Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 177 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-328 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 H.C., L.S., R.T., AND T.K. APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 60CV-22-4435] V. JAMES DARRELL NESMITH APPELLEE HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX, JUDGE REVERSED AND REMANDED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED. NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice This case presents a particularly important question: Can the General Assembly extend the statute of limitations in cases where it has already run and afford child-sex-abuse victims an opportunity to hold their abusers accountable? Citing this court’s vested-rights precedent, Defendant James Nesmith argues that it cannot. That precedent categorically bars “expand[ing] a limitation period so as to revive a claim already barred.” Hall v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 356 Ark. 609, 613–14, 158 S.W.3d 185, 188 (2004). Recognizing that, Plaintiffs—four individuals who allege Nesmith sexually abused them as children and failed to bring those claims within the generally applicable limitations period—urge us to reexamine that precedent and uphold the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-118(b) (Supp. 2025). That act revived and extended the statute of limitations for claims brought by minors for sexual abuse, and if valid, that act would revive Plaintiffs’ claims. The circuit court sided with Nesmith and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted Plaintiffs’ petition for review and now reverse the circuit court’s order. Revisiting our vested-rights precedent, we conclude that it lacks any constitutional basis and, as such, cannot stand. We therefore overrule our prior cases prohibiting the legislature from expanding a limitations period and thereby reviving time- barred claims; uphold the Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act against Nesmith’s constitutional challenge; reverse the circuit court’s decision dismissing this case on statute of limitations grounds; and remand this matter for further proceedings. Facts and Procedural Background Plaintiffs are four individuals who allege that Defendant James Nesmith sexually abused them while they were children. They claim that Nesmith abused them multiple times between 1995 and 2007. Three plaintiffs allege that Nesmith, then a pediatric doctor, abused them during medical visits. The fourth plaintiff alleges that Nesmith molested him multiple times at his home and at a church camp, where Nesmith served as a counselor. Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to recover damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, and the infliction of extreme emotional distress. Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to those damages under tort law and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-107 (Repl. 2016), which affords crime victims a cause of action. The parties agree that Plaintiffs did not bring those claims within the generally applicable limitations periods. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-56-105 (Repl. 2005) (establishing 2 a three-year limitations period for tort actions); 16-56-116 (Repl. 2005) (permitting minors to bring actions within three years after turning twenty-one).1 Plaintiffs, however, argue the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act revived those claims. As relevant here, that Act allows child sex-abuse victims to bring otherwise time-barred “civil action[s]” against their abusers within a narrow time window. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-118(b)(2). Plaintiffs undisputedly filed their complaint within that window.2 Nesmith moved for summary judgment. He argued that under this court’s vested- rights precedent, the General Assembly lacked the authority to revive already time-barred claims and that, as a result, the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act was invalid. And absent that act, he argued, Plaintiffs’ claims are undisputedly time-barred, entitling him to judgment as a matter of law. The circuit court agreed, granted Nesmith’s summary- judgment motion, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds. The court of appeals affirmed. H.C. v. Nesmith, 2025 Ark. App. 59, at 4–10, 705 S.W.3d 880, 884–86. In so doing, that court acknowledged the abhorrent nature of Nesmith’s alleged conduct but found that it was powerless to reach a different result, considering “supreme court precedent prohibiting legislative attempts to revive expired 1 Nesmith argued below that Plaintiffs’ claims were also barred by the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, which sets a different limitations period for injuries related to the provision of “professional services.” McQuay v. Guntharp, 336 Ark. 534, 540, 986 S.W.2d 850, 852–53 (1999); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-201(3). Plaintiffs’ sexual-assault claims are not that, and that provision does not apply. 2 The General Assembly has modified the period for bringing those claims, but those amendments are not material here because everyone agrees Plaintiffs filed their complaint within the window established by the version of the statute in effect at the time. See Act 117 of 2023. 3 statutes of limitation[s].” Id. at 10, 705 S.W.3d at 886. We granted Plaintiffs’ petition for review and now revisit that precedent. Discussion Plaintiffs ask us to reverse the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment. They argue that the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act is a lawful exercise of the General Assembly’s power and that it revived their otherwise time-barred claims. “We review circuit court orders granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party].” Gates v. Hudson, 2025 Ark. 48, at 6, 711 S.W.3d 142, 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having conducted that review, we reverse the circuit court’s order granting Nesmith’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint on statute-of- limitations grounds. Accepting Plaintiffs’ invitation to reexamine our vested-rights precedent, we find no constitutional basis for that precedent.3 Far from it, that precedent rests entirely on ungrounded judicial assertions and a deeply flawed understanding of the role of statutes of limitations. As such, we decline to reaffirm our vested-rights precedent, and we overrule the categorical prohibition against reviving barred claims. A. Start with first principles. Our constitution divides power between the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and it gives each a distinct role. Ark. Const. art. 4, § 1. Most importantly here, it vests the legislative department—in the form of the General Assembly—with the power to resolve public policy questions and ultimately “proclaim the 3 Plaintiffs did not timely respond to the motion for summary judgment. But they were nevertheless permitted to file a response, and thus, the response was considered by the circuit court. Those arguments are part of the record on appeal. 4 law through statutory enactments.” McCarty v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 2021 Ark. 105, at 3, 622 S.W.3d 162, 164; see also Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1 (The legislative power of the people of this State shall be vested in a General Assembly.”). That power is broad, “subject only to the limitations and restrictions” contained in the federal Constitution and other state constitutional provisions. Gipson v. Ingram, 215 Ark. 812, 817 n.5, 223 S.W.2d 595, 598 n.5 (1949). And our constitution vests the Governor with “supreme executive power” and responsibility for ensuring the General Assembly’s enactments are faithfully executed. Ark. Const. art. 6, § 2. By contrast, the judiciary’s role is narrow. We do not legislate, resolve public policy disputes, execute the laws, or pass on the wisdom of legislation; we “interpret legislative enactments” and enforce the federal and state constitutions. McCarty, 2021 Ark. 105, at 3, 622 S.W.3d at 164. Even then, our power to strike down legislation is highly circumscribed, limited strictly to cases in which “there is a clear incompatibility between the act and the constitution” and there is no possible constitutional interpretation of an act. City of Cave Springs v. City of Rogers, 343 Ark. 652, 659, 37 S.W.3d 607, 611 (2001); accord Jeffery v. Trevathan, 215 Ark. 311, 320, 220 S.W.2d 412, 417 (1949). Thus, when faced with a constitutional challenge to duly enacted legislation, as in this case, we “strong[ly] presum[e]” the legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, and absent clear evidence to the contrary, we must uphold the act. Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 523, 247 S.W.3d 851, 855 (2007). B. With that backdrop in mind, we turn to our vested-rights precedent. Under that precedent, “the legislature cannot expand a statute of limitation so as to revive a cause of 5 action already barred.” Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 203, 823 S.W.2d 883, 885 (1992); accord Chunn v. D’Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 145, 847 S.W.2d 699, 701 (1993); Wasson v. State ex rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537, 538, 60 S.W.2d 1020, 1021 (1933). That doctrine rests on the assumption that when a civil statute of limitations runs, a tortfeasor has a vested right to the property that could have been the subject of a potential claim. See id. at 1020–21; see also Johnson, 308 Ark. at 203, 823 S.W.2d at 885. In fact, our case law suggests that interest is so powerful that not even a change in the constitution—affirmatively giving the legislature the power to revive stale claims—could override it. See Wasson, 187 Ark. 537, 60 S.W.2d at 1020–21 (“[A]fter a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the Legislature has power to divest that right and revive the cause of action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson, 308 Ark. at 203, 823 S.W.2d at 885 (same). Predictably, given that atextual framing, our cases do not cite any constitutional basis for that doctrine. Far from it, when we first employed that principle to strike down legislation in 1933, we instead relied on a single legal encyclopedia published in 1915 assuring us that—at that sole moment in time—most jurisdictions held that legislatures could not revive a claim after a statute-of-limitations defense had run. Wasson, 187 Ark. at 538, 60 S.W.2d at 1020–21. Or, perhaps more generously, we relied on that legal encyclopedia plus an unreasoned extension of this court’s prior case law suggesting that to retroactively alter an applicable statute of limitations, the legislature needed to speak clearly and show it had considered the consequences. See id. at 1021 (declaring the 1915 encyclopedia’s framing was consistent with “[t]he rule announced . . . by this court in Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6 6, 164 S. W. 752”); see also Trapnall v. Burton, 24 Ark. 371, 385 (1866) (“[W]hen a new statute of limitations is enacted, it will be taken to be prospective in its operation, and to apply, not to causes of action which had accrued at its passage, but to those accruing thereafter, in the absence of language in the statute compelling a contrary construction.”); Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6, 14, 164 S.W. 752, 754 (1914) (“[W]e assume that the Legislature had in mind this rule of construction.”). That approach, unbound by actual text or constitutional history, is not consistent with our constitutional role. On the contrary, as discussed above, our constitutional role is limited to interpreting enactments and enforcing constitutional provisions. See Taylor v. Ferguson, 2025 Ark. 180, at 10, 722 S.W.3d 498, 504. It does not include constructing atextual limitations on the legislature’s power—let alone ones so robust that not even a “constitutional convention” can override it. See Wasson, 187 Ark. at 538, 60 S.W.2d at 1021. As such, our prior conviction that something should be the law is not a basis for striking down legislation, and it was not a basis for the circuit court to do so here. To be sure, some later cases—perhaps recognizing that our earlier cases do not cite any constitutional language supporting our vested-rights precedent—suggest that precedent rests on due-process principles. See Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Div. of Econ. & Med. Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 210, 866 S.W.2d 823, 825 (1993) (“We have indicated that it would violate due process to disturb vested rights or contractual rights.”); Forrest City Machine Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 40, 616 S.W.2d 720, 724 (1981). Our dissenting colleague employs the same approach. See post at __ (Womack, J., dissenting). But slapping a constitutional label on a century-old doctrine does not replace principled constitutional 7 analysis. Cf. Johnson, 308 Ark. at 203, 823 S.W.2d at 885 (still relying on the 1915 publication and an unreasoned citation to Rhodes to support vested-rights doctrine). Still, even if it did, that label does not work because the expiration of a statute-of-limitations period does not confer a property right—or any other right for that matter. As the Supreme Court has explained in rejecting similar arguments under the federal due process clause, a statute-of-limitations period merely governs the time within which a claim must be brought, see Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); it does not reflect a legislative judgment “that [a] defendant should ‘be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time.’” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014) (citing C.J.S. § 7, at 24 and comparing statutes of limitations and statutes of repose). Instead, these limitations “are by definition arbitrary” and rest entirely on legislative judgments about how best to encourage plaintiffs to diligently pursue claims and avoid litigation “after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.” Chase, 325 U.S. at 314; accord CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 8. As such, they “represent a public policy [choice] about” how to balance those interests and exist only by “legislative grace.” Chase, 325 U.S. at 314, 316. Altering that period and establishing a different, equally “arbitrary” date does not—contrary to our prior case law’s unfounded assertion—deprive a defendant of any vested property right. Id. Rather, balancing competing interests and “resolv[ing] the debate” about when a claim should be time-barred is precisely the kind of thing that our constitution leaves “to the legislature.” Standridge v. Fort Smith Pub. Schs., 2025 Ark. 42, at 11, 708 S.W.3d 773, 781. 8 We therefore hold that the court’s vested-rights precedent has no basis in law, and we overrule our prior cases categorically barring the legislature from expanding the limitations period and thereby reviving claims. Indeed, as we recently reaffirmed, “we are bound by constitutional text,” not precedent that “treats our constitution not as a written document but as a set of civic values and norms determined by judges.” State v. Minor Child, 2026 Ark. 66, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Gamble v. State, 2026 Ark. 44, at 11, 729 S.W.3d 661, 667; State v. Good Day Farm Ark., LLC, 2025 Ark. 207, at 12, 725 S.W.3d 1, 8. And we now restore to the General Assembly its constitutional power to decide how long is too long to bring a claim. C. Absent our vested-rights precedent, this is an easy case. The General Assembly has the authority to set statutes of limitations, and it did so here when it passed the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act and established a new window for bringing child- sex-abuse claims. No one disputes that Plaintiffs brought their claims within the window set by the General Assembly, and as such, the circuit court erred as a matter of law in dismissing those claims on statute-of-limitations grounds. We reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds. Conclusion Nothing in our constitution supports the court’s prior cases finding a vested right in a statute of limitations defense. Those cases rest entirely on ungrounded judicial pronouncements and a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of statutes of limitations. We decline to reaffirm that precedent. Instead, revisiting that precedent and returning to constitutional text, we overrule it and restore to the people’s elected representatives a power 9 this court should never have taken from them. Having done so, we reject Nesmith’s challenge to the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, reverse the circuit court’s decision dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds, and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded; court of appeals opinion vacated. Special Justice CORY COX joins. HUDSON, J., concurs. BAKER, C.J., and WOMACK, J., dissent. WEBB, J., not participating. COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. I begin with the fundamental principle that, as a general rule, we are bound to follow prior case law under the doctrine of stare decisis, a policy designed to lend predictability and stability to the law. Ward v. State, 2015 Ark. 62, at 5, 455 S.W.3d 830, 833. This court has consistently recognized a strong presumption regarding the validity of prior decisions, and it is necessary as a matter of public policy to uphold previous decisions unless great injury or injustice would result. Columbia Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Cenark Project Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2016 Ark. 185, at 11, 491 S.W.3d 135, 142. In other words, we do not lightly overrule our previous cases; precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable. See McCullon v. State, 2023 Ark. 190, at 24, 679 S.W.3d 358, 377. 10 Recognizing the vital importance of stare decisis, I nonetheless conclude that this is an exceptional case that warrants breaking with our precedent. Before the General Assembly enacted the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sexual Abuse Act, Act 1036 of 2021, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-118-118 (Supp. 2025), victims of sexual abuse who were under age twenty-one generally had until three years after attaining full age to file suit. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-116 (Repl. 2005). But see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-130 (Repl. 2005) (tolling limitations period to allow suit within three years from the time of discovery of the sexual abuse by the injured party). Yet childhood sexual abuse presents a unique problem in that—by its very nature—it often prevents victims from bringing timely claims. This consideration leads me to conclude that great injury and injustice will result if we continue to follow our vested-rights precedent in this case. Here, the plaintiffs allege that, as both a pediatrician and a church youth leader, Nesmith used his positions of power and trust to sexually abuse them. In the allegations involving Nesmith’s medical practice, he allegedly committed the assaults under the guise of legitimate medical examinations. Nonetheless, investigators chose not to believe the only plaintiff to report the abuse at the time it occurred. While Nesmith is certainly entitled to a fair trial on these allegations, the circumstances described in the complaint underscore the inherent power imbalances and special considerations surrounding childhood sexual abuse. In recent years, research has revealed the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse and some of the reasons for delayed reporting. For example, we now know that at least one in four girls and one in twenty boys in the United States experience child sexual abuse. See U.S. Centers for Disease Control, Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention, 11 https://www.cdc.gov/child-abuse-neglect/about/about-child-sexual-abuse.html (last visited November 4, 2026) (citations omitted). Even still, childhood sexual abuse is vastly underreported, and when it is reported, often years or decades have passed. Victims may be reluctant to come forward due to the negative repercussions of disclosure, such as disruptions in family stability, loss of close relationships, or involvement with the authorities; fear of not being believed; and psychological obstacles such as shame and self-blame.1 I join the majority’s holding that no categorical bar prevents the General Assembly from expanding the limitations period and thereby reviving claims. I respectfully concur. KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice, dissenting. I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse and remand. Instead, I would affirm the circuit court’s summary- judgment order because I disagree with the majority’s decision to upend 180 years of this court’s precedent prohibiting legislative attempts to revive expired statutes of limitation. See Couch v. Mckee, 6 Ark. 484 (1846); Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6, 164 S.W. 752 (1914); Wasson v. State ex rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537, 60 S.W.2d 1020 (1933); Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992); Chunn v. D’Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 847 S.W.2d 699 (1993); Hall v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 356 Ark. 609, 616, 158 S.W.3d 185, 189 (2004). In Rhodes, we confirmed that Couch stood for the proposition that “one could have a vested right in the defense of the statute of limitations of which one could not be deprived by subsequent legislation.” Rhodes, 112 Ark. at 14, 164 S.W. at 754. 1 The amicus curiae brief of Child USA contains numerous citations to relevant journal articles and studies on these topics. 12 Then in Wasson, we stated that [i]n most jurisdictions it is held that, after a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the Legislature has power to divest that right and revive the cause of action. 187 Ark. at 538, 60 S.W.2d at 1020–21. In my view, applying our vested-rights precedent to the present case, our General Assembly did not have the authority to include a revival window in the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act. Stated differently, the legislature lacked the power to revive the expired statute of limitations applicable to Nesmith, and therefore, the claims against Nesmith were time-barred. Because I disagree with the majority’s decision to overrule our longstanding precedent, I must respectfully dissent. SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. The majority departs from nearly two centuries of our vested-rights jurisprudence and, in doing so, permits the termination of what Arkansas law has long treated as a vested property right: to rely on an accrued statute- of-limitations defense. 1 Our precedent could not be clearer.2 Once a limitations period 1 See Couch v. McKee, 6 Ark. 484, 495–96 (1846) (“The proposition that the legislature has the power to take the property of one man and transfer it to another is at once monstrous and absurd. And what is the difference between that proposition and the one that the legislature has the power to deprive a man of a legal defence against a demand set up against him? In the first case the action would be direct and fully understood; in the second, it would be indirect, taking the property of the defendant under the form of a judicial sentence by depriving him of a valid defence against a demand invalid in law.”). 2 Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 203–04, 823 S.W.2d 883, 885 (1992) (“[A]fter a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the Legislature 13 expires, the defendant’s bar is not a mere procedural convenience; it ripens into a substantive right that the legislature may not retroactively take away.3 I fully understand and appreciate that, given the subject matter of this case, we are tasked with a difficult decision. The allegations here are deeply disturbing, and no one minimizes either the seriousness of child sexual abuse or the immense difficulty victims often face in reporting it. The policy considerations underlying the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act are therefore powerful and compelling. But difficult facts do not relieve this court of its constitutional role. Our duty is not to decide whether the legislature acted wisely or compassionately; it is to decide whether it acted within constitutional bounds. Constitutional limits often matter most when the equities point strongly in the other direction. And this court has consistently held for nearly two centuries that once a statute of limitations has expired, the resulting defense becomes a vested right that cannot be retroactively extinguished by later legislation. Indeed, in 1846 this court in Couch v. McKee treated the completed bar as a property interest that cannot be removed by later legislation.4 When the statute has run, the defendant’s right to be free from the claim becomes part of his or her protected legal estate, an interest the State cannot simply reassign by retroactive enactment. Our later cases have has power to divest that right and revive the cause of action.” (quoting Wasson v. State ex rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537, 538, 60 S.W.2d 1020, 1020–21 (1933))). 3 See, e.g., Chunn v. D’Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 143, 847 S.W.2d 699, 700–01 (1993) (litigant “could not have the benefit of the new statute of limitations with respect to a claim for . . . arrearages which were already barred when the new statute of limitations came into effect”); see also Hall v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 356 Ark. 609, 614, 158 S.W.3d 185, 188 (2004). 4 Couch, 6 Ark. at 495–96. 14 repeatedly applied that same rule, holding that revival statutes cannot constitutionally divest a defendant of a vested limitations defense.5 Nor, contrary to the majority’s assertion, is our vested-rights jurisprudence untethered from constitutional text. The Arkansas Constitution reflects a longstanding hostility toward retroactive laws impairing settled rights. See Ark. Const. art. 2, § 17 (prohibiting ex post facto laws and laws impairing contractual obligations); id. § 21 (protecting due process). Consistent with those principles, this court has repeatedly recognized that retroactive legislation may not constitutionally disturb vested substantive rights.6 As recently as 2023, this court reaffirmed that even when legislation expressly applies retroactively, courts “must still ensure that applying the statute will not impair or disturb a contractual or vested right.”7 That rule is not a mere formalism. Statutes of limitation serve an important public function. They encourage the prompt filing of claims so that the truth-finding process is not impaired by faded memories, lost documents, unavailable records, and deceased witnesses.8 Those concerns are not hypothetical. The amicus brief filed in this case 5 Johnson, 308 Ark. at 203–04, 823 S.W.2d at 885; Chunn, 312 Ark. at 142–43, 847 S.W.2d at 700–01. 6 See Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Div. of Econ. & Med. Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 210, 866 S.W.2d 823, 825 (1993) (“We have indicated that it would violate due process to disturb vested rights or contractual rights.”); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 40, 616 S.W.2d 720, 724 (1981) (“[T]he due process clauses are frequently held to prevent retroactive property belonging to one and giving it to another[.]”). 7 Alpe v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2023 Ark. 58, at 4, 662 S.W.3d 650, 653. 8 See McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 586, 707 S.W.2d 773, 776 (1986) (“The purpose of a statute of limitations is to encourage the prompt filing of claims by allowing 15 illustrates the serious prejudice that can result when claims are revived decades after the fact. Ms. Shirley Suhl, an eighty-seven-year-old retired widow, represents that she is defending claims in federal court arising from alleged events at a facility that ceased operating around 2006 and from conduct dating back nearly forty years. She is not alleged to have personally committed sexual abuse; rather, she is alleged to have known of or been complicit in abuse by others. According to her brief, relevant facility records no longer exist, potential witnesses are elderly or deceased, and one named former employee accused of abuse is now in his nineties. Whether those allegations ultimately have merit is not before us. The point is more basic: the passage of decades can make a fair defense difficult, sometimes impossible. This is precisely why Arkansas law has treated an accrued limitations defense as vested. Once the limitations period has run, the defendant is entitled to repose, not because the underlying allegations are unimportant but because the law recognizes that, at some point, the defense of stale claims becomes too impaired to permit reliable adjudication. The majority treats the limitations bar as a revocable act of legislative grace. Our cases have treated it differently. They have recognized that once the bar attaches, it becomes a substantive right to resist enforcement of the claim. That rule does not deny the gravity of child sexual abuse. It enforces the constitutional limit on retroactive legislation that destroys vested rights. In this instance, stare decisis carries particular force. The rule the majority abandons today is not isolated or recently decided precedent. It can be traced back to this court’s no more than a reasonable time within which to make a claim so a defendant is protected from having to defend an action in which the truth-finding process would be impaired by the passage of time.” (citing Zeleznick v. United States, 770 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1985))). 16 earliest jurisprudence and has been reaffirmed across generations of cases.9 Litigants, lawyers, and the General Assembly have long operated against that settled backdrop. 10 Yet today, the majority discards nearly two centuries of precedent. Stability in the law matters, especially when the court alters longstanding rules governing substantive rights and retroactive legislation.11 For the reasons stated herein, I would adhere to our longstanding vested-rights precedent and affirm the circuit court’s order granting Nesmith summary judgment and dismissing the case on statute-of-limitations grounds. I respectfully dissent. 9 See supra n.1. 10 Indeed, stare decisis carries particular force where legislatures and litigants have long ordered their affairs around settled legal rules. 11 While many judges and justices pledge full allegiance to the doctrine of stare decisis, even to the point of perpetuating clear errors of constitutional interpretation, I am not one of them. And while it is an important piece of our judicial system, I have frequently noted that “[t]his court “should not invoke stare decisis to uphold precedents that are demonstrably erroneous.” Kimbrough v. Grieve, 2024 Ark. 34, at 21, 685 S.W.3d 225, 237 (Womack, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Here, however, our two centuries of case law on the subject are rooted in the Arkansas Constitution as article 2 section 21 supports our precedent. Accordingly, I would follow it. See Greene v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 316, at 29 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is a hallmark of our justice system.”); Paschall v. Thurston, 2024 Ark. 155, at 19, 699 S.W.3d 352, 364 (Hiland, J., dissenting) (“Because the majority disregards this court’s decades-long legal precedent . . . I respectfully dissent.”); Kimbrough v. Grieve, 2024 Ark. 34, at 10 n.2 685 S.W.3d 225, 231 n.2 (“We must decline his invitation to disregard stare decisis. The Supreme Court has described adherence to precedent as ‘a foundation stone of the rule of law.’ [A]ny departure from the doctrine demands ‘special justification’—something more than “an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.” (quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 587 (2019) (internal citations omitted)). 17 Gillispie Law Firm, by: Joshua D. Gillispie; and Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellants. Anderson, Murphy & Hopkins, L.L.P., by: Mark D. Wankum; Hilburn Law Firm, by: Gary Rogers and Randy Grice, for appellee. *Note: Several amicus briefs were filed. This information will be added. 18