In re B.A. CA4/2

Filed 10/28/26 In re B.A. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re B.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087633 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J306155) v. OPINION L.A., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson, Judge. Affirmed. Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Laura Feingold, County Counsel and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1  L.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order regarding her daughter, B.A. The court removed B.A. from Mother’s custody and placed the child with her father, Roy A. (Father), with family maintenance services. The court did not order any services or visitation for Mother. Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the removal order. She also argues that the court applied the wrong legal standard when it denied her reunification services under subdivision (b)(6) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5. (Unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) She lastly argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that visitation with Mother would be detrimental to B.A. We affirm. BACKGROUND I. Detention In August 2025, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received a referral alleging that 16-year-old B.A. had been sexually abused by her adult half-sister’s husband, Fernando H. B.A. disclosed that he had groped her, touched her genitals, and digitally penetrated her. B.A. cried throughout her interview with the social worker. The child told the social worker that Fernando had been “touching and groping her private” several times per month since she was 13 years old, and he had “been touching and feeling her body” even before that age. B.A. and her family often visited his home, and Fernando and her half-sister often came to B.A.’s home. The first instance of digital penetration occurred at his house in the pool. He grabbed her by the arm and pulled her into the water against 2 her will. He penetrated her while she was underwater and would not let her surface until she poked him in the eye. B.A. thought that Mother knew about the abuse, because Mother told her “‘not to wear certain clothes’” around Fernando and stated “‘“you know how he (Fernando) is.”’” Mother stated that she did not know about the sexual abuse. She said that B.A. did not see Fernando often and that the child was never alone with him. The social worker asked whether Mother could see B.A. “at all times” when they were at Fernando’s home, and Mother refused to answer. Mother could not say how many times per year she and B.A. visited Fernando’s home. Father also reported that he did not know about the sexual abuse. He worked every day of the week and was not home often. But he was starting a new job in the next month, and the schedule would allow him four days off per week. He intended to spend more time at home with B.A. B.A. participated in a forensic interview at the Children’s Assessment Center. Mother refused to disclose whether B.A. had any developmental delays, speech issues, or medical issues, even after the social worker explained the interviewer’s need for that information. Mother had retained counsel and stated that her attorney advised her not to answer those questions. During the forensic interview, B.A. reported that Fernando had fondled her breasts; smacked her buttocks; fondled her genitals both over and under her clothes; kissed her bare stomach, her side, and her upper thighs; and digitally penetrated her. Mother had seen Fernando touch B.A.’s buttocks and breasts, but Mother said that “he 3 was just playing.” Mother told B.A. to lie to the interviewer. Mother and B.A.’s two adult half-sisters accused B.A. of “breaking the family apart.”1 Mother was also isolating B.A. in retaliation for disclosing the sexual abuse. She had taken away B.A.’s phone and was keeping the child home from school so that B.A. would not report the abuse to others. B.A. also reported that she had type 1 diabetes, and Mother had recently withheld B.A.’s insulin by storing it at a half-sister’s home. B.A. said that there was tension in the home and that she, Mother, and Father were not talking. B.A. was interested in therapy, but Mother would not allow it. B.A. also had a medical exam at the Children’s Assessment Center, and she told the examiner that Mother withheld her insulin in retaliation for disclosing the sexual abuse. She reported that Mother was her main caretaker, because Father was a nurse who worked nights and slept during the day. B.A. was shaking, said that she feared going home, and asked to speak to a therapist. The social worker obtained a protective custody warrant after the forensic interview. CFS filed a petition under subdivisions (b)(1), (c), and (d) of section 300, alleging that (1) Mother knew or should have known that Fernando was sexually abusing B.A., and she failed to protect B.A. from the abuse; (2) Mother blamed B.A. for the sexual abuse, called the child names, told her that she was unwanted, and withheld insulin from B.A., causing B.A. serious emotional damage; and (3) Father knew or 1 The report refers to them as B.A.’s sisters, but the record elsewhere clarifies that they are her half-sisters. 4 should have known that Fernando was sexually abusing B.A., and he failed to protect B.A. from the abuse. In October 2025, the court detained B.A. from both parents. The court ordered weekly supervised visits with the parents for two hours. The court also ordered CFS to provide the parents with referrals for predisposition services. II. Jurisdiction and disposition When the social worker interviewed B.A. for the jurisdiction/disposition report, the child was calm but appeared detached. B.A. reported that Mother blamed her for the sexual abuse. When B.A. wore shorts or a spaghetti-strap top for a visit to Fernando’s home, Mother told her, “‘You know how Fernando is, go change.’” B.A. felt that Mother “‘knew at a certain point’” about the sexual abuse. B.A. repeatedly told Mother that she did not want to go to Fernando’s house, but Mother forced her to go anyway. Mother also witnessed inappropriate contact firsthand. For instance, Mother saw Fernando wrap his arm around B.A.’s neck and place his hand on her chest. Mother did not intervene or redirect Fernando. Mother’s lack of response made B.A. “feel like her feelings ‘didn’t matter.’” Mother also frequently called B.A. names; B.A. asked her to stop, and Mother replied, “‘I’m your mother, I can do whatever I want.’” B.A. ran away from home because of the frequent name-calling and “emotional mistreatment.” Mother withheld B.A.’s insulin once for a few hours and a second time for roughly one and one-half days. B.A. did not want to have visits with Mother at that time. She felt that she might be ready to visit Mother after some family therapy. 5  B.A. “lit up with a smile” when the social worker asked about her relationship with Father. She and Father had a good relationship, and she described him as understanding and a good communicator. She did not disclose the abuse to Father because she “‘didn’t know how.’” B.A. thought that Father “‘should have seen,’” but she was not angry with him. She believed that he would have protected her if he had known about the abuse. B.A. wanted to have visits with Father, so long as the visits did not include Mother. She wanted to return home to Father but not Mother. Although B.A. missed Mother, she felt safer and more comfortable with Father. Father was cooperative, attentive, and engaged with the social worker. He was emotional and spoke about B.A. in loving and affectionate terms, describing her as his “‘pride and joy.’” He repeatedly asked about the child’s medical condition and how she was doing emotionally, and he asked if there was anything he could do to support her in foster care. His “voice cracked” when he expressed concern for her well-being, and his voice trembled as he described his close bond with B.A. and his devastation over learning about the sexual abuse. He never saw Fernando “‘getting close’” to B.A. and never saw any inappropriate behavior. He would have reported the abuse if he had known about it. But he thought that he had “‘failed’” the child. He loved B.A., and he wanted to learn to “‘be better for her,’” provide her with stability, and ensure her safety. Father was angry with Mother because she was continuing to visit Fernando’s home and have a relationship with Fernando. Mother said that she was doing so to protect her grandchildren (i.e., the children of Fernando and B.A.’s half-sister). Father responded that B.A.’s half-sister should protect her own children and that Mother should 6 not have contact with Fernando. He was frustrated that Mother was “‘not choosing their daughter.’” The parents were still living in the same home but were separated. Father was searching for a two-bedroom apartment, wanted to move out as soon as possible, and planned to seek a divorce from Mother. He also planned to seek sole physical custody of B.A. Regarding the allegations of withholding insulin, Father said that those stemmed from B.A.’s attempt to run away. Mother was also a type 1 diabetic and had a five-month supply of insulin in the home. B.A. had a separate one-month supply. When B.A. ran away, the child took both her supply and Mother’s supply. Mother told Father that she removed her five-month supply of insulin from the home so that B.A. could not take it again. Father said that he had not witnessed Mother calling B.A. names, but he believed that B.A. was telling the truth about it. Mother was harsh and prone to yelling, and he often intervened in situations to calm and redirect Mother. Mother presented as guarded and defensive during her interview with the social worker, and she “demonstrated limited insight, minimal accountability, and no observable remorse.” She frequently said that she did not know or did not remember when responding to questions about her history or B.A.’s circumstances. The social worker asked if Mother believed that B.A. was telling the truth about the sexual abuse, and Mother replied, “‘I don’t want to answer that question,’” in a flat and dismissive tone. She also said that she was “‘practicing [her] right not to talk about’” the “current allegations.” The social worker asked about Mother’s relationship with Fernando, and Mother described it as “‘a good one.’” He had been her son-in-law for 22 years. 7  The social worker obtained police reports and records of calls for service concerning the family. The records showed that in August 2025, Mother contacted law enforcement when B.A. ran away. Mother reported that B.A. had a history of depression and self-harm (cutting). CFS received the referral in this case two days later. The next day, Mother contacted law enforcement again and stated that she had proof that B.A. fabricated sexual abuse allegations. She claimed to have found text messages between B.A. and B.A.’s boyfriend in which they planned to “‘make up the story.’” Officers attempted to contact Mother on three occasions after that, and they received no response. Mother “did not express interest in supervised visits” with B.A. She reviewed the supervised visitation guidelines but did not give the social worker a signed consent form, saying that she would return the form “after her personal review.” Mother also did not sign the consent forms necessary for referrals to services, so she did not receive referrals. Father signed and returned all the consent forms necessary for visits and referrals to services. In late October 2025, the court authorized unsupervised visits with Father. The court also found that visits with Mother would be detrimental to B.A. and ordered no visitation with Mother. By the following month, Father had secured a two-bedroom apartment and was no longer living with Mother. He had two eight-hour, unsupervised visits with B.A., and the visits went well. The court then authorized overnight and weekend visits with Father. By December 2025, Father had completed three individual counseling sessions and three family therapy sessions, and he had two overnight visits with B.A. 8  The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings took place in January 2026. B.A. and Mother testified. B.A. testified that Fernando touched her inappropriately on her breasts, thigh, buttocks, and “lady parts.” The abuse started when she was 13 or 14 years old, and it occurred almost every time she was around him, which was three to four days per week. B.A. believed that Mother “knew that he had that way of thinking.” Mother instructed B.A. to change her revealing clothing when they were going to see Fernando, saying, “‘you know how he is.’” And when Mother saw B.A. become uncomfortable because Fernando touched her inappropriately, Mother told her, “‘he’s just playing and if you don’t like it get away.’” B.A. described the incident in the pool when Fernando digitally penetrated her. After she escaped him, she jumped out of the pool and ran inside crying. She was upset for the rest of the night and refused to go outside. Mother saw B.A. crying and knew that B.A. was upset, but she did not question the child. B.A. did not disclose the abuse until recently because she feared that she would not be believed or helped. When Mother learned about B.A.’s disclosures, she accused B.A. of lying and asked why she would lie about such events. That made B.A. feel unsupported and as though she could not rely on Mother. Mother often called B.A. “a whore and a bitch.” Mother also told B.A. that she would not get very far in life and that no one wanted to be around a person like her. B.A. loved Mother even though she did not treat B.A. “the best.” B.A. would consider visits with Mother in the future. Mother testified that she had a good relationship with Fernando. She estimated that the family saw Fernando roughly three times during the summer and also on special 9 occasions, such as birthdays, anniversaries, or holidays. When deputy county counsel asked whether Fernando posed a risk to B.A., Mother paused for roughly five seconds and replied, “Um, according to her allegations, yes.” She then said that she believed B.A.’s allegations were true, but she did not believe that Fernando posed a risk to his own children. Since B.A.’s detention, Mother had gone to Fernando’s home every week to see her grandchildren, but she did not go inside the home, and she did not see Fernando. She did not tell Father that she visited Fernando’s home to protect her grandchildren. Mother said that she found social media messages between B.A. and her boyfriend in which they planned “to make up this story.” B.A. sent a message stating: “‘I am going to say everything that your mom and dad advised me to say.’” Mother could not recall what the other messages said. She did not provide proof of the messages to law enforcement because she did not think that the officers would believe her. Mother talked to B.A. about her clothing because she wanted B.A. to dress appropriately for her age. She did not want people to make rude comments about B.A.’s clothing that might hurt or embarrass B.A. She thought that B.A. might have misunderstood where Mother was “coming from.” She did not tell B.A. to dress differently around Fernando, and she never said, “‘you know how he is.’” Mother did not see Fernando touch B.A.’s breasts or buttocks, and she did not tell B.A. that he was “just playing with her.” She had never seen him act inappropriately with B.A., and she was not aware of the abuse. If she had seen anything inappropriate, then she would have removed B.A. from the situation and called the police. Mother also denied calling B.A. any names and withholding her insulin. 10  With respect to jurisdiction, the court dismissed the allegation under section 300, subdivision (d), that Father knew or should have known of the sexual abuse and failed to protect B.A. The court found true all of the remaining allegations in the petition. The court observed that it found B.A. to be “100 percent credible” and explained: “[T]his young lady testified with intelligence, integrity, and nonhesitance, a very soft spoken young lady but sure-minded. And the allegations that she suffered—and the record will not reflect this, but there were several times when [B.A.] turned red and got emotional. Yet, every time somebody says ‘do you need a moment,’ she says ‘no’ and that indicates to the Court that she has tremendous strength, in addition to all the other attributes the Court just gave her. The Court completely believes her.... The Court whole-heartedly believes these things happened to [B.A.], whole-heartedly believes Mother had an indication what was happening to [B.A.] and [B.A.] was in the unenviable position of living with someone who blamed her, the victim, for what was happening to her when a full-grown adult, who should have known better, perpetrated these atrocities [against] this young lady.” With respect to disposition, Mother urged the court to order reunification services for her and argued that CFS had not shown that services should be bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) (child has been adjudicated a dependent as a result of severe sexual abuse or severe physical harm). In addition, Mother argued that if the court placed B.A. with Father with family maintenance services, then the court should order discretionary services for Mother. Counsel for B.A. urged the court to remove the child from both parents’ custody, order reunification services for Father, and bypass 11 reunification services for Mother under subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5. CFS recommended that the court place B.A. with Father with family maintenance services and deny Mother discretionary services. The court declared B.A. a dependent, removed her from Mother’s custody, and placed her in Father’s custody with family maintenance services. The court found that there was a substantial danger to B.A.’s health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being in Mother’s home and that there were no reasonable means to protect B.A. short of removal. The court did “not extend reunification services” to Mother, and the court did “not order discretionary services to Mother.” The court observed that the bypass provision was inapplicable because B.A. was being placed with Father. CFS’s recommended findings and orders included findings necessary to bypass reunification services for Mother under subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5, but the court struck those findings before adopting other recommended findings. The court nevertheless explained: “[T]he Court will make its record because the Court wants all parties to be aware that the Court is aware of the seriousness of this case, that the Court does find there was severe sexual abuse inflicted upon [B.A.]; the touching of the buttocks, the touching of the chest, the kissing of the thighs probably wouldn’t fall under the definition of severe sexual abuse, although it is clearly sexual abuse, but clearly [B.A.’s] testimony that the digital penetration of her vagina by Fernando at the bottom of the swimming pool, skin-to-skin, most definitely qualifies as severe sexual abuse.” The court further found that Mother had “implicit knowledge” of the abuse. The court 12 concluded: “[T]here is no likelihood this child will be safely returned within the period specified, even under discretionary services and those will be denied.” As to visitation, the court found that visitation with Mother would be detrimental to B.A., and it did not order any visitation. The court noted that it observed B.A.’s demeanor, and the child appeared to be “damaged” and “very fragile.” The court noted that B.A. had “substantial trust issues with respect to” Mother, and the child needed to “re-evaluate the belief in her own truth which ha[d] been compromised.” The court concluded that “right now is too soon” for visitation with Mother. DISCUSSION I. Removal order Mother argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the order removing B.A. from Mother’s custody. We disagree. The juvenile court removed B.A. under subdivision (c)(1) of section 361, which requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there “would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child in the parent’s home, and (2) “there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without” removal.2 (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) 2 We note that subdivision (c)(4) of section 361, which applies if the child has been “sexually abused” by a “person known to their parent,” arguably provides an alternative basis for removal in this case. But the juvenile court expressly relied on only subdivision (c)(1) of section 361. 13  We review the findings underlying the court’s removal order for substantial evidence (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633), taking into account the level of confidence that the clear and convincing evidence standard demands (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995). The question before us “is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at pp. 995-996.) We “view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.) Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that there was a substantial danger to B.A. in Mother’s home. The evidence showed that Fernando had been sexually abusing B.A. for years. He fondled B.A.’s breasts, buttocks, and genitals; kissed her bare stomach, her side, and her upper thighs; and digitally penetrated her. Mother had seen Fernando touch B.A.’s buttocks and breasts, and she did nothing to intervene. She instead said that Fernando “was just playing.” Mother also told B.A. to change her revealing clothing when they were going to see Fernando, saying, “‘you know how he is.’” And on one occasion when Fernando digitally penetrated B.A., Mother saw that B.A. was upset and crying, but she did not question the child. The court could reasonably infer from the foregoing evidence that Mother knew or should have known that Fernando was sexually abusing B.A. Moreover, the evidence showed that Mother did not protect B.A. from Fernando and blamed B.A. when the child disclosed the abuse. Mother displayed limited insight 14 and no observable remorse when the social worker interviewed her. She said that she had a “‘good’” relationship with Fernando. She let Fernando have frequent contact with B.A. during the period of abuse, and when the social worker asked if she could always see B.A. when the child was around Fernando, Mother refused to answer. She also refused to answer when the social worker asked if she believed B.A., and she did not want to talk about the allegations. She accused B.A. of lying, and she and B.A.’s half-sisters accused B.A. of “breaking the family apart.” Mother also called law enforcement and claimed to have messages showing that B.A. fabricated the allegations against Fernando, but she never shared that proof with officers. During Mother’s testimony, she described only one message, which did not show that B.A. was lying. B.A. merely told her boyfriend, “‘I am going to say everything that your mom and dad advised me to say.’” One reasonable interpretation of that statement is that B.A. had told her boyfriend’s parents about the abuse, and they had advised her to report it. On this record, the court could reasonably conclude that Mother knew or should have known that the sexual abuse was occurring, she failed to protect B.A. from the abuse, she blamed the child, and she thus would continue to be insufficiently protective, all of which posed a substantial danger to B.A.’s physical or emotional well-being. Mother also challenges the finding that there were no reasonable means to protect B.A. short of removal, but substantial evidence also supports that conclusion. For B.A. to remain safely in Mother’s custody, Mother would need to cooperate with CFS and meaningfully engage in services. But the court could reasonably infer that Mother would not do so. B.A. appeared to have “substantial trust issues” with Mother. The child felt 15 that Mother was retaliating against her, and she did not feel supported by Mother, given Mother’s response to B.A.’s disclosures and Mother’s failure to protect the child during the period of abuse. Mother had the opportunity to engage in predisposition services to start addressing those issues, but Mother did not return the forms necessary to get referrals. She also was guarded and defensive with the social worker, refused to answer pertinent questions about the allegations in the petition, and refused to provide pertinent information about whether B.A. had medical issues and developmental delays. Mother’s behavior stands in stark contrast to Father’s actions. He was cooperative and engaged with the social worker, demonstrated obvious remorse for having failed to protect B.A., and completed several individual counseling and family therapy sessions by the time of the disposition hearing. Mother contends that the record contains no discussion of less restrictive alternatives to removal, such as protective orders, restrictions on contact with Fernando, or in-home services and supervision. But the court was not required to expressly identify all the means short of removal that it considered and rejected. Regardless, the court could reasonably conclude that Mother’s proposed alternatives would not sufficiently protect B.A., given the evidence that Mother knew or should have known of the abuse, failed to protect B.A., blamed the child for disclosing the abuse, continued to have contact with Fernando, failed to cooperate with CFS, and failed to engage in predisposition services. The record amply supports the conclusion that there were no reasonable means to protect B.A. short of removing her from Mother’s custody. For all of these reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the removal order. 16 II. Denial of services Mother argues that the court applied the wrong legal standard to bypass reunification services under subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5, namely, that Mother had “implicit knowledge” of the abuse. Mother contends that implicit knowledge is not a “legally recognized standard” under the statutory provision. She also contends that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the order denying her reunification services under the correct standard. The argument lacks merit. Subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5 authorizes the court to deny reunification services if “the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of severe sexual abuse ... , and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).) However, under section 16507, “[f]amily reunification services shall only be provided when a child has been placed in out-of-home care, or is in the care of a previously noncustodial parent under the supervision of the juvenile court.” (§ 16507, subd. (b).) Accordingly, if the court’s dispositional order places the child with one of two previously custodial parents, the other parent is not entitled to reunification services. (In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 636.) Rather, the parent from whom the child is removed is eligible for enhancement services, or child welfare services “‘designed to enhance the child’s relationship with that parent.’” (Ibid.) “An order for enhancement services is subject to the court’s discretion.” (Id. at p. 637.) 17  The court denied Mother reunification services in this case because she was not entitled to reunification services under section 16507. That was correct. The court placed B.A. with Father, a previously custodial parent. The court expressly observed that its placement decision made the bypass provision inapplicable, and it struck the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), findings from CFS’s list of recommended findings. Mother’s argument is based on the false premise that the court denied her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), so the argument fails. In her reply brief, Mother acknowledges that the bypass provision was inapplicable, but she asserts that its inapplicability only “highlights” why the court erred by analyzing the case under that statutory framework. To the extent that the court proceeded to comment on the severe sexual abuse suffered by B.A., the court did so to demonstrate that it was “aware of the seriousness of this case.” Mother does not persuasively explain why those comments amounted to error, given that the court correctly denied her reunification services under section 16507, subdivision (b). Moreover, even if the court did apply the standards of the bypass provision, Mother fails to show any prejudice, which is her burden on appeal. (In re B.S. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 888, 893.) There is no reasonable probability that Mother would have achieved a better result, because the court would have denied her services anyway under section 16507. And she does not argue that the court abused its discretion by denying her enhancement services. In sum, Mother fails to show that the court erred by denying her services. 18 III. No-visitation order Mother argues that section 362.1 governs visitation in this case. She contends that the statute requires a detriment finding to deny visitation, but the record does not contain substantial evidence that visitation would be detrimental to B.A. We disagree that the court was required to make a detriment finding to deny visitation. Section 362.1 states that the court “shall provide” for visitation “consistent with the well-being of the child” if the court makes “any order placing a child in foster care” and orders reunification services. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Accordingly, “[i]f visitation is inconsistent with the well-being of the child, or would be detrimental to the child, the juvenile court has the discretion to deny such contact.” (In re F.P. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 966, 973.) But section 362.1 does not apply in this case, because the court did not place B.A. in foster care and did not order reunification services. Mother relies on case law in which those circumstances were present. (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 674, 676; In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 944.) She does not cite any authority for the proposition that a detriment finding is required to deny visitation when the court places the child with a previously custodial parent and does not order reunification services. Nor are we aware of any such authority. Rather, under circumstances analogous to those here, the court has discretion to permit or deny visitation without any finding of detriment. (§ 361.2, subd. (a), (b)(1) [if the court places the child with a previously noncustodial parent, then it may order sole legal and physical custody to that parent and “may also provide [for] reasonable visitation” by the other parent].) And although the 19 court made an unnecessary detriment finding in this case, we review the juvenile court’s ruling, not its reasoning. (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 675, fn. 4.) Mother does not argue that the court’s ruling denying visitation was an abuse of discretion. For these reasons, Mother fails to show that the court erred by denying her visitation. DISPOSITION The dispositional order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS MENETREZ J. We concur: RAPHAEL Acting P. J. LEE J. 20