In re D.K. CA2/8

Filed 11/3/26 In re D.K. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT In re D.K. et al., Persons Coming B350024 Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04909A–D) AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.M., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gabriela H. Shapiro, Commissioner. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________  INTRODUCTION D.M. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and orders declaring his son, Elijah M., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and removing the child from his custody. We affirm and find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Father posed a risk to Elijah, sufficient to justify both jurisdiction and removal. Father also makes jurisdictional and dispositional arguments about his children, D.K., Za., and Kh., and we dismiss the appeals as to these children because Father did not seek review of any orders where the trial court assumed jurisdiction over them or removed them from Father’s care. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. Dependency proceedings for D.K, Za. and Kh. The dependency proceedings for Elijah’s siblings provide essential background information although we will dismiss the appeals specific to these children.2 D.K. and Za. are now nine years old, and Kh. is six years old. In 2017, DCFS filed a petition regarding D.K. and Za., who were then two months old. The juvenile trial court sustained the allegations that: (1) A.F. (Mother) and Father engaged in mutual domestic violence in 2017, placing the children at risk of harm; and (2) Father created an endangering home environment by allowing Mother to have unmonitored contact with D.K. and Za. The trial court 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Elijah has half-siblings, with a different father, who were also dependents. However, because Father is the only appellant here, that history is beyond the scope of this opinion. 2 terminated jurisdiction on June 3, 2019, placing both children at home with the parents. While away from dependency jurisdiction, the parents had a third child, Kh. Based on a later petition, on March 17, 2023, the trial court sustained allegations that: (1) Father physically abused D.K. and Mother failed to protect D.K.; (2) Father physically abused Za. and Mother failed to protect Za.; and (3) Mother and Father engaged in domestic violence against one another. This petition made D.K. and Za. dependents for a second time, and Kh. a dependent for the first time. Regarding the domestic violence facts, both parents admitted arguing, but denied any physical altercations. The facts supporting jurisdiction based on Father’s domestic violence included DCFS’s summary of police call logs for the family home. According to the logs, Father reported he feared Mother on September 9, 2022, and reported a history of domestic violence. In a later police log, Father reported that Mother pushed him on June 14, 2022, while also vandalizing his property. Father’s case plan initially included conjoint counseling with Mother, a parenting program, and individual counseling to address case issues. At disposition, the trial court ruled that D.K., Za. and Kh. were to remain in Mother and Father’s care. In the next status review report, DCFS reported that Father completed his parenting class. Father was unable to enroll in individual counseling or conjoint counseling because he could not find any providers with openings. 2. 2023 petition involving domestic violence While dependency jurisdiction was ongoing with the children released to both parents, on August 28, 2023, DCFS investigated a claim that Father and Mother had a physical 3 altercation. At that time, Mother secured an emergency protective order. In September 2023, the trial court granted emergency removal of D.K., Za., and Kh. from the parents’ custody based on allegations of ongoing domestic violence. On October 2, 2023, DCFS filed a subsequent petition under section 342 alleging a history of mutual domestic violence including the September 2023 incident. DCFS also filed a supplemental petition under section 387 alleging: (1) Mother failed to comply with her case plan, trial court orders, and securing counseling for D.K., Za., and Kh.; and (2) Father failed to comply with his case plan, which placed the three children at risk. Thereafter, DCFS secured a police report dated August 28, 2023. The police report included the following information. Police officers observed red marks on Mother’s left hand and on forearm. According to Mother, she argued with Father over a photo on her phone. They had a dispute over car keys, and Mother attempted to retrieve the keys from Father’s pocket. Father responded by chasing Mother into the living room and shoving her to the floor several times, causing scrapes to her hand and arm. Father retrieved the keys and slammed the door on his hand as he was leaving. According to Father, he and Mother argued over a photo. Father initially left to “cool off” and later returned. Father decided to leave again, but Mother blocked the door. Father was able to get past Mother but reached back to grab something, and Mother slammed the door on his left hand. Father believed that Mother accidentally slammed the door on his hand. He went to the hospital for treatment. 4  DCFS also asked D.K. about domestic violence in the home, and he responded, “ ‘I am not supposed to say this to people. I do not know. Is a family secret. You are not supposed to know.’ ” He also noted, “ ‘[Father] bump his hand on the door because was fighting with mommy.’ ” Kh. stated, “ ‘[m]y mommy push daddy because daddy was being mean. Daddy hurt his hand. Daddy was bleeding because they were hitting each other. They poke each other. They scream [“]shut up.[”] I said sorry.’ ” D.K. and Za. were at school during this incident, and it is unclear where Kh., three years old at the time, was during the violence. When interviewed by DCFS, Father denied the domestic violence at issue in this investigation, and denied there had ever been physical altercations between him and Mother. During Mother’s DCFS interview, she denied any physical altercation, but also said Father pushed her to get car keys. She also said Father chased her around the home to retrieve the keys. Mother also denied any previous domestic violence with Father. On November 14, 2023, the trial court sustained allegations that both parents engaged in domestic violence based on the section 342 petition and dismissed the allegations in the section 387 petition with prejudice. The trial court ordered D.K., Za., and Kh. removed from the parents’ custody, which continued the status quo based on its earlier order limiting the parents’ custody. The court ordered an amended case plan noting that Father completed his parenting program; otherwise adding a domestic violence program. In total, the trial court ordered Father to attend a domestic violence support group for victims, conjoint counseling with Mother if they planned to reconcile, and individual counseling. In the next status report filed on April 29, 2024, DCFS stated that Father did not begin domestic violence 5 classes and had not enrolled in individual therapy. Mother also stated she did not intend to reunite with Father and conjoint therapy would not be necessary. On June 4, 2024, the trial court conducted a section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing, and declined to return D.K., Za. and Kh. to the parents. The trial court found Father’s progress on his case plan to be insubstantial. At the December 3, 2024, section 366.21, subdivision (f) hearing, the trial court returned D.K., Za. and Kh. to Mother’s care, and it converted Father’s services to enhancement services. Although Mother had custody of the children, the trial court ordered that she was not to monitor Father’s visits. The trial court also noted that Father had both monitored and unmonitored visits with the children, and ruled that a third party was to transfer the children for Father’s visits because of the domestic violence findings. In the status report preceding the hearing, DCFS noted that Father had not enrolled in any programs and he stated that “ ‘[a] relationship with [Mother] is not on my mind at the moment, especially since we do not speak.’ ” 3. Investigation regarding whether Father was living in the family home DCFS prepared a status review report filed on May 21, 2025. The report included a February 28, 2025 account that a child stated that Father was living in the family home. On March 6, 2025, DCFS went to speak to the children at their school, and Kh. said, “ ‘my daddy is in my mommy’s room,’ ” and then Za. said, “ ‘Please don’t tell the judge because last time we told[,] my dad got in trouble. We miss our dad and want to see him.’ ” 6  DCFS also interviewed Father for the report. Father stated that he went to the family home to help with his children and would see them there on occasion. Regarding his progress on his case plan, Father reported that he was upset that he was not visiting with his children. He did not update his other progress on the case plan. On June 5, 2025, the trial court continued the home-of- parent review hearing. The trial court ordered that the children were to remain placed with Mother. The trial court also ordered DCFS to provide an update on whether Father was living in the family home. In a last minute report filed on July 29, 2025, DCFS went to visit the family, and no one was home. Consequently, DCFS spoke to a neighbor who stated that she did not hear any fighting or screaming from the family home. Mother previously told DCFS that she was pregnant with the child who would later be named Elijah. Mother initially denied that Father was the biological father. In March 2025, Father denied that Mother was pregnant with his child, stating that he was “not around.” DCFS also reviewed police call logs, which revealed no domestic violence calls. However, the police came to check on Elijah for medical reasons, and he had the same surname as Father in the police report. In contrast, when DCFS asked Mother for the child’s name, she gave a different surname. Elijah was born in April 2025, and at some point before Elijah’s birth, Mother admitted that Father was Elijah’s father and that she and Father were coparenting the children. DCFS again reported that Father was not in compliance with his case plan. On August 14, 2025, the court conducted its six-month home-of-parent review hearing under section 364. DCFS 7 recommended that the trial court terminate jurisdiction based on Mother’s compliance with her case plan. There, the trial court declined to terminate jurisdiction and instead continued it. The court further ordered that Father was to have monitored visits thereby rescinding his unmonitored visits, and ordered Father not to visit in the family home. The trial court ordered that the children were to remain placed with Mother. 4. Dependency proceedings regarding Elijah On August 25, 2025, the trial court ordered Elijah, D.K., Za., and Kh. removed from both parents’ care in an emergency removal order. DCFS asked for the emergency removal based on unresolved domestic violence issues and the parents’ failure to obey court orders. On August 28, 2025, DCFS filed a petition under section 300 alleging that four-month-old Elijah was at risk of harm from his parents. On October 15, 2025, DCFS filed an amended petition specific to Elijah alleging: (1) Father physically abused sibling D.K., and Mother failed to protect from Father’s abuse (section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) & (j)); (2) Father physically abused sibling Za., and Mother failed to protect from Father’s abuse (section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) & (j)); and (3) Father and Mother engaged in domestic violence (section 300, subdivisions (b) & (j)). DCFS also filed a section 387 petition for Elijah’s siblings. That petition is not in the record and is not part of this appeal. For the detention report related to the petition for Elijah, DCFS summarized evidence that Father was living in the family home. Among other things, a social worker found Father in a bedroom wearing a robe in the family home. Earlier that same week, the trial court ordered that Father was not to be in the 8 family home. Both Father and Mother initially attempted to cover up his identity. Mother later admitted she was lying because Father was in the home. In addition, Mother stated there had been no domestic violence with Father in the home. Father stated that he did not have a stable home and that he did not want to go to a shelter. Nonetheless, Father packed his belongings and left the family home with his luggage in his hands. Father also stated that he had not enrolled in any further programs for the case plan. At the August 29, 2025 detention hearing, the trial court detained Elijah and his siblings from both parents. The trial court ruled that Father could reside in Mother’s home because the children were no longer living there. On October 3, 2025, DCFS filed its jurisdiction and disposition report. There, Za. stated that Father was not in the family home, but then said that DCFS found out that Father was in the home. Then, she said Father was not living in the home and that “ ‘I didn’t know he was there.’ ” She also denied seeing the parents argue or physically hit one another. D.K. stated that Father was living in the family home “a little.” D.K. said Father was in the home for approximately a year from 2024 to 2025. D.K. saw no issues with Father in the family home. However, D.K. disclosed being coached to not reveal information to the social workers. Finally, Kh. had difficulty differentiating the timing of any relevant facts given his young age. In her interview, Mother claimed that Father was allowed unmonitored contact with the children. Regarding the day that the social worker found Father in the family home, Mother claimed that the children were not in the home. She said Father worked nights, so he did not sleep in the house. In addition, she 9 allowed Father in the home on previous occasions, but the children were not home when Father visited. She and Father had been respectful towards each other, and there had been no physical altercations in two years. Regarding the previous domestic violence from a previous petition that court found true, Mother denied it occurred. Finally, Mother accused the social worker of lying. Father stated he had unmonitored visits with the children outside of the home, so he did not violate any court orders. Father admitted to living in the family home, but he and Mother kept his door locked to prevent any contact with the children. He said he never encountered the children in the home. Father would pick up the children from school but would not come into the home with them. In addition, there had not been any domestic violence for over two years because he and Mother had improved their relationship. Father also largely denied the previous domestic violence that the trial court had sustained. He said he was not physically aggressive with Mother. Regarding his case plan, Father reported taking his first session of a domestic violence awareness program. Father also provided evidence of enrollment, and the program’s manager said the 20-week Zoom program included homework and journaling. Father also began conjoint therapy with Mother, and they completed their initial session. In addition, Father stated he was awaiting being linked to an individual counselor and was open to pursuing additional referrals from DCFS. In its October 15, 2025 amended section 300 petition, DCFS also alleged Mother allowed Father to reside in the home and have unlimited access to Elijah and his siblings. The previous 10 allegations from the earlier iteration of this section 300 petition also remained. On October 20, 2025, the trial court conducted the adjudication and disposition hearing for DCFS’s section 300 petition addressing Elijah. Regarding Father’s conduct, the trial court sustained allegations that: (1) the parents’ domestic violence in the presence of the siblings placed Elijah at risk of harm; (2) Father’s physical abuse of D.K. placed Elijah at risk; (3) Father’s physical abuse of Za. placed Elijah at risk; and (4) Father resided in the siblings’ home with unlimited access to the children in violation of court orders, endangering Elijah. In ruling on jurisdiction, the court made the following findings regarding the section 387 petition while also referencing the section 300 petition: “The mother allowed the father to reside in the home and have unlimited access.… [¶] Since that court date, we have continued to have issues of compliance. Father’s lack of compliance, walk-ons and requests and orders for me to try to make sure that the father didn’t live in the home, to try to convince the mother to comply, with mother lying on the record to the court, father lying on the record to the court. The parents lying to their attorneys so that their attorneys [unknowingly] misrepresented facts to the court.” “The nexus and the risk that I see is that even though there have not been any police reports or any hospital visits by [Mother] about any domestic violence, [Father] has not overcome the initial petition that was sustained at the start of the case.” “[W]hat programs has [Father] done? A month of domestic violence? A couple of sessions of conjoint? How is that substantial so that there’s no risk? Maybe nobody’s reported it. Maybe the kids are so coached that they wouldn’t think to report.” 11  The trial court then removed Elijah from Father’s care. Under the section 387 petition that is not subject to this appeal, the trial court ordered D.K., Za. and Kh. removed from Father’s care, leaving the status quo in place. Father appealed the jurisdictional finding regarding Elijah and the trial court’s order removing Elijah from his care on October 20, 2025. Father also made substantive arguments regarding D.K., Za. and Kh. on appeal, and listed these children on his notice of appeal. DISCUSSION Father argues that he did not pose a risk to his children and that both the trial court’s jurisdictional and removal orders are unsupported by the record. We disagree as Father’s pattern of domestic violence presents an appropriate basis for jurisdiction and removal of Elijah from Father’ care. In addition, because Father did not appeal any order governing D.K., Za. and Kh., we dismiss Father’s appeal regarding these children. 1. Sufficiency of evidence supporting jurisdiction 1.1 Governing law Under section 300, subdivision (j), the juvenile court may assert jurisdiction if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be neglected.” (§ 300, subd. (j).) “Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 12 591, 601–602.) “ ‘A parent’s “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” ’ ” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.) Our Supreme Court has explained, section 300, subdivision (j), “ ‘was intended to expand the grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction as to children whose sibling has been abused or neglected as defined in section 300, subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i).’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774.) “ ‘The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly indicates that the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substantial risk of harm ... . The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’ ” (Ibid.) We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) 1.2 Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s jurisdictional finding based on Father’s domestic violence Exposing children to recurring domestic violence may be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 300. (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238; In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134.) Physical violence between a child’s parents supports 13 the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300 “where there is evidence that the domestic violence has placed the child at risk of physical harm and the violence is ongoing or likely to recur.” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.) Thus, even where the child has not yet been physically harmed, “the cycle of violence between the parents constitute[s] a failure to protect [the child] ‘from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.’ ” (In re T.V., at p. 135.) On appeal, Father first argues that there was no evidence of risk to Elijah because the domestic violence in the record was too remote in time, his children wanted to be with him, and his failure to complete the case plan did not create a current risk. Father cites to cases such as In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384, for the legally correct proposition that there must be a current risk of harm to support jurisdiction. Regarding the timing of the domestic violence, Father is correct that significant time passed. At the time of October 2025 jurisdictional hearing for Elijah, the most recent domestic violence incident was over two years old, from August 2023. As reflected in the record, however, the period of relative calm took place entirely under trial court jurisdiction with at least some periods where there is evidence that parents had limited contact with each other. In the subsequent report, filed in April 2024, after the trial court sustained the most recent domestic violence incident, Mother indicated that she did not intend to see Father or reunite with him. In the next DCFS report when interviewed in November 2024, Father stated that he was not seeing Mother and they did not speak to each other. Because Mother and Father lied about how often they saw each 14 other later in the case, the record is muddled, at best, about how often the parents were in each other’s presence. Regardless, the mere passage of time alone does not establish that Mother and Father no longer posed a domestic violence risk in each other’s presence as the record contains evidence that they were not together during a large chunk of this period. More importantly, the record established a long history of domestic violence, including a previous dependency petition in 2017 where the trial court found that the parents engaged in domestic violence and then Father allowed Mother to have unlimited access to the children. In March 2023, D.K. and Za. became dependents a second time because of their parents’ domestic violence, and Kh. became a dependent for the first time. Regarding the 2023 petition, there was evidence in the record that Father told police there was a history of domestic violence in his relationship with Mother. However, when DCFS interviewed him, he denied any current domestic violence and denied any previous domestic violence. When DCFS spoke to Mother, she admitted that Father pushed her and chased her in 2023, yet still denied there had been any domestic violence. D.K. and Kh., however, stated that domestic violence took place and that they had been coached to hide it. In August 2023, the parents again engaged in mutual domestic violence, while the children were released to their care, albeit with D.K. and Za. at school. The parents both conceded elements of domestic violence to the police, but then denied it to DCFS. D.K. and Za. both stated that domestic violence took place. On March 6, 2025, the children were released to Mother’s care with court orders restricting Father from living with Mother 15 and the children. Kh. alerted DCFS that the Father was living in the family home, and Mother was pregnant with Elijah at that time. Mother denied Father was living with the children and denied she was pregnant with Father’s child. Father also denied that he was Elijah’s Father and denied being in Mother’s presence. Thereafter, when DCFS found evidence that Elijah shared Father’s last name, Mother conceded that Father was Elijah’s father. Mother also admitted she and Father were raising the children together, including Elijah. We find this record presents an appropriate basis for jurisdiction over Elijah. Initially, eight years before the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing at issue here, the parents engaged in a similar pattern of behavior. In 2017, there was mutual domestic violence, and then one parent later allowed the other parent unlimited access to the children. At that time, it was the Father who allowed Mother unsupervised access to the children. For the current facts, the parents engaged in domestic violence, and the trial court released the children to one parent, Mother. Then, Mother allowed Father to move into the home, providing him unlimited access to the children. Here, the parents, including Father, have violated court orders to expose the children to a risk of domestic violence both historically and currently. Moreover, over the course of many years beginning in 2017, the parents exposed the children to domestic violence, which suggests a continuing risk of harm to the children. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156.) The parents even engaged in domestic violence while under court supervision, further suggesting that Father could not control his impulse to engage in domestic violence even when the consequences for his acts would 16 be heightened. In addition, Father’s continued denials of any domestic violence also increased the risk of recurrence. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) Nor did Father ameliorate the risk of domestic violence by making significant progress on his case plan, as Father had barely begun his program to address domestic violence. Finally, the children had been coached to cover up domestic violence, which created an additional risk that further violence would go unreported. Second, Father relies on appellate authority establishing that parents should not have custody of their children compromised simply to punish them for violating court orders. (In re W.O. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 906, 910.) While this is correct statement of the law, the evidence here establishes a continuing risk to Elijah, rather than any desire to punish Father. The trial court did note that Father repeatedly lied in the DCFS reports, but the trial court’s analysis of the current risk to Elijah does not rest on punishing Father. In short, we find that the trial court’s jurisdictional finding that Elijah was at risk of harm from Father’s domestic violence is supported by substantial evidence. Further, “ ‘ “[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283.) Thus, we do not address the alternative bases for jurisdiction over Elijah that the trial court sustained. 2. Substantial evidence supports the order removing Elijah from Father’s care To remove a child from parental custody, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence, that the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without 17 removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The jurisdictional findings provide prima facie evidence the minor cannot safely remain in the home. (Ibid.) The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. (In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 135–136.) We review the court’s dispositional findings for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) The trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supported Elijah’s removal is also supported by the record. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The same evidence supporting jurisdiction also supports removal from Father. Father has a long history of domestic violence, he commits domestic violence even under trial court supervision, he denies the history of domestic violence, and he has not made sufficient progress to address his propensity for domestic violence. In addition, Father’s willingness to lie about the violence and the fact that his children have been coached to lie about the presence of violence in the home, further creates additional risk that domestic violence may be unaddressed. 3. We dismiss the appeal regarding D.K., Za. and Kh. In his reply brief, Father clarifies that “Father appeals from the findings and orders made at the hearing conducted on October 20, 2025 regarding the amended section 300 petition filed on October 15, 2025.” Father further correctly explains that the “section 387 petition … pertains only to mother” and explains he does not challenge those orders. However, the only petition challenged on appeal, the section 300 petition heard on October 20, 2025, and the removal order related to that petition, addressed only Elijah. As a result, this appeal only challenges orders sustaining jurisdiction and removal regarding Elijah. Consequently, there is no order to challenge on appeal regarding 18 D.K., Za., or Kh., and we must dismiss Father’s appeals related to these children. DISPOSITION We affirm the order asserting jurisdiction over Elijah because of Father’s domestic violence under section 300, subdivision (j), and affirm the dispositional order removing Elijah from Father’s care. We dismiss Father’s appeal of the orders regarding D.K., Za., and Kh. VIRAMONTES, J. WE CONCUR: STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J. 19