Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 438 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-26-193 Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026 JOANNA DUCIC APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. [NO. 72JV-23-650] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN HONORABLE DIANE WARREN, SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN JUDGE APPELLEES AFFIRMED MIKE MURPHY, Judge Appellant Joanna Ducic appeals from the Washington County circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children, MC1 (DOB 02-25-22) and MC2 (DOB 03-18-23). On appeal, Joanna does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination or the best-interest findings. Instead, she argues that the court abused its discretion when it struck her pro se motion to appoint counsel and by not continuing the termination hearing when appointed counsel stated she could not provide meaningful representation. We affirm. This case began on November 2, 2023, when the Arkansas Department of Human Services exercised an emergency hold on the children due to Joanna’s drug use and concern for their safety. The Department filed a petition for dependency-neglect on November 6 seeking emergency custody and a finding of dependency-neglect. In the affidavit attached to the petition, the Department noted that Joanna was an enrolled Cherokee Indian, that the children are Indian children, and that in 2016, their five siblings had been adopted after termination proceedings by their Indian maternal grandparents, Allison and Brad Strensrud, who were also seeking placement of MC1 and MC2. On November 6, the court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody finding that the children’s placement in state custody was necessary to protect their health, safety, and welfare. The court set the case for a probable-cause hearing and appointed Lindsey Tosh as Joanna’s parent counsel. On December 11, the court held an adjudication hearing. Although the court took testimony, it subsequently found the children dependent-neglected via stipulation to dependency-neglect and all exhibits. The finding of dependency-neglect was based on neglect and parental unfitness. Both children were positive for methamphetamine on a recent hair- follicle test. Additionally, it found that the biological father was deceased. In early May 2024, Joanna sent documents to the court via email demonstrating that she had procured employment and a vehicle, and she had applied for housing through the Cherokee Nation Housing Authority. In a message directed to the court, she explained that “no one ever presents [my] documents or shows anything positive to you in court.” The court issued a letter to Counsel Tosh informing her and the other parties of the ex parte communication and noting that the documents could not be acted on by the court. The following month, the court held a review hearing. Joanna was represented by Counsel Tosh. At that hearing, the court entered into evidence the Department’s court 2 report, a case plan, a family-time log, and a drug-screen log. The court continued to find Joanna unfit, citing safety concerns because Joanna had not provided copies of documents demonstrating her compliance with case-plan requirements. On August 5, 2024, Joanna once again contacted the court via email with documentation of her progress because she did not trust her caseworker or attorney. The court responded, again, with an email to Counsel Tosh. Shortly thereafter, Joanna hired private counsel who filed a motion to substitute. An order of substitution was filed on August 20. One week after that substitution, the court held a permanency-planning hearing wherein the court continued the goal of the case as reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption. The court noted that Joanna continued to test positive for methamphetamine and that while she had stable housing, it was not clear whether the housing would sufficiently meet the needs of the children. On March 31, 2025, the court held a permanency-planning hearing. After receiving testimony and documentary evidence from the Department, the court changed the goal to adoption following termination of parental rights. Joanna continued to test positive for methamphetamine and failed to attend drug counseling. The court set the case for a termination-of-parental-rights hearing on August 5, 2025. On June 25, the Department filed a motion for appointment of counsel, indicating that Joanna needed new counsel because her private counsel had been suspended from the practice of law for failing to complete the continuing education requirement. The following day, the court removed that counsel from the case and reappointed Counsel Tosh. Four days 3 after that, the Department moved to vacate the permanency-planning-hearing order after it learned that the private counsel’s license had been suspended when he represented Joanna at the permanency-planning hearing. One month later, the court granted that motion and reset the case for a repeat permanency-planning hearing on August 5, 2025. The hearing took place as scheduled with Joanna appearing with Counsel Tosh. After that hearing, the court upheld the goal change to adoption following termination of parental rights, finding that Joanna had not made significant and measurable progress toward remedying her drug use. In response, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights alleging that termination was in the children’s best interest and that multiple grounds for termination of Joanna’s parental rights applied. The Strensruds filed for guardianship and intervention. The court entered an order setting the motion on the same date as the termination hearing. On October 27, 2025, the parties appeared for the termination hearing. Notably, however, Joanna was not present, and another attorney stood in for Counsel Tosh. At this hearing, the other attorney informed the court that Counsel Tosh had been hospitalized, and as a result, the attorney requested that the termination hearing be continued so that Counsel Tosh could represent Joanna for the hearing. The circuit court granted this request and set the termination hearing for November 25, 2025. On November 6, the Department filed a motion to strike papers filed with the court clerk because between October 22 and November 5, Joanna filed multiple pro se documents, including a request for new counsel. 4 On November 25, the court went forward on the termination petition after continuing the motion for intervention at the beginning of the hearing. The court then addressed the pro se documents and the motion to strike, and asked Counsel Tosh, “[W]here are we landing?” The following colloquy then took place: MS. TOSH: I -- Your Honor, I have no idea. Ms. Ducic has not responded to texts from me. I have tried to communicate with her. She has not communicated back to me. I am not sure what she wants at this point. I -- I think that communication at this point between us has broken down to the point where I don't think I can meaningfully represent her. I am not sure what she’s asking the Court for, if she wants a different lawyer or if she wants to represent herself, but she has not communicated with me at all. .... MS. DUCIC, MOTHER: But I would like a different one because I feel like this is a conflict of interest since I fired her and then she was reappointed. The court announced that is not the definition of “conflict of interest,” but it would continue the case and appoint new counsel. The ad litem then interjected and argued against a continuance, noting that it would be “very unfair to these children . . . to keep them in limbo because mother made the choice not to communicate with her court appointed attorney.” The children had been in care for 755 days. Additionally, the ad litem argued, The fact that Ms. Lindsey doesn’t -- or Ms. Tosh doesn’t feel like she can adequately represent the mother is due to no fault of Ms. Tosh. She’s a very good attorney, especially in these cases. It is because the mother has chosen not to communicate with Ms. Tosh. Ms. Tosh has been trying to communicate with the mother to prepare for this for today and the mother has chosen not to communicate with her attorney. Therefore, that’s why Ms. Tosh feels ill prepared. 5 She proposed that Joanna either proceed pro se with standby counsel or continue with counsel. In response, Counsel Tosh stated she could do “either of those things.” The court then announced it would deny the request for a different attorney and the request to continue the hearing. It then gave Joanna the option to either have Counsel Tosh represent her or represent herself. After a five-minute recess, Joanna agreed to proceed with the termination hearing with Counsel Tosh as her attorney. Testimony and evidence established that Joanna had continued to use methamphetamine as recently as November 2025, and she admitted that she used methamphetamine in October 2025. She had given birth to another child in September, and his infant cord tissue tested positive for methamphetamine. After the hearing, the court terminated Joanna’s parental rights. The court entered an order on November 26, 2025, striking the documents filed by Joanna, including the motion to appoint counsel. In support of this order, the court cited the fact that Joanna was represented by counsel and therefore waived her right to file her own pleadings and documents in the case. The court memorialized its termination findings in a written order dated January 6, 2026. It relied on the following grounds: twelve months failure to remedy, subsequent factors, aggravated circumstances, and previous termination of parental rights. It further found that termination was in the children’s best interest. Joanna now appeals. In Joanna’s first point on appeal, she argues that the circuit court erred in striking her pro se motion to appoint counsel that was filed on October 29, 2025. In response, the 6 Department argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the court’s November 26 order striking Joanna’s pro se pleadings. The Department explains that the notice of appeal referenced only the termination order, and it directs us to Davis v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2024 Ark. App. 240, at 17, 687 S.W.3d 827, 838, where we dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal referenced only the adjudication order. However, Davis is not directly on point because it concerns an adjudication order, which is listed as independently appealable pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9. An order striking pleadings is not one of those enumerated orders in the rule. The Department does not further explain why the strike order should be treated like an enumerated Rule 6-9 order. Regardless, Joanna’s argument lacks merit and is unpreserved. As the court found in its order, Joanna did not file a responsive pleading objecting to the Department’s motion to strike. And when the issue was raised at the termination hearing, there was no explicit objection to the striking of her pro se pleadings and request for new counsel. Moreover, Joanna was unquestionably represented by counsel when she filed her pro se motion to appoint counsel, and she continued to be represented by counsel throughout the termination hearing. Therefore, the circuit court was well within its right to strike the motion. See Monts v. Lessenberry, 305 Ark. 202, 806 S.W.2d 379 (1991) (holding that pro se filings by a represented party may be struck). Next, Joanna argues the court abused its discretion in not continuing the termination hearing to appoint her substitute counsel when Counsel Tosh expressly stated that a breakdown in communication prevented her from meaningfully representing Joanna. 7 On its own initiative, the circuit court initially decided to continue the case and appoint Joanna new counsel. However, after hearing arguments from the attorney ad litem, it changed its ruling. We are troubled by the court’s actions, but Joanna cannot establish the prejudice necessary to merit reversal. Consider Briley v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2025 Ark. App. 302, 715 S.W.3d 471. In Briley, Briley, the incarcerated father, argued that he was denied due process because his attendance was not secured at any of the hearings, and his appointed counsel “wholly failed to act effectively in his stead.” Id. at 9, 715 S.W.3d at 476. This court agreed, noting that the attorney did not communicate with Briley, did not develop an understanding of the case, and did not represent Briley well. However, we held that at the end of the day, the facts of the case favored termination because Briley was serving a sentence for a period of time that constituted a substantial period of MC’s life, and Briley could not state that had he had the opportunity to present testimony at any of the hearings, it would have influenced the outcome of the case. As in Briley, the facts before us favor termination, and Joanna cannot state how a different attorney could have influenced the outcome of the case. Here, the Department introduced a certified copy of Joanna’s prior involuntary-termination order. While there may be a defense to this ground when the parent remedies the cause of the prior termination, Joanna has no defense because her prior involuntary termination was due to her drug use, and she continued to use drugs a month before the termination hearing. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 2025). Joanna does not challenge these facts on appeal. 8 To affirm the termination order on appeal, this court needs evidence of only one termination ground. Briley, supra. Additionally, Joanna does not contest the best-interest finding, the adoptability finding, or the ICWA findings. The facts overwhelmingly favored termination, and any alleged shortcomings of the attorney or the circuit court’s actions did not affect the outcome. As we stated in Briley, “Parental rights must bow to the health and well-being of the child.” 2025 Ark. App. 302, at 15, 715 S.W.3d at 479. Affirmed. GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., agree. Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children. 9