C.M. v. G.M. CA4/2

Filed 11/3/26 C.M. v. G.M. CA4/2 Opinion following rehearing NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO C.M., Plaintiff and Respondent, E086357 v. (Super.Ct.No. DVME2501965) G.M., OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sophia Choi, Judge. Affirmed. G.M., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. C.M., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1  The family court issued a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting plaintiff and respondent C.M. (Wife) from her husband, defendant and appellant G.M. (Husband). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 On appeal, Husband raises contentions pertaining to insufficient evidence, due process violations, judicial bias, and errors admitting and excluding evidence. We affirm the order. FACTS On April 18, 2025, Wife applied for a domestic violence restraining order against Husband, including requests for (1) a stay-away order; (2) a move-out order; (3) an award of sole possession of three dogs; and (4) an order that Husband stay 100 yards away from the three dogs. In a declaration, Wife asserted that, on April 17, 2025, Husband demanded sexual intercourse. When Wife declined, Husband attempted to take her telephone from her hands and was verbally abusive. The family court issued a temporary restraining order. The hearing on a permanent restraining order took place on June 16, 2025. “[T]he court in the morning half of court session inquired of [Husband] as to a continuance to exchange discovery, but he declined the continuance and indicated he wanted to proceed with the trial. The court then placed the matter on second call for both sides to exchange evidence and witness lists. [¶] The matter was recalled at 1:40 p.m., after the lunch break.” 1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated. 2  Wife testified regarding the events of April 17, 2025, and to other acts of abuse: (1) on February 16, 2025, Husband grabbed Wife’s throat; (2) since November 2024, Huband has forced Wife to engage in anal intercourse; (3) on July 7, 2022, Husband grabbed Wife’s arm and threw her to the ground causing a bruise; (4) on December 5, 2021, Husband shoved Wife into a car door; (5) Husband struck one of the dogs, Ranger, with a belt; and (6) as to their dog Ghost, Husband punched the dog, threw shoes at the dog, and threw the dog. Husband also testified at the hearing. Husband “testified that he did not intend to harm [Wife] or law enforcement. [Husband] told the court to obtain law enforcement bodycam footage to verify his account, which the court declined.” As to Husband’s documentary evidence, the record reflects, “[Husband] presented evidence, through documents, that nothing was good enough for [Wife] and that she was always in a bad mood.” DISCUSSION A. RECORD ON APPEAL At the outset, we clarify the boundaries of the record on appeal, which includes a clerk’s transcript and a certified settled statement. 1. SETTLED STATEMENT On September 23, 2025, the family court filed an order on Husband’s First Amended Proposed Settled Statement concluding that corrections were required. The family court attached a modified settled statement to that order. On September 29, 2025, Husband filed a Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement. 3  The family court reviewed (1) the September 23, 2025, modified settled statement, and (2) Husband’s September 29, 2025, Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement. The family court certified the September 23, 2025, modified settled statement for the record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(h); Branger v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 351, 351 [“The settled statement, until certified, is not record”].) Husband asserts that the family court certified his Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement. Husband is mistaken. The family court’s order reads, “The court certifies the statement provided in the court’s 1st Amended Order on [Husband’s] Proposed Settled Statement, filed September 23, 2025. The court settles the statement and certifies that it is ready to be sent to the Court of Appeal.” The statement provided in the order on the First Amended Proposed Settled Statement is the September 23, 2025, modified settled statement. In his briefing on appeal, Husband repeatedly cites the September 29, 2025, Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement. We do not utilize the September 29, 2025, Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement because it was not certified by the family court. 2. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF Husband attached multiple exhibits to his appellant’s opening brief. In our review of the clerk’s transcript, we have been unable to locate exhibits that match those attached to Husband’s opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d).) Accordingly, we disregard the exhibits attached to Husband’s appellant’s opening brief. 4  B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Husband contends there is insufficient evidence he poses a “present credible threat of future abuse.” A DVRO may be issued “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse” (§ 6220), upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” (§ 6300, subd. (a); see also In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225-226). Evidence of a “present credible threat” is not a requirement for issuing a DVRO in California. (Fam. Code, §§ 6220, 6300; Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137 [Family Code, section 6300 “require[s] a showing of past abuse, not a threat of future harm”]; Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 783 [only past abuse is required for DVRO proceedings].) However, a person can be guilty of a wobbler offense if he violates a DVRO by committing “an act of violence or ‘a credible threat’ of violence.” (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(4).) Because a “present credible threat” is not a requirement for issuing a DVRO, we do not examine whether there is evidence to support such a finding. Husband also asserts that the family court erred by failing to make a “present credible threat” finding. As explained ante, such a finding is not required for issuing a DVRO. Therefore, the family court did not err. C. HUSBAND’S EVIDENCE Husband contends the family court erred by excluding evidence that was relevant to Wife’s credibility. Specifically, Husband sought to present evidence that Wife “had made nearly identical, unsubstantiated abuse claims in a prior proceeding.” The certified 5 settled statement does not include any information about credibility evidence having been excluded. Therefore, due to the inadequate record, we are unable to review this contention and must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos & Munoz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1126-1127.) D. DUE PROCESS 1. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE Husband contends the family court’s exclusion of his evidence amounted to a denial of his due process right to present a defense. “ ‘In a contested restraining order hearing, the trial court is tasked with protecting the fundamental due process rights of self-represented litigants both seeking a restraining order or defending against the request.’ ” (Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 149.) “Due process requires ‘the right to be heard in a meaningful manner.’ [Citation.] ‘A meaningful hearing requires an opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935.) “As a general matter, the ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence … does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.’ [Citations.] Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically could rise to this level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103.) At the DVRO hearing, Husband testified regarding his lack of intent to cause harm. Additionally, “[Husband] told the [family] court to obtain law enforcement 6 bodycam footage to verify his account, which the court declined.” The record does not indicate that Husband had the bodycam footage to play during the hearing. Rather, it reflects that Husband told the family court to gather evidence on his behalf. In other words, the family court did not exclude evidence that Husband sought to provide, it declined to gather evidence on Husband’s behalf. Indeed, Husband refers to the bodycam footage as “the evidence he asked the court to obtain.” Because the family court did not exclude Husband’s evidence, we conclude the family court did not violate Husband’s right to present a defense. 2. COURT REPORTER Husband contends that the lack of a court reporter at the hearing requires reversal because there is no reporter’s transcript of what transpired at hearing. Pursuant to Riverside County Superior Court Rules, rule 5153(E), “The court no longer provides court reporters for family law cases.” If Husband wanted a reporter’s transcript, then he needed to arrange for a court reporter to serve at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.956(c).) In a petition for rehearing, Husband asserts this court should have considered the recently issued case Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (2026) 20 Cal.5th 564 (FVAP). In FVAP, our Supreme Court discussed the shortage of court reporters in California courts and the negative impact the shortage has on indigent parties seeking thorough appellate review. (Id. at pp. 576-577.) The Supreme Court observed that many trial courts have policies requiring court reporters be provided for indigent parties, but often there is an insufficient number of court reporters, so indigent parties 7 frequently must choose between foregoing a court reporter or accepting a continuance. (Id. at pp. 576, 592.) The Supreme Court concluded that trial courts have a duty “to provide indigent litigants, upon request, with meaningful access in all cases to an official verbatim record of proceedings, including by means of electronic recording if an official reporter or official reporter pro tempore is unavailable.” (Id. at p. 596.) Notably, it is incumbent upon the indigent litigant to request a court reporter in the trial court. Riverside County Superior Court has the following directive: “In civil proceedings, a party who has received a fee waiver may request an official court reporter pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.956(b)(3) at least 10 calendar days prior to a trial or hearing by submitting Judicial Council form FW-020.” (Riverside County Superior Court Rules, rule 1095.) In his petition for rehearing, Husband asserts that he “requested an official record and showed he could not afford a private reporter (CT ___); none was provided.” Husband left the record citation blank. We have reviewed the register of actions and located Husband’s requests for a fee waiver. We also located Husband’s request for a court reporter, which was filed two days after the DVRO hearing; the DVRO hearing occurred on June 16, 2025; on June 18, 2025, Husband requested a court reporter for the June 16th hearing. Because Husband waited until after the DVRO hearing to request a court reporter, there was no error in failing to provide him a court reporter or an electronic recording of the DVRO hearing. 8  3. DISCOVERY DEADLINES Husband contends the family court erred by permitting Wife to present evidence that was not exchanged prior to the hearing in compliance with discovery deadlines. “[D]iscovery pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act [citation], is not permitted” in DVRO proceedings (§ 6309, subd. (b)), unless the family court grants a discovery request upon a showing of good cause (§ 6309, subd. (c)(1)). There is no indication that Husband made a request and established good cause for formal discovery. Therefore, there was no violation of formal discovery deadlines. Nevertheless, due process applies in DVRO proceedings, and due process “ ‘requires an opportunity to examine evidence and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 935.) The family court asked Husband if he wanted a continuance in order to exchange discovery, but he declined. As a result, the family court placed the hearing on second call, giving Husband an opportunity to examine Wife’s evidence during the break. Given that Husband was offered a continuance and declined, we conclude the family court did not violate Husband’s right to due process. Husband contends the family court wrongly permitted Wife to withhold evidence until the hearing, then “grant[ed] a recess to [let Wife] organize the surprise evidence, while denying [Husband] a continuance to respond.” The record reflects, “[T]he court in the morning half of court session inquired of [Husband] as to a continuance to exchange discovery, but he declined the continuance and indicated he wanted to proceed with the trial. The court then placed the matter on 9 second call for both sides to exchange evidence and witness lists. [¶] The matter was recalled at 1:40 p.m., after the lunch break.” Based upon the record, Husband declined the court’s offer of a continuance and the recess was meant to benefit both parties in exchanging discovery. Accordingly, we reject Husband’s assertions that the family court denied him a continuance and that the recess was meant to advantage Wife. In Husband’s appellant’s opening brief, he cites Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 for legal authority. That statute pertains to noticed motions, which are often decided without an evidentiary hearing or trial. By contrast, the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.) controls the exchange of evidence prior to trial. (Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1288.) In this case, there was a trial. Therefore, it is the discovery rules that would control the exchange of evidence; however, as explained ante, discovery is only available upon a showing of good cause in DVRO proceedings. (Fam. Code, § 6309, subds. (b))&(c)(1).) In Husband’s petition for rehearing, he asserts the certified settled statement contains omissions. Husband contends that he tried to correct the omissions via his September 29, 2025, “Second Amended Proposed Settled Statement,” but the family court declined to certify that proposed statement. For example, Husband contends the certified settled statement includes the first discussion of a continuance, which occurred before evidence was exchanged, but it omits a second discussion of a continuance, which occurred after Wife presented her case in the family court. Husband asserts that omissions in the record should not be a basis for affirming the DVRO given Husband’s 10 attempt to cure the omissions. Husband waited until a petition for rehearing in the appellate court to challenge the juvenile court’s allegedly incomplete settled statement. Because Husband waited so long, he has forfeited the issue of the settled statement allegedly being incomplete. (See generally St. George v. Superior Court in and for San Mateo County (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 815, 816-817 [discussing challenging a trial court’s decision not to certify a settled statement]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137 [procedures for certifying settled statements].) 4. CUMULATIVE ERROR Husband contends that when the foregoing alleged errors are added together, they amount to a due process violation. We have not found an error, which means there are no errors to add together. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 562 [“In the absence of error, there is nothing to cumulate”].) Husband’s right of due process was not violated. E. WIFE’S EVIDENCE 1. VIDEO Husband contends the family court erred by admitting an edited video offered by Wife because the editing caused the video to be misleading. Evidence Code section 356 provides: “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in 11 evidence.” If Husband wanted to introduce the rest of the video or question Wife about the rest of the video, then he likely could have done so. (Evid. Code, § 356.) The family court did not err by admitting the edited video. 2. TESTIMONY Husband contends the family court erred by permitting Wife “to testify about a series of uncorroborated alleged incidents from 2021 through 2025, including serious claims of sexual and physical abuse, without any supporting evidence beyond her own testimony.” Husband asserts that the admission of the testimony violated Evidence Code section 352 because it was uncorroborated and the incidents were remote in time. The law pertaining to DVRO proceedings is as follows: “An order may be issued under this part to restrain any person for the purpose specified in Section 6220, if an affidavit or testimony and any additional information provided to the court pursuant to Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse. The court may issue an order under this part based solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (§ 6300, subd. (a), italics added.) There is no requirement of corroboration in DVRO proceedings; the testimony of the person seeking protection can be sufficient evidence to issue a DVRO. (§ 6300, subd. (a); In re F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119 [“In many domestic violence cases, however, the sole evidence of abuse will be the survivor’s own testimony which, standing alone, can be sufficient to establish a fact”].) Turning to remoteness, DVRO proceedings require “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) Wife’s testimony that Husband abused her from 12 2021 to 2025 was probative of an ongoing pattern of abuse that necessitated a DVRO to “prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse.” (§ 6220.) Thus, the family court did not err by permitting Wife to testify to the past acts of abuse. F. HUSBAND’S DVRO REQUEST 1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Wife filed her request for a DVRO with a move-out order on April 18, 2025. On April 24, 2025, Husband filed his own request for a DVRO and a request for control of property, but neither of Husband’s filings is included in the record on appeal. Husband’s and Wife’s requests were both heard on June 16, 2025. The following is taken from the settled statement: “The [family] court found that [it] must not issue mutual protective orders unless the court makes detailed findings of fact that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in self-defense. [(§ 6305, subd. (a)(2).)] The dominant aggressor is the person determined to be the most significant. The court found [Husband] to be the dominant aggressor.”2 “The [family] court found insufficient evidence of domestic abuse by [Wife] against [Husband] but found sufficient evidence of domestic abuse by [Husband] against [Wife]. Accordingly, the [family] court denied [Husband’s] request for a restraining order but granted [Wife’s] request for one.” “[Husband’s] requests for orders re: property control, spousal support, mental health evaluations, and any other requests in the requests for 2 In the settled statement, there is a mixture of “primary aggressor” (Fam. Code, § 6305, subd. (a)(2)) and “dominant aggressor” (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. (c)(3)). 13 orders were denied.” The DVRO issued by the family court included an order for Husband to move out of the residence he shared with Wife. 2. PRIMARY AGGRESSOR Husband contends the family court erred in finding him to be the primary aggressor (§ 6305, subd. (a)(2)), because the court excluded “all of his evidence concerning [Wife’s] motive to fabricate allegations in the context of the pending dissolution proceedings.” The settled statement does not mention excluded evidence offered by Husband. It only includes the family court’s denial of Husband’s request for the family court to gather bodycam footage on behalf of Husband. Because we do not have an adequate record to know what evidence offered by Husband may have been excluded, we must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 312.) Husband also asserts that the family court failed to make a finding that he was the dominant aggressor. Contrary to Husband’s assertion, the minute order and certified settled statement read, “The court found [Husband] to be the dominant aggressor.” 3. JUDICIAL BIAS Husband contends that the Honorable Sophia Choi was biased against him as demonstrated by (1) her favorable rulings toward Wife, such as not requiring Wife to comply with discovery deadlines, (2) the move-out order against Husband, and (3) the denial of Husband’s request for control of property. “ ‘[A] trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 14 732; see also In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1328 [“[T]he mere fact a judicial officer rules against a party does not show bias”].) Because Husband’s contention of judicial bias is based upon rulings that were unfavorable to him, his contention fails. G. COMMUNITY PROPERTY Husband contends the family court erred by ordering Husband to move out of the home he shared with Wife because the court failed to preserve community assets. Husband asserts he shares the mortgage with Wife; Wife stopped paying the mortgage; and the house is at risk of foreclosure. Wife contends the house was at risk of foreclosure at the time of the DVRO hearing. With some statutory exceptions, community property is defined as “all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state.” (§ 760.) It is unclear from the record whether the house is community property. The record does not include a finding from the family court that the house is community property. In Wife’s DVRO application, in the section for requesting a move-out order, Wife marked the boxes next to (1) “I own the home,” (2) “My name is on the lease,” (3) I have lived at this address for 3 years,” and (4) “I pay for some or all the rent or mortgage.” The record does not indicate to whom the house belongs, which means the record is inadequate to address Husband’s contention. Therefore, we must conclude the family court did not err. (In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos & Munoz, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1126-1127.) 15  G. CUMULATIVE ERROR Husband contends that, cumulatively, the family court’s errors amount to a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. We have found no errors. Therefore, there are no errors to cumulate. (See People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 562 [“In the absence of error, there is nothing to cumulate”].) DISPOSITION The DVRO is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. MILLER J. We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. CODRINGTON J. 16