Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 554 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION No. CV-25-736 Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 KHALIL CAMPBELL APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60DR-25-2314] KENYATTA HAYES HONORABLE LATONYA APPELLEE HONORABLE, JUDGE REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge Khalil Campbell appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order of protection prohibiting him from initiating any contact with his minor twin sons, MC1 and MC2, for three years. He argues that Hayes, the children’s mother, produced insufficient evidence to support the court’s order and that she did not allege or prove domestic abuse against one of the children—MC2—at all. Hayes did not file a responsive brief. We affirm the orders of protection as to MC1 and Hayes. We also affirm the portion of the order that provides for a temporary change of custody of MC1 and MC2. We reverse the order of protection as to MC2. Hayes petitioned the Pulaski County Circuit Court for an order of protection on behalf of herself and her minor sons, MC1 and MC2, on June 5, 2025. She alleged that Campbell had slammed their child into a vehicle and subjected the children to choking, body slamming, beatings that left some scarring, and refusal of meals. Hayes averred that she “was made aware that these claimed occurrences happened while they were in Khalil’s care.” The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on August 19. The main witness was MC1’s third-grade teacher, Kinley Ray. She testified that on May 20, 2025, Campbell picked MC1 up from school early. As they left, MC1 and Campbell turned and waved through the door of her classroom. Ray testified that this occurred at approximately 1:00 in the afternoon, and she was able to see what Campbell and MC1 were wearing as she said goodbye. Ray left the school at 4:00 to drive home to North Little Rock. When she turned onto Wisteria Drive, she saw a white four-door car on the side of the road. An African- American man in a bright white t-shirt was holding a young boy in a maroon polo and khaki pants up against the car by the collar of his shirt. Ray testified, “[W]hen I slowed down, I realized that it looked exactly like Khalil Campbell and MC1, and I wanted to make sure I was able to see.” Ray continued: So I did get to see most of Mr. Campbell’s face, and I saw the side profile of [MC1’s] face. I saw the man in the white t-shirt holding him by the collar against the car kind of yelling in his face going side to side. And then I observed him throw the boy into the back seat of the car, slam the door, get in the driver’s seat, and drive. 2 Ray immediately called 911 and talked to the dispatcher. Though she tried to catch up with the man in the white four-door car, she lost him on Camp Robinson Road before she was able to capture the license plate number. While Ray awaited a police officer so that she could file a report, she called Hayes and asked whether she had her sons with her. Hayes said no, they were with their father. Ray inquired as to the type of car Campbell drove, and Hayes told her it was a white four- door “SUV sedan.” Hayes told Ray that it was a “newer rather than older car,” which was consistent with Ray’s impression that the car was very shiny and very clean. Ray asked Hayes what MC1 was wearing. Hayes responded that he was wearing a maroon polo shirt with Khaki pants, which matched what Ray recalled from the school day and from observing the incident. The following day, MC1 was late to school. Ray asked him how his previous day had been, and he replied, “Really bad.” Ray was not permitted to continue testifying along this line due to a sustained hearsay objection. On redirect, Ray testified that the next day, she spoke with MC1, and he “gave [her] additional things that he said had happened other than this instance.” Ray testified that she filed a report with the child-abuse hotline and spoke with the Division of Child and Family Services. On cross-examination, Ray testified: The white, four-door car/sedan/SUV – I don’t know which term is correct – was on the right side pulled over on the road. On the right-passenger- back-seat side there was a man facing the car with a white shirt, who was Mr. Campbell, holding [MC1] with the red polo and the khakis by the collar of the shirt, and his legs went up off the ground. 3 The boy was crying, and I saw Mr. Campbell after shaking him and his head was going back and forth in the boy’s face, then open the car – the car door on the passenger back side, push him into the car, slam the door, and then drove off onto Camp Robinson. Ray stated that Campbell was choking the boy by his collar and that it was so tight it was lifting him off the ground. Ray reiterated that she saw most of the adult’s face—about 75 percent of it—and it was Campbell. The man at the scene was the same height, size, and build as Campbell and that he was muscular like Campbell. Ray testified that she saw most of the child’s face, but because he was crying, his face “was scrunched.” The child’s eyes were closed, but in addition to seeing most of his face, Ray saw his hair, what he was wearing, his height, and his build. Ray admitted that “it wasn’t the clearest snap shot.” The next day at school, she did not see any marks on MC1, but his collar covered his neck area. Hayes testified next. She and Campbell share two children, MC1 and MC2. Hayes and Campbell are no longer together, but there is a parenting plan in place entered in Colorado. Pursuant to the plan, Campbell has custody of the children, and they live in Colorado. However, at the time of the incident in issue, MC1 and MC2 had been living with Hayes in Little Rock for approximately six months. The boys were enrolled in school in Little Rock and attended the Academies of Math and Science. At the time of the hearing, Hayes was working with her attorney in hopes of gaining custody of the boys and moving the case to Arkansas. After the incident that triggered Hayes’s petitioning for an order of protection, Campbell returned to Colorado. On cross-examination, Hayes admitted that 4 she had not personally observed the abuse alleged in her petition. She asked the court to enter an order of protection for three years. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered a final order of protection. The order granted a three-year order of protection as to MC1 and MC2 as well as to Hayes. The order also contained a provision awarding temporary custody of both children to Hayes for the duration of the protective order “or until future orders shall be issued from a Court with jurisdiction over the parties.” This appeal followed. The standard of review on appeal from the entry of an order of protection is whether the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Morales v. Morales, 2023 Ark. App. 582, 680 S.W.3d 765. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. Resolution of disputed facts and credibility determinations fall to the trier of fact. Id. For purposes of this case, “domestic abuse” is defined as “physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103(4)(A) (Supp. 2025). “Family or household members” includes children and persons who have children in common. Id. § 9- 15-103(5). Upon a finding of domestic abuse, a court may afford relief to the petitioning party in a number of forms, including entering an order of protection. Ark. Code Ann. § 9- 15-205 (Repl. 2020); Morales, supra. 5 The petitioner bears the burden of proof in order-of-protection cases. Morales v. Garcia, 2021 Ark. App. 438. “When there is no evidence that the respondent committed physical abuse or inflicted fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, it is an abuse of discretion to issue the order of protection.” Millican v. Konecny, 2026 Ark. App. 426, at 3–4, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. Having reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing, we hold that Hayes met her burden of proof to support an order of protection as to MC1. The testimony supports the conclusion that Campbell held MC1 up by his shirt collar to the point that he lifted MC1’s feet off the ground and shook him, while MC1’s collar was choking him. Campbell yelled at MC1 as he cried, then Campbell tossed or pushed him head first into the backseat of the car before slamming the door and driving away. From the testimony, it is apparent that MC1 told Ray about other occurrences.1 On the other hand, Hayes presented no evidence that Campbell abused MC2 or that MC2 was even present when the alleged abuse occurred. On multiple occasions, this court has affirmed an order of protection as to a mother while reversing the order as to her child or children because there was no evidence that the husband and/or father also abused the child or children. The cases hold that the petitioner must show abuse of—or fear of abuse by—every individual on whose behalf the petition is filed. For example, in Brewer v. Patterson, this court stated: 1 Hayes did not present any evidence, however, that Campbell refused MC1 meals or beat him in a way that left scarring, as alleged in her petition. 6 First, appellee did not allege any abuse by appellant as it related to MC. When she testified at the hearing, she stated that MC was not present during the car incident or any of the incidents mentioned in her petition. Her only concern was during an argument in 2021, appellant had MC with him, and she was concerned for his safety because when appellant “gets mad, he drives at unreasonable speeds that are dangerous.” However, this was conclusionary, and she did not testify that she had witnessed appellant driving in this manner with MC. This court has reversed an order of protection as it related to a child where the child had been exposed to the domestic abuse the appellant had subjected the mom to. More recently, in Morales [v. Garcia, 2021 Ark. App. 438], we also reversed an order of protection in regard to the appellant’s five children because, although the children witnessed the abuse on the mother by appellant, this was not enough to support a finding that the appellant had engaged in acts of domestic violence against them. Here, there was no testimony that MC witnessed the violence, that he was a victim of the violence, or that he was ever in fear of harm from appellant. Thus, the circuit court’s order of protection as to MC was erroneous. We affirm the extension of the order of protection as to appellee; however, we reverse and dismiss that portion of the order that pertains to MC. 2023 Ark. App. 447, at 9–10, 675 S.W.3d 906, 911; but see Dixon v. Dixon, 2022 Ark. App. 439, 655 S.W.3d 520 (affirming the circuit court’s determination that the abuser’s physically and emotionally abusive behavior against the mother could reasonably inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault on the petitioning daughter). In the present case, the record is devoid of any evidence that Campbell abused MC2. Also lacking is evidence that MC2 witnessed Campbell abusing MC1. Without such evidence, the circuit court should not have granted an order of protection as to MC2, and doing so was an abuse of discretion. See Millican, supra. Thus, we must reverse the portion of the final order that provides an order of protection as to MC2. We affirm the portions 7 of the final order that provide orders of protection as to MC1 and to Hayes.2 We also affirm the temporary change of custody of both MC1 and MC2 as set forth in the order. 3 Reversed in part; affirmed in part. HIXSON and BROWN, JJ., agree. Terrence Cain, for appellant. One brief only. 2 Campbell does not argue any points on appeal pertaining to the protective order as to Hayes. 3 See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-205(a)(3)(A) and (8)(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(c)(1) (Supp. 2025). 8