In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.P.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. No. CV-25-0173-PR Filed September 1, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County The Honorable Helena S. Seymour, Judge Pro Tempore Nos. JD20230397; S20240024 AFFIRMED Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two 260 Ariz. 234 (App. 2025) VACATED COUNSEL: Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Autumn Spritzer, Dawn R. Williams (argued), Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Department of Child Safety James L. Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender, Sybil Clarke (argued), Assistant Legal Defender, Pima County Legal Defender’s Office, Tucson, Attorneys for Maria P. Paul Bennett (argued), Child and Family Law Clinic, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, Tucson, Attorneys for M.P. Steve Koestner, Legal Advocate, Office of the Legal Advocate, Amanda L. Adams, Deputy Legal Advocate, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate Michael C. Jones, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Defender, Jamie R. Heller, Deputy Legal Defender, Phoenix; Shannon Burns, Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Seth Draper, Deputy Public Advocate, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Indigent Defense Agencies  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court Anne C. Ronan, Nicholas Ansel, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES MONTGOMERY, KING, and CRUZ joined. CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICE CRUZ authored concurring opinions. JUSTICE BOLICK dissented. JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court: ¶1 The juvenile court may terminate a parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory factors for termination exists and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. See Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 13 (2022); A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Section 8-533(B)(2) allows the court to terminate a parent’s rights if: “the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child. This abuse includes serious physical or emotional injury or situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.” ¶2 In this case, we consider (1) whether the court of appeals misapplied § 8-533(B)(2) by requiring the juvenile court to consider a parent’s “participation in and benefit from services” when determining whether the parent is unfit under the statute, and (2) whether the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the juvenile court did not have to consider a parent’s success in services as part of its best-interests finding. For the following reasons, we hold that the court of appeals erred in both respects and ultimately erred by vacating the juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights. BACKGROUND ¶3 Mother gave birth to M.P. in February 2023. In September, Mother called 911 after she observed her daughter having a seizure. M.P. 2  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court weighed “approximately seven pounds” when she arrived at the hospital and medical providers there documented her condition as “emaciated, malnourished, and in medical distress.” ¶4 M.P. required medical care to prevent cardiac and circulatory failure, dehydration, metabolic crisis, and shock. A brain scan revealed atrophy consistent with prolonged malnutrition. Medical staff noted that M.P. did not exhibit gross motor skills typical of a seven-month-old child, and testing indicated developmental delays across all categories for her age. Advanced diagnostics aside, her malnourished state was evident from her sunken eyes and cheeks and loose, hanging skin. A healthy child of M.P.’s age should weigh approximately fifteen pounds—more than double her weight upon arrival at the hospital. ¶5 Mother reported that M.P. had weighed fourteen pounds a month earlier and that she was “cold to the touch” for several days before being taken to the hospital. Mother denied any illness or vomiting that could have contributed to M.P.’s weight loss, although Mother acknowledged that she and M.P.’s father had adopted “a more holistic approach to life” and that she may not have been producing enough breast milk to feed her daughter. ¶6 M.P. immediately began gaining weight while at the hospital. It was later determined that M.P.’s malnutrition was not a metabolic issue but rather resulted from a lack of proper care and feeding. M.P. stayed in the hospital for approximately two weeks. Upon her release, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of M.P. and placed her in a certified medically fragile foster home to meet her ongoing needs. ¶7 Mother was arrested on child abuse charges, subsequently pleaded guilty to attempted child abuse, a class 3 felony, and was placed on probation for seventeen years. ¶8 DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that M.P. was dependent, as to Mother, due to neglect. Specifically, DCS asserted that Mother had “failed to recognize early signs of malnutrition” and had “failed to take appropriate action to ensure the child’s wellbeing.” DCS also alleged that Mother neglected M.P. because of domestic violence between 3  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court Mother and M.P.’s father.1 Father was arrested and incarcerated for domestic violence in 2023 after strangling Mother during a dispute concerning Mother’s ability to parent M.P. Even after Father was released from jail, Mother allowed him to have contact with M.P. at the family residence in violation of the release conditions in Father’s criminal case. ¶9 The court adjudicated M.P. dependent after Mother did not contest the dependency allegations. DCS requested that the juvenile court set a concurrent case plan goal of both family reunification and severance and adoption. The court instead set an initial case plan with the goal of family reunification and ordered DCS to provide services to address Mother’s neglect of M.P., as well as the domestic violence between Mother and M.P.’s father. ¶10 Although the juvenile court found that Mother was participating in services and complying with the case plan at later review hearings, DCS continued to express concerns about her ability to understand and respond to M.P.’s needs. DCS reported that Mother could not identify safety risks related to her relationship with M.P.’s father and failed to recognize the power and control dynamics present in that relationship. As a result, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship, alleging that Mother had neglected M.P. by “causing the child to have severe malnourishment while in her care and custody,” under § 8-533(B)(2). After a multi-day hearing, the court found, in a comprehensive order containing detailed findings and conclusions, that DCS had proven this ground and determined that termination was in M.P.’s best interests—subsequently terminating Mother’s parental rights. ¶11 In evaluating the § 8-533(B)(2) ground, the court turned to § 8-201(25)(a) for guidance on the meaning of “neglect.” That statute defines “neglect,” in pertinent part, as “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . of a child to provide that child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). The court also noted that § 8-533(B)(2) uses the past tense “neglected,” suggesting that past neglect could be grounds for termination even in the absence of current neglect. 1 M.P.’s father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this appeal. 4  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court ¶12 Applying the relevant law to the evidence presented at the termination hearing, the court concluded that “Mother’s neglect caused a substantial risk of harm to [M.P.’s] health and well-being.” The court noted that during this time Mother and M.P.’s father were the child’s sole caregivers. The court further noted that M.P. lost nearly half of her body weight over a two-month period, despite the absence of any medical condition that could explain such drastic weight loss. Mother was aware that she was producing limited breast milk but still failed to take steps to seek timely medical care for M.P. As a result of Mother’s inaction, the court determined that she “failed to provide the basic necessities for [M.P.], leaving her so severely malnourished and developmentally delayed that she had no gross motor functions and required hospitalization.” ¶13 Accordingly, the juvenile court found that Mother was either unable or unwilling to provide her child with proper nourishment or timely medical care, creating a substantial risk of harm to the child’s health and welfare. Alternatively, the court also found that Mother failed to protect her child from another person who was unable or unwilling to provide proper nourishment or medical care, likewise placing the child at substantial risk. ¶14 Turning to the best-interests analysis, the court considered two key factors in determining whether terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve M.P. First, the court concluded that M.P. would benefit from being “freed for adoption.” The court highlighted Mother’s “documented history of neglecting [M.P.’s] needs” and the fact that “[M.P.] was close to death at the time she was admitted to the hospital.” Given that M.P. was thriving in a prospective adoptive placement, the court found that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in M.P.’s best interests. ¶15 Next, the court found that continuing the parental relationship would harm M.P. It underscored that M.P. had “suffered severe malnourishment” due to Mother’s neglect and that she failed to grasp “the severity of M.P.’s condition.” The court further concluded that, given the parents’ history of domestic violence, it was not in M.P.’s best interests to be denied a secure and stable adoptive home that was meeting her needs. 5  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court ¶16 In determining M.P.’s best interests, the court “specifically considered [Mother’s] completion of various reunification services.” While it acknowledged that Mother had participated in multiple therapeutic programs aimed at improving Mother’s mental and physical well-being and preparing her to protect both herself and M.P. from M.P.’s father, the court ultimately concluded that M.P. remained at risk of harm if returned to Mother’s care. ¶17 The court rejected Mother’s claim that she could safely care for M.P. based on her newfound insight into her relationship with M.P.’s father and their history of domestic violence. It acknowledged that Mother had complied with the “reunification services and shown some benefit,” but found that she had “not demonstrated any significant behavioral changes or understanding of how to protect [M.P.] from future abuse or neglect[,] including domestic violence.” Accordingly, the court determined that if returned to Mother’s care, M.P. “would be at risk of continued neglect and/or domestic violence between her parents.” The court thus concluded that “[M.P.’s] home was a potentially lethal environment due to the neglect that led to her hospitalization and the domestic violence she was exposed to. Mother has not benefited from her reunification services, and [M.P.] would remain at risk if left in Mother’s unsupervised care.” ¶18 The juvenile court also based its decision in part on Mother’s history of providing untruthful answers about her care of M.P. In its termination order, the court specifically noted Mother’s testimony that she herself had suffered from malnourishment in the months before M.P.’s hospitalization. However, this statement was contradicted by photographs of Mother taken between June and September 2023, which showed no evidence of malnourishment or significant weight loss. ¶19 In a divided opinion, the court of appeals vacated the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights, finding that the court “erred in failing to consider [Mother’s] participation in and benefit from services . . . in its finding of parental unfitness under § 8-533(B)(2).” In re M.P., 260 Ariz. 234, 243 ¶ 29 (App. 2025). The court explained that when DCS seeks to terminate a parent’s rights solely on the basis of neglect while providing services under a court-ordered family reunification plan, the parent’s engagement with and benefit from those services “must be considered as part of the court’s determination of parental unfitness.” Id. 6  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court at 244 ¶ 29. In evaluating the juvenile court’s best-interests analysis, however, the court indicated that this determination “requires no consideration of a parent’s success in [rehabilitative] services.” Id. at 243 ¶ 27. ¶20 We granted review to clarify the appropriate inquiry when making a termination finding under § 8-533(B)(2)—an issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION I. ¶21 Juvenile courts apply a two-step analysis in determining whether to terminate a parent-child relationship. Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 474 ¶ 13. First, the court must decide whether clear and convincing evidence supports at least one ground for termination listed in § 8-533(B). Id. Second, the court must determine whether a preponderance of the evidence supports finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. ¶22 We will affirm a juvenile court’s termination order unless it is clearly erroneous. See Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579–80 ¶ 10 (2021). A decision is clearly erroneous if, as a matter of law, “no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 479 ¶ 31 (2023) (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9 (1955)). II. ¶23 Resolving whether the court of appeals erred by requiring the juvenile court to consider “all relevant evidence”—including Mother’s “participation in and benefit from services”—when determining parental unfitness under § 8-533(B)(2) presents a question of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 476 ¶ 17. ¶24 “Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) 7  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court (quoting BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9 (2018)). To effectuate the text “we interpret statutes according to their plain language,” id., giving “words ‘their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended,’” State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, 228 ¶ 10 (2023) (quoting Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd., 243 Ariz. 539, 541 ¶ 7 (2018)). ¶25 As relevant here, § 8-533(B)(2) provides, “[e]vidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child relationship shall include . . . [t]hat the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child.”2 Because § 8-533(B)(2) uses the phrase “has neglected,” past neglect may support termination. See Jade K. v. Loraine K., 240 Ariz. 414, 417–19 ¶¶ 12–20 (App. 2016) (past neglect may serve as a basis for termination). Thus, under the statute’s plain language, termination is supported if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent neglected the child by being unable or unwilling to provide basic necessities, thereby placing the child’s health or welfare at substantial risk of harm. See A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a) (defining “neglected” as “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . of a child to provide that child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare”). ¶26 At this point in the determination, the statute requires proof only of the enumerated elements—it does not require the juvenile court to also consider whether the parent has since participated in or benefited from rehabilitative services. Rather, that consideration is reserved for the best-interests analysis that follows. See infra ¶ 37. Additionally, in 1998, the Legislature amended § 8-533(B) to remove “the availability of reunification services to the parent and the participation of the parent in these services” from the evidence to consider when finding the statutory ground satisfied. See 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 276, § 13 (2d Reg. Sess.). Section 8-533(B)’s evolution thus confirms that the statutory grounds must be considered without regard to a parent’s reunification services, unless a specific subsection directs otherwise. Subsection (B)(2) contains no such directive. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 256 (2012) (“If the [L]egislature amends or reenacts a provision other 2 DCS did not allege that Mother wilfully abused M.P. Thus, the issue in this case is whether Mother “neglected” M.P. 8  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court than by way of a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning.”). ¶27 Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the court of appeals’ majority’s suggestion that the statutory definition of “neglect” requires consideration of Mother’s later education and conduct. See In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 242 ¶ 23. As the court of appeals’ dissent observed, the majority cited no statutory language supporting its analysis, and the definition of “neglect” “unambiguously does not require consideration of a parent’s subsequent education and conduct.” Id. at 247 ¶ 52 (Sklar, J., dissenting). ¶28 By requiring the juvenile court to consider a parent’s subsequent conduct, it inserted an additional element into the statute—an action beyond the court’s authority. See Orca Commc’ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder, 236 Ariz. 180, 182 ¶ 11 (2014) (“[I]t is not the function of courts to rewrite statutes.” (quoting City of Phoenix v. Butler, 110 Ariz. 160, 162 (1973))); see also Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 27 (“[T]o the extent that the court of appeals imposed an additional showing of parental unfitness outside of § 8-533(B)(8)(c)’s elements, it misinterpreted the statute.”). ¶29 As discussed above, we derive a statute’s meaning by “determin[ing] the plain meaning of the words the [L]egislature chose to use.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 5 (quoting Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11 (2023)). Faithful adherence to the plain meaning of the Legislature’s words requires us to conclude that the § 8-533(B)(2) ground, as alleged in this case, is established when the juvenile court finds based on clear and convincing evidence that a parent has neglected her child due to her inability or unwillingness to provide basic needs, thereby placing the child’s health or welfare in substantial risk of harm. There is no statutory mechanism to negate proven past neglect. III. ¶30 The court of appeals’ majority further concluded that, in cases alleging neglect under § 8-533(B)(2), the juvenile court must consider “all relevant evidence,” In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 241 ¶ 20, including Mother’s “participation in and benefit from services,” during the initial statutory unfitness inquiry, id. at 243 ¶ 29. It asserted that excluding such evidence would not “comport with our due process principles.” Id. at 242 ¶ 20. That assertion is incorrect. 9  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court ¶31 Over twenty years ago, this Court held that the grounds for termination listed in § 8-533(B) are synonymous with parental unfitness and that a juvenile court’s finding of a termination ground under § 8-533(B) satisfies due process. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 285–86 ¶¶ 31–32 (2005). More recently, in Alma S. v. Deparment of Child Safety, we “explicitly reiterate[d]” that holding, explaining that when a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists, a parent’s due process rights are satisfied. 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 9 (2018). The court of appeals’ majority erroneously concluded that due process requires more based on a misapprehension of Sandra R. v. Department of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224 (2020). ¶32 In Sandra R., we considered the findings a juvenile court must make when terminating parental rights under § 8-533(B)(2) with respect to a child who has not been abused or neglected. Id. at 225 ¶ 1. We concluded that due process requires the court to determine, during the parental unfitness inquiry, that the child faces a “risk of harm” before parental rights may be terminated. Id. at 228 ¶ 17. We further explained that this requirement is consistent with prior decisions protecting due process by establishing a nexus between the abuse of one child and termination proceedings involving a child for whom no abuse or neglect has been shown. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. ¶33 The court of appeals’ dissent here rightly emphasized that the majority “glides past this distinction” in its analysis. In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 246 ¶ 45 (Sklar, J., dissenting). Drawing on Sandra R., which requires due process to include “a demonstrable connection between the ground for termination and the harm or risk of harm to a child,” the court of appeals’ majority held that a juvenile court’s failure to consider parental fitness during the initial unfitness inquiry both violates due process and contradicts the Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 241–42 ¶¶ 19–20 (quoting Sandra R., 248 Ariz. at 229 ¶ 24). Again, that conclusion does not withstand scrutiny. ¶34 The majority misconstrues our jurisprudence on this issue. First, as previously discussed, § 8-533(B)(2)’s plain language does not require the juvenile court to consider a parent’s subsequent education or conduct when determining parental unfitness. See supra ¶ 27. Second, the 10  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court majority misreads Sandra R. There, we held that when the state seeks to terminate a parent’s right to a child who has not been abused under § 8-533(B)(2), the “risk of harm” to the child must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to satisfy due process and Santosky. Sandra R., 28 Ariz. at 229 ¶ 24. The majority both distorts that holding and misapplies it here. In this case, unlike the child in Sandra R., M.P. was neglected. 3 ¶35 Finally, the court of appeals’ majority erroneously broadens the due process requirements for termination proceedings. It cites Santosky to argue that excluding relevant evidence—Mother’s participation in and benefit from services—denies due process. See In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 242 ¶ 20. That reading stretches Santosky too far. In Kent K., we clarified that “within the context of Arizona’s legislative scheme [for terminating parental rights], Santosky mandates only that the findings of the statutory grounds for termination be supported by clear and convincing evidence.” 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 32. Section 8-533(B) requires findings of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, providing the “fundamentally fair procedures” necessary to satisfy due process. Id. at 284 ¶ 24 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754). The majority cannot overlook this Court’s clear precedent: compliance with § 8-533(B) fully satisfies due process. Any effort to circumvent this clear holding is misguided. ¶36 This conclusion also undercuts the court of appeals’ majority’s related assertion that the juvenile court’s alleged failure to consider Mother’s performance in reunification services renders its initial statutory unfitness findings illusory. See In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 27. By determining that Mother “neglected” M.P., the juvenile court fulfilled the purpose of § 8-533(B)(2) and established parental unfitness. Once that determination was made, Mother’s performance in and benefit from reunification services became relevant—not to unfitness, but to the subsequent inquiry: whether M.P.’s interest in maintaining a relationship with Mother is outweighed by the potential harm of remaining with an unfit parent. The majority’s conclusion here implies that completing reunification services guarantees the restoration of parental rights. This reasoning is incorrect and inconsistent with § 8-533(B)(2) and our case law. 3 In September 2023, Mother pleaded guilty to attempted child abuse. Because of this, Mother has never raised that M.P.’s neglect did not occur. 11  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court IV. ¶37 Once a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination under § 8-533(B) has been established, its inquiry shifts to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 474 ¶ 13. Regarding the best-interests analysis, this Court has instructed that “we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 12 (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 35). Thus, once a juvenile court “finds ‘that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts to the interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent.’” Id. (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 31). ¶38 Consistent with this framework, this Court has held that termination is in the child’s best interests if either of the following conditions are met: (1) the child will benefit from severance, or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 16 (2016). However, determining whether a child would be harmed by the continuation of the parental relationship or would benefit from its termination does not allow courts to disregard other relevant evidence bearing on the child’s best interests. See Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 588 ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (“While a [factfinder] may find that severance is in a child’s best interests if the child is found to be adoptable, the [factfinder] is not required to do so.”). Although the best-interests inquiry ultimately centers on the child, juvenile courts should nonetheless consider a parent’s rehabilitation efforts as part of that analysis. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 15. Accordingly, we reiterate the directive set forth in Alma S.: juvenile courts should take a parent’s rehabilitation efforts into account when conducting the best-interests analysis. This review ensures that the process set forth in § 8-533(B) for terminating parental rights comports with constitutional requirements. ¶39 In making its best-interests determination in this case, the juvenile court noted Alma S.’s admonition and “specifically considered [Mother’s] completion of various reunification services.” The court acknowledged that Mother had been compliant with those services. However, it ultimately found that although Mother had shown some 12  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court benefit, she “[had] not demonstrated any significant behavioral changes or understanding of how to protect [M.P.] from future abuse or neglect, including domestic violence.” The court therefore concluded that “[M.P.] remains at risk of harm if returned to [Mother’s] care.” See supra ¶¶ 16–18. ¶40 Based on this evidence, the court found that termination would benefit M.P., noting Mother’s history of neglecting M.P.’s needs and the fact that M.P. was near death when admitted to the hospital. The court further determined that M.P. would be harmed if Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, as M.P. had suffered severe malnourishment due to Mother’s neglect and Mother’s failure to comprehend the severity of M.P.’s condition. ¶41 As an appellate court, we owe deference to the juvenile court’s factual findings and will accept them if reasonable evidence and inferences support them. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9. Additionally, we do not reweigh the evidence. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18. ¶42 The court of appeals’ majority erred by failing to follow these established standards. In discussing the juvenile court’s best-interests findings, the majority acknowledged that the court “considered [Mother’s] compliance with the case plan and her benefit from services.” In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 27. 4 Although the majority recognized that evaluating Mother’s participation in and benefit from services was “proper” as part of the best-interests analysis, it nevertheless “question[ed] whether consideration of a parent’s benefit from services under the best-interests analysis is sufficient.” Id. The majority doubted that assessing Mother’s rehabilitation efforts was necessary, reasoning that “[t]he best-interests analysis can be proven in two ways—by showing that the child will benefit from severance or will be harmed if severance is denied.” Id. Thus, it concluded that a best-interests finding may rest on evidence that the child is adoptable or in a more stable environment, without requiring evaluation of the parent’s progress in services. Id. This conclusion is simply incorrect. As previously noted, a juvenile court’s best-interests determination must 4 Although the majority stated that the juvenile court considered Mother’s participation and benefit from services, later in the same paragraph it inexplicably concluded that the “best-interests requirement was met in this case without consideration of [Mother’s] participation in services.” In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 27 (emphasis added). 13  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court account for a parent’s progress toward rehabilitation. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 15. Having mistakenly concluded that rehabilitation efforts are an optional consideration under the best-interests analysis, the majority then asserted that rehabilitation efforts, as a necessary “part of the termination calculus,” must inform “the court’s determination of parental unfitness.” In re M.P., 260 Ariz. at 243 ¶¶ 27, 29. Again, as previously explained, that assertion is incorrect. See supra ¶ 28. ¶43 Viewing the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s best-interests finding, Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 2 ¶ 2, and applying our deferential standard of review, see id. at 3 ¶ 9, we conclude that the finding is supported by sufficient evidence. M.P. was placed with a relative who is a prospective adoptive placement, where she is thriving and her needs are being met. In assessing the totality of the circumstances for its best-interests determination, the juvenile court further found that Mother failed to benefit from reunification services and that M.P. remains at risk in Mother’s care. V. ¶44 Although our dissenting colleague reprises objections he has expressed in prior writings concerning Arizona’s parental-termination statute, 5 neither those objections nor the authorities on which he relies justify departing from well-settled Arizona law. ¶45 The dissent principally argues that Arizona’s termination framework is “so far removed from federal procedural and substantive due process requirements” that it has become a “due process-free zone.” Infra ¶¶ 88, 93. That characterization does not withstand even a cursory examination of Arizona law and controlling federal precedent. 5 See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 152–56 ¶¶ 24–39 (Bolick, J., concurring in result); Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 84, 92–100 ¶¶ 33–73 (2019) (Bolick, J., dissenting); Sandra R., 248 Ariz. at 231 ¶ 34 (2020) (Bolick, J., concurring in result); Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 583–84 ¶¶ 31–35 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and in judgment); Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 479–81 ¶¶ 36–49 (Bolick, J., concurring in result); Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 481–83 ¶¶ 49–60 (Bolick, J., concurring in result). 14  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court ¶46 Because the dissent relies heavily on Santosky, we begin there, focusing on the issue the Supreme Court was tasked with and what it actually held. In Santosky, the state of New York sought to terminate the parents’ rights to their children. 455 U.S. at 751. Under New York law, parental rights could be terminated upon proof that the children were permanently neglected, a showing the state was required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 747. Throughout the state-court proceedings, the parents challenged the constitutionality of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Id. at 751–52. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether that standard satisfied due process. Id. at 750–51. ¶47 The Court recognized that a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and management of his or her child is a fundamental liberty interest that does not evaporate merely because the parent has not been a model parent or has lost temporary custody to the state. Id. at 753. It further explained that, before the state may terminate parental rights, it must provide parents with “fundamentally fair procedures.” Id. at 753–54. ¶48 The Court therefore considered what the Due Process Clause requires before the state may permanently terminate that interest. Applying the three-factor balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), 6 it held that New York’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was “inconsistent with due process.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758. It further concluded that due process requires proof of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence because that burden “strikes a fair balance between the rights of the natural parents and the State’s legitimate concerns.” Id. at 769. ¶49 Mindful of Santosky’s bottom line, this Court has held that, under Arizona’s statutory scheme, “Santosky mandates only that the findings of the statutory grounds for termination be supported by clear and 6 Mathews requires consideration of: “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335. 15  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court convincing evidence.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 32 (emphasis added). Arizona’s statutory framework thus faithfully implements the constitutional principles articulated in Santosky, which integrated the balancing framework established in Mathews. The dissent is therefore mistaken in asserting that today’s opinion fails to engage those constitutional principles. ¶50 Recognizing those principles, however, does not mean parental rights are without limits. To be sure, parents possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in raising their children, but “parental rights are not absolute.” Id. at 284 ¶ 24. When a child’s health or welfare is seriously jeopardized, the state has both the authority and the responsibility to act on the child’s behalf. See In re the Appeal in Cochise Cnty. Juv. Action No. 5666-J, 133 Ariz. 157, 161 (1982). Thus, “[a] court may order severance of parental rights under certain circumstances, so long as the parents whose rights are to be severed are provided with ‘fundamentally fair procedures’ that satisfy due process requirements.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284 ¶ 24 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754). ¶51 Due process is satisfied when the state proves parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, as Santosky requires, and the case otherwise proceeds fairly. Here, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother neglected M.P. by failing to provide her with basic necessities, a failure that nearly cost M.P. her life, thereby placing M.P.’s future health and welfare at substantial risk of harm. Although parents possess a fundamental right to direct their children’s upbringing, that right does not extend to conduct that deprives a child of life’s basic necessities and places the child at substantial risk of death or serious physical harm. ¶52 It is this unfitness determination—not the later best-interests stage—that supplies the constitutional safeguards a parent is owed, a point the dissent’s critique of Arizona’s framework misses. The dissent argues that the framework is deficient because it relegates consideration of the parent’s rights to the best-interests analysis. Infra ¶¶ 106–07. Not so. Once the state has carried its clear and convincing burden under Santosky, the parent has already received all process demanded by the Constitution. From that point forward, the state bears both the responsibility and 16  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P. Opinion of the Court authority to act in the child’s interest—the parent’s constitutional stake