Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 446 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-26-241 Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026 EARL PACE APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26JV-24-51] V. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILD APPELLEES AFFIRMED BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge The Garland County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of Earl Pace to his three daughters.1 Pace has appealed and argues that the circuit court erred in finding statutory grounds for termination and in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm the circuit court’s termination order. On 20 February 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) petitioned for emergency custody of MC1 (fourteen years old), MC2 (thirteen years old), MC3 (ten years old), MC4 (eight years old) and MC5 (three years old). The accompanying affidavit explained that DHS’s history with this family began in 2011 with reports of inadequate supervision and environmental neglect. DHS had also opened several 1 The court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother, Tenisha Pace, but she is not a party to this appeal. 1 protective-services cases and foster-care cases with the family between September 2015 and September 2023. The circumstances leading to the February 2024 removal began on 1 November 2023 when DHS opened a protective-services case after receiving a referral alleging physical abuse and educational neglect. The family was offered intensive family services through Youth Villages, transportation, random home visits, drug screens, and case-management services. In early January 2024, DHS checked on the family in their home, and Tenisha tested positive for methamphetamine/amphetamine. DHS made new referrals for counseling and drug treatment and continued to assist with intensive outpatient services. In late January, DHS received reports that the children had not been attending school consistently and that the children had told a counselor that they were living in an abandoned trailer. DHS was unable to locate the trailer, but on 16 February 2024, DHS located Tenisha and the children at the local Quality Inn Motel. The motel room was in disarray and had food sitting out. Tenisha agreed to take a drug screen and tested positive for methamphetamine/amphetamine and THC. MC5 appeared to have an injury, and Tenisha said she was not sure where it came from. MC5 said that he had been hit by an unknown male who was also in the motel room. DHS exercised an emergency hold of the children due to ongoing drug use, lack of reliable housing, and physical abuse. The circuit court granted emergency custody and later found probable cause to continue custody with DHS. On 12 April 2024, Tenisha stipulated that the children were dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness and specifically her substance abuse. The order identified Pace as a noncustodial, nonoffending parent and the legal father of MC1, 2 MC3, MC4, and MC5 but found that he was not fit and proper for custody at that time. The court expressed concern with Pace’s history of substance abuse and failure to communicate with DHS. In June 2024 the court reviewed the case and found that Tenisha was compliant with the case plan but did not mention Pace. A second review order entered in October 2024 noted that Pace had been released from jail on 19 April 2024 and had not contacted DHS. On 6 March 2025, the court entered a permanency-planning order and found that the goal would remain reunification with a fit and proper parent. The court found that Pace had expressed interest in working with DHS and had been added to the case plan. He was also employed full time and “living in Chemical Free living.” In June 2025, the court found that Pace was mostly compliant with the case plan but had admittedly relapsed on 18 May 2025 and recently entered treatment at Covenant Recovery. The court changed the goal of the case to adoption following termination of parental rights. DHS filed its petition to terminate parental rights in August 2025; specific to Pace, DHS petitioned to terminate his parental rights to MC1, MC3, and MC4. DHS cited grounds of failure to remedy (noncustodial parent), subsequent factors, and aggravated circumstances (little likelihood of reunification). See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(2), (vii)(a), and (ix)(a)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. 2025). At a hearing on 18 September 2025, the DHS caseworker, Sara Tadlock, testified that one of the issues in the case is that the four older children do not want to reunite with either parent. Pace and his three daughters attempted family therapy but “it didn’t go well.” Pace had participated in substance-abuse treatment, mental-health therapy, and anger 3 management, and he had maintained employment. He was living in a two-bedroom apartment owned by Covenant Recovery, where he was subject to random drug screens. His housing allowed children but his daughters could not be placed with him at his current home due to its small size. Tadlock opined that the main issues preventing the girls from reunification with either parent were “[t]he amount of trauma that they have endured and that they are still having to work through and that they’ve been in [foster care] three times and neither parent has changed.” She believed that the girls needed to move forward with trauma recovery, so “pushing them backwards” by placing them with either parent was not in their best interest. On cross-examination, Tadlock stated that Pace had complied with the case plan but he needed to have a home with more room for the children for reunification to occur. She also said that Pace had “always been positive” at visitations with the girls and that “[h]e’s still learning how to interact with teenage girls.” She agreed that he was “actively working[] toward[] getting better with the girls.” Sonya Cole, an adoption specialist with DHS, testified that she had found two matches for the girls as a sibling group and many matches for the girls individually. She was not aware of anything that would make the children not adoptable. Courtney Clark, the girls’ therapist, testified that she had administered a “child adolescent trauma screen” on each of the girls, and they all scored “very high.” She also attended some visitations with the parents and observed MC1 having a panic attack on more than one occasion. All the girls had told Clark that they did not want to return home. With Pace, the girls had “concerns with [him] being able to take care of them financially and 4 everything.” On cross-examination, Clark said she had done one family-therapy session with Pace and the girls, and she thought the session had gone well. Her impression was that Pace “really cares and he’s trying.” Crystal Siever, the children’s court-appointed special advocate (CASA), recommended that both parents receive family therapy and that the girls remain in their current placement with adoption considered as a long-term permanency goal. She explained that Pace had not been in the picture until April or May 2025 and that CASA recommended family therapy for both parents. She did not believe DHS had made reasonable efforts to facilitate family therapy. Pace testified that he had gotten a two-bedroom because: “Tadlock told me to work on getting a place for me and myself and then work on getting my girls once they see my success with my son.” He never intended for all the children to stay there. He had been employed at Express Services for nine months and had recently gotten a promotion. He said that he liked attending family therapy and did not know why the sessions had stopped. He also said he had relapsed by drinking alcohol in May 2025 but immediately sought treatment, and he has been attending NA meetings and drug counseling through Covenant Recovery. The circuit court decided to give the parents one more chance and continue the hearing. The court entered an order finding that the children are adoptable but continued the remaining issues presented in the termination petition until November 12 “to allow additional time to attempt family therapy between the juveniles and the parents.” 5 DHS filed another petition to terminate parental rights in October 2025, this time citing grounds of failure to remedy (noncustodial parent) and subsequent factors. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(2) and (vii)(a). Pace moved to dismiss the petition and continue the November 12 hearing; the court entered an agreed continuance order and set the termination hearing for 7 January 2026. At the hearing, Sara Tadlock testified that Pace had completed outpatient drug treatment and maintained employment and housing, although his home was a two-bedroom apartment that could not accommodate all the children. And he did briefly require help with his rent while he was between jobs. Pace also attended individual family therapy sessions and had trial home visits with MC5. In fact, DHS had since placed MC5 with Pace. As for family therapy, Methodist Counseling Center told Tadlock that the services could not be completed “due to ethical code of conduct.” She attempted to have family therapy set up elsewhere but was told “either they were not able to provide services or they ethically couldn’t complete them.” Tadlock believed it was in MC1’s, MC3’s, and MC4’s best interest to terminate parental rights. She agreed that the children did not want to return to either parent. On cross-examination, Tadlock said that Pace had attended several therapy sessions with the children to try and repair their relationship. Pace had also recently lost his job but had gotten a new job. Tadlock said there was nothing more in the case plan that Pace needed to do, and the only thing preventing the girls from being placed with him was his housing and “their mental health status with dad.” When asked if DHS had done anything 6 since the last hearing to help Pace find a larger home, Tadlock responded, “He hasn’t ask[ed] for it. He hasn’t asked for help in that area. He’s asked for rental assistance in his current housing, so to maintain housing I helped him with [that].” Pace testified that things had been going well with MC5 in his home and that he was looking for a larger home. He knew when he acquired his current home that it was too small for all the children, but his caseworker suggested he should first focus on establishing stability with MC5. Pace also said he had found a new job and could pay all his bills. The court ruled from the bench that it was granting DHS’s petition. The court remarked, Mr. Pace has done everything asked of him by the Department, but we have this problem with housing. He’s showing he had a house that’s only for one individual. Number two, we still have the problem of the four girls— no testimony’s been changed—that don’t want to go back and despite all efforts to try to get counseling and try to work on that, it’s not been able to be accomplished, even began. This case is 22 and a half months old from what I can tell. This is the third time that these children have been in foster care. They are deserving of stability. . . . In regard to the four girls, I am terminating the parental rights in regard to the father for the reasons of no— insufficient housing continued and the relationship between the girls and not being able to get them to a point of being able to talk to their father, much less interact with them. The court’s written order found that DHS had proved the statutory ground of failure to remedy, specifically a lack of appropriate housing for all the children, with regard to Pace. The court noted that neither parents’ housing situation had changed since the previous termination hearing on 10 September 2025. The court also noted its previous finding of adoptability and found the children would face potential harm considering that the “juveniles subject to this petition have expressed an unwillingness to return to the care of 7 either parent, and neither parent is in a position at this time for these juveniles to be placed with them.” Pace timely appealed the circuit court’s order. In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9- 35-325(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025); Trogstad v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 443, 609 S.W.3d 661. The circuit court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Posey, supra. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to assess the witnesses’ credibility. Lee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277 (2008). Only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Id. 8 I. Statutory Grounds The circuit court’s order found that the evidence had proved the failure-to-remedy statutory ground for termination, which states as follows: That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued to be out of the home of the noncustodial parent for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that prevented the child from safely being placed in the parent’s home, the conditions have not been remedied by the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(2). The court’s written order stated that Pace did “not have appropriate housing for all the juveniles. He lives in a small, two (2) bedroom residence that does not have room for all the juveniles.” Pace argues that the circuit court erred in finding that this statutory ground had been proved. He acknowledges that at both the September 2025 and January 2026 hearings, Tadlock testified that his two-bedroom apartment was appropriate only for him and MC5. But other than helping with the rent for one month while he was out of work, there was no testimony of any services provided to assist him in finding a home large enough for all four of his children. The failure-to-remedy ground requires DHS to make a meaningful effort to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that prevented the child from safely being placed in the parent’s home, and Pace asserts that DHS did not make a meaningful effort to address his housing issue. He denies that he was required to specifically request housing assistance from DHS. And considering that MC5 had already been placed with him, there were clearly no issues with his home other than the size, and that could have easily been remedied with assistance from DHS. Pace concludes, “Efforts cannot be reasonable if they are never made, and services cannot be meaningful if they are never 9 offered. DHS abdicated its responsibility to this family to remove the one issue barring reunification.” We are unable to reach Pace’s argument on appeal. This court has held that we will not address an argument that DHS failed to make meaningful efforts to reunify the family when the appellant did not appeal from an earlier permanency-planning order finding reasonable efforts. Phillips v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 565, 567 S.W.3d 502. In Phillips, this court noted that not only had appellant not appealed from the permanency-planning order, she also did not object at the termination hearing to DHS’s failure to provide services, which is a waiver of that issue on appeal. Id. (citing Contreras v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510). Here, Pace did not appeal from the finding in the permanency-planning order that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide family services. He also made no objection at the termination hearing that DHS had failed to provide services; therefore, he has waived that issue on appeal. II. Best Interest As a reminder, in making its finding of potential harm, the circuit court considered the following. “[A]ll four (4) juveniles subject to this petition have expressed an unwillingness to return to the care of either parent, and neither parent is in a position at this time for these juveniles to be placed with them.” Pace first incorporates his argument made above and reiterates that if DHS had provided meaningful services in assisting him in finding a larger home, he would have been in a position to have his daughters placed with him at the time of the termination hearing. 10 Second, Pace acknowledges that there was testimony that the girls did not want to return to the home of either parent, but he argues that there was little to no effort made throughout the case to address the issues in the relationship between him and his daughters and explain why they did not want to be placed in his home. The only testimony offered is that the girls were concerned about Pace’s ability to support them financially. There were no allegations of inappropriate behavior by Pace in any visitation or the one family-therapy session that he had with his daughters; in fact, Clark testified that his sessions with the girls went well and that he was trying. Pace contends that by not facilitating individual and family therapy sooner, DHS failed both him and the girls and their long-term mental health. Again, we are unable to reach Pace’s argument because it is based on DHS’s failure to make meaningful efforts, an issue that has been waived on appeal. Affirmed. BARRETT and BROWN, JJ., agree. Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant. One brief only. 11