Full Opinion

Rel: September 18, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________ CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL- 2026-0174, and CL-2026-0175 _________________________ H.J. and J.C. v. S.L., Jr.; G.H.; Sarah Brazzolotto, in her capacity as guardian ad litem; and St. Clair County Department of Human Resources Appeals from St. Clair Juvenile Court (JU-23-201.03, JU-23-201.06, JU-23-201.08, JU-23-202.03, JU-23- 202.06, and JU-23-202.08) BOWDEN, Judge. H.J. and J.C. ("the foster parents") appeal from judgments of the St. Clair Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that, among other things, CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 awarded custody of N.H. and D.H. ("the children"), who are the children of S.L., Jr. ("the father"), and G.H. ("the mother"), to their mother. We reverse the judgments to the extent that they awarded custody of the children to the mother. We also instruct the juvenile court to vacate orders that it entered after jurisdiction over the underlying matters was vested in this court as a result of the foster parents' appeals. Facts and Procedural History The St. Clair County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") commenced dependency actions concerning the children that were assigned case numbers JU-23-201.03 and JU-23-202.03 ("the .03 dependency actions"). In those actions, the juvenile court found the children dependent and awarded legal custody of the children to DHR; physical custody of the children was awarded to the foster parents. DHR thereafter commenced actions to terminate the parental rights of the parents that were assigned case numbers JU-23-201.06 and JU-23- 202.06 ("the .06 termination actions"). The foster parents intervened in the .03 dependency actions and the .06 termination actions. In November 2025, the mother filed motions to dismiss the .06 termination actions. In her motions to dismiss, the mother asked the 2 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 juvenile court to return custody of the children to her. The juvenile court initially set the mother's motions to dismiss for a hearing on December 9, 2025. Later, it scheduled a hearing on those motions for January 27, 2026. On January 20, 2026, seven days before the scheduled hearing on the mother's motions to dismiss, the foster parents commenced actions in the juvenile court seeking legal custody of the children. The foster parents' actions were assigned case numbers JU-23-201.08 and JU-23- 202.08 ("the .08 custody actions"). In their petitions commencing the .08 custody actions, the foster parents alleged that the children were dependent and that the juvenile court should award them sole legal custody or joint legal custody of the children. The foster parents also alleged that the juvenile court should terminate the parents' parental rights and then award them permanent legal custody. They asserted that the termination of the parents' parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. The juvenile court held a hearing on the mother's motions to dismiss as scheduled on January 27, 2026. The juvenile court received evidence from witnesses that included opinions from those witnesses on 3 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 what they considered to be the best interests of the children. The juvenile court also made statements concerning the scope of the January 27, 2026, hearing at the start of the hearing, during the parties' presentation of evidence, and at the close of the hearing. At the start of the January 27, 2026, hearing, the juvenile court noted that the hearing was set "for a hearing on all pending motions, status, a determination of whether or not dependency still exists, and then how we are going to proceed going forward." It stated that it would start with the mother's attorney "because I think what we said, we would have a hearing on whether or not custody should be returned to your client, which would mean that I've got to make a finding in order to do that, that the children are no longer dependent." The juvenile court also made statements about the scope of the January 27, 2026, hearing during the parties' presentation of evidence. During the cross-examination of a witness, the juvenile court stated: "And just so everybody knows, I'm focused at this point right now, like, is -- I'm sorry, are [the children] dependent is the key. Are they dependent? That's my question. I mean, that's ultimately, I think, what the issue that we're arguing about right now, isn't it?" Later, during 4 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 recross-examination of a witness by the foster parents, the foster parents referenced a psychologist's report. The reference drew objections. In response to those objections, the juvenile court stated: "Well, I'm going to say for what purpose? For what purpose? Are you wanting -- I mean, I'm going to give you wide leeway, but for what purpose? Because, really, what I'm focusing on right now is whether or not these children are dependent." Additionally, during the testimony of Jenna Gardner, the mother asked Gardner whether she had concerns about the children being placed with the foster parents; that question drew an objection, resulting in the following statement from the juvenile court about the scope of the January 27, 2026, hearing: "[Counsel for the mother]: Do you have concerns as we stand here today, with the children being placed in their current foster placement? "[Counsel for DHR]: Judge, I'm going to object. This motion is about return [of] custody to the mother and not about the foster parents' petition. "[The Court]: Sustained. I just want to focus on our dependency. So, sustained." (Emphasis added.) The foster parents also cross-examined Gardner. The foster parents asked Gardner about the mother's alleged pregnancy, 5 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 which drew a relevancy objection from DHR. DHR argued that the testimony was not relevant because "[w]e're here on, I guess, on [counsel for the mother's] motion to return custody." The juvenile court sustained the objection. The juvenile court also commented about the scope of the January 27, 2026, hearing after the close of evidence. At one point, the juvenile court stated that it was not conducting a dependency hearing but, instead, a hearing on a motion to return custody. Nonetheless, the juvenile court indicated that it intended to find that the children were not dependent and to return custody to the mother. The foster parents then asked about the transition of the custody of the children back to the mother. In response, the juvenile court stated: "[The Court]: So this is what I want to have happen. I want y'all to sit down because, although, legally, the issue of best interest was not technically before the Court today, the issue was whether or not -- was, number one, the status of all the petitions. Number two, whether or not the children are dependent. This Court is always concerned with the best interest of the children. …" (Emphasis added.) 6 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 Later, in response to the father's statement that he wanted to invoke his constitutional rights as a parent, the juvenile court commented: "And, technically, the issue of dependency, and whether or not there's going to be a return to custody, technically, is in front of the court every time we come back. But we were here specifically because [of an oral motion for the return of custody made] the last time we were here. So I want to make sure the kids' best interests are looked out for. I've made some legal rulings based on the law, based on the evidence that was submitted today. But I have some concern about the bond that exists and how that is going to take place, moving from one place to another. Just like I have the concern, when I issue orders in the middle of the night, removing children from their parents' care and putting them into somebody else's care. I recognize that every time we move a child, even when it's unnecessary, even when it's [a], quote/unquote, 'good move,' it causes some level of harm for children. I want to make sure that we, as a system do the least amount of harm possible. And with the number of people I have right here, I'm not -- I hope that y'all can talk about it and really put the kids' best interests forward. So it's definitely a concern of mine. It's a fair question." (Emphasis added.) The juvenile court entered the same judgment in each action on January 30, 2026. The January 30, 2026, judgments found that the children were no longer dependent and returned custody of the children to the mother. The juvenile court dismissed the .06 termination actions 7 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 and the .08 custody actions; however, it did not dismiss the .03 dependency actions and ordered DHR to continue to provide services to the mother. It also set the .03 dependency actions for a review hearing and expressly noted that it was retaining jurisdiction over those matters. The foster parents filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. ("the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion"). In that motion, the foster parents argued that the juvenile court had improperly concluded that the children were no longer dependent. They reasoned that the children were dependent because the father was not able or willing to provide for the children and, therefore, the children were dependent under Alabama's "one-parent doctrine." The foster parents also argued that, because the juvenile court did not find the children to be dependent, it lacked jurisdiction to make a custodial disposition of the children. They also argued that the juvenile court had received limited evidence as to the best interests of the children at the January 27, 2026, hearing, and they requested that the juvenile court "set[] a hearing during which the children's custody may be disposed of with proper consideration of their best interests." 8 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 On February 9, 2026, the juvenile court entered an order setting the foster parents' first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion for a hearing. That order provided: "MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND filed by [the foster parents] is hereby set for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on February 17, 2026. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2026." (Capitalization in original; bold typeface omitted.) A hearing was held on February 17, 2026. At the start of the hearing, the juvenile court stated that the parties were present "for a hearing on a motion to alter, amend, or vacate an order that this Court entered on January 30[, 2026] …." The juvenile court stated that "part" of the foster parents' first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion was due to be granted. The juvenile court noted that it agreed with the foster parents that the children were dependent "as to the father." The juvenile court stated that, in its opinion, there was "zero evidence" to support a finding that the children were dependent "as to [the mother]." The foster parents argued that, if the children are dependent, then the juvenile court was compelled to hold a hearing on the best interests of the children. The juvenile court then stated: 9 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 "I think that we had evidence presented at the last hearing and I am certainly willing to hear any evidence anybody has today about best interest. My recollection is I heard from two [DHR] workers who rendered their opinions as to what was best for these children and whether or not the children were dependent, whether or not the children should return home. I heard testimony from a counselor based on her interactions with the children. And I'm trying to remember, the family, children, it was her opinion that the children should be returned home, which I think is implicit that it's in their best interest. … So I don't -- I mean, I'm certainly willing to do that and I don't mind cleaning it up in the amended order that I'm going to enter today that includes a clarification. I'm just going to set that order aside. There will be a new order issued, and I will address the best interest. I'm not so sure that that's necessary but I will do it so that if it goes up on appeal the appellate court has my thinking and my opinion as to what those best interests are, even if unnecessary." The foster parents then requested "to be able to present evidence" regarding the best interests of the children. In response, the juvenile court asked what evidence the foster parents would like to proffer with respect to the best interests of the children. The juvenile court later stated: "I feel very confident in a position that if any court in this State finds that a child is not dependent as to a particular parent, that that court is not faced with the opportunity to leave that child in foster care. It goes against Federal law. It goes against State law. I think that that is something that I personally would get blistered by the appellate courts." 10 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 Later, the foster parents again requested a hearing on the best interests of the children. In response the juvenile court stated: "I'm giving you that opportunity. I gave you that opportunity kind of, but I understand where you're coming from because I did hammer down -- I did at that hearing on dependency. So I agree with you there I'm more than willing to let you proffer what you believe that I would be able to use to make a finding of it being in the children's best interest to leave them in the State's custody. The reason that there's -- part of what I'm struggling with is like if the state of facts that existed as of the date of the January 27th [hearing] and that continued to exist …, unless somebody has evidence to the contrary, like there is no chance I would have removed those children from [the mother] under this set of circumstances." Later, the juvenile court again provided the foster parents with an opportunity to "proffer anything that you have to offer the Court why it would be in the best interest to leave custody of these children with the Sate of Alabama versus Mother." In response, the foster parents argued that the February 17, 2026, hearing was being held on the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion and that they were not prepared to make an argument or proffer evidence at the February 17, 2026, hearing, "as we would in a custody hearing." The juvenile court then asked the foster parents what witnesses they would like to call. The foster parents named some witnesses and described some potential testimony, which the 11 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 juvenile court dismissed as not sufficient to compel it to reach a result different than awarding custody to the mother. Later, the foster parents and the juvenile court discussed the purpose of the February 17, 2026, hearing: "[Counsel for the foster parents]: For purposes of establishing a record, I just want to assert, again, that today's hearing is for the motion to alter, amend, or vacate. We are not prepared for an evidentiary hearing on best interest. "[The Court]: Let me say this. … [A] part of your motion to alter, amend, or vacate was based on best interest. I mean, today's the day. "[Counsel for the foster parents]: Well -- "[The Court]: I'm not saying that you're not prevented. I'm just saying the Court has been -- it has been, is ready, willing, and able to hear that evidence. That's a part of your motion to alter, amend, or vacate. "[Counsel for the foster parents]: We did not come prepared to do that. "[The Court]: I'm saying I set it for that. "[Counsel for the foster parents]: Well, you set it to hear our argument on alter, amend, or vacate. "[The Court]: 100 percent. Was it or was it not part of the basis for your motion to alter, amend or vacate that the best interest was not looked at? "[Counsel for the foster parents]: It was 12 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 "[The Court]: That's what we're here for today. "[Counsel for the foster parents]: No. We are not here for an evidentiary hearing on that. "[The Court]: We are here 100 percent for an evidentiary hearing on that. That's what I set it for. That's why I set it for hearing instead of just issuing an order. "[Counsel for the foster parents]: So on that basis, Judge, we would object to not holding an evidentiary hearing on that. "[The Court]: For the record, like your objection is overruled, because we are here for an evidentiary hearing today on that, which is included in my calculus of determining whether or not I should alter, amend, or vacate the order. Again, I'm going to say it very clearly, my first inclination when I read the motion was I was going to grant it and clarify exactly what I said, make a finding that the children were dependent as to father, not dependent as to mother, and then go on about my business. Then I'm like, wait a second, he argued in here about best interest. I'm going to let them flesh that out, which, again, is why I didn't just issue an order. I set it for hearing." The juvenile court then received testimony regarding whether the foster parents had returned certain items to DHR. That same day, February 17, 2026, the juvenile court entered the same new judgment in each action. Those judgments state, in pertinent part: 13 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 "This matter was called for hearing on February 17, 2026, on a Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate filed by [the foster parents]. All parties and counsel were present. Evidence was presented, testimony was heard ore tenus, and arguments were heard. Upon consideration thereof, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: "1. Foster Parents' motion is hereby GRANTED. The Court's order entered on January 30, 2026 is hereby set aside and held for naught. The provisions set forth below constitute an AMENDED ORDER of this Court, after considering evidence, testimony and arguments presented at hearings before this Court on January 27, 2026, and February 17, 2026. "2. The [children] made the subject of these proceedings … [are] no longer dependent as to [the mother]. "3. The [children] remain[] dependent as to [the father]. "4. The Court finds that it is in the minor child[ren's] best interests to return [to] and award[s] custody to [the mother]." (Capitalization in original.) The February 17, 2026, judgments dismissed the .06 termination actions and the .08 custody actions. They also ordered DHR to continue to provide services in the .03 dependency actions and set the .03 dependency actions for a review hearing. On February 26, 2026, the foster parents filed a second motion to alter, amend, or vacate under Rule 59 ("the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion"). In that motion, the foster parents argued that 14 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 the juvenile court had failed to set or notify the foster parents of a "full evidentiary hearing." The foster parents argued that the juvenile court had expanded the scope of the February 17, 2026, hearing to be a "full evidentiary hearing" to include the topic of the children's best interests, rather than simply a hearing on their first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion. They argued that such an expansion was done without proper notice and cited cases indicating that a lack of notice deprives a party of due process. They also argued that they were entitled to have a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of the best interests of the children, and they included a list of witnesses that they indicated that they would call at such a hearing. Finally, the foster parents argued that the juvenile court had applied a standard different than the best-interests-of-the- child standard when deciding the cases. They argued that the juvenile court should have -- but did not -- consider the factors for determining the best interests of the children set forth in Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981). The juvenile court entered an order denying the foster parents' successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion on February 28, 2026. The foster parents appealed on March 4, 2026. On March 17, 2026, the juvenile 15 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 court entered orders removing the foster parents as parties to the .03 dependency actions. The Mother's Motion to Dismiss The mother filed a motion to dismiss the foster parents' appeals that we must consider before reaching the merits of the appeals. In her motion to dismiss, the mother alleges that the foster parents' appeals are untimely. The mother argues that the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion did not suspend the time to appeal because, she argues, it did not raise arguments different from those that could have been raised in the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion. Because the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion did not suspend the time to appeal, the mother argues, the foster parents' appeals are untimely. The mother's argument is not persuasive. An appeal must be timely filed; if it is not timely filed, we must dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 2(1), Ala. R. App. P.; Moultrie v. Wall, 143 So. 3d 128, 135 (Ala. 2013); Webb v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Health, [Ms. CL-2025-0387, Dec. 12, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). Generally, the required period in which to file an appeal from a juvenile-court judgment is 14 days from the date that the juvenile court 16 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 entered its judgment. See Rule 28(D), Ala. R. Juv. P. The required period in which to file an appeal changes, however, if a party files a motion asserting grounds for relief under Rule 59, such as a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment under Rule 59(e). When a Rule 59 postjudgment motion is denied in a juvenile case, a party must file an appeal within 14 days from the date of the entry of the order denying the Rule 59 postjudgment motion or within 14 days from the date that the Rule 59 postjudgment motion is denied by operation of law; otherwise, the appeal is untimely. When a trial court grants a Rule 59 postjudgment motion and issues a new or amended judgment, however, a party's successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion will alter the required period in which to appeal if (1) the trial court takes some action on a first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion that prompts a "new objection," i.e., one that could not have been raised in the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion, and (2) the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion asserts that new objection. Docen v. Docen, 294 So. 3d 767, 771 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019); McGinnis v. Steeleman, 199 So. 3d 69, 72 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015); cf. C & D Logging v. Mobley, 61 So. 3d 1067 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)(holding that a party's successive Rule 59 postjudgment 17 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 motion did not alter the required period in which to appeal because, although the trial court had entered an amended judgment in response to the party's first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion, the party's successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion asserted the same issues that had been raised in first-filed postjudgment motion), and Green v. Green, 43 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)(holding that a party's successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion did not alter the required period in which to appeal because, although the trial court had entered an amended judgment, the party's successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion asserted grounds that could have been brought in the first-filed postjudgment motion). Here, the foster parents asserted arguments in the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion that were not and could not have been raised in the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion. In the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion, the foster parents argued that findings in the February 17, 2026, judgments stemmed from a hearing on their first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment that, they argued, was erroneously not a "full evidentiary hearing" on the issue of the best interests of the children. That hearing occurred, of course, after the entry of the January 30, 2026, 18 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 judgments and, therefore, the issues regarding that hearing that the foster parents raised in the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion could not have been raised in the foster parents' first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion. The foster parents also argued in the successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion that the juvenile court had applied an incorrect standard when determining the best interests of the children. That argument also could not have arisen before the issuance of the February 17, 2026, judgments because the juvenile court did not apply any standard regarding the best interests of the children in the January 30, 2026, judgments, in which it had found that the children were not dependent and had returned custody of the children to the mother. Accordingly, the foster parents' successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion was not an impermissible repetitive postjudgment motion, see Docen, 294 So. 3d at 771, or a motion to reconsider a denied postjudgment motion. It was, instead, a successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion raising new issues that could not have been brought in the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion. The successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion therefore altered the required period in which to appeal. Specifically, the foster parents had 14 days from February 28, 2026, which is the date 19 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 their successive Rule 59 postjudgment motion was denied, to appeal the February 17, 2026, judgments. The foster parents appealed on March 4, 2026. Their appeals were therefore timely, and the mother's motion to dismiss the foster parents' appeals is denied. Issues The foster parents assert three arguments on appeal. They argue that the juvenile court violated their right to due process by holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the best interests of the children during the hearing on the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion without providing them with sufficient notice of that hearing. They argue that the juvenile court failed to apply the correct best-interests-of-the- child standard when awarding custody of the children. And they argue that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to remove the foster parents as parties to the .03 dependency actions while their appeals were pending. The foster parents' arguments do not concern whether the February 17, 2026, judgments improperly dismissed the .06 termination actions or the .08 custody actions. Furthermore, our holdings in these appeals, discussed below, do not require a reversal of the February 17, 2026, judgments to the extent that they dismissed the .06 termination actions 20 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 and the .08 custody actions. Accordingly, the foster parents' appeals relating to the .06 termination actions and the .08 custody actions are dismissed as moot. See Reeves v. Reeves, 363 So. 3d 996, 1001 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) ("The former husband does not raise any issue in regard to the claims asserted in case number DR-15-900460.02 or the orders or judgments relating to those claims; therefore, we dismiss appeal number 2200217, which arises from case number DR-19-900460.02, as moot"). Analysis I. Whether the juvenile court violated the foster parents' right to due process A. As parties to the .03 dependency actions, the foster parents were entitled to due process in those actions, including the right to reasonable notice of a dispositional hearing. The foster parents intervened in the .03 dependency actions; therefore, they are parties to those actions. "Procedural due process requires 'notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)." Briner v. City of Midfield, 831 So. 2d 53, 56 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). "The 21 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 operative test is that ' "the notice as published must reasonably apprise any interested person of the issues involved in the proceeding." ' North Alabama Express, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted)." Del Vecchio v. Board of Comm'rs of Dothan, [Ms. CL- 2025-0262, Aug. 29, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). In these cases, the notice provided to the foster parents did not reasonably apprise them of the issues that were ultimately decided at the February 17, 2026, hearing. Specifically, the notice provided by the juvenile court did not apprise the foster parents that the juvenile court would conduct a dispositional hearing on February 17, 2026, and issue judgments disposing of the custody of the children. In the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion, the foster parents argued that the juvenile court had improperly concluded that the children were not dependent and that the juvenile court had received limited evidence as to the best interests of the children at the January 27, 2026, hearing. They requested, as relief, that the juvenile court set a hearing to receive evidence regarding the children's best interests before disposing of their custody. The juvenile court then issued an order on 22 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 February 9, 2026, stating only that it was setting a hearing on the foster parents' first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion. During the hearing on the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion, the juvenile court indicated that it would grant that motion and would find the children dependent as to the father but as not to the mother. That comment indicated that the juvenile court would enter judgments finding the children to be dependent, even though the children were not dependent as to the mother. See Ex parte W.E., 64 So. 3d 637, 638 (Ala. 2010)(Murdock, J., concurring specially)("[D]ependency is a status created by law that either is true of a child or is not."); M.C.A. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 397 So. 3d 962, 968 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)("In Ex parte L.E.O., [61 So. 3d 1042 (Ala. 2010),] our supreme court held that a child is dependent if he or she does not receive 'adequate care and supervision from those persons legally obligated to care for and/or to supervise the child.' 61 So. 3d at 1047 (some emphasis omitted). 'Persons' is a plural form of the word 'person.' "); J.L. v. D.G.H., 402 So. 3d 261, 267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(Moore, P.J., concurring specially)("Ex parte L.E.O., [61 So. 3d 1042 (Ala. 2010),] as interpreted by this court, mandates that a child be adjudicated dependent even if one of two joint custodial parents 23 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 can properly provide the child with care and supervision." (emphasis added)). After finding a child to be dependent, a trial court must then hold a dispositional hearing. K.R. v. Z.B., 249 So. 3d 523, 527 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)(holding that "juvenile court erred in failing to hold a hearing concerning the issue of the disposition of the custody of the child"). After indicating that it would find the children dependent, the juvenile court appears to have immediately conducted a dispositional hearing on February 17, 2026, rather then set a dispositional hearing for a future date. It then entered judgments awarding custody of the children to the mother. Of course, a juvenile court may proceed immediately to a dispositional hearing after an adjudicatory hearing. Rule 25(A), Ala. R. Juv. P.; T.B. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 6 So. 3d 1195, 1203 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). But the February 17, 2026, hearing was set as a postjudgment proceeding, see Rule 59(g), not as an adjudicatory hearing, and the only issue before the juvenile court -- and the only issue that it had provided notice to the parties that it would consider -- was whether to alter, amend, or vacate the January 27, 2026, judgments based on the arguments asserted in the foster parents' first-filed Rule 59 24 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 postjudgment motion. Accordingly, the February 9, 2026, order providing notice of a hearing on the first-filed Rule 59 postjudgment motion did not reasonably apprise the foster parents that the juvenile court would immediately conduct a dispositional hearing after granting that motion. Although not directly on point, dependency cases discussing the due process that parents must receive further persuade us that the foster parents, who are parties to the .03 dependency actions, were not afforded due process in these cases. In N.J.D. v. Madison County Department of Human Resources, 110 So. 3d 387 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), this court noted that the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, provides for three types of hearings: an adjudicatory hearing, a dispositional hearing, and review hearings. After the father's child in N.J.D. was removed from the father's home by the Madison County Department of Human Resources, the child was found dependent after an adjudicatory hearing. The father then received notice that the trial court had set a review hearing. However, after conducting the review hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding legal custody of the child to a relative. On appeal, this court noted that the father's attorney had come to the scheduled hearing prepared for a review hearing and 25 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 "not for a final dispositional hearing for which [the father's attorney] had no notice." N.J.D., 110 So. 3d at 394. We held that, "in failing to notify the father of the nature of the proceedings, the trial court deprived the father of his right to due process." Id. See also M.E. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 148 So. 3d 737 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding that trial court violated mother's right to due process in child-dependency proceeding when trial court held a permanency hearing even though trial court had notified mother that the scheduled hearing was a "review hearing"); A.D.G. v. D.O., 160 So. 3d 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(holding that mother's due-process rights were violated when only notice that mother received about hearing was that hearing was to be a dispositional hearing and the trial court instead held a permanency hearing); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 103 So. 3d 833, 835-36 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (reversing judgment after noting that "there was no indication in the record that the trial court intended to consider the parties' claims seeking a final custody determination at the February 2, 2012 hearing"). As parties, the foster parents were entitled to notice of the juvenile court's intent to conduct a dispositional hearing. See Rule 13(C), Ala. R. Juv. P. (providing, subject to exceptions not applicable here, that "written notice of all hearings … 26 CL-2026-0170, CL-2026-0171, CL-2026-0172, CL-2026-0173, CL-2026- 0174, and CL-2026-0175 shall be provided to all parties in the proceedings, and such notice shall include the date, time, place, and purpose of the hearings"). And, similar to the parents in the foregoing cases, their procedural-due-process rights were violated. B. The due-process violation was not harmless error This court will not reverse the judgment of a trial court if the error complained of is harmless error. Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.; Professional Educ. Servs. Grp., LLC v. Ford, [Ms. CL-2025-0215, Feb. 13, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026)(" 'The judgm