Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 409 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-26-147 Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026 PAULA RANEY APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT V. [NO. 42BJV-24-26] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN, CHILD JUDGE APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO BE RELIEVED GRANTED CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge Paula Raney appeals the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to her son, MC, who was fifteen months old at the time of the termination hearing. 1 Her attorney filed a no-merit brief accompanied by a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Linker- Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j). The clerk of this court delivered a copy of her counsel’s brief and motion to withdraw to Raney and informed her of her right to file pro se points for reversal. Raney did not file any points. We affirm and grant the motion to withdraw. 1 The circuit court also terminated the parental rights of MC’s father, Michael Jolliff, but he does not appeal the decision. Therefore, we address the issues only as they pertain to Raney. I. Procedural History and Termination Hearing MC was born on August 20, 2024. On August 29, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (the Department) exercised a seventy-two-hour hold on MC because both Raney and the infant tested positive for methamphetamine. Raney admitted to substance abuse, including methamphetamine, but denied having a drug problem. She stated she had last used drugs on August 15. She was unable to provide an address where she and MC would live upon discharge from the hospital and hoped to move in with her sister in Booneville. According to the affidavit supporting the petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody, MC remained in the hospital when Raney was discharged. Raney did not return to participate in MC’s care, stating she did not have transportation. The hospital had provided her a family room in which to stay, but Raney did not participate in MC’s care, so the hospital removed the room from her use. On August 28, the nurse caring for MC called the Department and reported that the hospital had not been able to contact Raney. She had last been to the hospital on August 25 and had left that day after the 3:00 p.m. feeding. The nurse informed the Department that MC would be ready for discharge from the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) within a couple of days. Raney had not contacted the hospital or been to visit, and the hospital could not discharge MC to Raney until she stayed overnight so the hospital could observe her ability to care for the infant. The Department tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to contact Raney by telephone. The family service worker (FSW) assigned to the case drove to the address where Raney last 2 lived. A man answered the door and told the FSW that Raney and MC’s father, Michael Jolliff, lived next door. Raney then approached the FSW, and the FSW informed her that a team decision-making meeting was scheduled regarding MC. Raney said she could borrow a car and attend. She arrived an hour late to the meeting. The circuit court entered an ex parte order on September 2 finding that the Department had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of MC from his home. The court placed MC in the Department’s custody pending other orders of the court. By order entered September 9, Michael Jolliff was added to the case as a necessary party. The probable-cause hearing was held on September 10. The court found that the emergency conditions that necessitated the removal of MC from Raney’s custody continued to exist, making it necessary for MC to remain in the custody of the Department. On November 15, the court entered an adjudication order following its consideration of testimony, exhibits that included Raney’s and MC’s medical records, the record, and statements of the parties and counsel. The parties stipulated that MC was dependent- neglected pursuant to Garrett’s Law.2 The court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove MC from his home and that 2 Garrett’s Law requires medical personnel to report newborns who are born with illegal substances in their system or experiencing drug-withdrawal symptoms to the Child Abuse Hotline. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-305 (Repl. 2016); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18- 103(14)(B) (Supp. 2025). A Garrett’s Law finding supports an adjudication of dependency-neglect. Garner v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 328, 603 S.W.3d 858; Johnson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs, 2018 Ark. App. 221, 547 S.W.3d 489. Arkansas law provides for fast-tracked adoption of Garrett’s Law babies. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-702 (Supp. 2025). 3 MC was in need of the Department’s services. The court further found that returning MC to Raney would be contrary to his welfare. The court ordered the Department to provide services to Raney, including drug-and-alcohol assessment, counseling, parenting classes, psychological evaluations, homemaking services, adequate and safe housing, and random drug screens. The court set the goal at reunification. Following a review hearing held on January 7, 2025, the court determined that Raney had been minimally compliant with the orders of the court and the case plan. Raney had had issues with the STEPS3 parenting program and drug-and-alcohol assessments. Raney had not undergone a psychological evaluation. Raney’s drug screens continued to be positive. Raney did not have an appropriate home for MC. The court stated that Raney needed to watch the video “The Clock is Ticking” again. The goal of the case remained reunification, but the court warned Raney that if she continued to use methamphetamine, her child would not be returned to her. The court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency plan for MC. Following a review on April 15, the court ordered Raney to obtain a recommendation for inpatient rehabilitation from her counselor. The court also ordered the Department to take the necessary steps to ensure Raney was provided inpatient treatment. The court found that Raney was going to counseling at that time. The family did not have any transportation, and their home was “totally inappropriate.” The court determined that there was “no way” 3 Safety Training Education Prevention Solutions. 4 MC could be placed with Raney at that time. The court kept the goal of the case as reunification but stated that if the Department believed Raney had not made significant progress by the permanency-planning hearing, it could ask for termination of parental rights. Following the review hearing on August 19, the court found that not only had Raney made no progress since the previous hearing, but she had also digressed. The home was inappropriate, the conditions being abysmal. Raney still did not have transportation. There had been instances of domestic violence that resulted in criminal charges against the father and a no-contact order. Raney had continued to use illicit drugs. Raney had failed to either complete or pass even one random drug screen since the last hearing. A year had passed since the Department had taken custody of MC, and MC needed permanency. The court allowed the Department to change the goal of the case to adoption. The Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights on September 12, 2025, relying on three bases for termination: Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), (vii)(a), and (ix)(a) (Supp. 2025). Pursuant to subdivision (i)(a), it alleged that MC had been out of Raney’s custody over twelve months, and despite meaningful efforts by the Department to rehabilitate her, the conditions that caused the removal had not been remedied. Pursuant to subdivision (vii)(a), the Department alleged that other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect demonstrating that placement of MC in Raney’s custody would be contrary to MC’s health. The Department’s final ground, subdivision (ix)(a), was that Raney had subjected MC to 5 aggravated circumstances in that there was little likelihood that continued services from the Department would result in a successful reunification. The termination hearing was held on November 18. Before testimony began, Raney’s trial counsel objected to the introduction of the Department’s exhibit 11, which was a hair- follicle test. The bases for the objection were that it was hearsay and that the Department was unable to lay the proper foundation for the test. The Department responded that the tests were ordered by the court and conducted out of state. The Department had never been successful in getting the company to certify the results of its hair follicle tests. The court allowed the introduction of the test over the objections. The Department called Thomas Black, who was the primary caseworker assigned to MC’s case. He testified that the initial removal of MC from Raney’s custody was due to Raney’s use of methamphetamine and the child’s testing positive for methamphetamine. The other safety concerns at that time included the lack of adequate housing and Raney’s abandonment of MC at the hospital with the hospital having no way to contact her. The Department had offered the following services: the video “The Clock is Ticking,” drug-and-alcohol assessment, a psychological evaluation, parenting classes, homemaking services, hair-follicle testing, random drug screens, transportation, counseling, family time, and home visits. Raney watched the video and underwent drug-and-alcohol assessment. The psychological evaluation was also completed. Raney completed six random drug screens and participated in counseling and family time. 6 Raney’s drug screens, when she was able to produce a sample, were consistently positive. The Department was able to obtain six drug screens from her. Raney refused six drug screens, produced one invalid screen, and on twelve attempted screens was unable to produce urine to be tested. Black reviewed Raney’s drug tests: she was positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, benzo, and THC in December; in February, she was positive for the same drugs; in April and May she was again positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, benzos, and THC; and in May she tested positive for benzos. The week before the hearing, she tested positive for THC. The morning of the hearing, the Department received test results that showed Raney positive for both benzos and THC. Raney told Black she was going to rehabilitation but had two uncompleted attempts. She went to Horizon Renewal Center from May 9 to May 12, 2025. She then went to Gateway Recovery Center from May 22 to June 1. Raney had not returned to rehabilitation since she left Gateway without completing the program. At the time of the termination hearing, Raney still needed to attend the STEPS parenting classes; she had no adequate housing; she still tested positive for illegal substances; and there remained domestic-abuse and violence issues between her and her husband, MC’s father. Black testified that he did not believe Raney had benefited from services offered by the Department. He opined that continued work with Raney was not likely to result in a successful reunification with MC. He described the progress of MC’s parents in remedying the issues that caused MC’s removal as minimal. Black testified that the Department did 7 not believe Raney had made any substantial progress. He further testified that MC, who is healthy, is adoptable and that there are no barriers to adoption. Raney testified that at the time of the hearing, she was “just kind of couch-surfing” until she went to rehabilitation, which she planned to do in a few days. She further testified that she had last used methamphetamine twenty-five to thirty days before the termination hearing. Raney had last used THC—she does not have a medical marijuana card— approximately two weeks before the hearing. Raney testified that she did not currently have a car but was working on getting one. Raney also did not have a driver’s license. According to Raney, she had not completed her paperwork to take the STEPS parenting classes because she was in a car wreck and, unbeknownst to her, had lost half of the packet to complete. Raney testified that, as of the date of the hearing, she was not able to take MC home with her. She needed get sober and obtain housing first. Raney requested that the court give her more time in order for her to complete rehabilitation. The court ordered termination based on two grounds, the first being Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(i)(a), that the child had been adjudicated dependent- neglected and remained out of the custody of Raney for twelve months and that, despite meaningful efforts by the Department to rehabilitate her and correct the conditions that caused the removal, the conditions had not been remedied. The second ground was section 9-35-325(b)(3)(ix)(a), that the parents had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances in that there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Raney filed a timely notice of appeal. 8 II. Analysis A. Standard of Review To terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence at least one of the grounds for termination listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B). Coston v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 413, 698 S.W.3d 647. The court must also determine by clear and convincing evidence that terminating parental rights is in the best interest of the child, taking into consideration the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted and the potential harm to the child if returned to the parents. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Crawford v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 319, 738 S.W.3d 662. On appeal, this court reviews termination cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, upon review of the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. This court gives due deference to the superior position of the circuit court to assess the witnesses’ credibility. Id. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j) provides for the filing of a no-merit brief and motion to withdraw in a parental-rights-termination case if appellate counsel determines, after studying the record and researching the law, that there are no meritorious grounds for 9 appeal. In such cases, appellate counsel must include in the statement of the case all of the rulings adverse to the appellant. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(B). Likewise, in the argument section, appellate counsel must list all the rulings that were adverse to the appellant on all objections, motions, and requests at the hearing from which the appeal arose and explain why each does not constitute a meritorious ground for reversal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 609(j)(1)(A). When considering a no-merit brief, the issue before this court is whether an appeal would be wholly frivolous or whether there are any issues of arguable merit. Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 70, 730 S.W.3d748. B. Statutory Grounds Appellate counsel correctly states in her brief that, although the circuit court based its termination of parental rights on two distinct statutory grounds, only one was necessary to support the termination. See Coston, supra. Counsel then addresses the evidence supporting the court’s finding of aggravated circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. She is correct that any challenge to the court’s finding of aggravated circumstances would be frivolous. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3) provides that one of the grounds upon which a court may terminate parental rights is that it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent subjected the juvenile to aggravated circumstances. “Aggravated circumstances” includes, inter alia, that “a determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification.” Ark. Code Ann § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(B)(i). “This type of aggravated 10 circumstance occurs when a parent is not following through with offers of assistance, is not completing basic goals of the case plan, and is not making significant progress.” Jones v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 299, at 7, 578 S.W.3d 312, 317. In Jones, this court affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights when, after seventeen months of services, she still did not demonstrate sufficient parenting skills to regain custody of her children, to be trusted with a trial placement, or to have unsupervised visitation. The court noted that this was most evidenced by the mother’s continued use of illegal drugs. The mother continued to test positive for drugs fifteen months after the child’s removal. The same is true in the present case. Raney and MC both tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of MC’s birth. By the time of the termination hearing, when MC was fifteen months old, Raney had never been able to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills to have unsupervised visitation, much less a trial placement or custody. Sadly, Raney continued to test positive for illicit drugs, including methamphetamine. At the hearing, she testified that she had last used methamphetamine twenty-five to thirty days before and THC approximately two weeks before. She was couch-surfing, did not have transportation, had not managed to complete an inpatient rehabilitation program, and had not attended the STEPS parenting class or even completed the paperwork for it. As stated in Jones, supra, “A parent’s continued inability to protect and care for his or her child and failure to benefit from the services provided demonstrate little likelihood that further services will result in a successful reunification.” 2019 Ark. App 299, at 8, 578 S.W.3d at 317–18. 11 Based on our de novo review of the record, we cannot say that the circuit court’s finding of aggravated circumstances is clearly erroneous. C. Best Interest The circuit court did not err in determining that termination of Raney’s parental rights was in MC’s best interest. It considered both adoptability and the potential for harm if MC were returned to either of his parents. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A). Brown testified that MC is adoptable. MC was a healthy fifteen-month-old child, and there were no barriers to adoption. This is sufficient to support the required consideration of the likelihood of adoption. Jones, supra. The analysis of the potential-harm factor is to be conducted in a forward-looking manner and considered in broad terms. Copp v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 491, 679 S.W.3d 380. The best-interest finding overall must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, rather than the individual factors considered. Id. The circuit court is not required to identify actual harm when considering the potential-harm factor. Id. The same evidence that supports a finding of aggravated circumstances on the ground of little likelihood of successful reunification is sufficient to support a circuit court’s potential-harm finding. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193, 625 S.W.3d 374. In the present case, the clear and convincing evidence of Raney’s continued drug use throughout the entire fifteen months leading to the termination supports the court’s determination of the risk of harm to MC if he were returned to his parent. Id.; see also Jones, supra. 12 D. Adverse Rulings There were two adverse rulings in addition to the termination, both of which appellate counsel addressed in her brief. 1. Admission of hair-follicle test Trial counsel objected to the admission of exhibit 11, a hair-follicle test, on the basis of lack of foundation.4 She argued that no witness was present to testify as to how or when the test was administered or how the results were reached. The circuit court allowed the admission of the test results over trial counsel’s objection. As asserted by appellate counsel, even if the circuit court erred in admitting the test results, any error was harmless and could not constitute reversible error. This court will not reverse a circuit court’s ruling on admissibility in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. Barton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 239, 576 S.W.3d 59. “A mere showing that the circuit court erroneously admitted evidence will not support a reversal absent a showing of prejudice. Without any showing of prejudice, any judicial error as to the admissibility of evidence is harmless error and cannot be grounds for disturbing a circuit court’s order.” Id. at 12, 576 S.W.3d at 67 (citation omitted). When the objected-to evidence is admitted through a separate source, there is no reversible error. Id. In the present case, there was ample evidence of Raney’s continued illicit drug use, including her own testimony that she had used methamphetamine within the prior month and THC 4 The test results were positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC. 13 within the last two weeks before the hearing. Thus, the court’s admission of exhibit 11 does not constitute reversible error. 2. Request for additional time Raney requested that the circuit court give her more time in order to go to rehabilitation and prove that she could stay clean. In terminating her parental rights, the court denied this request. Appellate counsel is correct that this denial does not constitute reversable error. At no time was Raney in compliance with the case plan. At the time of the hearing, she still had not addressed her substance-abuse issues, even though the Department had been providing services to her. She had no home, no job, and no transportation. She had not completed the parenting classes. Raney was using methamphetamine at the time of MC’s birth and was still using it within a month of the hearing fifteen months later. Appellate counsel correctly observes that a parent’s past behavior is a strong indicator of his or her future behavior, and a child’s need for permanency and stability may outweigh a parent’s request for more time to try to change his or her behavior. See Bradley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 154, 732 S.W.3d 56. As highlighted by appellate counsel, the purpose of the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when returning the child to the parents is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and the evidence demonstrates that a return to the home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time when viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325; see also Bradley, supra. 14 III. Conclusion Having fully examined the record and the no-merit brief, we hold that Raney’s counsel has fully complied with the requirements for a no-merit termination-of-parental- rights appeal and that any appeal would be wholly without merit. We affirm the termination of Raney’s parental rights and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved. Affirmed; motion to be relieved granted. WOOD and HIXSON, JJ., agree. Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant. One brief only. 15