Full Opinion

2026 UT App 176 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MULTIACTIVOS LEASING S.A. DE C.V. AND RECICLADORA DE NEUMÁTICOS DEL PACÍFICO, S.A. DE C.V., Appellants and Cross-appellees, v. ECO GREEN EQUIPMENT, LLC, Appellee and Cross-appellant. Opinion No. 20241111-CA Filed November 19, 2026 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy No. 190902600 Andrew G. Deiss and Corey D. Riley, Attorneys for Appellants and Cross-appellees Erik A. Olson and Dominic W. Shaw, Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-appellant JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred. LUTHY, Judge: ¶1 Multiactivos Leasing S.A. de C.V. (Multiactivos) purchased tire recycling equipment from Eco Green Equipment, LLC (Eco Green) and entered into a lease agreement with Recicladora de Neumáticos del Pacífico, S.A. de C.V. (Recicladora) for Recicladora to use the equipment. Eco Green is a Utah company, while Multiactivos and Recicladora are based in Guadalajara, Mexico. After Eco Green delivered the equipment, Multiactivos and Recicladora (collectively, Appellants) determined that it did not comport with the sales contract and sued Eco Green. The case was tried before a jury. The jury found Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment that Eco Green had not breached its sales contract with Multiactivos but that it had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Recicladora. Based on the findings of fraud and negligent misrepresentation by Eco Green, the jury awarded nominal damages to Recicladora and punitive damages in favor of both Appellants. The district court, however, vacated the punitive damages awards. ¶2 Appellants now assert that the district court’s vacatur of the punitive damages awards was erroneous. We ultimately affirm the court’s decision on this issue. Appellants also contend that the district court erred in instructing the jury that for Appellants to recover, they were required to prove the equipment had no value. But Appellants fail to challenge the discovery ruling—made under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure—on which this instruction was based. We therefore affirm on this issue. Appellants further assert that the district court improperly dismissed Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary claim. However, the parties’ contractually chosen law—the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)—is silent on this issue, and the district court properly determined that Recicladora failed to satisfy Utah’s standard for achieving third-party beneficiary status. Thus, we affirm the dismissal of Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary claim. ¶3 In a cross-appeal, Eco Green asserts that the district court erred in denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law on Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. We agree because (1) Appellants provided no evidence that Eco Green knew at the time it made the alleged misrepresentations on which these claims are based that Multiactivos intended to lease the equipment to another entity and (2) Eco Green could not knowingly or intentionally make misrepresentations to a lessee whose existence it knew nothing about. Accordingly, we vacate the jury’s verdict and nominal damages awards on these causes 20241111-CA 2 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment of action. And because we hold that Appellants were not entitled to any other damages award, Appellants’ challenge to the court’s vacatur of the punitive damages awards cannot prevail. ¶4 In sum, we reverse the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law on Appellants’ fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims and affirm in all other respects. BACKGROUND Eco Green Sends a Proposal, and Appellants Are Formed ¶5 In 2014, Mario Fernández González (Fernández 1), an attorney and businessman based in Guadalajara spoke with a representative of Eco Green about the prospect of recycling tires. After continued discussions, Eco Green sent Fernández a sales proposal for a tire recycling system (the Proposal) in June of that year. The cover page of the Proposal indicated that Eco Green prepared it for “INDUSTRIAS ECOLAND,” though Fernández later testified that he was unfamiliar with any such company. ¶6 Fernández and his business partner decided to move forward with the business venture, and—at some point—they formed Multiactivos and Recicladora as business entities headquartered in Guadalajara. They used a separate business 1. “Traditionally, in Spanish-speaking cultures, people have two surnames: a paternal and maternal surname, with the paternal surname preceding the maternal surname.” Nat’l Ass’n of Hisp. Journalists, NAHJ Issues Guidance on the Proper Use of Spanish Surnames Following the Tragic Killing of Valentia Orellana Peralta (Dec. 30, 2021), https://nahj.org/nahj-issues-guidance-on-the- proper-use-of-spanish-surnames-following-the-tragic-killing-of- valentina-orellana-peralta/ [https://perma.cc/RNA7-76QE]. “When referring to an individual by surname, the traditional format is to use the first surname.” Id. 20241111-CA 3 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment model for each entity: Multiactivos was to purchase the recycling equipment, and its investors were to profit by leasing out the equipment; Recicladora was to lease the equipment from Multiactivos, and its investors were to earn dividends from the recycling business. In keeping with this plan, Multiactivos and Recicladora at some point entered into a lease agreement. Eco Green and Multiactivos Sign a Purchase Agreement ¶7 Fernández continued to negotiate with Eco Green for the potential purchase of recycling equipment. On August 20, 2014, a member of Fernández’s legal team informed Eco Green that Multiactivos would be the company entering into the forthcoming sales contract. ¶8 Five days later, Multiactivos and Eco Green executed a purchase agreement for tire recycling equipment (the Purchase Agreement), with Multiactivos agreeing to pay $1,696,656 for the equipment. The Purchase Agreement expressly incorporated the Proposal. The Purchase Agreement stated that it would be “governed by and construed in accordance with the [CISG]” and that Utah would be the venue for any disputes arising under the Purchase Agreement. ¶9 In February 2015, Eco Green and Multiactivos executed an amendment to the Purchase Agreement (the Amendment). In the Amendment, they agreed to a later delivery deadline and a lower sales price. The new delivery deadline was September 30, 2015, and the sales price was reduced by $234,328. The Equipment Arrives ¶10 The delivery deadline passed without Eco Green delivering the equipment. Most of the equipment finally arrived in February 2016. On August 30, 2016, Multiactivos sent Eco Green a “Notice of manufacturing defects and irregularities inherent in the recycling plant” (the Notice of Defects). Therein, 20241111-CA 4 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment Multiactivos alleged that Eco Green had failed to meet the delivery deadline set forth in the Amendment and, therefore, that a “late delivery penalty [was] applicable under the terms of the [Purchase] Agreement.” Multiactivos also asserted that certain “components of the [e]quipment were received with defects, damage or with different specifications [from those] agreed [to] in [the Purchase Agreement].” Multiactivos listed twelve components it believed were unsatisfactory, describing the alleged defects and providing photos of each. According to a later-filed declaration by Fernández, “Eco Green responded to the Notice of Defects by promising to fix the damaged and defective components but ultimately didn’t end up fixing anything.” ¶11 Two years after Eco Green delivered most of the equipment, Recicladora got its recycling plant “up and running,” but it determined that the equipment was “only . . . able to process 20% of what was promised.” Recicladora was never able to turn a profit. Appellants Sue Eco Green and Provide Their Initial Damages Disclosure ¶12 In March 2019, Appellants sued Eco Green. As relevant here, Multiactivos asserted a claim of breach of contract, Recicladora asserted a claim of breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, and they both asserted claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with economic relations. Their claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation were based on alleged “extracontractual misrepresentations that were misleading,” including alleged statements Eco Green made during negotiations with Fernández about the quality and origin of the equipment. ¶13 Appellants included in their initial disclosures the following statement in response to the mandate of rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for parties to disclose a computation of their damages: 20241111-CA 5 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment [Appellants] sustained the following damages: $1,696,656.00 for the value of the [e]quipment; lost profits arising from [Eco Green’s] failure to deliver the goods and services that [Eco Green] promised to deliver; consequential damages arising from [Eco Green’s] failure to deliver the goods and services that [Eco Green] promised to deliver, including costs of shipping, customs, lost sales, incidentals, and other losses; [and] punitive damages to be determined at trial. Appellants did not supplement their initial disclosures with any other computation of their claimed damages. Eco Green Moves for Summary Judgment and to Strike Appellants’ Damages Claims ¶14 Eco Green moved for summary judgment on all of Appellants’ claims. In response, the district court dismissed Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary claim on the grounds that the parties’ chosen law, the CISG, is silent on the issue of third- party beneficiaries and Recicladora could not meet Utah’s standard for third-party beneficiary status, which requires a clear intention by the contracting parties to confer a distinct benefit on a purported third party. The court dismissed Multiactivos’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims on the basis of the economic loss rule. The court did not apply that rule, however, to Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims; thus, it did not dismiss those claims. The court also determined that the economic loss rule did not bar Recicladora’s or Multiactivos’s claims for intentional interference with economic relations. 20241111-CA 6 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment ¶15 On the same day Eco Green filed its motion for summary judgment, it also filed a motion to strike Appellants’ claims for contract-related damages, arguing that Appellants had not disclosed a computation of damages under rule 26 and that, because the fact and expert discovery deadlines had passed, it was too late for them to do so. The district court determined that Appellants had “timely and properly disclosed damages in the amount paid for the equipment.” But the court ruled that because Appellants did not disclose any “other or alternative damage calculation,” none would be permitted at trial. “[F]or example,” the court explained, Appellants would not be allowed to “claim damages for lost profits or for other types of damages that were not properly disclosed.” ¶16 Later, Eco Green filed a second motion to limit breach of contract damages, this time with respect only to Multiactivos’s breach-of-contract claim (Recicladora’s third-party breach claim having already been dismissed). In this motion, Eco Green asked the court “to prevent [Multiactivos] from presenting any evidence or making argument at trial of its alleged damages other than nominal damages.” Eco Green asserted that Multiactivos’s only damages disclosure—the purchase price of the equipment— would have been an appropriate measure of damages only if Multiactivos had been seeking to void the contract and obtain avoidance damages, which Multiactivos admitted it was not seeking. Eco Green also noted that Multiactivos had not disclosed a computation of consequential damages or of damages based on lost profits. Finally, Eco Green argued that “expectation or lost- benefit-of-the-bargain damages” are the difference between the value of what the plaintiff bargained for and the value of what the plaintiff actually received and that because Multiactivos had not disclosed what it believed the equipment’s actual value to be, it had not adequately disclosed a computation of its expectation damages. For these reasons, Eco Green asked the court to “exclude evidence or argument regarding damages for breach of contract.” 20241111-CA 7 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment ¶17 In response, Multiactivos argued that it had satisfied the disclosure requirement by disclosing a computation of expectation damages equal to the value of what it bargained for (as measured by the purchase price of the equipment) minus the market value of what it received (which it claimed to be zero). Thus, Multiactivos asserted that it would simply need to prove at trial that the market value of the delivered equipment was zero, which it intended to do. Multiactivos contended that Eco Green could attempt to prove mitigation or offset but that the burden of proving these was on Eco Green. In short, Multiactivos argued that the question for the jury would be whether the equipment that was delivered was essentially “paper-mache” and that Multiactivos would “have to prove that,” while Eco Green could attempt to prove that the equipment was not valueless. ¶18 After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court declined to disturb its earlier ruling wherein it declined to strike Multiactivos’s claim for contract-related damages altogether. But it stated that Multiactivos’s damages disclosure left Multiactivos with the “burden of proving that what it received was, in fact, valueless” or, in other words, that the equipment was the equivalent of “paper-mache.” The court stated that if Appellants did not prove at trial that the equipment was worthless, the court would “grant a directed verdict or a motion to dismiss on that basis.” It then said, “So . . . at the end of the day, the motion’s denied, but Multiactivos has its work cut out for it in terms of what it’s going to have to prove in order to be able to recover at trial.” Rather than object to the requirement that it prove the equipment was worthless, Multiactivos responded, “We’re ready.” The Parties Discuss Jury Instructions on Damages ¶19 Before trial, the parties submitted proposed jury instructions. During an ensuing discussion, Multiactivos objected to a statement in Eco Green’s proposed instruction on breach- 20241111-CA 8 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment related damages that “Multiactivos must prove that the market value of equipment at the time of the sale was zero.” In arguing against such an instruction, Multiactivos made an assertion regarding damages that are available under the CISG, to which the court responded, “But this isn’t a CISG issue. This is a disclosure issue. This is a [r]ule 26 issue, as I recall.” Multiactivos acknowledged as much, saying, “Yeah.” The court then said that it was nevertheless sustaining Multiactivos’s objection to Eco Green’s proposed instruction and that it planned to instruct the jury using this statement instead: “Multiactivos claims the purchase price that it paid to Eco Green for the equipment. This is Multiactivos’s only claim for damages for breach of contract.” ¶20 Eco Green contended that this statement was too “open- ended” in that it would allow the jury to pick any damages figure it wished without determining “the difference between the price paid and the value of what [Multiactivos] received.” At this point, Multiactivos asserted that this instruction was “a ruling from the court on the procedural history” and that it is normally a defendant’s burden to show that delivered goods had some value. The court then said, “If the jury comes back . . . with a number that is not [the purchase price], then you’ve got . . . grounds for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, given my earlier ruling, and I’m likely going to grant it . . . .” Multiactivos responded, “I want to formally say you should reconsider.” When the court declined to do so, Multiactivos again asserted that instead of requiring it to prove the equipment had zero value in order to recover, the court should simply allow Eco Green to contend, as a defense, that Appellants generated some income from the equipment and that this income should offset an award equal to the purchase price of the equipment. Eco Green disagreed, saying, “[I]t’s an all-or-nothing proposition for [Multiactivos]. They have to prove the value of what they got was zero.” The court agreed with Eco Green. 20241111-CA 9 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment ¶21 Thus, in line with its earlier decisions regarding damages for Multiactivos’s breach-of-contract claim, the court determined that it would give (and later did give) the jury the following instruction, which was numbered as Instruction 28I: On its breach of contract claim, Multiactivos claims damages equal to the purchase price that it paid to Eco Green for the equipment. To prevail, it must show that the equipment it received did not have any market value. This is Multiactivos’s only claim for damages for breach of contract. The Jury Reaches a Mixed Verdict ¶22 After the parties presented their cases, Eco Green moved for judgment as a matter of law under rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court took the motion under advisement. ¶23 The jury, using a special verdict form, ultimately found that Multiactivos did not prove “by a preponderance of evidence that Eco Green committed a fundamental breach of the parties’ agreement.” As to Recicladora’s causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, the jury found Eco Green liable on both and awarded Recicladora nominal damages of $1 for each of these claims. The jury then awarded punitive damages of $300,000 in favor of Multiactivos and $200,000 in favor of Recicladora. Finally, the jury found that Appellants did not prove their intentional interference with economic relations claims. Upon Eco Green’s Motion, the Court Vacates Punitive Damages ¶24 After trial, Eco Green filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, asking the court to (1) “set aside the jury’s finding that Eco Green committed fraud or negligent misrepresentation because those claims are barred by the economic loss rule and because Recicladora failed to prove those claims by clear and convincing evidence” and (2) “set aside the 20241111-CA 10 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment jury’s punitive damages award[s].” The court declined to disturb its earlier ruling that the economic loss rule did not apply to Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, and it further declined to disturb the jury’s verdict on those claims. However, the court vacated the jury’s awards of punitive damages, reasoning that punitive damages were not available where the jury had otherwise awarded only nominal damages. Accordingly, the court entered judgment against Eco Green for $2. ¶25 Appellants timely appealed, and Eco Green cross- appealed. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶26 Appellants raise three issues for our review. First, they assert that the district court erred in instructing the jury that for Multiactivos to prevail on its breach-of-contract claim, it had to prove that the equipment had no market value. “Claims of erroneous jury instructions present questions of law that we review for correctness.” Meeks v. Peng, 2024 UT 5, ¶ 27, 545 P.3d 226 (cleaned up). Here, however, the contested jury instruction was a product of the court’s discovery sanction against Appellees. “We review discovery sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 16, 215 P.3d 933. But “an error of law by the district court . . . would be an abuse of discretion.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT 76, ¶ 26, 267 P.3d 885 (cleaned up). ¶27 Second, Appellants argue that the court erred in concluding that Recicladora was not a third-party beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement as a matter of law. “Appellate courts review a district court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2017 UT 54, ¶ 14, 423 P.3d 1150 (cleaned up). 20241111-CA 11 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment ¶28 Third, Appellants contend that the court erred in vacating the jury’s punitive damages awards in response to Eco Green’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. “Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for [judgment as a matter of law] for correctness. Accordingly, we will sustain a [judgment as a matter of law] if, after examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non- moving party’s favor.” Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, ¶ 6, 311 P.3d 564 (cleaned up). ¶29 Eco Green raises one issue in its cross-appeal. It asserts that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims on its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Again, “appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law for correctness.” Hallett v. Tully, 2024 UT App 90, ¶ 13, 552 P.3d 779 (cleaned up). ANALYSIS I. Jury Instruction on Damages ¶30 Appellants first argue that Instruction 28I—which told the jury that for Multiactivos to prevail on its breach-of-contract claim, it had to “show that the equipment it received did not have any market value”—was erroneous. 2 They assert that the 2. Eco Green contends that this issue is unpreserved. “But because we resolve [this issue] in [Eco Green’s] favor, we need not address whether [it is] preserved.” See State v. Main, 2021 UT App 81, ¶ 18 n.6, 494 P.3d 1056; see also State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28, 484 P.3d 415 (“If the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party asserting that the claim was not preserved, we readily may opt to do so without addressing preservation.” (cleaned up)). 20241111-CA 12 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment instruction’s “implication is completely at odds with long- standing Utah law,” that it “took away the jury’s broad discretion to fashion a damages remedy,” and that it “impermissibly shifted the burden to Multiactivos to prove the absence of offset.” ¶31 Problematically, however, Appellants do not appeal the limitation or sanction imposed by the district court under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in response to Appellants’ damages disclosure. As recited above, based on to Eco Green’s first motion to strike Appellants’ claims for contract-related damages—brought under rule 26—the court determined that Appellants had “timely and properly disclosed damages in the amount paid for the equipment,” but it ruled that because Appellants did not disclose any “other or alternative damage calculation,” none would be permitted at trial. And after hearing argument on Eco Green’s second motion to limit Multiactivos’s breach-of-contract damages, the court declined to disturb its earlier ruling and stated that Appellants’ damages disclosure left Multiactivos with the “burden of proving that what it received was, in fact, valueless” or, in other words, that the equipment was the equivalent of “paper-mache.” ¶32 Thereafter, when discussing the parties’ proposed jury instructions, the court clearly indicated that the language it intended to use (and that it eventually incorporated into Instruction 28I) was tied to its earlier decision under rule 26 to limit Appellants’ damages theories to the specific computation it had impliedly disclosed. Specifically, when Multiactivos made an assertion regarding damages that are available under the CISG, the court said, “But this isn’t a CISG issue. This is a disclosure issue. This is a [r]ule 26 issue, as I recall.” Multiactivos acknowledged as much, saying, “Yeah.” Multiactivos later similarly acknowledged that the requirement that it prove the equipment had zero value was “a ruling from the [c]ourt on the procedural history.” Ultimately, the court said, “If the jury comes back . . . with a number that is not [the purchase price], then 20241111-CA 13 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment you’ve got . . . grounds for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, given my earlier ruling, and I’m likely going to grant it . . . .” At this point, Multiactivos asked the court to reconsider, which the court declined to do. ¶33 Given this background, Instruction 28I did not purport to be a statement of generally applicable Utah law. Instead, Instruction 28I was an application of the sanction the court imposed under rule 26 in response to Appellants’ less-than- fulsome damages disclosure. Thus, to successfully challenge Instruction 28I on appeal, Appellants need to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion by imposing this sanction under rule 26. But Appellants’ opening brief contains no such argument; in fact, Appellants make no argument whatsoever under rule 26. Instead, their argument with respect to Instruction 28I is that the instruction misstates Utah law. However, this framing ignores the reality that Instruction 28I was actually a reflection of the court’s decision to sanction Appellants for their failure to provide a more fulsome computation of their damages. Because Appellants’ opening brief does not challenge the appropriateness of that ruling, Appellants have waived this argument. 3 See Allen v. Friel, 3. Appellants contend in their reply brief that the court’s “all-or- nothing damages ruling wasn’t predicated on any discovery violation” but “was a purely legal conclusion centered on the parties’ substantive burdens of proof.” But this argument contradicts the court’s plain statements, as well as Appellants’ own acknowledgments. While it is true that the court ruled that Appellants had complied with the damages disclosure requirement of rule 26 to the extent that they had disclosed a computation of expectation damages measured as the purchase price minus the asserted “paper-mache” value of the delivered equipment, the court determined that Appellants had not disclosed any other amount or computation of damages and, thus, that Appellants could not attempt to prove any computation other (continued…) 20241111-CA 14 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (“It is well settled that issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.” (cleaned up)). ¶34 In sum, because Instruction 28I was based on the sanction the district court imposed under rule 26 in response to Appellants’ damages disclosure and because Multiactivos has not challenged the propriety of that sanction, Multiactivos cannot prevail on this issue. II. Third-Party Beneficiary ¶35 Appellants also contend that the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Recicladora was not a third-party beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement. This issue was addressed through Eco Green’s motion for summary judgment, and the district court dismissed Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary claim on the grounds that the parties’ chosen law, the CISG, is silent on the issue of third-party beneficiaries and that Recicladora could not meet Utah’s standard on this point. We agree with the district court. ¶36 “Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration.” Val Peterson Inc. v. Tennant Metals Pty. Ltd., 2023 UT App 115, ¶ 42, 537 P.3d 660 (cleaned up). ¶37 Appellants assert that Recicladora’s third-party breach-of contract-claim is viable under the CISG. However, the CISG is than the purchase price minus zero. The court’s decision to predicate any recovery by Multiactivos based on its breach-of- contract claim on proof that the equipment it received had no market value (and to so instruct the jury) was clearly based on its application of rule 26. 20241111-CA 15 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment silent on the issue of third-party beneficiaries. See generally United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. Notably, Article 4 of the CISG indicates that the CISG “governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.” See id. art. 4 (emphasis added). In other words, the rights of a third-party beneficiary are beyond the scope of the CISG. See Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., No. 06 Civ. 3972, 2007 WL 2059239, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (holding that there was “no viable third-party beneficiary claim” under the CISG because “[t]o the extent that the CISG applies to a transaction, it addresses only the rights of buyer and seller”); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he text of the CISG and analysis by commentators suggest that the CISG applies only to buyer and seller, not to third parties.”); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 165, 173 (1995) (“Unless otherwise expressly provided, [the] CISG is not concerned with the effect which the contract may have on . . . the rights of third persons who are not parties to the contract. In essence, [the] CISG is limited to two-party commercial contracts for sale . . . .” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, the court did not err in turning to Utah law to determine whether Recicladora had a viable third-party claim. See Cedar Petrochemicals, 2007 WL 2059239, at *3 (turning to New York law to assess a third-party beneficiary claim pled under the CISG). ¶38 In Utah, “for a third party to have enforceable rights under a contract, the intention of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear.” Val Peterson, 2023 UT App 115, ¶ 43 (cleaned up). “This is a high standard. It is not enough that the parties to the contract know, expect[,] or even intend that others will benefit from the contract; the contract must be undertaken for the plaintiff’s direct benefit, 20241111-CA 16 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment and the contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear.” Id. (cleaned up). ¶39 Appellants point to nowhere in the Purchase Agreement or in the Proposal (which, again, was incorporated into the Purchase Agreement) where the parties made a clear affirmative expression of intent that Recicladora be a third-party beneficiary. Such a claim would be difficult to establish given that neither document ever names Recicladora. Instead, Appellants argue that the contract between Multiactivos and Eco Green was ambiguous on the issue of a possible third-party beneficiary because the Proposal’s cover page used the name “INDUSTRIAS ECOLAND,” a name Fernández indicated he was unfamiliar with, and that this ambiguity necessitates consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. We are not persuaded. ¶40 Regardless of the name on the Proposal’s cover page, Appellants cannot satisfy the high bar applicable here because the contract does not clearly and affirmatively declare that it was undertaken for any third-party’s direct benefit, let alone Recicladora’s. With no such affirmative declaration and no reference whatsoever to Recicladora, the district court correctly determined that Appellants could not, as a matter of law, satisfy Utah’s standard for establishing third-party beneficiary status. See id. (“There is barely a reference to [the purported third-party beneficiary] in the [contract], let alone anything from which we may infer a clear intention to confer a distinct benefit upon [that entity]. . . . Thus, [that entity] is not a third-party beneficiary . . . .”). Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Recicladora’s third-party breach-of-contract claim. III. Recicladora’s Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims ¶41 Eco Green asserts in its cross-appeal that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Recicladora’s claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation on Eco Green’s motion for judgment 20241111-CA 17 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment as a matter of law. Eco Green makes two alternative arguments here, asserting that either (1) the economic loss rule applies to bar Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims or (2) Recicladora failed to meet its evidentiary burden because it did not prove Eco Green made the alleged misrepresentations with the intent that Recicladora act on them. We agree with Eco Green’s second contention. ¶42 When considering the appropriateness of a court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we “examin[e] all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party” and conclude that the motion should have been granted only if “there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non- moving party’s favor.” Montgomery v. Gardiner, 2025 UT App 146, ¶ 30, 579 P.3d 1083 (cleaned up). Here, even examining the evidence in Recicladora’s favor, there was not sufficient evidence for Recicladora to succeed on its fraud claim or its negligent misrepresentation claim. ¶43 Proving fraud in Utah requires a claimant to show, among other things, that someone made a representation “for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it.” Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, ¶ 12, 21 P.3d 219 (cleaned up). Likewise, “a claim for negligent misrepresentation requires a party to demonstrate that . . . a party carelessly or negligently ma[de] a false representation expecting the other party to rely and act thereon.” Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ¶ 36 n.12, 158 P.3d 562 (cleaned up). In other words, for either claim to succeed, Recicladora needed to prove that Eco Green made the alleged misrepresentations in order to induce Recicladora to act on them or expecting Recicladora to do so. ¶44 Appellants’ evidence at trial was that Eco Green sent Fernández the Proposal, that at some point Fernández formed Multiactivos and Recicladora (with Multiactivos being structured to purchase and lease out the equipment and Recicladora being 20241111-CA 18 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment structured to lease the equipment from Multiactivos and operate it), and that at some point Recicladora and Multiactivos entered into a lease agreement. 4 But even viewing the facts to suggest that Recicladora was formed and executed the lease agreement before Eco Green and Multiactivos signed the Purchase Agreement, there was no evidence that Eco Green was informed before this point that Multiactivos was purchasing the equipment with the intention of leasing it to another party. 5 Without such knowledge, 4. While Appellants state that the relevant misrepresentations “started prior to formal contract negotiations and continued through the filing of this lawsuit,” they identify no alleged misrepresentations that were made and relied on after the Purchase Agreement was signed. Therefore, we limit our analysis to “Eco Green’s precontractual statements.” 5. In its reply to Eco Green’s cross-appeal, Recicladora contends that “Eco Green knew that one company would purchase the equipment and lease it to another, and thus knew that a lessee company would specifically and separately rely on Eco Green’s representations.” But the evidence Recicladora identifies as supportive of this assertion does not bear it out. The first evidence Recicladora cites is a set of emails exchanged between Eco Green and Fernández, but nowhere in the emails does Fernández mention an anticipated lessee or Recicladora. And while Recicladora claims that the emails demonstrate that “the businesses changed names multiple times before the equipment was ordered,” even if this proposition is true, it cannot support a finding that Eco Green knew the purchaser was not the entity planning to use the equipment. Next, Recicladora cites passages of trial testimony regarding Multiactivos and Recicladora’s lessor/lessee relationship, but the testimony provides no evidence that Eco Green knew of that relationship before the parties signed the Purchase Agreement. Recicladora also cites evidence relating to the shipment of the equipment to Recicladora, but this (continued…) 20241111-CA 19 2026 UT App 176 Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment Eco Green could not have made the alleged misrepresentations in order to induce Recicladora (or any third-party lessee, for that matter) to act on them or expecting Recicladora (or any other third-party lessee) to do so. Accordingly, Recicladora was unable to prove an essential element of its fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, and the claims should have been dismissed. The district court erred in not doing so. Therefore, we reverse the court’s denial of Eco Green’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to these causes of action and vacate the award of nominal damages for each. IV. Punitive Damages ¶45 The final claim in Appellants’ appeal is that the district court erred in vacating the jury’s punitive damages awards in response to E