Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketCase No. 20241111-CA
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
2026 UT App 176
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MULTIACTIVOS LEASING S.A. DE C.V. AND RECICLADORA DE
NEUMÁTICOS DEL PACÍFICO, S.A. DE C.V.,
Appellants and Cross-appellees,
v.
ECO GREEN EQUIPMENT, LLC,
Appellee and Cross-appellant.
Opinion
No. 20241111-CA
Filed November 19, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
No. 190902600
Andrew G. Deiss and Corey D. Riley, Attorneys for
Appellants and Cross-appellees
Erik A. Olson and Dominic W. Shaw, Attorneys for
Appellee and Cross-appellant
JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER
concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 Multiactivos Leasing S.A. de C.V. (Multiactivos)
purchased tire recycling equipment from Eco Green Equipment,
LLC (Eco Green) and entered into a lease agreement with
Recicladora de Neumáticos del Pacífico, S.A. de C.V.
(Recicladora) for Recicladora to use the equipment. Eco Green is
a Utah company, while Multiactivos and Recicladora are based in
Guadalajara, Mexico. After Eco Green delivered the equipment,
Multiactivos and Recicladora (collectively, Appellants)
determined that it did not comport with the sales contract and
sued Eco Green. The case was tried before a jury. The jury found
Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
that Eco Green had not breached its sales contract with
Multiactivos but that it had committed fraud and negligent
misrepresentation against Recicladora. Based on the findings of
fraud and negligent misrepresentation by Eco Green, the jury
awarded nominal damages to Recicladora and punitive damages
in favor of both Appellants. The district court, however, vacated
the punitive damages awards.
¶2 Appellants now assert that the district court’s vacatur of
the punitive damages awards was erroneous. We ultimately
affirm the court’s decision on this issue. Appellants also contend
that the district court erred in instructing the jury that for
Appellants to recover, they were required to prove the equipment
had no value. But Appellants fail to challenge the discovery
ruling—made under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure—on which this instruction was based. We therefore
affirm on this issue. Appellants further assert that the district
court improperly dismissed Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary
claim. However, the parties’ contractually chosen law—the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG)—is silent on this issue, and the district court
properly determined that Recicladora failed to satisfy Utah’s
standard for achieving third-party beneficiary status. Thus, we
affirm the dismissal of Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary
claim.
¶3 In a cross-appeal, Eco Green asserts that the district court
erred in denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law on
Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. We
agree because (1) Appellants provided no evidence that Eco
Green knew at the time it made the alleged misrepresentations on
which these claims are based that Multiactivos intended to lease
the equipment to another entity and (2) Eco Green could not
knowingly or intentionally make misrepresentations to a lessee
whose existence it knew nothing about. Accordingly, we vacate
the jury’s verdict and nominal damages awards on these causes
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
of action. And because we hold that Appellants were not entitled
to any other damages award, Appellants’ challenge to the court’s
vacatur of the punitive damages awards cannot prevail.
¶4 In sum, we reverse the district court’s denial of judgment
as a matter of law on Appellants’ fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims and affirm in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
Eco Green Sends a Proposal, and Appellants Are Formed
¶5 In 2014, Mario Fernández González (Fernández 1), an
attorney and businessman based in Guadalajara spoke with a
representative of Eco Green about the prospect of recycling tires.
After continued discussions, Eco Green sent Fernández a sales
proposal for a tire recycling system (the Proposal) in June of that
year. The cover page of the Proposal indicated that Eco Green
prepared it for “INDUSTRIAS ECOLAND,” though Fernández
later testified that he was unfamiliar with any such company.
¶6 Fernández and his business partner decided to move
forward with the business venture, and—at some point—they
formed Multiactivos and Recicladora as business entities
headquartered in Guadalajara. They used a separate business
1. “Traditionally, in Spanish-speaking cultures, people have two
surnames: a paternal and maternal surname, with the paternal
surname preceding the maternal surname.” Nat’l Ass’n of Hisp.
Journalists, NAHJ Issues Guidance on the Proper Use of Spanish
Surnames Following the Tragic Killing of Valentia Orellana Peralta
(Dec. 30, 2021), https://nahj.org/nahj-issues-guidance-on-the-
proper-use-of-spanish-surnames-following-the-tragic-killing-of-
valentina-orellana-peralta/ [https://perma.cc/RNA7-76QE]. “When
referring to an individual by surname, the traditional format is to
use the first surname.” Id.
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
model for each entity: Multiactivos was to purchase the recycling
equipment, and its investors were to profit by leasing out the
equipment; Recicladora was to lease the equipment from
Multiactivos, and its investors were to earn dividends from the
recycling business. In keeping with this plan, Multiactivos and
Recicladora at some point entered into a lease agreement.
Eco Green and Multiactivos Sign a Purchase Agreement
¶7 Fernández continued to negotiate with Eco Green for the
potential purchase of recycling equipment. On August 20, 2014, a
member of Fernández’s legal team informed Eco Green that
Multiactivos would be the company entering into the forthcoming
sales contract.
¶8 Five days later, Multiactivos and Eco Green executed a
purchase agreement for tire recycling equipment (the Purchase
Agreement), with Multiactivos agreeing to pay $1,696,656 for the
equipment. The Purchase Agreement expressly incorporated the
Proposal. The Purchase Agreement stated that it would be
“governed by and construed in accordance with the [CISG]” and
that Utah would be the venue for any disputes arising under the
Purchase Agreement.
¶9 In February 2015, Eco Green and Multiactivos executed an
amendment to the Purchase Agreement (the Amendment). In the
Amendment, they agreed to a later delivery deadline and a lower
sales price. The new delivery deadline was September 30, 2015,
and the sales price was reduced by $234,328.
The Equipment Arrives
¶10 The delivery deadline passed without Eco Green
delivering the equipment. Most of the equipment finally arrived
in February 2016. On August 30, 2016, Multiactivos sent Eco
Green a “Notice of manufacturing defects and irregularities
inherent in the recycling plant” (the Notice of Defects). Therein,
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
Multiactivos alleged that Eco Green had failed to meet the
delivery deadline set forth in the Amendment and, therefore, that
a “late delivery penalty [was] applicable under the terms of the
[Purchase] Agreement.” Multiactivos also asserted that certain
“components of the [e]quipment were received with defects,
damage or with different specifications [from those] agreed [to] in
[the Purchase Agreement].” Multiactivos listed twelve
components it believed were unsatisfactory, describing the
alleged defects and providing photos of each. According to a
later-filed declaration by Fernández, “Eco Green responded to the
Notice of Defects by promising to fix the damaged and defective
components but ultimately didn’t end up fixing anything.”
¶11 Two years after Eco Green delivered most of the
equipment, Recicladora got its recycling plant “up and running,”
but it determined that the equipment was “only . . . able to process
20% of what was promised.” Recicladora was never able to turn a
profit.
Appellants Sue Eco Green and Provide Their Initial Damages
Disclosure
¶12 In March 2019, Appellants sued Eco Green. As relevant
here, Multiactivos asserted a claim of breach of contract,
Recicladora asserted a claim of breach of contract as a third-party
beneficiary, and they both asserted claims of fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and intentional interference with economic
relations. Their claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation
were based on alleged “extracontractual misrepresentations that
were misleading,” including alleged statements Eco Green made
during negotiations with Fernández about the quality and origin
of the equipment.
¶13 Appellants included in their initial disclosures the
following statement in response to the mandate of rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for parties to disclose a
computation of their damages:
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
[Appellants] sustained the following damages:
$1,696,656.00 for the value of the [e]quipment;
lost profits arising from [Eco Green’s] failure to
deliver the goods and services that [Eco Green]
promised to deliver;
consequential damages arising from [Eco Green’s]
failure to deliver the goods and services that [Eco
Green] promised to deliver, including costs of
shipping, customs, lost sales, incidentals, and other
losses; [and]
punitive damages to be determined at trial.
Appellants did not supplement their initial disclosures with any
other computation of their claimed damages.
Eco Green Moves for Summary Judgment and to Strike Appellants’
Damages Claims
¶14 Eco Green moved for summary judgment on all of
Appellants’ claims. In response, the district court dismissed
Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary claim on the grounds that
the parties’ chosen law, the CISG, is silent on the issue of third-
party beneficiaries and Recicladora could not meet Utah’s
standard for third-party beneficiary status, which requires a clear
intention by the contracting parties to confer a distinct benefit on
a purported third party. The court dismissed Multiactivos’s fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims on the basis of the
economic loss rule. The court did not apply that rule, however, to
Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims; thus,
it did not dismiss those claims. The court also determined that the
economic loss rule did not bar Recicladora’s or Multiactivos’s
claims for intentional interference with economic relations.
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
¶15 On the same day Eco Green filed its motion for summary
judgment, it also filed a motion to strike Appellants’ claims for
contract-related damages, arguing that Appellants had not
disclosed a computation of damages under rule 26 and that,
because the fact and expert discovery deadlines had passed, it was
too late for them to do so. The district court determined that
Appellants had “timely and properly disclosed damages in the
amount paid for the equipment.” But the court ruled that because
Appellants did not disclose any “other or alternative damage
calculation,” none would be permitted at trial. “[F]or example,”
the court explained, Appellants would not be allowed to “claim
damages for lost profits or for other types of damages that were
not properly disclosed.”
¶16 Later, Eco Green filed a second motion to limit breach of
contract damages, this time with respect only to Multiactivos’s
breach-of-contract claim (Recicladora’s third-party breach claim
having already been dismissed). In this motion, Eco Green asked
the court “to prevent [Multiactivos] from presenting any evidence
or making argument at trial of its alleged damages other than
nominal damages.” Eco Green asserted that Multiactivos’s only
damages disclosure—the purchase price of the equipment—
would have been an appropriate measure of damages only if
Multiactivos had been seeking to void the contract and obtain
avoidance damages, which Multiactivos admitted it was not
seeking. Eco Green also noted that Multiactivos had not disclosed
a computation of consequential damages or of damages based on
lost profits. Finally, Eco Green argued that “expectation or lost-
benefit-of-the-bargain damages” are the difference between the
value of what the plaintiff bargained for and the value of what the
plaintiff actually received and that because Multiactivos had not
disclosed what it believed the equipment’s actual value to be, it
had not adequately disclosed a computation of its expectation
damages. For these reasons, Eco Green asked the court to
“exclude evidence or argument regarding damages for breach of
contract.”
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
¶17 In response, Multiactivos argued that it had satisfied the
disclosure requirement by disclosing a computation of
expectation damages equal to the value of what it bargained for
(as measured by the purchase price of the equipment) minus the
market value of what it received (which it claimed to be zero).
Thus, Multiactivos asserted that it would simply need to prove at
trial that the market value of the delivered equipment was zero,
which it intended to do. Multiactivos contended that Eco Green
could attempt to prove mitigation or offset but that the burden of
proving these was on Eco Green. In short, Multiactivos argued
that the question for the jury would be whether the equipment
that was delivered was essentially “paper-mache” and that
Multiactivos would “have to prove that,” while Eco Green could
attempt to prove that the equipment was not valueless.
¶18 After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court
declined to disturb its earlier ruling wherein it declined to strike
Multiactivos’s claim for contract-related damages altogether. But
it stated that Multiactivos’s damages disclosure left Multiactivos
with the “burden of proving that what it received was, in fact,
valueless” or, in other words, that the equipment was the
equivalent of “paper-mache.” The court stated that if Appellants
did not prove at trial that the equipment was worthless, the court
would “grant a directed verdict or a motion to dismiss on that
basis.” It then said, “So . . . at the end of the day, the motion’s
denied, but Multiactivos has its work cut out for it in terms of
what it’s going to have to prove in order to be able to recover at
trial.” Rather than object to the requirement that it prove the
equipment was worthless, Multiactivos responded, “We’re
ready.”
The Parties Discuss Jury Instructions on Damages
¶19 Before trial, the parties submitted proposed jury
instructions. During an ensuing discussion, Multiactivos objected
to a statement in Eco Green’s proposed instruction on breach-
20241111-CA 8 2026 UT App 176
Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
related damages that “Multiactivos must prove that the market
value of equipment at the time of the sale was zero.” In arguing
against such an instruction, Multiactivos made an assertion
regarding damages that are available under the CISG, to which
the court responded, “But this isn’t a CISG issue. This is a
disclosure issue. This is a [r]ule 26 issue, as I recall.” Multiactivos
acknowledged as much, saying, “Yeah.” The court then said that
it was nevertheless sustaining Multiactivos’s objection to Eco
Green’s proposed instruction and that it planned to instruct the
jury using this statement instead: “Multiactivos claims the
purchase price that it paid to Eco Green for the equipment. This is
Multiactivos’s only claim for damages for breach of contract.”
¶20 Eco Green contended that this statement was too “open-
ended” in that it would allow the jury to pick any damages figure
it wished without determining “the difference between the price
paid and the value of what [Multiactivos] received.” At this point,
Multiactivos asserted that this instruction was “a ruling from the
court on the procedural history” and that it is normally a
defendant’s burden to show that delivered goods had some value.
The court then said, “If the jury comes back . . . with a number that
is not [the purchase price], then you’ve got . . . grounds for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, given my earlier ruling,
and I’m likely going to grant it . . . .” Multiactivos responded, “I
want to formally say you should reconsider.” When the court
declined to do so, Multiactivos again asserted that instead of
requiring it to prove the equipment had zero value in order to
recover, the court should simply allow Eco Green to contend, as a
defense, that Appellants generated some income from the
equipment and that this income should offset an award equal to
the purchase price of the equipment. Eco Green disagreed, saying,
“[I]t’s an all-or-nothing proposition for [Multiactivos]. They have
to prove the value of what they got was zero.” The court agreed
with Eco Green.
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
¶21 Thus, in line with its earlier decisions regarding damages
for Multiactivos’s breach-of-contract claim, the court determined
that it would give (and later did give) the jury the following
instruction, which was numbered as Instruction 28I:
On its breach of contract claim, Multiactivos claims
damages equal to the purchase price that it paid to
Eco Green for the equipment. To prevail, it must
show that the equipment it received did not have
any market value. This is Multiactivos’s only claim
for damages for breach of contract.
The Jury Reaches a Mixed Verdict
¶22 After the parties presented their cases, Eco Green moved
for judgment as a matter of law under rule 50 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court took the motion under advisement.
¶23 The jury, using a special verdict form, ultimately found
that Multiactivos did not prove “by a preponderance of evidence
that Eco Green committed a fundamental breach of the parties’
agreement.” As to Recicladora’s causes of action for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation, the jury found Eco Green liable on
both and awarded Recicladora nominal damages of $1 for each of
these claims. The jury then awarded punitive damages of $300,000
in favor of Multiactivos and $200,000 in favor of Recicladora.
Finally, the jury found that Appellants did not prove their
intentional interference with economic relations claims.
Upon Eco Green’s Motion, the Court Vacates Punitive Damages
¶24 After trial, Eco Green filed a renewed motion for judgment
as a matter of law, asking the court to (1) “set aside the jury’s
finding that Eco Green committed fraud or negligent
misrepresentation because those claims are barred by the
economic loss rule and because Recicladora failed to prove those
claims by clear and convincing evidence” and (2) “set aside the
20241111-CA 10 2026 UT App 176
Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
jury’s punitive damages award[s].” The court declined to disturb
its earlier ruling that the economic loss rule did not apply to
Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, and
it further declined to disturb the jury’s verdict on those claims.
However, the court vacated the jury’s awards of punitive
damages, reasoning that punitive damages were not available
where the jury had otherwise awarded only nominal damages.
Accordingly, the court entered judgment against Eco Green for $2.
¶25 Appellants timely appealed, and Eco Green cross-
appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶26 Appellants raise three issues for our review. First, they
assert that the district court erred in instructing the jury that for
Multiactivos to prevail on its breach-of-contract claim, it had to
prove that the equipment had no market value. “Claims of
erroneous jury instructions present questions of law that we
review for correctness.” Meeks v. Peng, 2024 UT 5, ¶ 27, 545 P.3d
226 (cleaned up). Here, however, the contested jury instruction
was a product of the court’s discovery sanction against Appellees.
“We review discovery sanctions under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 16, 215 P.3d
933. But “an error of law by the district court . . . would be an
abuse of discretion.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT 76, ¶ 26, 267 P.3d
885 (cleaned up).
¶27 Second, Appellants argue that the court erred in
concluding that Recicladora was not a third-party beneficiary of
the Purchase Agreement as a matter of law. “Appellate courts
review a district court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or
denial of summary judgment for correctness, viewing the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners,
Ltd., 2017 UT 54, ¶ 14, 423 P.3d 1150 (cleaned up).
20241111-CA 11 2026 UT App 176
Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
¶28 Third, Appellants contend that the court erred in vacating
the jury’s punitive damages awards in response to Eco Green’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. “Appellate
courts review the grant or denial of a motion for [judgment as a
matter of law] for correctness. Accordingly, we will sustain a
[judgment as a matter of law] if, after examining all evidence in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-
moving party’s favor.” Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT
App 226, ¶ 6, 311 P.3d 564 (cleaned up).
¶29 Eco Green raises one issue in its cross-appeal. It asserts that
the district court erred in failing to dismiss Recicladora’s fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims on its motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Again, “appellate courts review the
grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law for
correctness.” Hallett v. Tully, 2024 UT App 90, ¶ 13, 552 P.3d 779
(cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. Jury Instruction on Damages
¶30 Appellants first argue that Instruction 28I—which told the
jury that for Multiactivos to prevail on its breach-of-contract
claim, it had to “show that the equipment it received did not have
any market value”—was erroneous. 2 They assert that the
2. Eco Green contends that this issue is unpreserved. “But because
we resolve [this issue] in [Eco Green’s] favor, we need not address
whether [it is] preserved.” See State v. Main, 2021 UT App 81, ¶ 18
n.6, 494 P.3d 1056; see also State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28,
484 P.3d 415 (“If the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in
favor of the party asserting that the claim was not preserved, we
readily may opt to do so without addressing preservation.”
(cleaned up)).
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
instruction’s “implication is completely at odds with long-
standing Utah law,” that it “took away the jury’s broad discretion
to fashion a damages remedy,” and that it “impermissibly shifted
the burden to Multiactivos to prove the absence of offset.”
¶31 Problematically, however, Appellants do not appeal the
limitation or sanction imposed by the district court under rule 26
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in response to Appellants’
damages disclosure. As recited above, based on to Eco Green’s
first motion to strike Appellants’ claims for contract-related
damages—brought under rule 26—the court determined that
Appellants had “timely and properly disclosed damages in the
amount paid for the equipment,” but it ruled that because
Appellants did not disclose any “other or alternative damage
calculation,” none would be permitted at trial. And after hearing
argument on Eco Green’s second motion to limit Multiactivos’s
breach-of-contract damages, the court declined to disturb its
earlier ruling and stated that Appellants’ damages disclosure left
Multiactivos with the “burden of proving that what it received
was, in fact, valueless” or, in other words, that the equipment was
the equivalent of “paper-mache.”
¶32 Thereafter, when discussing the parties’ proposed jury
instructions, the court clearly indicated that the language it
intended to use (and that it eventually incorporated into
Instruction 28I) was tied to its earlier decision under rule 26 to
limit Appellants’ damages theories to the specific computation it
had impliedly disclosed. Specifically, when Multiactivos made an
assertion regarding damages that are available under the CISG,
the court said, “But this isn’t a CISG issue. This is a disclosure
issue. This is a [r]ule 26 issue, as I recall.” Multiactivos
acknowledged as much, saying, “Yeah.” Multiactivos later
similarly acknowledged that the requirement that it prove the
equipment had zero value was “a ruling from the [c]ourt on the
procedural history.” Ultimately, the court said, “If the jury comes
back . . . with a number that is not [the purchase price], then
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
you’ve got . . . grounds for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, given my earlier ruling, and I’m likely going to grant it
. . . .” At this point, Multiactivos asked the court to reconsider,
which the court declined to do.
¶33 Given this background, Instruction 28I did not purport to
be a statement of generally applicable Utah law. Instead,
Instruction 28I was an application of the sanction the court
imposed under rule 26 in response to Appellants’ less-than-
fulsome damages disclosure. Thus, to successfully challenge
Instruction 28I on appeal, Appellants need to demonstrate that the
court abused its discretion by imposing this sanction under rule
26. But Appellants’ opening brief contains no such argument; in
fact, Appellants make no argument whatsoever under rule 26.
Instead, their argument with respect to Instruction 28I is that the
instruction misstates Utah law. However, this framing ignores the
reality that Instruction 28I was actually a reflection of the court’s
decision to sanction Appellants for their failure to provide a more
fulsome computation of their damages. Because Appellants’
opening brief does not challenge the appropriateness of that
ruling, Appellants have waived this argument. 3 See Allen v. Friel,
3. Appellants contend in their reply brief that the court’s “all-or-
nothing damages ruling wasn’t predicated on any discovery
violation” but “was a purely legal conclusion centered on the
parties’ substantive burdens of proof.” But this argument
contradicts the court’s plain statements, as well as Appellants’
own acknowledgments. While it is true that the court ruled that
Appellants had complied with the damages disclosure
requirement of rule 26 to the extent that they had disclosed a
computation of expectation damages measured as the purchase
price minus the asserted “paper-mache” value of the delivered
equipment, the court determined that Appellants had not
disclosed any other amount or computation of damages and, thus,
that Appellants could not attempt to prove any computation other
(continued…)
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2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (“It is well settled that issues raised
by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the
opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered
by the appellate court.” (cleaned up)).
¶34 In sum, because Instruction 28I was based on the sanction
the district court imposed under rule 26 in response to Appellants’
damages disclosure and because Multiactivos has not challenged
the propriety of that sanction, Multiactivos cannot prevail on this
issue.
II. Third-Party Beneficiary
¶35 Appellants also contend that the court erred in concluding
as a matter of law that Recicladora was not a third-party
beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement. This issue was addressed
through Eco Green’s motion for summary judgment, and the
district court dismissed Recicladora’s third-party beneficiary
claim on the grounds that the parties’ chosen law, the CISG, is
silent on the issue of third-party beneficiaries and that Recicladora
could not meet Utah’s standard on this point. We agree with the
district court.
¶36 “Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized
as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract to
which they are not parties and for which they give no
consideration.” Val Peterson Inc. v. Tennant Metals Pty. Ltd., 2023
UT App 115, ¶ 42, 537 P.3d 660 (cleaned up).
¶37 Appellants assert that Recicladora’s third-party breach-of
contract-claim is viable under the CISG. However, the CISG is
than the purchase price minus zero. The court’s decision to
predicate any recovery by Multiactivos based on its breach-of-
contract claim on proof that the equipment it received had no
market value (and to so instruct the jury) was clearly based on its
application of rule 26.
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silent on the issue of third-party beneficiaries. See generally United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
Notably, Article 4 of the CISG indicates that the CISG “governs
only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and
obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”
See id. art. 4 (emphasis added). In other words, the rights of a
third-party beneficiary are beyond the scope of the CISG. See
Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., No. 06 Civ.
3972, 2007 WL 2059239, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (holding that
there was “no viable third-party beneficiary claim” under the
CISG because “[t]o the extent that the CISG applies to a
transaction, it addresses only the rights of buyer and seller”);
Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Products, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 885
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[T]he text of the CISG and analysis by
commentators suggest that the CISG applies only to buyer and
seller, not to third parties.”); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of
UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.
165, 173 (1995) (“Unless otherwise expressly provided, [the] CISG
is not concerned with the effect which the contract may have on
. . . the rights of third persons who are not parties to the contract.
In essence, [the] CISG is limited to two-party commercial
contracts for sale . . . .” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, the court did
not err in turning to Utah law to determine whether Recicladora
had a viable third-party claim. See Cedar Petrochemicals, 2007 WL
2059239, at *3 (turning to New York law to assess a third-party
beneficiary claim pled under the CISG).
¶38 In Utah, “for a third party to have enforceable rights under
a contract, the intention of the contracting parties to confer a
separate and distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear.”
Val Peterson, 2023 UT App 115, ¶ 43 (cleaned up). “This is a high
standard. It is not enough that the parties to the contract know,
expect[,] or even intend that others will benefit from the contract;
the contract must be undertaken for the plaintiff’s direct benefit,
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
and the contract itself must affirmatively make this intention
clear.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶39 Appellants point to nowhere in the Purchase Agreement or
in the Proposal (which, again, was incorporated into the Purchase
Agreement) where the parties made a clear affirmative expression
of intent that Recicladora be a third-party beneficiary. Such a
claim would be difficult to establish given that neither document
ever names Recicladora. Instead, Appellants argue that the
contract between Multiactivos and Eco Green was ambiguous on
the issue of a possible third-party beneficiary because the
Proposal’s cover page used the name “INDUSTRIAS
ECOLAND,” a name Fernández indicated he was unfamiliar
with, and that this ambiguity necessitates consideration of
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. We are not
persuaded.
¶40 Regardless of the name on the Proposal’s cover page,
Appellants cannot satisfy the high bar applicable here because the
contract does not clearly and affirmatively declare that it was
undertaken for any third-party’s direct benefit, let alone
Recicladora’s. With no such affirmative declaration and no
reference whatsoever to Recicladora, the district court correctly
determined that Appellants could not, as a matter of law, satisfy
Utah’s standard for establishing third-party beneficiary status. See
id. (“There is barely a reference to [the purported third-party
beneficiary] in the [contract], let alone anything from which we
may infer a clear intention to confer a distinct benefit upon [that
entity]. . . . Thus, [that entity] is not a third-party beneficiary
. . . .”). Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing
Recicladora’s third-party breach-of-contract claim.
III. Recicladora’s Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims
¶41 Eco Green asserts in its cross-appeal that the district court
erred in failing to dismiss Recicladora’s claims of fraud and
negligent misrepresentation on Eco Green’s motion for judgment
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
as a matter of law. Eco Green makes two alternative arguments
here, asserting that either (1) the economic loss rule applies to bar
Recicladora’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims or
(2) Recicladora failed to meet its evidentiary burden because it did
not prove Eco Green made the alleged misrepresentations with
the intent that Recicladora act on them. We agree with Eco Green’s
second contention.
¶42 When considering the appropriateness of a court’s denial
of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we “examin[e] all
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party” and
conclude that the motion should have been granted only if “there
is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-
moving party’s favor.” Montgomery v. Gardiner, 2025 UT App 146,
¶ 30, 579 P.3d 1083 (cleaned up). Here, even examining the
evidence in Recicladora’s favor, there was not sufficient evidence
for Recicladora to succeed on its fraud claim or its negligent
misrepresentation claim.
¶43 Proving fraud in Utah requires a claimant to show, among
other things, that someone made a representation “for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it.” Robinson v.
Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, ¶ 12, 21 P.3d 219 (cleaned up).
Likewise, “a claim for negligent misrepresentation requires a
party to demonstrate that . . . a party carelessly or negligently
ma[de] a false representation expecting the other party to rely and
act thereon.” Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ¶ 36 n.12, 158 P.3d
562 (cleaned up). In other words, for either claim to succeed,
Recicladora needed to prove that Eco Green made the alleged
misrepresentations in order to induce Recicladora to act on them
or expecting Recicladora to do so.
¶44 Appellants’ evidence at trial was that Eco Green sent
Fernández the Proposal, that at some point Fernández formed
Multiactivos and Recicladora (with Multiactivos being structured
to purchase and lease out the equipment and Recicladora being
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
structured to lease the equipment from Multiactivos and operate
it), and that at some point Recicladora and Multiactivos entered
into a lease agreement. 4 But even viewing the facts to suggest that
Recicladora was formed and executed the lease agreement before
Eco Green and Multiactivos signed the Purchase Agreement,
there was no evidence that Eco Green was informed before this
point that Multiactivos was purchasing the equipment with the
intention of leasing it to another party. 5 Without such knowledge,
4. While Appellants state that the relevant misrepresentations
“started prior to formal contract negotiations and continued
through the filing of this lawsuit,” they identify no alleged
misrepresentations that were made and relied on after the
Purchase Agreement was signed. Therefore, we limit our analysis
to “Eco Green’s precontractual statements.”
5. In its reply to Eco Green’s cross-appeal, Recicladora contends
that “Eco Green knew that one company would purchase the
equipment and lease it to another, and thus knew that a lessee
company would specifically and separately rely on Eco Green’s
representations.” But the evidence Recicladora identifies as
supportive of this assertion does not bear it out. The first evidence
Recicladora cites is a set of emails exchanged between Eco Green
and Fernández, but nowhere in the emails does Fernández
mention an anticipated lessee or Recicladora. And while
Recicladora claims that the emails demonstrate that “the
businesses changed names multiple times before the equipment
was ordered,” even if this proposition is true, it cannot support a
finding that Eco Green knew the purchaser was not the entity
planning to use the equipment. Next, Recicladora cites passages
of trial testimony regarding Multiactivos and Recicladora’s
lessor/lessee relationship, but the testimony provides no evidence
that Eco Green knew of that relationship before the parties signed
the Purchase Agreement. Recicladora also cites evidence relating
to the shipment of the equipment to Recicladora, but this
(continued…)
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Multiactivos Leasing v. Eco Green Equipment
Eco Green could not have made the alleged misrepresentations in
order to induce Recicladora (or any third-party lessee, for that
matter) to act on them or expecting Recicladora (or any other
third-party lessee) to do so. Accordingly, Recicladora was unable
to prove an essential element of its fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims, and the claims should have been
dismissed. The district court erred in not doing so. Therefore, we
reverse the court’s denial of Eco Green’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law as to these causes of action and vacate the award
of nominal damages for each.
IV. Punitive Damages
¶45 The final claim in Appellants’ appeal is that the district
court erred in vacating the jury’s punitive damages awards in
response to E