Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 411 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-26-251 JASON LYNCH Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 26JV-24-287] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge Jason Lynch appeals the January 16, 2026, Garland County Circuit Court order terminating his parental rights to his three minor children, MC1 (DOB 09/09/13), MC2 (DOB 07/30/14), and MC3 (06/27/16). On appeal, he argues there was insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights under the failure-to-remedy and substantial- sentence-in-a-criminal-proceeding grounds. Although we do not affirm on the statutory grounds relied on by the circuit court, our de novo review permits us to affirm on an alternative ground pleaded by the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and supported by the record; accordingly, we affirm on the ground of aggravated circumstances. I. Relevant Background This dependency-neglect case involves the three minor children of Keri Lynch 1 and Jason Lynch. DHS removed the children from Jason’s custody in September 2024 due to concerns of threat of harm and parental substance abuse. The children had previously been in foster care in an earlier dependency-neglect case. The prior case was closed in April 2024 with Jason receiving custody of all three children, but DHS continued a protective-services case and provided in-home services. Within weeks, Jason and the children returned to the home with Keri, whom the children had been removed from. At the time of the September removal, DHS received three separate referrals alleging Jason had been driving drunk with the children in the vehicle, smashed the children’s fish tank, made the children watch the fish die, and poured bleach on the children’s dog while the children watched. The referrals also alleged Keri had been using drugs and living in the home with the children despite custody not being returned to Keri during the last case due to her noncompliance. When DHS and law enforcement investigated, they saw damage to the home and a dog with chunks of fur missing all over its back and scabs on its skin. Jason acknowledged he struggled with his behavior and had been unsafe around the children, but he later denied the allegations, became agitated, and refused a drug screen. The children independently reported they did not feel safe with Jason because of his increasingly erratic behavior. They described Jason’s drinking and driving recklessly with While Keri is not part of this appeal, we include relevant discussion of her 1 involvement in this case. 2 them in the vehicle, running off the road, punching holes in doors, damaging the home, physically assaulting Keri, and striking one of the minor children. The children also reported that Jason claimed to be God and stepped on the dog’s paw until they apologized for contradicting him. The children indicated Jason’s conduct was ongoing, describing him as “always upset” and stating that “every day is a bad day.” Keri acknowledged Jason had been drinking and acting inappropriately and reported his behavior had previously become so angry and erratic that she sent the children to stay with her mother. Keri nevertheless minimized several of the children’s allegations and twice failed to provide a valid drug screen. In light of the children’s reports, Jason’s conduct, the condition of the home and the dog, and the parents’ behavior during the investigation, DHS exercised a hold on all three children and removed them from the home. At the January 7, 2026, termination hearing, DHS caseworker Cecily Truslow testified she had been assigned to the case throughout most of its pendency. Jason had been incarcerated since shortly after the case opened. While incarcerated, he completed an anger- management program and participated in family time, but Truslow was unaware of any other services he had completed and did not know his anticipated release date. Truslow also testified that Keri frequently failed to complete requested drug screens. According to Truslow, Keri would state that she could not provide a urine sample, leave without completing a requested screen, or otherwise fail to address the request. Truslow further testified that most of the screens Keri did provide were adulterated and had an insufficient 3 temperature reading. DHS offered Keri a hair-follicle test in April 2025, but Keri never completed it. Keri was no longer participating in counseling at the time of the hearing. She continued to reside in the residence from which the children had been removed. Truslow attempted to inspect the residence on the morning of the termination hearing, but Keri told her she did not have time for an assessment. Truslow’s previous inspection, which occurred several months earlier, revealed ongoing repairs. One bedroom was being used for storage and was inappropriate for a child, while flooring had been removed from other rooms and was being replaced. Truslow testified the residence was not a home to which DHS could return the children. Truslow testified she believed termination was in the children’s best interest because they deserved an opportunity to be placed together and to begin addressing their trauma in a stable home. She explained the children could not be returned to Keri because DHS did not know the current condition of the residence and lacked proof of Keri’s sobriety or treatment. According to Truslow, Keri had completed a drug-and-alcohol assessment and was participating in medication management, but those were the only completed services identified at the hearing. Jason participated in weekly thirty-minute Zoom visits with the children while incarcerated. Truslow described those visits as “[n]ot great.” One child did not wish to participate and frequently attempted to leave or remain off camera. Truslow testified the child was sometimes coerced or yelled at to return, and the therapist had reported the visits 4 were stressful for the child. Keri and Jason also argued during visits and required redirection by DHS. Although some of the children had previously expressed a desire to return to Keri, Truslow testified that by the time of the termination hearing, they were less focused on returning to their mother and more concerned with ultimately being placed together. DHS adoption specialist Sandra Marfoglio-Hinton testified regarding the children’s adoptability. When she entered the three children’s information into the adoption-matching system as a sibling group, the system identified eleven possible adoptive homes. She was unaware of any condition affecting any of the children that would render them unadoptable. Keri testified she opposed termination and did not believe it was in her children’s best interest. She stated she visited the children weekly as much as possible and attempted to communicate with them and check on their well-being. Keri was not participating in counseling at the time of the termination hearing. She explained she had been discharged from counseling because she lacked insurance and disputed DHS’s characterization of her treatment recommendations. Keri maintained that records she obtained stated that outpatient treatment could continue, although she acknowledged that other paperwork reflected a recommendation for inpatient treatment. Keri testified she attempted to obtain admission to other inpatient programs and acknowledged that inpatient treatment would help her. Regarding drug testing, Keri acknowledged there were occasions when she did not submit to requested screens, although she testified she had complied with screens for several months during the summer. She admitted she had not completed the requested hair-follicle 5 test. Keri further acknowledged that submitting to drug screens was part of her case plan and conceded she had not complied “100 percent.” When asked when she had last used methamphetamine, Keri responded it had been “months,” but she could not identify how many months and referenced a failed drug screen. When later asked what the result would be if she submitted to a drug screen that day, Keri stated that she did not know. Jason testified by video from prison. He stated he was incarcerated for a six-month parole violation and also had pending criminal charges. According to Jason, the parole board continued to defer consideration of his release while awaiting resolution of those charges. He testified his pending charges included felony fleeing, felony terroristic acts, and misdemeanor criminal mischief. His criminal case was scheduled for a March 12 pretrial hearing and a May jury trial. Jason owned a home and testified he would have a residence available immediately upon his release. He opposed termination of his parental rights and hoped Keri would obtain treatment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court noted the children had been in DHS custody for approximately 431 days, or more than sixteen months, and emphasized their need for stability and to remain together. The court also considered the family’s prior foster-care case. As to Keri, the circuit court found her compliance with DHS had fallen short of substantial compliance. The court cited her lack of cooperation with drug testing, her failure to cooperate with DHS’s efforts to assess her residence, and her incomplete compliance with the case plan. 6 As to Jason, the circuit court expressly stated it was not basing its termination decision on his pending felony charges. The court did, however, consider that Jason was incarcerated following a parole violation and that there was no known release date. The court acknowledged Jason owned a home and had completed an anger-management program and participated in family time while incarcerated. The circuit court ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The court found the children adoptable, terminated Keri’s and Jason’s parental rights, and established adoption as the permanency goal. II. Discussion This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 64, 684 S.W.3d 219. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Jennings v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 429, 636 S.W.3d 119. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the circuit court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. An order terminating parental rights must be based on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds is satisfied and that termination is in the children’s best interest. Robinson, supra. Clear and convincing evidence is the degree of 7 proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction of the allegation sought to be established. Rugama v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 62, 684 S.W.3d 256. To make a best-interest finding, the circuit court must consider two facts: (1) the likelihood of adoption and (2) the potential harm that would result to the juvenile if he or she were returned to the parent’s custody. Beanblossom v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 605. A best-interest finding as a whole—rather than each factor—must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The circuit court terminated Jason’s parental rights on two statutory grounds: (1) twelve-month failure to remedy and (2) a substantial sentence in a criminal proceeding. Jason challenges both grounds on appeal but does not challenge the circuit court’s best-interest findings. Although the evidence supporting the two grounds expressly relied on by the circuit court is not particularly strong—especially with respect to failure to remedy—the record nonetheless supports affirmance. Most significantly, DHS pled aggravated circumstances as an independent ground for termination in its petition. Although the circuit court did not expressly rule on that ground in its written order, we affirm termination on aggravated circumstances pursuant to our de novo review. Under our de novo review, we will affirm a termination-of-parental-rights order on a statutory ground that was pled in a DHS petition but not relied on—or addressed—by the circuit court if the ground was proved at the termination hearing. See Millican v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 175, 709 S.W.3d 871. This principle is consistent with the broader rule that an appellate court may affirm when the circuit court reaches the right 8 result, even if for a different reason. See Watkins v. State, 2014 Ark. 283, 437 S.W.3d 685. Our de novo review opens the entire record for review and does not constrain the appellate court to the circuit court’s rationale, allowing for review of the record for additional reasons to affirm. See Kazzee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 78, at 11, 684 S.W.3d 279, 287. Here, the circuit court’s written order does not reject aggravated circumstances; rather, it simply does not address that ground despite DHS having pled it. Our task on de novo review is therefore not limited to determining whether the evidence supporting the two grounds expressly identified in the order was overwhelming. We may review the entire record to determine whether termination was nevertheless warranted on the aggravated- circumstances ground properly placed before the court. Under the aggravated-circumstances ground, parental rights may be terminated when there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–(B)(i) (Supp. 2025). The inquiry is forward- looking. The question is not merely whether a parent participated in services or made some efforts toward compliance but whether additional services are likely to achieve the ultimate goal of reunification. Id. Even full compliance with a case plan is not determinative because the relevant consideration is whether the parent has become a stable and safe parent capable of caring for the children. See, e.g., Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 85, at 6, 512 S.W.3d 694, 697. 9 Viewed as a whole, the record provides considerable evidence in support of termination under the aggravated-circumstances ground. Jason remained incarcerated at the time of termination, and his incarceration substantially limited his ability to demonstrate he could provide the children with the stability and care necessary for reunification. Although Jason made some efforts while incarcerated—including completing anger-management classes and participating in family time by Zoom—those efforts did not establish that further services would realistically permit reunification within a time frame consistent with the children’s needs. The record supports the conclusion that there was not a realistic likelihood additional services would result in successful reunification. We have specifically addressed incarceration as evidence supporting the aggravated-circumstances ground. In Bevell v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2023 Ark. App. 138, 662 S.W.3d 259, we held the circuit court did not clearly err in finding aggravated circumstances where the father was incarcerated at the termination hearing, had been incarcerated ten of the fifteen months of the case, remained incarcerated under a five-year sentence, admitted he did not participate in the case during the period he was not incarcerated, and missed three DNA testing appointments. Similarly, in Murphey v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2016 Ark. App. 430, 502 S.W.3d 544, evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated circumstances where the mother was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and stated she had no home to return to upon release from prison, and the children had been removed from her care on three separate occasions due to environmental issues. 10 While the facts of the present case are not identical, the record demonstrates the minor children have previously spent time in foster care, Jason allowed Keri back into the home after the children were removed from her care, Jason admitted having behavioral issues around the children, and he was incarcerated the majority of the pendency of the case without a release date in sight. Accordingly, even if the evidence supporting one or both of the statutory grounds expressly relied on by the circuit court gives this court some pause, reversal is not required. DHS pled aggravated circumstances, the issue was before the circuit court, and the evidence presented at the termination hearing supports that ground by clear and convincing evidence. Under our de novo review, we may therefore affirm the termination order on the aggravated- circumstances ground. Affirmed. HARRISON and BROWN, JJ., agree. Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children. 11