P.W. v. E.D., R.W., and Limestone County Department of Human Resources

Rel: September 18, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________ CL-2026-0253 _________________________ P.W. v. E.D., R.W., and Limestone County Department of Human Resources Appeal from Limestone Juvenile Court (JU-25-256.01) BOWDEN, Judge. P.W. appeals from an order of the Limestone Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") denying her motion to intervene in a dependency matter concerning E.W. ("the child") and her emergency motion for custody of the child. CL-2026-0253 P.W. raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying the motion to intervene, (2) whether the juvenile court erred by denying the emergency motion for custody, and (3) whether the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on a postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. App. P. We agree with P.W. that the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying the motion to intervene. P.W. was not a party to the underlying action, so she lacks standing to appeal from the order denying the emergency motion for custody. Finally, it was harmless error for the juvenile court not to hold a hearing on the postjudgment motion because P.W. is obtaining the same relief from this court that she could have obtained if the juvenile court had held a hearing. Therefore, we reverse the juvenile court's order as it pertains to the denial of the motion to intervene, dismiss the appeal as it pertains to the denial of the emergency motion for custody, and remand the cause to the juvenile court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Background The child was born on April 7, 2025. The record indicates that the Limestone County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") removed 2 CL-2026-0253 the child from the physical custody of E.D. ("the mother") because the mother had tested positive for cocaine shortly after giving birth to the child. DHR subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court on May 30, 2025, alleging that the child was dependent. The juvenile court entered a shelter-care order on June 3, 2025, awarding temporary legal and physical custody of the child to DHR. DHR filed a "motion for DNA genetic testing" on July 28, 2025, which was granted. The paternity-test results indicate that there is a 99.99% probability that R.W. ("the biological father") is the biological father of the child. Based on the paternity-test results, the juvenile court entered an order on November 18, 2025, that, in part, determined the biological father to be the legal father of the child. The record indicates that after the juvenile court entered that order, DHR discovered that the mother had been married to M.J.D. when the child was born. Thus, M.J.D. is presumed to be the child's legal father. See § 26-17-204(a), Ala. Code 1975 (creating a rebuttable presumption that a man is the legal father of a child under certain circumstances, including when "he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage"). 3 CL-2026-0253 The juvenile court entered a judgment on July 29, 2025, finding the child to be dependent. Legal custody of the child remained with DHR. A court report filed by DHR on October 8, 2025, indicates that the permanency plan for the child was "adoption by current foster parent" with a concurrent plan of "relative placement." That report also indicates that the child had been placed with J.W., the child's biological paternal aunt, since June 11, 2025. The juvenile court entered an order on November 18, 2025, finding that the underlying matter "qualifie[d] … as a kinship guardianship case" because the child had been placed with J.W. The juvenile court found that the mother and the biological father had abandoned the child and thus relieved DHR of its duty to make reasonable efforts to return the child to them. See § 12-15-312(c), Ala. Code 1975 ("Reasonable efforts shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of the child if the juvenile court has determined … that a parent has done any of the following: (1) Subjected a child to an aggravated circumstance against the child ... and the risk of child abuse or neglect is too high for the child to remain at home safely or to be returned home. An aggravated circumstance includes, but is not limited to, … abandonment …."). 4 CL-2026-0253 The juvenile court conducted a dispositional-review hearing and, on December 12, 2025, entered an order noting that the permanency plan for the child had changed to "kinship guardianship" with a concurrent plan of "adoption by current placement." The child continued to be placed with J.W., and legal custody of the child remained with DHR. The juvenile court entered an order on December 19, 2025, noting that J.W. had died suddenly and that the child had since been placed with K.W.1 The juvenile court noted that DHR's counsel had stated that DHR would need time to determine whether it would "continue with kinship" and to locate M.J.D. P.W. filed a verified "motion to intervene and emergency petition for custody" on February 5, 2026. Pertaining to the motion to intervene, P.W. asserted that she is a biological paternal aunt of the child and had been the primary guardian of the child since J.W. died. P.W. further asserted that she was a fit and capable parent, was willing and able to provide for the child, and that she intended to adopt the child. Pertaining to the emergency motion for custody, P.W. asserted that she had passed all of DHR's background checks and home studies, had enrolled and 1K.W.'s relationship to the child is unclear. 5 CL-2026-0253 continued to participate in foster-parent courses recommended by DHR, was a licensed foster parent, and had complied with a safety plan for the child initiated by DHR on January 21, 2026. P.W. further asserted that she was willing and able to provide a capable and consistent home life for the child and could care for the child without DHR's intervention. P.W. alleged that DHR had notified her on February 4, 2026, the day before she filed the motion, that it was removing the child for a "better" placement. P.W. alleged that there was no basis for DHR to conclude that she was not a fit and capable guardian for the child and that removing the child from her home would negatively impact the child's well-being. DHR opposed both motions. The juvenile court conducted a hearing on February 13, 2026, and entered an order on March 11, 2026, denying the motion to intervene and the emergency motion for custody without making specific findings of fact. P.W. filed a "motion to alter, amend or vacate" the juvenile court's March 11, 2026, order on March 25, 2026, arguing that the juvenile court had "abused its discretion in denying [the] Motion to Intervene" and noting only that the juvenile court had prematurely ruled on the emergency motion for custody. Although P.W. "request[ed] oral 6 CL-2026-0253 argument," the record indicates that the juvenile court did not conduct a hearing on the postjudgment motion. P.W. filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court's March 11, 2026, order on March 25, 2026. See Jim Parker Bldg. Co. v. G&S Glass & Supply Co., 69 So. 3d 124, 130 (Ala. 2011)(" '[A] denial of a motion to intervene is always an appealable order.' " (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Raine, 905 So. 2d 832, 833 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004))). The notice of appeal became effective on April 7, 2026, when the juvenile court entered an order denying the postjudgment motion. Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P. Standard of Review The standard of review for a denial of a motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., is whether the trial court exceeded its discretion. See M.S. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 391 So. 3d 890, 895 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). " ' " 'A court exceeds its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when it has acted arbitrarily without employing conscientious judgment, has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of all circumstances, or has so far ignored recognized principles of law or practice as to cause substantial injustice.' " ' " Russell v. Russell, 430 So. 3d 911, 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)(quoting Ex parte Malone, 12 So. 3d 60, 62-63 (Ala. 2008)). 7 CL-2026-0253 Under the ore tenus rule, we presume that a juvenile court's findings are correct unless they are plainly and palpably wrong. M.P. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 394 So. 3d 1080, 1085 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). "[I]n the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate courts will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous." Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996). Analysis I. Whether the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying the motion to intervene P.W. argues that the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying the motion to intervene because, she says, none of the discretionary factors regarding permissive intervention disfavored her intervention. We agree. As a general proposition, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed to allow intervention. See Root v. City of Mobile, 592 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Ala. 1992). Still, a trial court must consider the following factors when an applicant seeks permission to intervene in a matter: (1) whether the motion to intervene was timely filed, (2) whether the applicant's claim or defense and the main action share a common question of law or fact, and 8 CL-2026-0253 (3) whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.2 Rule 24(b); see M.S., 391 So. 3d at 895-96. Nothing in the language of Rule 24(b) expressly prohibits a trial court from considering factors other than the ones enumerated in the rule when ruling on a motion to intervene. Cf. Holland v. Eads, 614 So. 2d 1012, 1016-17 (Ala. 1993) (holding that a trial court should consider, among other factors, the existence of any extraordinary circumstances suggesting or cautioning against intervention when ruling on a Rule 24(a) motion to intervene for the purpose of unsealing the record). However, we have held that a court should refrain from considering the ultimate merits of the claim to be heard following intervention when ruling on a motion to intervene. M.S., 391 So. 3d at 897 (holding that the 2 "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. … In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 9 CL-2026-0253 Calhoun Juvenile Court appeared to be "improperly influenced" by facts pertaining to the suitability of the maternal grandparents as custodians because the trial court had referred to those facts in its order denying the motion to intervene). Hence, when exercising its discretion to rule on a motion to intervene, a trial court must, at a minimum, consider the three discretionary factors enumerated in Rule 24(b), and it may not consider the ultimate merits of the potential intervenor's claim to be heard following a permitted intervention. A. Timely motion to intervene Our supreme court has applied the following factors when determining whether a motion to intervene was timely: " ' "(1) [T]he length of time during which the would-be intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply as soon as he knew or reasonably should have known of his interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the would-be intervenor if his petition is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely." ' " 10 CL-2026-0253 Jim Parker Bldg. Co., 69 So. 3d at 131 (quoting QBE Ins. Corp. v. Austin Co., 23 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Ala. 2009), quoting in turn United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983)). P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying matter to assert a claim for custody of the child. The earliest date that P.W. knew or reasonably should have known that she had an interest in the underlying matter was in December 2025, when she began caring for the child. P.W. filed the motion to intervene approximately two months later, on February 5, 2026. See Jim Parker Bldg. Co., 69 So. 3d at 131-32 (holding that a party had acted promptly to protect its interest by filing a motion to intervene six weeks after the filing of a complaint, which weighed in favor of finding that the motion to intervene was timely). Furthermore, P.W. expressed an interest in advocating for the child's best interests in the motion to intervene. See M.C. v. Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 374 So. 3d 711, 720- 21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022)(holding that the trial court did not err by allowing foster parents to intervene in an action that had been pending for a year and to assert a claim for custody because the foster parents had an interest in advocating for the best interests of the child). 11 CL-2026-0253 Nothing in the record indicates that DHR, the mother, or the biological father were prejudiced because P.W. sought to intervene in February 2026 rather than December 2025. After J.W. died in December 2025, the juvenile court noted in an order that DHR's attorney had stated that DHR would need time to determine whether it would "continue with kinship" and to locate M.J.D. The motion to intervene was the next document that was filed in the underlying matter. As we have stated, P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying matter to seek custody of the child. P.W. must intervene in the underlying matter because P.W. may not commence a separate action to seek custody of the child. See J.S. v. Greene Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2025-0181, Aug. 22, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)("[The Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-101 et seq.,] does not authorize a relative seeking the custody of a dependent child to commence a separate child-custody action for the purpose of adjudicating the custody of the dependent child."). Thus, P.W. would be prejudiced if she is not allowed to intervene. Id. at ___ ("[A] person who is seeking custody of a dependent child but who is not already being considered a placement option for the child by the juvenile court should 12 CL-2026-0253 file a motion to intervene in the dependency proceeding regarding the child."). There are unusual circumstances in this case, but those circumstances militate for a determination that the motion was timely. As we have discussed, DHR had placed the child with J.W. pursuant to a permanency plan of "kinship guardianship," but J.W. died in December 2025. The record indicates that P.W. became the child's guardian when J.W. died and that DHR notified P.W. on February 4, 2026, that it was removing the child from her care. P.W. filed the motion to intervene the next day. Furthermore, the record indicates that DHR discovered that the mother was married to M.J.D. when the child was born after the juvenile court had adjudicated the biological father to be the child's legal father. The record also indicates that DHR's attorney informed the juvenile court that DHR would need time to assess the permanency plan and to locate M.J.D. In other words, P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying matter the day after DHR had notified her that it was removing the child from her care and about two months after DHR had indicated that it needed time to locate M.J.D., who must be added as a party to the underlying matter. See § 26-17-603, Ala. Code 1975 ("The 13 CL-2026-0253 following individuals must be joined as parties in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage: (1) the mother of the child; and (2) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated." (emphasis added)). We acknowledge that DHR presented evidence during the February 13, 2026, hearing that may be relevant to whether P.W. should be awarded custody of the child.3 To the extent that the juvenile court considered that evidence when ruling on P.W.'s motion to intervene, that was improper. See M.S., 391 So. 3d at 896. Moreover, that evidence does not relate to the timeliness of the motion to intervene. 3DHR presented evidence during the February 13, 2026, hearing indicating that it was concerned that the child was "going from home to home, different men holding her," including the biological father, when the child was in the care of P.W. There was also evidence presented during the hearing indicating that DHR was concerned that P.W. had asked for financial assistance from her family to help take care of the child and that P.W. was releasing confidential information regarding the matter to her family. There was also evidence indicating that P.W. and B.W., a biological paternal uncle of the child, had remained in DHR's parking lot for more than two hours after releasing the child to DHR on February 4, 2026. Laquandria Ferrell, a DHR caseworker assigned to the case, testified that she became concerned and took the child out a back door and "put her in a rental vehicle so that [Ferrell] could safely transport her without being followed." Ferrell also testified that she had received reports that P.W. and B.W. had driven to different family members' homes to identify the child's new placement. 14 CL-2026-0253 Based on the foregoing discussion of the four factors to be applied in assessing the timeliness of a motion to intervene, we conclude that P.W.'s motion to intervene was timely. B. Common question of law or fact Next, we must consider whether P.W.'s "claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." Rule 24(b). As we have stated, P.W. sought to intervene in the underlying matter to obtain custody of the child. Both child-custody and dependency actions concern the best interests of the child. See Ex parte Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 288 So. 3d 483, 500 (Ala. 2019)(plurality opinion)(" '[W]e have long stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the child.' " (quoting W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So. 2d 572, 580-81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003))). Thus, there is a common question of fact between P.W.'s child-custody claim and the underlying matter. C. Undue delay or prejudice Finally, we must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties to the underlying matter. See Rule 24(b). Based on our review of the record, 15 CL-2026-0253 neither the mother nor the biological father have meaningfully participated in the underlying dependency matter. Before P.W. filed the motion to intervene, the juvenile court had entered an order relieving DHR of its duty to exercise reasonable efforts to return the child to the mother and the biological father because it found that they had abandoned the child. Further, we cannot discern how P.W.'s intervention would prejudice the adjudication of the rights of DHR. As we have stated, the record indicates that DHR's attorney informed the juvenile court in December 2025 that DHR would need time to reassess the permanency plan and to locate M.J.D. The next document that was filed in the underlying matter was the motion to intervene. Additionally, P.W.'s custody claim and the underlying matter both involve the child's best interests. See Jim Parker Bldg. Co., 69 So. 3d at 133 ("Furthermore, Parker's intervention will not unduly prejudice G & S because, as previously stated, G & S's action and Parker's counterclaim involve at least one common question of fact."). Thus, P.W.'s intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the mother, the biological father, or DHR. 16 CL-2026-0253 D. Conclusion The juvenile court did not make any specific findings of fact when it denied P.W.'s motion to intervene. Thus, we assume that the juvenile court found that the three discretionary factors set forth in Rule 24(b) weighed against allowing P.W. to intervene. See Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d at 1324. However, as we have explained, none of the three discretionary factors militate against allowing P.W. to intervene. And to the extent that the juvenile court considered any evidence pertaining to the suitability of P.W. as a custodian for the child when it ruled on the motion to intervene, that was improper. See M.S., 391 So. 3d at 897. Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by denying P.W.'s motion to intervene, and we reverse the juvenile court's March 11, 2026, order as it pertains to the denial of the motion to intervene.4 4In light of our holding in M.S. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 391 So. 3d 890, 897 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), it may be a better practice for trial courts to rule on a motion to intervene before considering any evidence pertaining to the merits of the potential intervenor's claim to be heard following intervention. 17 CL-2026-0253 II. Whether the juvenile court erred by denying the emergency motion for custody P.W. argues that the juvenile court erred by denying the emergency motion for custody "based on … speculative and unsupported evidence" pertaining to her ability to protect the child. P.W.'s brief, pp. 36-37. As we have discussed, the juvenile court did not allow P.W. to intervene, so P.W. was not a party to the underlying matter. See B.V. v. Macon Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 14 So. 3d 171, 175 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)("B.V. and D.V. failed to successfully intervene in the instant case, and, therefore, they are not parties in this case."). Because P.W. was not a party to the underlying matter, she lacks standing to appeal from the denial of the emergency motion for custody. See id. (holding that foster parents lacked standing to appeal from a juvenile court's judgment dismissing their child-custody petition because they had failed to successfully intervene in the underlying matter). Accordingly, we dismiss P.W.'s appeal as it pertains to the denial of the emergency motion for custody.5 See Goodyear 5We note that the juvenile court's denial of the motion to intervene was not an adjudication on the merits of P.W.'s underlying claim for custody of the child. See Ex parte A.B., 290 So. 3d 833, 836 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019)("[T]he denial of the custodians' motion to intervene was a judgment on the merits of that controversy -- the propriety of the request to intervene. … We cannot conclude, therefore, that the denial of the 18 CL-2026-0253 Tire & Rubber Co. v. Moore, 900 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)("[B]ecause the company in the present case lacks standing to seek appellate review …, we must dismiss this appeal."). III. Whether the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on the postjudgment motion P.W. argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on the postjudgment motion because, she says, it had "probable merit." P.W.'s brief, pp. 27-29. Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a postjudgment motion "shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be heard thereon." Our supreme court has held that the "failure to grant a hearing on a motion for new trial pursuant to [Rule] 59(g) is reversible error only if it 'probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the custodians' motion to intervene … was an adjudication on the merits of the custodians' dependency and custody claims, such that the doctrine of res judicata would apply to bar those claims in the custodians' action."). Further, the juvenile court's denial of the emergency motion for custody was an interlocutory order and does not preclude P.W., after intervention, from pursuing permanent custody of the child. See Strickland v. McClendon, 193 So. 3d 740, 742 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)("Because an emergency custody order is intended to address exigent circumstances that may abate, such an order is considered under Alabama law to be interlocutory in nature pending a later final determination as to custody based on evidence adduced at a trial by the competing parties, i.e., a pendente lite order."). 19 CL-2026-0253 parties.' " Kitchens v. Maye, 623 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (Ala. 1993)(emphasis added). Otherwise, it is harmless error. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. ("No judgment may be reversed or set aside … unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties."). Because we are reversing the juvenile court's March 11, 2026, order as it pertains to the denial of the motion to intervene, P.W. is obtaining the relief that she could have obtained on that issue if the juvenile court had held a hearing on the postjudgment motion. See Hollander v. Nichols, 19 So. 3d 184, 197 (Ala. 2009) (holding that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59 was harmless error because the movant had obtained the relief on appeal that he could have obtained if the trial court had held a hearing on the motion and because the remainder of his claims had no probable merit). Thus, P.W. has not demonstrated that the juvenile court "probably injuriously affected [her] substantial rights" by failing to hold a hearing on the postjudgment motion. Rule 45. 20 CL-2026-0253 Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court's March 11, 2026, order is reversed as it pertains to the denial of P.W.'s motion to intervene; the appeal is dismissed as it pertains to the denial of P.W.'s emergency motion for custody; and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See M.S., 391 So. 3d at 897. APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur. Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion. 21