Full Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO F.L., Petitioner, E089010 v. (Super.Ct.No. J308235) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Petition denied. Children’s Advocacy Group, David Knuchell and Rebecca Eckley for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. 1 Laura Feingold, County Counsel, Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, petitioner F.L. (Mother) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief with respect to the juvenile court’s setting of a Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 366.26 hearing regarding her son, M.B. (Minor, born in April 2026). Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in bypassing her reunification services with Minor based on her failure to reunify with Minor’s siblings. For the reasons set forth post, we deny Mother’s writ petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Mother has two children with V.B. (Father): Minor and his older brother G.B. (Brother). Father is not a party to Mother’s writ petition. Mother also has a daughter, J.B. (Sister), with another individual. On July 4, 2025, real party in interest San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received an immediate response referral regarding Sister and Brother (collectively, the siblings). Mother called 911 multiple times, “ ‘talking nonsense,’ ” and seemed very confused and noncooperative. When law enforcement arrived at the home, Mother was “ ‘going crazy,’ ” did not believe the deputies were real, and believed somebody was trying to kidnap her. Mother grabbed Sister by the arm and made her walk on hot asphalt and had Brother “ ‘dangling’ ” by the arm over rocks and hot concrete. The two children were forcibly removed from Mother’s arms and Mother was 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless specified otherwise. 2 detained. Mother’s great aunt reported that Mother had taken ecstasy a few weeks ago and “ ‘hasn’t been the same since.’ ” Mother was arrested for child abuse. Mother’s dependency case regarding the siblings was still pending when Minor was born in April 2026. Mother underwent a psychiatric evaluation in January 2026. On April 24, 2026, Mother’s therapist stated he was concerned that Mother’s self-report of the events leading to CFS intervention “was a description of someone struggling with [a] psychotic [breakthrough] event,” that Mother was keeping her camera off during telehealth sessions, and that she was “very guarded and measured in responding to questions.” The therapist suggested that Mother may require additional psychiatric assessments. CFS received a referral on April 27, 2026, regarding Minor after Mother disclosed that the siblings had been removed from her care, and there were concerns that no one was at Mother’s bedside. However, Mother was reported to be acting appropriately with Minor, including feeding and bonding with him. When CFS contacted Mother by telephone regarding the referral, she stated that she was at her sister’s home in Las Vegas with Minor. Mother would not identify Minor’s father and stated that she would submit a birth certificate. CFS determined on April 29, 2026, that in Mother’s pending case for the siblings, she had recently had her unsupervised visits with the children revoked because she had allowed Father to attend the visit in violation of the visitation agreement. This only came to light because Sister told her therapist that she did not want Father at visits because she did not want him and Mother to fight, and the therapist asked CFS if Father was supposed 3 to be at the visits. CFS also determined that Mother was to submit to substance abuse testing six times since January 30, 2026, but had missed two tests without explanation. On April 30, 2025, a CFS social worker informed Mother three times that there was a warrant to detain Minor; Mother stated that she was in Las Vegas and did not have transportation to the CFS office. On May 2, 2026, Mother attended a visit with the siblings in Victorville, California, but did not produce Minor to CFS. On May 4, 2026, CFS filed a section 300 petition regarding Minor, alleging with respect to Mother that she has untreated mental health issues placing Minor at substantial risk of abuse and/or neglect, Mother has a substance abuse problem that impairs her ability to provide adequate care, supervision, and protection to Minor, and that Minor’s siblings were removed from Mother due to her mental health and substance abuse. At the detention hearing on May 5, 2026, Mother was physically present in court. The juvenile court ordered Minor to be detained and removed from both parents. 2 Mother stated several times that Minor was in Las Vegas with her sister. The juvenile court issued a protective custody warrant for Minor and addressed Mother directly: “I’m going to order that you transport [Minor] here to San Bernadino to the CFS office by tomorrow, end of business. Okay?” Mother responded: “Okay.” After providing the address of the CFS office to Mother, the court addressed Mother again: “Make sure you contact the social worker. The Court is going to order that you bring the minor to that 2 Although Mother refused to disclose Father’s identity at the start of M.B.’s case, Father was identified as M.B.’s alleged father in the May 4, 2026, petition, and CFS attempted to contact Father prior to the detention hearing. 4 CFS office by tomorrow, close of business; okay? I’ll have the social worker give you the address just in case you don’t have it.” According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, on May 6, 2026, after CFS inquired with Mother regarding her bringing Minor to the CFS office, Mother stated that she had reached out to Father regarding compliance with the court order because Father had custody of Minor and was in Nevada at that time. On May 8, 2026, the CFS-referred domestic violence program in the siblings’ case stated that after multiple attempts to schedule Mother for domestic violence services, Mother did not respond, so the referral was closed in February. As set forth in the jurisdiction/disposition report, on May 13, 2026, Mother’s therapist stated that Mother was not benefiting from therapeutic services and advised that Mother undergo a psychiatric and psychological evaluation. The therapist believed Mother may have originally suffered a psychotic break and based on her absconding with Minor, was “still undergoing its effects.” The therapist stated that he was terminating Mother’s therapy because she was keeping her camera off during sessions and was potentially using artificial intelligence (AI) in her responses. On May 20, 2026, as set forth in the jurisdiction/disposition report, the caregiver for the siblings stated that Mother had called her to yell at her, accusing the caretaker of lying and blaming her for interfering with Mother’s reunification with the children. Mother was insisting that the caregiver had created a new visitation schedule, which the caregiver stated was concerning because the conversation had never occurred. The caregiver also stated that she had concerns about Mother’s care of the children, such as 5 Mother taking away Sister’s glasses without reason, and Mother blaming the caregiver for the lack of case progress. On May 26, 2026, CFS filed an amended petition with revised allegations as to Father. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 27, 2026, Father’s attorney stated that Minor was with Father in Las Vegas. Counsel for CFS noted that Mother had been present at the prior hearing and indicated that she was going to bring Minor to CFS by the close of the following business day, but “[t]hat was not complied with.” The juvenile court ordered that it was “going to continue to leave the warrant active. I’ll order again the parents to turn the child over to CFS. I’m not going to clarify visitation or increase visitation or clarify any services until we have the child in care because it’s moot until then.” The court continued the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, reiterating to Mother and Father: “I’m going to continue to order you to comply with the Court’s order to turn the child over to CFS; otherwise, none of the things you’re asking for are going to happen.” Mother surrendered Minor to CFS a month later on June 26, 2026. According to the addendum report filed by CFS on July 29, 2026, Mother stated at that time that she had a diagnosis from a private psychological evaluator of “an adjustment disorder due to stress and reaction from the case,” although she admitted she did not tell the evaluator/psychiatrist or her current therapist about the specific details of the case. When CFS spoke with Mother’s therapist, because the therapist was with a private office rather than a CFS referral, the therapist could only confirm the number of sessions Mother 6 attended, some of Mother’s goals, and that there was progress being made in her treatment plan. Mother did not allow the treatment plan, specifics about her sessions, diagnosis, or other information to be shared. With respect to Mother’s missed random drug tests, she had an explanation for one of the missed dates but not the other. Mother was asked about domestic violence education being part of her case plan for the siblings, and Mother said that the court had dismissed the requirement and that she had met with the domestic violence counselor. When Mother was informed that the counselor closed the referral due to Mother being unresponsive, Mother said she was unsure about the service but would be willing to complete it in order to reunify with the children. During her interview with CFS, Mother denied withholding Father’s name from CFS at the beginning of the case. Mother stated she was unable to provide proof of Father having cared for Minor during the time he was stated to have been in Las Vegas or details about how she transported Minor to Las Vegas. Father also refused to discuss how Minor was supposedly transported to Las Vegas, saying it was “historical.” At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on July 30, 2026, Mother testified that she was unable to bring Minor to CFS until June 26, 2026, because she did not have the funds to pay for transportation. She testified that she attended counseling, where the topics included “[g]rounding techniques, coping mechanisms and skills” as well as “parenting techniques and parenting skills.” Mother testified that she also took a parenting class where she learned how to nurture her child, proper discipline and growth, milestones and development. She also testified that she underwent two psychological 7 evaluations, had never tested positive for an illicit substance, and was currently attending a domestic violence course and receiving therapy. On cross-examination, Mother stated that Father showing up to her unsupervised visits with Sister “was not coordinated” and that “he showed up on his own account,” but that she did not take any action to ask him to leave. Mother admitted that she was aware her therapist was limited in the information that could be provided to CFS because she had not given authorization to discuss certain aspects of her therapy. Mother also admitted that she had not told the psychological evaluators that the juvenile court had sustained allegations of substance use and mental health issues, and that she had not provided the psychological evaluators with any reports or authorized CFS to provide the evaluators with any reports. A CFS social worker testified that she reached out to Mother and Father with text messages and phone calls after the detention hearing in an effort to detain Minor, and informed Mother that it could impede reunification with her other children. The social worker believed that Mother was deliberately concealing or absconding with Minor because she confirmed with the transitional assistance department that Mother was claiming Minor was in her care in June and she was receiving benefits for him. The social worker testified that Mother was unable to provide to CFS any information about transporting Minor to Las Vegas or stamped receipts showing baby provisions purchased in Las Vegas to verify her claim that Minor was not in her care, and neither parent ever sent a picture of Minor in Las Vegas with Father. The social worker also suspected that 8 Minor was being breastfed up until he was placed in CFS custody, because he was throwing up after being fed formula. The juvenile court found with respect to the siblings’ case that “while [Mother] has engaged in a number of services, it’s very clear that she has not benefitted from the services. The Court has significant concerns about her forthrightness, not only today but throughout the life of the cases with respect to both [Minor] and the unsupervised visitation. [¶] The history with the service providers, and even with the services she has engaged in, being limited in the information provided to the service providers, and limiting the ability of the social worker to follow up on her benefit. [¶] So, we are not even close to a position of return to either parent, nor do I believe, based on the whole history of the case and the Court’s credibility concerns, do I believe that continuance to the [section 366.22] hearing, which would be in January, would lead us to a position where I would be able to return [the children].” The juvenile court terminated reunification services with respect to the siblings. With respect to Minor, the juvenile court found “the Department has more than met their burden to bypass the parents given everything that happened in the older siblings’ case and the lack of progress and benefit in services. [¶] I do not believe it’s in [Minor’s] best interest to offer services given that history, so I will find the Department has met their burden under (b)10 and adopt the amended findings.” The relevant portion of the amended findings adopted by the juvenile court states: “Reunification services need not be provided to [Mother] and [Father] in that there is clear and convincing evidence that: [¶] a. Court ordered-termination of reunification 9 services for the siblings of [Minor] after having been removed from the custody of [Mother] and [Father] pursuant to §361; [Mother] and [Father] failed to reunify with that [sic] siblings, [Mother] and [Father] have not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of siblings.” The juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for November 30, 2026. Mother timely filed her notice of intent to file her writ petition. DISCUSSION Where a child has been removed from his or her parents’ custody, the juvenile court is generally required to order family reunification services to the dependent child, the child’s mother, and the child’s presumed father. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) However, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b), services need not be provided to a parent where a court finds certain enumerated circumstances, which are known as bypass provisions, to be true. (In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271 (Jayden C.).) The bypass provisions are used to avoid the “ ‘ “fruitless” ’ ” use of “ ‘ “scarce” ’ ” resources where there is little likelihood of reunification based on the parent’s past failures. (Ibid.) The child welfare agency bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that one of the provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.) In this case, the bypass provision in question provides that reunification services need not be provided when the court finds: “That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the 10 sibling or half sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).) “We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of section 361.5 for substantial evidence.” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121.) When undertaking a substantial evidence review, “we ask whether there is sufficient evidence in the record that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—when viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination— for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [the child welfare agency] carried its burden by clear and convincing evidence.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273.) Questions of statutory interpretation, however, are reviewed de novo. (Ibid.) This case presents the somewhat uncommon scenario where the juvenile court is making its dispositional orders regarding one child at the same hearing where it is terminating reunification services for the child’s siblings, and thus there is no gap in time between the two events. There is no dispute between the parties that “[t]he appellate courts are divided over how to proceed where there is no time gap.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274, fn. 9, citing In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831 (Harmony B.), and Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87 (Cheryl P.).) 11 In Harmony B., the parents had been receiving reunification services for approximately 14 months for two of their children and had not reunited with those children by the time a petition was filed in the juvenile court regarding the youngest child, who was only a month old. (Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 835-836.) The juvenile court terminated reunification services for the two older children, then “[i]mmediately thereafter” conducted the jurisdiction and disposition hearing for the youngest child. (Id. at p. 836.) The juvenile court denied reunification services for the youngest child based on the termination of reunification services for the older siblings. (Ibid.) This court affirmed the juvenile court’s order, holding that where the termination of reunification services with one child occurs in immediate proximity to the denial of reunification services with respect to a second child, the clause regarding a parent’s lack of reasonable effort “is a formality because the parent’s circumstances necessarily will not have changed.” (Harmony B., supra. 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 842-843.) In this court’s view, section 361.5, subdivision (b), was amended “to provide a parent who has worked toward correcting his or her problems an opportunity to have that fact taken into consideration in subsequent proceedings; it was not amended to create further delay so as to allow a parent, who up to that point has failed to address his or her problems, another opportunity to do so.” (Id. at pp. 842-843.) A different division of this appellate district disagreed with our decision in Harmony B. (Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 98-99.) The Cheryl P. court held that Harmony B. “necessarily adopts the position that the Legislature intended to provide 12 disparate treatment between cases in which some time has elapsed after services have been terminated in the sibling’s dependency and cases in which termination of services in the first case is closely followed by the child’s dispositional hearing,” and the court “cannot accept that was the Legislature’s intent.” (Cheryl P., at p. 99.) The Cheryl P. court accordingly issued a writ directing the juvenile court to vacate its order denying reunification services to the parents and direct the child welfare agency to provide six months of reunification services in the younger child’s case. (Id. at pp. 99-100.) The fundamental difference between the interpretations of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), in Harmony B. versus Cheryl P. is whether the reference to a parent “subsequently” making reasonable efforts to address their parenting issues means efforts made subsequent to the first sibling being removed from the parent’s care (as per Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at 98) or subsequent to the juvenile court terminating reunification services for the first sibling (as per Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at 842-843). The Harmony B. standard necessarily means a parent will not be able to show subsequent reasonable efforts when, as here, the termination of reunification services is ordered at the same hearing where disposition orders are being made. Mother argues that we should overturn our own precedent set in Harmony B. in favor of Cheryl P., so that her efforts to address her problems are reviewed over the entire time span of the siblings’ case rather than the reasonable efforts clause being treated as a “formality.” Under the Cheryl P. standard, Mother claims that the juvenile court erred in requiring her to show that her efforts to address her issues after the removal of the siblings were successful, rather than merely reasonable. 13 We decline to overturn our precedent. We do not agree that the plain language of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A), necessitates a different result. The word “subsequently” in the subdivision could reasonably apply to either the first clause of “the court ordered termination of reunification services,” or to the subordinate clause of “after the sibling or half sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian.” The wording of the statute “permits more than one reasonable interpretation,” and thus we may consider “the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy” in interpreting its meaning. (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989-990.) The fundamental purpose of the bypass provisions is to avoid the use of precious resources on a parent who has already had an opportunity to address the issues leading to dependency jurisdiction but failed to do so. “[T]he focus of the [dependency] proceedings is to reunify the child with a parent, when safe to do so for the child. [Citations.] However, there are circumstances in which reunification with a particular parent is presumptively contrary to the child’s best interest. [Citations.] When those circumstances apply, the bypass provisions of section 361.5 protect the child, promote the child’s permanency and stability, and help focus limited resources where they can best effect the goals of child protection and family reunification.” (In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 59 fn. omitted; see also In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227 [where it is determined that one of the bypass provisions applies, “ ‘the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources’ ”].) Under the Cheryl P. standard that Mother urges us to adopt, the juvenile court would be required to offer 14 reunification services to a parent whom the court has just determined, at the very same hearing, would not benefit from further reunification services for a different child. This approach would frustrate the purpose of the bypass provisions to provide permanency and stability to the child and focus scarce resources where they can best be utilized. We do not believe the Harmony B. standard would cause the juvenile court to have “no choice but to ‘reflexively deny’ reunification services,” as Mother argues. Even under the Harmony B. standard, the juvenile court is not completely barred from ordering reunification services, because the parent retains the ability to make a showing by clear and convincing evidence that providing reunification services would be in the child’s best interest despite the bypass provisions. (§ 361.5, subd. (c); see Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272-1273 [where the child welfare agency has met its burden pursuant to § 361.5, subd. (b), “the burden shifts to the parent to prove that it is in the child’s best interest for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to provide reunification services in this case”].) In this instance, Mother is not claiming in her writ petition that she made a best interest showing. We accordingly find no error in the juvenile court’s bypass of reunification services of Mother with respect to Minor We need not assess the reasonableness of Mother’s efforts for the reasons set forth ante, but we note that some amount of effort does not necessarily equate to a reasonable effort. (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914 [“We do not read the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass provisions to mean that any effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these provisions inapplicable”].) 15 Here, where Mother’s mental health and substance abuse were the reasons for removal of the siblings, there were ample reasons for the juvenile court to call into question the reasonableness of her efforts to address those issues, including: Mother’s refusal to meaningfully participate with the CFS-referred therapist (i.e., leaving her camera off during sessions and seemingly using AI for her responses); the restrictions Mother placed on her private therapist and psychological evaluators with respect to sharing information with CFS and sharing the details of the CFS investigation with those mental health experts; Mother’s unexplained missed drug test; Mother’s threatening conduct against the siblings’ caregiver, including claims about a conversation that had not taken place; Mother permitting Father to attend her visits with the siblings in violation of the visitation agreement, and not disclosing that fact until Sister brought it up with her therapist; and Mother refusing to produce Minor to CFS for almost two months after being directly ordered to do so by the juvenile court and in the face of significant evidence that Mother had custody of Minor during that time period (i.e., the complete lack of evidence of Father caring for Minor, and Minor seeming to have been breastfed up until he was surrendered to CFS), and had the ability to travel to California (i.e., Mother attending a visit with the siblings in Victorville just two days after telling CFS she was in Las Vegas and did not have transportation). Thus, there may ultimately be little difference in the outcome of Mother’s request for reunification services with respect to Minor regardless of whether the juvenile court applied Harmony B. or Cheryl P. 16 DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION MILLER J. We concur: RAMIREZ P. J. CODRINGTON J. 17