Khalil Campbell v. Kenyatta Hayes
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 554
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION
No. CV-25-736
Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
KHALIL CAMPBELL
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH
DIVISION
V. [NO. 60DR-25-2314]
KENYATTA HAYES HONORABLE LATONYA
APPELLEE HONORABLE, JUDGE
REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN
PART
CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge
Khalil Campbell appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order of protection
prohibiting him from initiating any contact with his minor twin sons, MC1 and MC2, for
three years. He argues that Hayes, the children’s mother, produced insufficient evidence to
support the court’s order and that she did not allege or prove domestic abuse against one of
the children—MC2—at all. Hayes did not file a responsive brief. We affirm the orders of
protection as to MC1 and Hayes. We also affirm the portion of the order that provides for
a temporary change of custody of MC1 and MC2. We reverse the order of protection as to
MC2.
Hayes petitioned the Pulaski County Circuit Court for an order of protection on
behalf of herself and her minor sons, MC1 and MC2, on June 5, 2025. She alleged that
Campbell had slammed their child into a vehicle and subjected the children to choking,
body slamming, beatings that left some scarring, and refusal of meals. Hayes averred that
she “was made aware that these claimed occurrences happened while they were in Khalil’s
care.”
The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on August 19. The main witness was
MC1’s third-grade teacher, Kinley Ray. She testified that on May 20, 2025, Campbell picked
MC1 up from school early. As they left, MC1 and Campbell turned and waved through the
door of her classroom. Ray testified that this occurred at approximately 1:00 in the
afternoon, and she was able to see what Campbell and MC1 were wearing as she said
goodbye.
Ray left the school at 4:00 to drive home to North Little Rock. When she turned
onto Wisteria Drive, she saw a white four-door car on the side of the road. An African-
American man in a bright white t-shirt was holding a young boy in a maroon polo and khaki
pants up against the car by the collar of his shirt. Ray testified, “[W]hen I slowed down, I
realized that it looked exactly like Khalil Campbell and MC1, and I wanted to make sure I
was able to see.” Ray continued:
So I did get to see most of Mr. Campbell’s face, and I saw the side profile of
[MC1’s] face. I saw the man in the white t-shirt holding him by the collar
against the car kind of yelling in his face going side to side. And then I
observed him throw the boy into the back seat of the car, slam the door, get
in the driver’s seat, and drive.
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Ray immediately called 911 and talked to the dispatcher. Though she tried to catch up with
the man in the white four-door car, she lost him on Camp Robinson Road before she was
able to capture the license plate number.
While Ray awaited a police officer so that she could file a report, she called Hayes
and asked whether she had her sons with her. Hayes said no, they were with their father.
Ray inquired as to the type of car Campbell drove, and Hayes told her it was a white four-
door “SUV sedan.” Hayes told Ray that it was a “newer rather than older car,” which was
consistent with Ray’s impression that the car was very shiny and very clean. Ray asked Hayes
what MC1 was wearing. Hayes responded that he was wearing a maroon polo shirt with
Khaki pants, which matched what Ray recalled from the school day and from observing the
incident.
The following day, MC1 was late to school. Ray asked him how his previous day had
been, and he replied, “Really bad.” Ray was not permitted to continue testifying along this
line due to a sustained hearsay objection. On redirect, Ray testified that the next day, she
spoke with MC1, and he “gave [her] additional things that he said had happened other than
this instance.” Ray testified that she filed a report with the child-abuse hotline and spoke
with the Division of Child and Family Services.
On cross-examination, Ray testified:
The white, four-door car/sedan/SUV – I don’t know which term is
correct – was on the right side pulled over on the road. On the right-passenger-
back-seat side there was a man facing the car with a white shirt, who was Mr.
Campbell, holding [MC1] with the red polo and the khakis by the collar of the
shirt, and his legs went up off the ground.
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The boy was crying, and I saw Mr. Campbell after shaking him and his
head was going back and forth in the boy’s face, then open the car – the car
door on the passenger back side, push him into the car, slam the door, and
then drove off onto Camp Robinson.
Ray stated that Campbell was choking the boy by his collar and that it was so tight it was
lifting him off the ground. Ray reiterated that she saw most of the adult’s face—about 75
percent of it—and it was Campbell. The man at the scene was the same height, size, and
build as Campbell and that he was muscular like Campbell. Ray testified that she saw most
of the child’s face, but because he was crying, his face “was scrunched.” The child’s eyes were
closed, but in addition to seeing most of his face, Ray saw his hair, what he was wearing, his
height, and his build. Ray admitted that “it wasn’t the clearest snap shot.” The next day at
school, she did not see any marks on MC1, but his collar covered his neck area.
Hayes testified next. She and Campbell share two children, MC1 and MC2. Hayes
and Campbell are no longer together, but there is a parenting plan in place entered in
Colorado. Pursuant to the plan, Campbell has custody of the children, and they live in
Colorado. However, at the time of the incident in issue, MC1 and MC2 had been living
with Hayes in Little Rock for approximately six months. The boys were enrolled in school
in Little Rock and attended the Academies of Math and Science. At the time of the hearing,
Hayes was working with her attorney in hopes of gaining custody of the boys and moving the
case to Arkansas. After the incident that triggered Hayes’s petitioning for an order of
protection, Campbell returned to Colorado. On cross-examination, Hayes admitted that
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she had not personally observed the abuse alleged in her petition. She asked the court to
enter an order of protection for three years.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered a final order of protection. The
order granted a three-year order of protection as to MC1 and MC2 as well as to Hayes. The
order also contained a provision awarding temporary custody of both children to Hayes for
the duration of the protective order “or until future orders shall be issued from a Court with
jurisdiction over the parties.” This appeal followed.
The standard of review on appeal from the entry of an order of protection is whether
the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Morales v. Morales, 2023 Ark. App. 582,
680 S.W.3d 765. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support
it, the appellate court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed. Id. Resolution of disputed facts and credibility
determinations fall to the trier of fact. Id.
For purposes of this case, “domestic abuse” is defined as “physical harm, bodily injury,
assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between
family or household members.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103(4)(A) (Supp. 2025). “Family or
household members” includes children and persons who have children in common. Id. § 9-
15-103(5). Upon a finding of domestic abuse, a court may afford relief to the petitioning
party in a number of forms, including entering an order of protection. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-
15-205 (Repl. 2020); Morales, supra.
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The petitioner bears the burden of proof in order-of-protection cases. Morales v.
Garcia, 2021 Ark. App. 438. “When there is no evidence that the respondent committed
physical abuse or inflicted fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, it is an
abuse of discretion to issue the order of protection.” Millican v. Konecny, 2026 Ark. App.
426, at 3–4, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.
Having reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing, we hold that Hayes met her
burden of proof to support an order of protection as to MC1. The testimony supports the
conclusion that Campbell held MC1 up by his shirt collar to the point that he lifted MC1’s
feet off the ground and shook him, while MC1’s collar was choking him. Campbell yelled
at MC1 as he cried, then Campbell tossed or pushed him head first into the backseat of the
car before slamming the door and driving away. From the testimony, it is apparent that
MC1 told Ray about other occurrences.1
On the other hand, Hayes presented no evidence that Campbell abused MC2 or that
MC2 was even present when the alleged abuse occurred. On multiple occasions, this court
has affirmed an order of protection as to a mother while reversing the order as to her child
or children because there was no evidence that the husband and/or father also abused the
child or children. The cases hold that the petitioner must show abuse of—or fear of abuse
by—every individual on whose behalf the petition is filed. For example, in Brewer v. Patterson,
this court stated:
1
Hayes did not present any evidence, however, that Campbell refused MC1 meals or
beat him in a way that left scarring, as alleged in her petition.
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First, appellee did not allege any abuse by appellant as it related to MC.
When she testified at the hearing, she stated that MC was not present during
the car incident or any of the incidents mentioned in her petition. Her only
concern was during an argument in 2021, appellant had MC with him, and
she was concerned for his safety because when appellant “gets mad, he drives
at unreasonable speeds that are dangerous.” However, this was conclusionary,
and she did not testify that she had witnessed appellant driving in this manner
with MC. This court has reversed an order of protection as it related to a child
where the child had been exposed to the domestic abuse the appellant had
subjected the mom to. More recently, in Morales [v. Garcia, 2021 Ark. App.
438], we also reversed an order of protection in regard to the appellant’s five
children because, although the children witnessed the abuse on the mother by
appellant, this was not enough to support a finding that the appellant had
engaged in acts of domestic violence against them. Here, there was no
testimony that MC witnessed the violence, that he was a victim of the violence,
or that he was ever in fear of harm from appellant. Thus, the circuit court’s
order of protection as to MC was erroneous. We affirm the extension of the
order of protection as to appellee; however, we reverse and dismiss that
portion of the order that pertains to MC.
2023 Ark. App. 447, at 9–10, 675 S.W.3d 906, 911; but see Dixon v. Dixon, 2022 Ark. App.
439, 655 S.W.3d 520 (affirming the circuit court’s determination that the abuser’s physically
and emotionally abusive behavior against the mother could reasonably inflict fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault on the petitioning daughter).
In the present case, the record is devoid of any evidence that Campbell abused MC2.
Also lacking is evidence that MC2 witnessed Campbell abusing MC1. Without such
evidence, the circuit court should not have granted an order of protection as to MC2, and
doing so was an abuse of discretion. See Millican, supra. Thus, we must reverse the portion
of the final order that provides an order of protection as to MC2. We affirm the portions
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of the final order that provide orders of protection as to MC1 and to Hayes.2 We also affirm
the temporary change of custody of both MC1 and MC2 as set forth in the order. 3
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
HIXSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Terrence Cain, for appellant.
One brief only.
2
Campbell does not argue any points on appeal pertaining to the protective order as
to Hayes.
3
See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-205(a)(3)(A) and (8)(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(c)(1)
(Supp. 2025).
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