Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 122 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2026 November 19, 2026 THE WYOMING OIL AND GAS ) CONSERVATION COMMISSION ) ) Appellant ) (Respondent), ) ) v. ) No. S-26-0080 ) 4HC ENERGY LLC, a Texas limited ) liability company and HYPERION OIL & ) GAS LLC, a Texas limited liability company, ) ) Appellees ) (Petitioners). ) Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County The Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge Representing Appellant: Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorney General; Stephanie Sneesby, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jonathan D. Sater, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Representing Appellees: No appearance. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., GRAY, FENN, and JAROSH, JJ., and KASTE, D.J. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. KASTE, District Judge. [¶1] After holding a contested case hearing, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (Commission) issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order resolving twenty-eight applications for compulsory pooling orders. Two of the parties to the contested case hearing sought review of the Commission’s order in the district court and identified the Commission as a respondent in those proceedings. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss asserting it was not a proper party to the proceedings in the district court because it was acting in its adjudicatory capacity when it issued the compulsory pooling orders. The district court denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss. The Commission appealed and we reverse. ISSUE [¶2] The Commission presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: When the Commission issues an order resolving a dispute between mineral interest owners after holding a contested case hearing, is the Commission a proper party to an appeal of that order? FACTS [¶3] In June and July 2023, Anschutz Exploration Corporation (Anschutz) filed twenty- eight applications with the Commission requesting statutory forced pooling in the Scott Field drilling unit under Wyoming Statute § 30-5-109(f) and (g). 4HC Energy LLC (4HC) and Hyperion Oil & Gas LLC (Hyperion) own mineral interests in the Scott Field. 4HC and Hyperion objected to each of the twenty-eight applications, triggering a contested case hearing before the Commission under Wyoming Statute § 30-5-106(a)(iv). [¶4] On September 12, 2023, the Commission held a contested case hearing on the applications and objections. Anschutz, 4HC, and Hyperion were parties to the contested case before the Commission. As parties, they presented testimony and evidence to the Commission in support of their respective positions. [¶5] On March 18, 2024, the Commission issued its decision on the applications and objections in a document titled “Report of the Commission.” The report consists of the Commission’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In its order, the Commission approved twelve of the forced pooling applications, provided for an extended election period for thirteen, and denied the remaining three applications as moot. -1- [¶6] On April 12, 2024, 4HC and Hyperion filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s order pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12 and Wyoming Statute § 16-3-114. In their petition, 4HC and Hyperion named Anschutz and the Commission as respondents. [¶7] On May 24, 2024, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss asserting it was not a proper party to the appeal because it acted in its adjudicatory capacity during the contested case hearing. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The district court later affirmed the Commission’s report. [¶8] 4HC and Hyperion appealed from the district court’s order affirming the Commission’s report. The Commission then cross-appealed from the district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss. 4HC and Hyperion dismissed their separate appeal on October 12, 2026. In this appeal, 4HC and Hyperion were identified as parties by the Commission, but neither filed a brief. STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶9] “Our standard of review when reviewing motions to dismiss is de novo.” Williams v. Lundvall, 2024 WY 27A, ¶ 6, 545 P.3d 431, 433 (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted). “We examine the same materials and apply the same standards as the district court, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. We have also previously determined that whether an agency is a proper party in an appeal presents a question of law which we review de novo. Wyoming Outdoor Council v. Wyoming Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 2010 WY 20, ¶ 6, 225 P.3d 1054, 1056 (Wyo. 2010). DISCUSSION [¶10] At various times agencies can act in either an adjudicative or a legislative capacity, which we have sometimes also referred to as regulatory or rulemaking capacity. “Legislative actions operate in the future, apply to a general class of individuals, and produce a general rule or policy, while adjudicatory action applies to identifiable persons and specific situations.” Bienz v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, Cnty. of Albany, 2024 WY 102, ¶ 28, 556 P.3d 227, 237 (Wyo. 2024) (citations and quotations omitted). When an agency is engaged in rulemaking it acts in its legislative capacity. Wyoming Outdoor Council, ¶ 16, 225 P. 3d at 1058. Conversely, when an agency serves as an impartial tribunal presiding over an adversarial proceeding between other parties it acts in its adjudicative capacity. Id.; see also Antelope Valley Imp. and Service Dist. of Gillette v. State Bd. of Equalization for State of Wyo., 4 P.3d 876, 878 (Wyo. 2000) (Antelope Valley II) (clarifying Antelope Valley Imp. v. State Bd. of Equalization for State of Wyo., 992 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1999)) (Antelope Valley I). -2- [¶11] The nature of the agency’s action and the capacity in which it acted dictates whether it is a proper party in an appeal challenging that action. “[A]n administrative agency acting in its regulatory, or rulemaking, capacity is a proper respondent to a district court appeal.” Wyoming Outdoor Council, ¶ 19, 225 P.3d at 1059. “However, when [an agency] functions in its adjudicative capacity, it is not a proper party to an appeal from its order resulting from that proceeding.” Antelope Valley II, 4 P.3d at 878. These results flow from the judicial review provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. [¶12] Under Wyoming Statute § 16-3-114(a) and W.R.A.P. 12.01 only a person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final agency decision may seek review of that decision in the district court. We have previously concluded, ‘“a court or [agency] exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, not being a party to its proceedings, and not having any legal interest in maintaining its determination, can neither appeal from a judgment or order of a court reversing the proceedings nor be heard on the appeal.’” Antelope Valley I, 992 P.2d at 567 (quoting 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 175 (1993)). Moreover, we have recognized that a “person who is not a party in an original action is not a necessary party to an appeal[.]” Id. at 568. Thus, an agency holding a contested case hearing and resolving a dispute between others is not a party to that contested case and cannot be a party to an appeal of its own decision.1 See, id. at 568. [¶13] “When [an agency] acts in its adjudicatory capacity, [it] resembles a ‘lower tribunal,’ not an administrative agency.” Antelope Valley II, 4 P.3d at 878. Permitting or requiring an agency acting in its adjudicatory capacity to participate as a party on appeal would be “analogous to a district court’s filing of a brief with this Court when one of its decisions is being appealed, in the hope that it can explain ‘the real reason why [it] rendered a particular decision.’” Id. “The [agency’s] opportunity to explain its reasoning lies in its order, just as a district court’s opportunity to explain its reasoning lies in its orders.” Id. Moreover, an agency required to participate in an appeal of its decision after 1 Other courts have routinely reached the same conclusion in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204, 1209-10 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (concluding employee not required to name Career Service Review Board as a respondent on appeal of the agency’s decision and citing cases); State Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Anne Arundel County, 664 A.2d 400, 408 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (explaining an administrative agency exercising a quasi-judicial function usually is not entitled to appeal from a circuit court judgment reversing the agency’s decision, absent specific statutory authority); Phila. Bd. of Pensions & Ret. v. Pearlman, 586 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (providing that where a body acts in a judicial function, “it does not have authority or standing to participate as a party in appeals from matters that it originally adjudicated”); Minn. State Bd. of Health v. Governor’s Certificate of Need Appeal Bd., 230 N.W.2d 176, 178 (Minn. 1975) (“The decisions of our court, however, which follow the majority view, are to the effect that, where no statute provides otherwise, an agency which functions in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity is without right to appeal since, in such a case, the agency is in no different position from a court or judge which has rendered the decision.”). -3- a contested case hearing would be placed in the untenable position of advocating for the position of one of the parties that appeared before it. Nothing in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act contemplates or authorizes such advocacy. See, e.g., Blauer, 128 P.3d at 1209-10 (further noting that requiring an agency to advocate in an appeal of its own decision, would annihilate the agency’s impartiality). [¶14] Turning to this case, to determine the specific capacity in which the Commission acted, we first look to the legislation creating the entity. Wyoming Outdoor Council, ¶ 7, 225 P.3d at 1056. In this case, that means we look to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-5-101 to -104 and 30-5-108 to -119. [¶15] The Oil and Gas Conservation Act was enacted in 1951 to regulate the oil and gas industry in the state. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 222 (Wyo. 1994). The purpose of the Act “is to provide a comprehensive regulatory program which prevents the waste of Wyoming’s oil and gas resources and protects the correlative rights of property owners.” Id. at 223. “Under the Act, the legislature created the Commission and granted it the ‘jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property, public and private, necessary to effectuate the purposes and intent of th[e] act[.]’” Devon Energy Prod. Co., LP v. Grayson Mill Operating, LLC, 2020 WY 28, ¶ 26, 458 P.3d 1201, 1209 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-104(a)). The Act grants the Commission the ability to create rules, regulations, and orders to fulfill the Act’s purposes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-104(c). [¶16] The Act specifically permits the Commission to establish drilling units. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-109(a). “After the drilling unit is established, the Commission also has the authority to order the pooling of all interests, including royalty interests.” Union Pac., 882 P.2d at 224. Under the Act, pooling may be either voluntary or compulsory: (f) When two (2) or more separately owned tracts are embraced within a drilling unit, or when there are separately owned interests in all or a part of the drilling unit, then persons owning such interests may pool their interests for the development and operation of the drilling unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission, upon the application of any interested person, may enter an order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for the development and operation thereof. Each such pooling order shall be made after notice and hearing and shall be upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable. [. . . .] -4- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-109(f) (2025). Thus, when a mineral interest owner objects to voluntary pooling, the Commission’s role is to hold a hearing and decide whether and on what terms to order pooling. [¶17] Here, the Commission did just that. After receiving 4HC and Hyperion’s objections, the Commission held a contested case hearing,2 received evidence from the applicant and objectors, and resolved their dispute after making specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission served as an impartial tribunal presiding over a specific dispute between identifiable parties. Antelope Valley II, 4 P.3d at 878 and Bienz, ¶ 28, 556 P.3d at 237. The Commission was not a party to the contested case and, like any other lower tribunal, it has no legal interest in maintaining its determination. Antelope Valley II, 4 P.3d at 878. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission was acting in its adjudicatory capacity when it heard and decided the matter below. That being the case, the Commission was not a proper party to the proceedings in the district court and its motion to dismiss should have been granted. [¶18] In denying the Commission’s motion to dismiss, the district court did not expressly conclude that the Commission was not acting in its adjudicatory capacity. Instead, the district court reviewed Antelope Valley I and II and noted that those cases arose from an appeal to the Board of Equalization from the Department of Revenue. See Antelope Valley I, 992 P.2d at 565. Because the Commission was not acting as an appellate body, like the Board of Equalization, the District Court concluded that Antelope Valley I and II were distinguishable. [¶19] We agree that the Commission and the Board of Equalization in Antelope Valley I and II performed different adjudicatory functions. However, both appeals and contested case hearings are adjudicatory in nature. In both situations, the agency acts as an impartial tribunal resolving a specific dispute between identifiable parties. Antelope Valley II, 4 P.3d at 878 and Bienz, ¶ 28, 556 P.3d at 237. In either procedural posture, the agency is not a proper party to an appeal of its decision. [¶20] The district court also noted that the Commission had previously been named in numerous appeals and had chosen to participate without seeking dismissal.3 The 2 Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act “‘Contested case’ means a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing[.]” Wyoming Statutes §§ 30-5-106(a)(iv) and 30-5-109(f) required the Commission to hold a hearing and determine the rights and duties of the applicant and objectors. 3 See Anschutz Corp. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 923 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1996); Exaro Energy III, LLC v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2020 WY 8, 455 P.3d 1243 (Wyo. 2020); Moncrief v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 981 P.2d 913 (Wyo. 1999); Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 569 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1977); and Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 446 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1968). -5- Commission’s decision to seek or not seek dismissal in prior cases is not determinative. The Commission’s litigation decisions do not change the relevant inquiry and do not change adjudicative action into legislative action. The issue was not raised in those prior cases and, therefore, we had no opportunity to consider whether the Commission was a proper party. See State v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 90, ¶ 35, 32 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2001) (“Under this court’s long-standing precedent, this court will not frame the issues for the litigants and will not consider issues not raised by them and not supported by cogent argument and authoritative citation.”). Now that the issue has been raised, we conclude the Commission is not a proper party to an appeal of its own order rendered after conducting a contested case hearing.4 CONCLUSION [¶21] Because the Commission was acting in an adjudicatory capacity during the contested case hearing it was not a proper party to the proceedings in the district court. The district court erred when it denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss. [¶22] Reversed. 4 To the extent that 4HC and Hyperion’s dismissal of their separate appeal might render this cross-appeal moot, we conclude that the recurrent naming of the Commission in appeals by various parties warrants application of an exception to the mootness doctrine. “An issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” In re DJS-Y, 2017 WY 54, ¶ 6, 394 P.3d 467, 469 (Wyo. 2017). “We have recognized three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, and have considered technically moot matters when: (1) the issue is one of great public importance; (2) we have deemed it necessary to provide guidance to state agencies and lower courts; or (3) the controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id at ¶ 7, 394 P.3d at 469 (quotation and citation omitted). Here, we deem it necessary to provide guidance regarding the proper parties to appeals from orders of the Commission to the Commission, the parties appearing before the Commission, and the lower courts. -6-