Byrd v. Aurora

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE KAYLA BYRD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. AURORA BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM LLC, Defendant/Appellee. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0413 FILED 11-12-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2025-029570 The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge APPEAL DISMISSED COUNSEL Kayla Byrd, Mesa Plaintiff/Appellant Wood Smith Henning & Berman, LLP, Phoenix By Jason R. Mullis, Jeremy J. Butler Counsel for Defendant/Appellee MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.  BYRD v. AURORA Decision of the Court C A T T A N I, Judge: ¶1 Kayla Byrd challenges the superior court’s dismissal of her complaint against former employer Aurora Behavioral Health System LLC. Because Byrd’s notice of appeal was premature, we lack jurisdiction and thus dismiss the appeal. ¶2 Byrd sued Aurora claiming that racial discrimination and retaliation led to her wrongful termination. Aurora moved to dismiss, asserting that the complaint lacked any allegations of fact showing (or supporting a reasonable inference of) race-based actions or discrimination. The court gave Byrd leave to amend her complaint to address the deficiencies noted in Aurora’s motion. Byrd then filed an amended complaint that mirrored the original complaint but added an allegation about Aurora’s motion to dismiss. ¶3 The superior court granted (on reconsideration) Aurora’s renewed motion to dismiss, which was again premised on the complaint’s lack of any factual allegations tying adverse consequences to discriminatory motives or intent. The court did so in an unsigned minute entry that directed Aurora to submit a proposed form of judgment. The minute entry ruling did not address attorney’s fees, which Aurora had requested in its answer. ¶4 Aurora submitted a proposed form of judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice, directing that each side bear its own attorney’s fees, and including a Rule 54(c) certification. Byrd then filed two motions (captioned “Motion to Oppose Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(c)” and “Motion to Alter Judgment”) that, in substance, objected to the form of judgment: suggesting that the dismissal ruling did not resolve certain claims, objecting to the dismissal being with prejudice, and asserting a technical defect in the Rule 54(c) certification. Byrd then moved to strike Aurora’s response to one of the motions. The court denied the motion to strike, then denied Byrd’s motion for reconsideration of that ruling. ¶5 Before the superior court ruled on Byrd’s objections to the form of judgment and before the court entered judgment, Byrd filed a notice of appeal. Three weeks later, the superior court denied Byrd’s remaining motions, then entered a Rule 54(c) judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice and ordering each side to bear its own attorney’s fees. Byrd did not file a notice of appeal thereafter. 2  BYRD v. AURORA Decision of the Court ¶6 Although neither side contests appellate jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to determine our jurisdiction over this appeal. See Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co., 191 Ariz. 464, 465 (App. 1997). As relevant here, an appeal lies from a final judgment, and a notice of appeal filed before entry of final judgment is premature. See Camasura v. Camasura, 238 Ariz. 179, 181, ¶ 6 (App. 2015); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Here, Byrd filed her notice of appeal prematurely, three weeks before the superior court ultimately entered a final judgment. ¶7 In limited circumstances, a premature notice of appeal may relate forward to a later-entered judgment, but only if the court had already resolved all issues. See ARCAP 9(c) (premature notice of appeal “filed after the superior court announces an order or other form of decision—but before entry of the resulting judgment that will be appealable—is treated as filed on the date of, and after the entry of, the judgment”); Camasura, 238 Ariz. at 183, ¶¶ 15–16 (concluding ARCAP 9(c) does not save a premature notice of appeal if the order being appealed did not dispose of all issues); see also Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 212 Ariz. 407, 415, ¶ 37 (2006) (noting a “limited exception to the final judgment rule” permitting a premature notice of appeal after final decision but before entry of a formal judgment only “if no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merely ministerial”). ¶8 Here, at the time Byrd filed her notice of appeal, the superior court had not ruled on attorney’s fees, which Aurora had requested in its answer. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(1) (requiring claims for fees be resolved before entry of a Rule 54(c) judgment). Although the later-entered final judgment disposed of the fees issue (by requiring each side to bear its own fees), that does not save Byrd’s premature notice of appeal because a ruling on fees is not a merely ministerial act. See AU Enters. Inc. v. Edwards, 248 Ariz. 109, 112, ¶ 10 (App. 2020); Fields v. Oates, 230 Ariz. 411, 415, ¶ 13 (App. 2012). Byrd’s premature notice of appeal was thus ineffective and a nullity, see Camasura, 238 Ariz. at 181, 183, ¶¶ 6, 16, and we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal. ¶9 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 3