does not assert on appeal that any testimony from
these experts provides evidence in support of his claim.
3 Plaintiff testified that Beverly and Richard Kreider “took me in when I was
little”; were “like my grandparents, but they’re not blood related”; and “were never
guardians or nothing like that.” However, multiple witnesses at trial including plaintiff
referred to the Kreiders merely as plaintiff’s grandparents. Thus, for clarity and
consistency, we will also refer to the Kreiders as plaintiff’s grandparents in this opinion,
despite the lack of actual blood relation.
5
plaintiff would visit Cox’s home to play video games or watch television; go on camping
trips and hike with Cox; accompany Cox to visit Cox’s family members; and go shooting
with Cox. Cox would arrange for plaintiff and plaintiff’s friends to participate in ride-
alongs in sheriff’s deputy patrol vehicles. And, on one occasion, Cox obtained
permission from Mother for plaintiff to house-sit for Cox.
Sometime in April 2014, plaintiff discovered an envelope addressed to Mother in
his grandparent’s mailbox. The envelope contained a card addressed to Mother with a
“little baggie of some sort of substance that [plaintiff] assumed was drugs.” Plaintiff
became upset and turned the substance over to Cox, who told plaintiff the substance
appeared to be methamphetamine. The following day, Cox told plaintiff that the
substance had tested positive for methamphetamine and that some of Cox’s friends at
work had found out about it.
Plaintiff confronted Mother about the drugs and ran away from his grandparents’
home. Plaintiff went to Cox’s backyard. When Cox returned home, he told plaintiff that
Mother had contacted him and asked him to find plaintiff. Cox permitted plaintiff to
spend the night at his home as a “healing period” to give time for plaintiff and Mother to
reconcile. After that initial night, there was a transition period in which plaintiff would
split his time between his grandparents’ home and Cox’s home. Eventually, in August
2014, plaintiff began living “full-time” at Cox’s home.
Sometime after he began living “full-time” in Cox’s home, plaintiff and Cox
engaged in a sexual act. Plaintiff repeatedly testified that there was never any sexual
6
activity with Cox prior to moving into Cox’s home.4 In response to this first incident,
plaintiff left Cox’s home and returned to live with his grandparents for a couple of days.
However, plaintiff went back to living in Cox’s home after Cox apologized and promised
it would never happen again. Despite Cox’s promise, plaintiff estimated that he was
sexually abused over a thousand times while living with Cox. Plaintiff also testified that
Cox sexually abused him while on a trip to Hawaii during this period of time.
Except for a six-month period in 2016, plaintiff lived in Cox’s home until
sometime in 2020. While living with Cox, plaintiff interacted with multiple other
employees working with the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department. These
interactions included riding along in sheriff patrol vehicles, attending community events,
attending social outings, doing chores together, and visiting the courthouse where Cox
worked. Plaintiff did not disclose any sexual abuse to any of these individuals but did tell
them that he was living with Cox due to Mother’s neglect.
4 The opening brief asserts that there was conflicting evidence regarding when
Cox’s sexual abuse of plaintiff began. However, our review of the record does not
disclose that any such evidence was ever presented to the jury at trial. The County cites
repeatedly to plaintiff’s responses to written discovery, which was marked as exhibit 92
at trial. However, the trial record does not indicate that these discovery responses were
ever admitted into evidence. Further, exhibit 92 was referenced only on a single occasion
during witness testimony, and the portion of the exhibit published to the jury did not
include the specific responses upon which the County now relies to assert the existence of
conflicting evidence. The County also briefly cites to the testimony of a law enforcement
officer who testified that plaintiff reported being sexually abused during four camping
trips. However, the testimony referenced only the fact that plaintiff reported being
abused during camping trips and the interview notes actually published to the jury did not
provide a date for those trips, stating only that they occurred when plaintiff “was between
the ages of 14 [years old] and 17 [years old].”
7
At some point in 2017, plaintiff reported Mother for welfare fraud. In response, a
social worker came to Cox’s home to interview plaintiff. Plaintiff disclosed to the social
worker that he lived with Cox, that Cox financially provided for him, and that he would
visit Mother and his grandparents a “couple times a week to keep in contact.” Mother
was charged with welfare fraud, plaintiff testified against her at trial, Mother was
convicted, and Mother was sentenced to prison as a result.
Plaintiff confirmed that he never disclosed the sexual abuse to anyone other than
anonymous online friends. He did not disclose the abuse because he was afraid that Cox
would kill himself; was afraid Cox might kill him; and because he did not think anyone
working at the Sheriff’s Department would believe him. Plaintiff testified that he would
have welcomed someone from child protective services coming to speak with him during
this time and asserted that he would have disclosed the sexual abuse if an investigator had
asked him about it. He eventually reported Cox’s sexual abuse sometime after he moved
out of Cox’s home.
2. Cox’s Testimony
Excerpts from Cox’s videotaped deposition were played for the jury in lieu of live
testimony. Cox admitted that he was sentenced to state prison based upon pleading no
contest to multiple charges that he committed sexual criminal offenses. Cox admitted
that he suspected plaintiff was neglected by Mother but does not recall ever telling his
suspicions to another employee of the County. Cox considered reporting Mother for
neglect but decided not to do so based upon his belief that the foster system was broken
and plaintiff would be worse off if social services became involved. He was aware that
8
plaintiff lived with his grandparents and that plaintiff’s grandparents provided plaintiff
with food and other necessities. He did not suspect plaintiff’s grandparents were
neglecting him and believed that the grandparents felt a responsibility to care for plaintiff.
Cox denied having any sexual contact with plaintiff until after the time plaintiff
moved into Cox’s home. Cox testified that he learned of Mother’s suspected drug abuse
prior to the time he had any sexual contact with plaintiff. Cox never disclosed to any
employee of the County that he had a sexual relationship with plaintiff.
According to Cox, he had obtained Mother’s consent for plaintiff to live in his
home, and Cox always kept mother informed of decisions related to plaintiff. He told
other employees of the County that plaintiff was living with him to avoid “a bad home
life” and always kept mother informed of decisions related to plaintiff.
3. Nicol Stolar-Peterson
Nicol Stolar-Peterson testified that she has a master’s degree in social work as
well as a doctorate in psychology, worked for more than 10 years for Riverside County as
a child protective services investigator and forensic interviewer, has been involved in
over 1000 child abuse investigations, and has trained hundreds of other social workers.
Stolar-Peterson explained that after a report of child abuse is made, a social
worker or specialist will utilize a “structured decision-making tool” to determine what
information should be requested from the reporting party, as well as to determine what
type of response is required. The tool typically helps determine whether a claim is
screened out, cross-reported to other agencies, or whether an urgent response is needed.
For claims that are not screened out, the report is reviewed by a supervisor who will
9
research any relevant social services history and then assign the matter to an appropriate
unit or social worker for case handling. The social worker will then attempt to conduct
an interview with the identified child away from any potential perpetrators of abuse as
well as interview the reporting party and other relevant persons. After these initial
interviews, the social worker may choose to continue investigating, work with the parents
to develop a safety plan, or take the child into protective custody. If taken into protective
custody, the child will be placed with relatives, nonrelated extended family members
(NREFM), or an approved foster home.
Stolar-Peterson testified that if Cox had reported neglect by Mother, the case
would likely have progressed through the initial screening, would have been accepted for
investigation, and a social worker would have responded within 10 days. She explained
that this was likely because the structured decision-making tool automatically requires
acceptance of reports made by law enforcement officers and usually flags them as urgent.
Stolar-Peterson opined that it was likely a social worker would have asked questions
about the relationship with Cox if plaintiff were living in Cox’s home. She also believed
that social workers would have recognized Cox’s behavior as indicative of grooming and
would have asked questions to prove the potential of sexual abuse.
Stolar-Peterson explained that the reasonable and probable outcome of any child
protective services intervention would have involved the development of a safety plan
with the input of the juvenile court. In her opinion, the safety plan likely would have
involved removal of plaintiff from Cox’s home and placement with plaintiff’s
grandparents, the grandparents’ adult daughter, or another foster care home. She opined
10
that, within a reasonable degree of probability, Cox’s home would have been determined
inappropriate for placement. And she explained this would primarily be due to the
presence of weapons in the home. She did not address whether any safety plan would
have addressed the risk of sexual abuse or prevented plaintiff from continuing to interact
with Cox unsupervised.
On cross-examination, Stolar-Peterson admitted that removal of a child is not
within the authority of a social worker alone but required intervention by the court in the
juvenile dependency system based upon the evidence presented to a judge. She conceded
that her opinion that plaintiff would have been removed was based solely on the
information provided to her, but that it is difficult to discern what Mother might have said
in any interview or what might have been discovered had an investigation actually been
conducted. She also admitted that, as a general matter, a parent’s homelessness, poverty,
or responsible delegation of the care of a child to another adult is not grounds for removal
or a finding of neglect. Finally, Stolar-Peterson admitted that, even if plaintiff had been
removed from Cox’s home, a relationship between plaintiff and Cox could have
continued.
4. Francesca LeRue
Francesca LeRue testified that she has master’s degrees in social work and public
administration, as well as more than 30 years of experience working with child protective
services. LeRue opined that if Cox had made a report of child neglect to the child abuse
hotline, the matter likely would have been accepted as a “neglect case.” Upon acceptance
of the case, a social worker would have conducted an interview of plaintiff, Mother, and
11
Cox. Based upon her training and experience, she believes the outcome of any
investigation would have resulted in removal of plaintiff from Cox’s home and that such
removal would have occurred within 10 days of any report. She did not offer an opinion
about what might have happened if a report had been made prior to plaintiff’s moving
into Cox’s home, and she did not offer an opinion about what protective measures a
hypothetical safety plan might have included other than precluding plaintiff from living
full time in Cox’s home.
5. Carole Jenny
Carole Jenny testified that she is a medical doctor and is board certified in
pediatrics with a specialty in child abuse pediatrics. Jenny explained that, in general,
children who run away from home are at heightened risk of exploitation, physical
problems, sexual exploitation, sexually transmitted diseases, health risks, behavioral
problems, violence, criminal exploitation, and mental health problems. She also opined
that children who are from fractured families, lack supportive parents, lack adult
supervision, are isolated, or have low self-esteem are at heightened risk of sexual
exploitation.
She believed plaintiff’s isolation, access to, and dependency on Cox likely played
a role in Cox’s sexual abuse. She explained that sexual abuse involving children is
“almost always” perpetrated by someone the child knows, such as a respected member of
the community or someone within the family. As examples, she listed “teachers,
coaches,” “[p]eople who are working in children’s charities, boy scout leaders, religious
advisors, priests, ministers.” The important factor is “people who have access to kids on
12
a regular basis and who, perhaps, would not be supervised when they’re around
children.”
Jenny also opined that plaintiff’s nondisclosure in this case was consistent with the
behaviors commonly associated with child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. She
did not believe someone in plaintiff’s position had the ability to consent to sexual activity
given plaintiff’s age, developmental level, and unbalanced relationship with Cox. She
also opined that plaintiff’s mental conditioning deprived him of the ability to consent,
even after he turned 18. In Jenny’s view, absent a trusted figure in plaintiff’s life,
plaintiff was unlikely to disclose the abuse and would not have the ability to extract
himself from the relationship with Cox.
On cross-examination, Jenny expressed the opinion that removal of plaintiff from
Cox’s home would have prevented the sexual abuse, but she did not explain how she
reached this conclusion. Instead, when pressed on the matter, Jenny disclaimed any
expertise on California mandated reporting procedures, the process for home placements,
or the provision of social services. She agreed that Cox’s behavior prior to any alleged
sexual abuse would fall within the definition of grooming behaviors. Finally, Jenny
admitted that it is very common for sexual abuse involving minors to go undetected and
very common for sexual abuse victims to delay or never disclose incidents of abuse.
C. Verdict, Posttrial Motions, and Judgment
The trial court denied the County’s motion for nonsuit. Prior to submission of the
cause to the jury, the County requested several instructions to (1) clarify that the scope of
any duty to file a mandated report under CANRA would not include the duty to file a
13
report after the Fifth Amendment right to self-incrimination attached; (2) clarify that the
scope of any mandatory duty to report under CANRA does not include a mandatory duty
to investigate and discover additional facts; and (3) clarify that, as a matter of law,
delegation of the care of a minor to another adult does not constitute neglect. The trial
court declined to give each of these requested instructions.5
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the County.
Specifically, the jury concluded that (1) Cox and three other employees of the County
breached their mandatory duty to report suspected neglect under CANRA; (2) the failure
of each of these individuals to report Mother’s neglect was a substantial factor in causing
plaintiff harm; and (3) plaintiff suffered $33 million in damages.6 The trial court denied
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Judgment was
entered against the County,7 and the County appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the County contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict on the element of proximate causation; (2) there was insufficient evidence
5 The County also filed a motion for directed verdict, but the record does not
indicate the trial court ruled on the motion.
6 When apportioning fault, the jury apportioned 50% of the fault to Cox in his
capacity as a mandated reporter, but only 15% of the fault to Cox in his personal capacity
for actually committing the sexual assaults.
7 Despite naming multiple individuals and requesting an apportionment of fault,
the judgment actually entered and the subject of this appeal names only the County as the
judgment debtor.
14
to support a finding that specific county employees breached a duty of care; and (3) the
trial court erred by refusing several of the County’s requested jury instructions. As we
explain, we agree with the County on the first issue and reverse the judgment on this
basis. As a result, it is unnecessary for us to reach the remaining issues raised in this
appeal.
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The tort liability of public entities and employees is generally governed by the
Government Claims Act. (Holman v. County of Butte (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 177, 192
(Holman); Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) The statutory scheme establishes a general rule that
public entities are immune from tort liability except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code,
§ 815, subd. (a).) However, one such statutory exception is found in Government Code
section 815.6, which provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty
imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of
injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its
failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity established that it exercised
reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” (Gov. Code, § 815.6; Holman, at p. 192.)
“As our Supreme Court has explained, Government Code section 815.6 has three
discrete requirements that must be met to impose public entity liability: (1) an enactment
must impose a mandatory duty; (2) the enactment must be meant to protect against the
kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a
proximate cause of the injury suffered.” (Holman, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 192; B.H.
v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179 (County of San Bernardino).)
15
The first two elements are not at issue in this appeal. “CANRA sets forth several
different reporting requirements once child abuse or neglect is suspected.” (County of
San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 178; Pen. Code, § 11166 et seq.) Under this
statutory scheme, “[c]ertain types of professionals known as ‘mandated reports’ [citation]
‘shall’ report to law enforcement agencies or county welfare departments any known or
suspected instance of child abuse or neglect.” (County of San Bernardino, at p. 178.)
And for purposes of this appeal, the parties do not dispute CANRA’s applicability or the
existence of a mandatory duty to report. Instead, the County challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at trial to establish the third element and, specifically, the
requirement of proximate cause.
“Proximate cause is often said to focus on two things: the ‘cause in fact’ of the
injury and ‘policy considerations.’ ” (Ortiz v. Daimler Truck North America LLC (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 608, 619 (Ortiz); State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015)
61 Cal.4th 339, 352 (State Hospitals) [The element of proximate cause itself “has two
aspects.”].) “A cause in fact is a necessary antecedent of an event…. Where concurrent
independent causes contribute to an injury, courts apply a substantial factor test for
determining cause in fact.” (Fisher v. Fisher (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 899, 914.) “The
second aspect of proximate cause ‘focuses on public policy considerations.’ ” (State
Hospitals, at p. 353; Fisher, at p. 914.) This second aspect is concerned “ ‘ “ ‘not with
the fact of causation, but with the various considerations of policy that limit an actor’s
responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.’ ” ’ ” (State Hospitals, at p. 353;
Ortiz, at p. 620.)
16
The question of whether a defendant’s act or omission “ ‘ “was a cause in fact of
plaintiff’s damage … is a factual question for the jury to resolve.” ’ ” (Huitt v. Southern
California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1596.) However, “the scope of
liability element of proximate cause presents an issue of law subject to de novo review
because it is primarily concerned with public policy.” (Fisher, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at
p. 915; Modisette v. Apple Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 136, 153-154; Jacoves v. United
Merchandising Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 88, 111.) Even then, the scope of liability
question must be decided based upon actual evidence presented in the case because
“[p]roximate cause rules apply in individual cases [citation] and ‘take into account the
particular context in which any act or injury occurred.’ ” (Novak v. Continental Tire
North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 196 (Novak).)
“ ‘When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply
the substantial evidence standard of review.’ ” (McDoniel v. Kavry Management, LLC
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, 965.) “ ‘We must “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolving all conflicts in its favor.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “[N]either conflicts in the evidence nor
‘ “the testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion … justif[ies] the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility
of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
17
B. Application
1. Public Policy Does Not Preclude a Finding of Proximate Causation
Initially, we address the County’s argument that “[p]roximate cause is absent as a
matter of law where the effective prevention of harm depends upon subsequent,
discretionary acts.” In making this argument, the County relies exclusively on statutory
and case authority instead of any reference to specific evidence in this case. Thus, as we
understand it, this argument is directed at the second aspect of proximate cause: that
public policy should limit the liability of the County in this case.8 On this point, we
agree with plaintiff that the failure to file a mandatory report under CANRA can be a
substantial factor in causing subsequent harm, despite the fact that such a report
necessarily triggers subsequent discretionary acts. In our view, the fact that subsequent
discretionary acts may be necessary to protect from the harm alleged is not a sufficient
public policy ground to preclude a finding of proximate cause.
By definition, a mandated report under CANRA will always be followed by
subsequent discretionary acts. Penal Code “[s]ection 11166 requires only that mandated
8 We also note that the County’s argument appears to conflate the issue of duty
with the public policy aspect of proximate causation. In asserting entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law on this basis, the County relies exclusively on statutory and
case authority without reference to any of the evidence or the facts specific to this case.
While “[t]he concepts of duty and proximate cause are each expressions of public policy
and courts have taken varying approaches in using one or the other concept to limit
liability,” “[o]ur California Supreme Court has held that ‘ “[n]o-duty rules are appropriate
only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law
applicable to a general class of cases.” ’ ” (Novak, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 196.)
This differentiates a duty analysis from that of proximate cause, which focuses on
whether public policy should preclude liability based upon the specific facts applicable to
individual cases. (Ibid.)
18
reporters report suspected child abuse or neglect. [Citation.] Once a report is made, it is
the responsibility of various child protective agencies to investigate the report.”
(Holman, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 183.) And “the decisions of child welfare agency
employees—regarding determinations of child abuse, the potential risk to a child,
placement of a child, removal of a child, and other resultant actions—are subjective
discretionary ones that are incidental to the employees’ investigations.” (County of San
Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 191-192.) Despite this statutory scheme, the
California Supreme Court has unambiguously concluded that the failure to file a report
mandated under CANRA can be considered a substantial factor in causing subsequent
harm. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 413-414; see Alejo v. City of Alhambra
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1189, overruled in part by County of San Bernardino,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 188.) We are bound by the decision of the California Supreme
Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455) and, as such,
decline to hold that the mere presence of discretionary decisions in a chain of causation
constitutes a sufficient public policy reason to limit liability.
The County’s reliance on State Hospitals, supra, 61 Cal.4th 339 is unpersuasive.
In that case, our Supreme Court affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer for failure to allege
facts to establish proximate cause. (Id. at p. 356.) However, in doing so, it explicitly
explained: “We do not hold that the intervention of any discretionary decision between
breach of a mandatory duty and a subsequent injury will always foreclose a finding of
proximate cause. Nor do we hold that proximate cause can never be established.… [A]
cause of action would not necessarily be barred simply because subsequent discretionary
19
decisions would have been required to prevent the [harm suffered].” (Ibid.) Thus, in
affirming the sustaining of the demurrer, our Supreme Court relied solely on the
insufficiency of the specific factual allegations in the context of the case before it and did
not set forth the blanket rule urged by the County here. Contrary to the County’s
assertion, State Hospitals does not stand for the proposition that the existence of
intervening discretionary acts negates proximate cause as a matter of law.
The other authorities cited by the County are equally unpersuasive. Each of these
cases involved an analysis of the specific duties and the specific processes involving
intervening discretionary acts before concluding that the facts did not support a finding of
proximate causation. (State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848,
860; Fleming v. State of California (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384; Whitcombe v.
County of Yolo (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 698, 708; MacDonald v. California (1991)
230 Cal.App.3d 319, 332-333.) More importantly, all of these cases predate our Supreme
Court’s guidance in State Hospitals, in which it clearly expressed the view that the
existence of an intervening discretionary act is not itself a basis to conclude the absence
of proximate causation as a matter of law.
Thus, we disagree with the County’s contention that merely establishing the
existence of intervening discretionary acts constitutes sufficient public policy grounds to
conclude that a defendant should not be liable for an injury. The County has not met its
burden to show that proximate cause is absent because public policy reasons should limit
liability in this case and we decline to reverse on this basis.
20
2. Plaintiff’s Evidence Was Insufficient To Establish Cause In Fact
While we have concluded that the existence of intervening discretionary acts is not
itself grounds to negate the existence of proximate cause, that does not end our inquiry.
At trial, plaintiff still bears the burden of proof to establish each element of his claim.
(Evid. Code, § 500.) Thus, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to produce actual evidence
upon which a jury could rely to support the first aspect of proximate cause—that the
failure to file a mandated CANRA report of Mother’s neglect was a substantial factor in
causing plaintiff’s subsequent harm. (See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 780 (Saelzler) [“No matter how inexcusable a defendant’s act or
omission might appear, the plaintiff must nonetheless show the act or omission caused, or
substantially contributed to, her injury.”].) And, upon review of the trial testimony
relevant to causation, we conclude that the evidence presented by plaintiff was simply
insufficient to support the jury’s finding on this issue.
a. The expert testimony presented at trial did not provide a sufficient basis
for the jury to find causation.
Generally, to prove cause in fact, “ ‘[the] plaintiff must show some substantial link
or nexus between omission and injury.’ ” (Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095,
1104.) The difficulty in this case is that the alleged omission by the County is the failure
to report Mother for neglect, which has no clear or obvious link to the sexual abuse
perpetrated by Cox. Plaintiff does not allege that any CANRA report should have
identified Cox or any allegation of sexual abuse. Thus, there is no clear link between the
omission and the injury. Instead, plaintiff relies on a theory that requires establishing
21
multiple links in a chain of causation. And while “[d]irect proof of each link in a chain of
causation is not required” (City of Modesto v. Dow Chemical Co. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
130, 153), there must be evidence upon which a jury could draw reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor without mere speculation or conjecture (ibid.).
With respect to Cox, plaintiff’s theory was expressly limited to the failure to report
Mother’s neglect prior to any act of sexual abuse. Thus, to establish some causal nexus,
plaintiff at the very least needed to show that (1) a report would likely have triggered an
investigation by the relevant child welfare agency, (2) any investigation would likely
have triggered further intervention by social workers, and (3) any safety plan developed
by social workers would likely have deterred or prevented future acts of sexual abuse by
Cox. While the allegations against other employees of the County are not limited in time,
as to these employees plaintiff still needed to establish that (1) a report of Mother’s
neglect would likely have triggered an investigation, (2) any investigation would likely
have created a suspicion of sexual abuse by Cox, (3) social workers would likely have
substantiated such suspicions upon further