People v. Williams

Filed 8/31/26; Certified for Publication 9/17/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E087071 v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1400060) DEMONDRE L. WILLIAMS, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. Demondre L. Williams, in pro. per.; Thien Huong Tran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1  Defendant and appellant Demondre L. Williams appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion pursuant to the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), as set forth in Penal Code section 745.1 Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed a no-issue brief and requested our independent review pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). We reviewed the potential issue suggested by counsel, as well as the issues raised by defendant in his supplemental brief, and find no basis for reversal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s orders. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2 The victim was shot and killed in September 2012 in the parking lot of an apartment complex. (Williams1, supra, E062483 at p. 2-3.) A witness told detectives that he had been approached just prior to the shooting by a Black male who pointed a gun at the witness, said he was from “Grape Street” and asked the witness where he was from. (Id. at p. 2.) After the witness replied “nowhere,” the man ran away. (Ibid.) The witness went into his friend’s apartment, heard shots outside and saw a flash, then saw the victim on the ground. (Ibid.) The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim testified that the victim was shot twice in the head from a distance of no more than three or four feet. (Id. at p. 3.) 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 We derive much of the factual history of this case from this court’s opinion in defendant’s direct appeal of his judgment. (People v. Williams (June 30, 2016, E062483) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams1).) 2  Defendant was located in May 2014. (Williams1, supra, E062483 at p. 3.) Defendant at first denied killing anyone. (Id. at p. 3.) He then claimed there was friction between him and the victim from when they had been imprisoned together. (Ibid.) Defendant claimed that prior to the murder the victim had on one occasion shot at him at a Burger King restaurant, and on another occasion the victim and another man pulled a gun on him. (Ibid.) Defendant stated that on the day of the murder, the victim tried to pull a gun on him but dropped it, and defendant shot the victim with the victim’s gun. (Ibid.) Defendant then changed his story after the investigating detective told him that a witness had seen him with a gun prior to the shooting. Defendant stated that when the victim dropped his gun, defendant kicked it under a car and pulled his own gun, pointed it at the victim, and ordered him to the ground. (Ibid.) Defendant said he then shot the victim and ran away. (Ibid.) Defendant admitted to the detective that he had been a member of the Grape Street gang since he was 10 or 11 years old. (Ibid.) The investigating detective had searched under all cars in the parking lot and did not find any weapons. (Williams1, supra, E062483 at p. 3.) The victim was holding only a pair of prescription eyeglasses in his hands. (Ibid.) Prison records reflected that defendant and the victim had never been housed in the same prison. (Id. at p. 5.) A crime analyst with the San Bernadino Police Department testified that there had been no reports of any shootings in the vicinity of a certain Burger King restaurant in the six months preceding the victim’s murder. (Ibid.) In October 2014, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a), count 2). The 3 jury also found true three firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (b), (c), & (d)) and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) with respect to count 1, and a gang enhancement with respect to count 2. Defendant admitted to having a prior conviction pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). (Williams1, supra, E062483 at p. 1.) Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life on count 1, an additional 25 years to life for one of the firearm enhancements, the upper term of three years on count 2, the upper term of four years for the gang enhancement on count 2, and an additional year for his prior prison term. The court struck the punishment on the gang enhancement on count 1, and suspended imposition of sentence on two of the firearm enhancements. In total, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life and a determinate term of eight years. In December 2023, following the enactment of section 1172.75,3 the court struck defendant’s prison prior, reducing the determinate sentence to seven years, and set a full resentencing hearing. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the superior court in January 2024 pursuant to the CRJA, alleging that, at his trial, Juror No. 12 exhibited racial bias and animus towards defendant (the same claim he is raising now, which is discussed post) and that the People “ ‘used discriminatory language during jury selection.’ ” The superior court denied the petition in February 2024. Defendant filed an 3 Section 1172.75 eliminated virtually all sentence enhancements based on prior prison terms, and entitles a defendant with a now-invalid enhancement to be resentenced. (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054-1055.) 4 appeal with this court from the denial of the petition, which appeal was dismissed in March 2024 as no appeal lies from a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.4 In April 2024, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court pursuant to the CRJA, again alleging that Juror No. 12 exhibited racial bias and the People used racially discriminatory language during jury selection, which petition was denied in June 2024.5 In October 2024, defendant filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus with the superior court pursuant to the CRJA in which he alleged that (1) he was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races engaged in similar conduct and similarly situated, and the prosecution sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share his race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where he was convicted, and (2) he received a longer or more severe sentence compared to similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants who share defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin than others in that county. The superior court denied the petition in November 2024. In December 2024, defendant filed a CRJA motion with the trial court ahead of the section 1172.75 resentencing hearing. The court denied the motion in January 2025. 4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court’s March 18, 2024, dismissal of defendant’s appeal, case No. E083431. 5 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of defendant’s April 18, 2024, petition for writ of habeas corpus and this court’s June 12, 2024, denial of the petition, case No. E083691. 5 The court granted defendant’s request for his counsel to be relieved and that he be appointed new counsel, and continued the resentencing hearing. In July 2025, defendant filed another CRJA motion ahead of the continued section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, which he described as “renew[ing] his petition for relief” under the CRJA based on “newly presented facts and controlling law.” On September 8, 2025, the trial court again denied defendant’s CRJA motion. The court resentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count 1 with an additional consecutive 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement for a total indeterminate term of 50 years to life, and a concurrent determinate term of two years on count 2. The court struck the gang enhancements on both counts. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal in October 2025. This court appointed appellate counsel for defendant in February 2026. Counsel filed a brief in which he stated that after thoroughly reviewing the record he had not found an arguable issue, and he requested that this court exercise its discretion to conduct an independent review of the record. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232.) Counsel identified the following issue for our potential independent review: “Whether appellant’s [CRJA] motion established a prima facie showing of racial bias by a juror or attorney, and/or discriminatory charging.” We invited defendant to file a supplemental brief, and he did so. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We are therefore obligated to “evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Ibid.) 6  DISCUSSION Defendant raised three bases for his CRJA motion, both at the trial court level and in his supplemental brief: (1) Juror No. 12 at his trial stated during voir dire that he “grew up with racism”; (2) deputy district attorney Michael Selyem made public statements that were described in a joint letter from various civil rights organizations as displaying “vicious and hateful beliefs toward African Americans”; and (3) statistical data showed that Black defendants in San Bernadino County received sentence enhancements more frequently than White defendants. Section 745, subdivision (a)(1), provides that a violation of the CRJA is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “an attorney in the case … or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” In order to make a prima facie showing that would then require an evidentiary hearing by the trial court, the defendant must produce facts that “if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred. For purposes of this section, a ‘substantial likelihood’ requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.” (§ 745, subd. (c) & (h)(2).) None of the claims raised by defendant meet the prima facie showing required by section 745 that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. Juror No. 12’s comment during voir dire, when reviewed in the context of the entire exchange between him and the People, contradicts defendant’s claim of racial discrimination. The juror stated that he believed that he had been exposed to racist attitudes during his upbringing but that he had overcome that bias to a large degree and 7 would consider the evidence objectively. The juror offered an example of his past interaction with a family member where he admonished her “about the way she used to talk” in support of his change in attitude. The statements from the juror do not evidence bias towards defendant on the basis of race. Deputy district attorney Selyem was not the assigned prosecutor on defendant’s case, and appeared at hearings on two occasions only for the purposes of continuing the matter. There is no indication that he worked on the case in any other capacity or that he ever interacted with the jury. Defendant has presented no evidence that presents “more than a mere possibility” that Mr. Selyem exhibited bias or animus towards defendant based on his race. As to the statistics offered by defendant, section 745, subdivision (a)(3), establishes that a CRJA claim may lie where “[t]he defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.” Subdivision (h) of section 745 defines “more frequently sought or obtained” as meaning that “the totality of the evidence demonstrates a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot 8 establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity. The evidence may include statistical evidence, aggregate data, or nonstatistical evidence.” We previously explained that it was clear from the language of the statute “that to prove a prima facie case of a violation under section 745, subdivision (a)(3), the evidence must establish that [the defendant] was similarly situated and engaged in similar conduct with other nonminority defendants who were charged with lesser crimes, and that there was racial disparity in the District Attorney’s capital charging system.” (Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 128-129 (Mosby).) In Mosby, in support of his CRJA claim, the defendant (who was potentially facing the death penalty) presented statistical studies from three experts reflecting significantly higher rates of African- American defendants being charged with special circumstances, receiving death penalty notices, and receiving death penalty sentences. (Id. at pp. 114-115, 118.) The Mosby defendant also provided evidence of similar cases involving Caucasian defendants charged during the same time period that he was convicted, including the factual background of those cases, reflecting that he faced “significantly harsher punishment than other similarly situated Caucasian defendants.” (Id. at p.119-120.) We held that the statistical studies together with the evidence of other cases involving nonminority defendants were sufficient to meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case. (Id. at p. 132.) In defendant’s case, he has presented only one statistic, claiming that “Black defendants in San Bernadino County received sentence [e]nhancements in 64% of prison 9 admissions compared to 42% for White [d]efendants.” We could not locate this statistic in the exhibits that defendant attached to his CRJA motion. Even if the figures provided by defendant are accurate, they are very broad. As the study provided by defendant reflects, a “sentence enhancement” may include firearms enhancements, gang enhancements (which have been stricken from defendant’s sentence), enhancements based on the defendant’s prior criminal history (which have also been stricken from defendant’s sentence), and enhancements based on the “Three Strikes” law (which do not apply here). The single statistic provided by defendant does not provide enough specific information to draw any potential conclusions about a difference in his treatment versus similarly situated nonminority defendants. (Cf. Mosby, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 115-116 [one expert’s statistical study, after controlling for a variety of factors of the defendants and the victims in the study, reflected that African- American defendants in Riverside County “were 1.71 times more likely to be charged with a special circumstance, 9.06 times more likely to receive a death penalty notice, and 14.09 times more likely to have received a death sentence than Caucasian defendants”].) Defendant has also not provided evidence of cases of nonminority defendants who were similarly situated and engaged in similar conduct as defendant but were charged with lesser crimes. (Cf. Mosby, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p.119-120.) We accordingly agree with the trial court that defendant has not met his prima facie burden in establishing a CRJA claim. Defendant’s first appeal of the judgment was reviewed pursuant to the procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, such that the entire record has 10 previously been reviewed for arguable issues. (Williams1, supra, E062483, at p. 7.) We decline to exercise our discretion to examine the entire record once more to attempt to identify unraised issues. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) DISPOSITION The trial court’s orders are affirmed. MILLER Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON J. FIELDS J. 11 Filed 9/17/26 COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT DIVISION TWO ORDER THE PEOPLE, E087071 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1400060) DEMONDRE L. WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant. ORDER CERTIFYING _______________________________________ OPINION FOR PUBLICATION THE COURT The request for publication of the nonpublished opinion filed in the above matter on September 14, 2026, is GRANTED. The opinion meets the standards for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). IT IS SO ORDERED that said opinion filed August 31, 2026, be certified for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b). MILLER Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON J. FIELDS J.