Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 403 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-26-117 KATIE MONTELONGO Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN V. DISTRICT [NO. 42BJV-25-9] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge Katie Montelongo appeals the November 2025 circuit court order that terminated her parental rights to her sons, MC1 and MC2, born in 2015 and 2018, respectively.1 Katie challenges the circuit court’s findings that (1) statutory grounds were proved to support terminating her parental rights, and (2) termination was in her children’s best interest. We affirm. Dating back to 2019, Katie has had several interventions by the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) concerning her children. Relevant to this case, DHS took custody of the boys in June 2023: Katie was driving while intoxicated, and the boys were in the 1 Katie’s soon-to-be ex-husband is not the children’s biological father. No father is listed on either child’s birth certificate. No putative father was ever part of this case. vehicle with her. Katie regained custody in August 2024. A DHS protective-services case remained open on MC1 and MC2. This case was instituted in February 2025. The boys had excessive absences from school, so a DHS investigator was dispatched to Katie’s home. Katie had a history of methamphetamine use. Katie presented as confused, her speech was slurred, and she struggled to stay awake while the investigator was there. The investigator believed Katie was misusing her sedative medication (Xanax). She refused to take a drug test. DHS took emergency custody of the children. Also in February 2025, Katie was arrested for furnishing prohibited articles to her cellmates while she was in jail. After a May 2025 hearing, the boys were adjudicated dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness and severe educational neglect. Katie was ordered to comply with the DHS case plan and work toward reunification. DHS provided services to Katie and the family that included foster care, therapy, parenting classes, random drug screens, DHS worker visits, and supervised visitation. Katie was ordered to undergo a drug-and-alcohol assessment and a psychological evaluation and complete any recommended treatment. She was ordered to complete parenting classes, permit random home visits, have reliable transportation, and resolve her pending criminal issues. In the following months, Katie was in and out of jail. At first, the children were permitted to live with one of Katie’s friends, an apartment-complex manager who had helped in the past when the boys came to her for food. After that, the children’s maternal 2 grandfather and step-grandmother acted as their foster parents. The grandparents, however, did not want to be guardians or adopt the boys. By early September 2025, Katie did not have a driver’s license, a job, any income, or transportation. She was homeless and had been jailed. The circuit court noted that of the last twenty-six months, Katie’s sons had been in DHS’s custody for twenty-two months. The court noted Katie had been “in and out of treatment” and was “not really doing anything.” Katie was divorcing her husband. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to assist Katie in resolving her issues and reuniting with her sons. On September 23, 2025, DHS filed a petition to terminate Katie’s parental rights alleging three statutory grounds: (1) one year out of custody, (2) subsequent other factors, and (3) aggravated circumstances. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025) (effective Aug. 5, 2025). By late October 2025, Katie completed her twenty-eight-day drug- treatment program. The termination hearing was conducted on November 4, 2025. Katie said she had been in a behavioral health center for a week at the beginning of this case and that it helped. Nonetheless, Katie maintained that DHS had no reason to take her sons in February 2025. She said her last drug use was in June 2025. She was in a posttreatment transitional-living home, and DHS had paid her rent through November 15. Katie would then owe $175 a week in rent, which she believed she could pay when she got a job. Katie complained that DHS had not helped her, and she had to call to get supervised visits. Katie had watched DHS’s “The Clock is Ticking” video. She had completed the Mothers 3 Against Drunk Driving course, so she was able to regain her driver’s license in late October 2025. Katie acknowledged that she had been jailed for driving on a suspended license, failure to appear, and possession of marijuana. She was required to pay sixty dollars a month for her probation. Katie had applied for disability but was denied, so she was currently looking for a job. She completed six out of eight parenting classes. She thought she would restart therapy in about ten days. Katie wanted “the full year” to demonstrate that she could remain sober and maintain a stable life and said she should be allowed to have her sons back in three months to show she was ready. The boys, then seven and nine, were bonded with her and love her. Cindy Moore, a peer support specialist since 2021, testified that she was assisting Katie in her recovery. Cindy helped Katie regain her driver’s license; Katie was registered to take a three-month substance-abuse-therapy program. She connected Katie with resources and charitable organizations, and she believed Katie was highly motivated. The caseworker agreed that Katie had finally completed a drug-rehabilitation program but was concerned that this was “early” sobriety; she described long-term sobriety to mean six to twelve months. She testified about Katie’s history with DHS that included educational neglect, incarceration, and drug use. The caseworker said she and Katie talked often. MC1 and MC2 had been in foster care in this and the previous DHS case a total of twenty-two months. She said the boys recently moved to a different placement because their grandfather was leaving the country. She recommended termination to give the boys an opportunity to find permanency. 4 Katie’s attorney asked that her client be given three more months to show her sobriety and prepare to have her sons back. The attorney ad litem advocated for termination; she said drugs had been a persistent problem and were only now under control because Katie was living in a controlled environment. The attorney ad litem felt it relevant to consider the previous DHS intervention, Katie’s regaining custody for about six months, and her losing custody again in February 2025. The circuit court found that Katie had demonstrated an incapacity or indifference to remedying the circumstances that caused the boys’ removal, which would prevent her from regaining custody of her sons. The court recognized that Katie loves her boys, but until recently, she was unable or unwilling to become stable. The circuit court also found that further services were not likely to result in successful reunification. The court congratulated Katie on finishing her rehabilitation program, but she had no job or home, she was on probation, and she had no transportation. The court was bothered that, even now, Katie said there was no reason for DHS to have taken her sons in February 2025. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate Katie and help her toward reunification. The court recognized that this particular DHS case had been open only nine months (since February 2025), but Katie and her sons had been given DHS services repeatedly and over a long period of time. The court found that termination was in the boys’ best interest. It considered their adoptability and the potential harm in returning them to Katie. This appeal followed. 5 Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Gilbert v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 256, 599 S.W.3d 725. The first step requires proof of one or more statutory grounds for termination; the second step, the best-interest analysis, includes consideration of the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted and of the potential harm that could be caused by returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. Statutory grounds and a best-interest finding must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Gilbert, supra. The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent, able to care for his or her child. Best v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 485, 611 S.W.3d 690. Katie argues that she had shown real progress, albeit only a few months after this case began. She asserts that she needed more time since completing rehabilitation to get her life in order. She blamed DHS for not assisting her enough, and she argues that she was making legitimate progress, which should bar termination of her parental rights at this juncture. We are not left with a firm and distinct impression that a mistake was made in this case. 6 Only one statutory ground is necessary to support the first step. Ibarra v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 628, 703 S.W.3d 528. A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior. Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 145, 643 S.W.3d 479. We applaud Katie’s newfound sobriety. However, these children had been subjected to their mother’s neglect for a long time. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the aggravated-circumstances statutory ground was proved. See Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. 2023 Ark. App. 46, 660 S.W.3d 357. Not every best-interest factor must be established by clear and convincing evidence; rather, after consideration of all factors, the evidence must clearly and convincingly show that termination is in a child’s best interest. Myers, supra. The circuit court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Id. Potential harm must be viewed in broad terms and a forward looking manner. Id. MC1 and MC2 needed permanency, which is the goal of the Juvenile Code, and it could not be achieved with Katie in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the children’s perspective. Katie essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence on appeal, and credibility determinations are left to the circuit court. Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 280, 626 S.W.3d 136. Although parents have a fundamental constitutional right to direct the care and upbringing of their children, the State of Arkansas has an equally compelling interest in the protection of its children. Porter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 374 Ark. 177, 286 S.W.3d 686 (2008). We have reviewed the 7 record de novo, and we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the best interest of these boys was best served by terminating their mother’s parental rights. Affirmed. ABRAMSON and VIRDEN, JJ., agree. Kimberly Eden, for appellant. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children. 8