Full Opinion

Opinion issued November 6, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00920-CV ——————————— SANJAY KHANDUJA, INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR WITH WILL ANNEXED TO THE ESTATE OF DR. R.K. DHINGRA, Appellant V. MALACHITE VENTURE CORP., Appellee On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 396745-409 MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal concerns Appellant’s (R.K. Dhingra’s Estate’s) ability, under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 162 and 163, to nonsuit claims against one party in a multi-party property dispute. The Estate timely nonsuited its claims against Appellee (Malachite Venture Corporation). This record shows no prejudice by the Estate’s doing so. Nonetheless, the trial court refused the nonsuit then granted summary judgment on those claims to Malachite. That was error. The Estate’s nonsuit of its claims against Malachite became effective as to those claims when filed. The merits of those claims were no longer live when trial court attempted to adjudicate their merits. We reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND This appeal arises out of a property dispute. The Property at issue was part of a tract of land conveyed in 1992 to Shiva Investment Group. In 2009, a deed purported to convey the tract from Shiva Investment Group to The 2525 Brothers, L.P. The deed bears a signature purporting to be that of R.K. Dhingra on behalf of Shiva Investment Group. In 2010, 2525 Brothers conveyed the Property to Appellee Malachite. After Dhingra’s death, the Estate filed suit against several parties, including David Scheffler and his various entities. The Estate took the position that Scheffler forged Dhingra’s signature on the 2009 deed to transfer the tract to 2525 Brothers, a company Scheffler controlled. The record reflects that Scheffler was charged with the felony offense of securing execution of documents by deception based in part on the disputed conveyance and was initially placed on deferred adjudication. Later, the court adjudicated Scheffler guilty and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. 2 At issue here, in addition to its claims against the other defendants, the Estate filed (then later sought to nonsuit) a trespass-to-try-title action against Malachite seeking to divest Malachite of title to the Property. The Estate asserted that Malachite did not hold valid title to the Property because there was a fraudulent deed in its chain of title. Malachite answered and pleaded counterclaims against the Estate and cross-claims against the Scheffler defendants for fraud, negligence, and breach of the covenant of seisin. Those filings are not in this (severed) appellate record. In 2018, while this case was pending, Shiva Investment Group, through a remaining partner, executed a Special Warranty Deed conveying all of its interest in the Property to the Estate. On June 23, 2021, Malachite filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s claims against it. Malachite argued, among other things, that the Estate could not maintain a trespass-to-try-title action because neither Dr. Dhingra nor the Estate owned the Property when the Estate filed suit (as opposed to obtaining title later). Before the summary judgment hearing, the Estate filed a “Notice Of Nonsuit Of Estate’s Claims Against Malachite Venture Corp., Only,” stating that it nonsuited all its claims against Malachite without prejudice. The notice did not purport to 3 dismiss the Estate’s claims against the other defendants or to dismiss claims pleaded by Malachite. Malachite objected. The trial court signed an order sustaining Malachite’s objections and denying the Estate’s nonsuit, pointing to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 163. The trial court then granted Malachite’s motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s claims against Malachite. DISCUSSION The Estate contends the trial court erred by denying its nonsuit of its claims against Malachite and by subsequently granting summary judgment on those claims. We agree. Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address the Estate’s remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. A. Governing Law We begin with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162. Rule 162 provides that “[a]t any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take a non-suit, which shall be entered in the minutes.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. Rule 162 also makes clear that “[a]ny dismissal pursuant to this rule shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief . . . .” Id. (also providing that “[a] dismissal under this rule shall have no effect 4 on any motion for sanctions, attorney’s fees or other costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as determined by the court”). Applying Rule 162, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that, generally, “parties have an absolute right to nonsuit their own claims for relief at any time during the litigation until they have introduced all evidence other than rebuttal evidence at trial.” Villafani v. Trejo, 251 S.W.3d 466, 468–69 (Tex. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. 2011) (“In Texas, plaintiffs may nonsuit at any time before introducing all of their evidence other than rebuttal evidence. No court order is required.” (citations omitted)). “In the context of a summary judgment proceeding, a plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time prior to the time the court renders judgment.” Birnbaum v. CSD Van Zandt, LLC, 735 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2026, no pet.). Texas law also provides that the granting of a nonsuit is, generally, a ministerial act by the court. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010); In re Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding); Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914. A nonsuit extinguishes the claims from the moment the motion is filed; it renders the merits of the nonsuited claims moot. See City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 375 (Tex. 2011); Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862–63; In re Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 S.W.3d at 310–11; Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914. 5 When a party seeking to nonsuit claims has asserted claims against multiple parties, we then turn to Rule 163 as well. Rule 163 states: When it will not prejudice another party, the plaintiff may dismiss his suit as to one or more of several parties who were served with process, or who have answered, but no such dismissal shall in any case, be allowed as to a principal obligor, except in the cases provided for by statute. TEX. R. CIV. P. 163; see also C/S Sols., Inc. v. Energy Maint. Servs. Grp. LLC, 274 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (plaintiff must dismiss all claims against the defendant it wishes to nonsuit). Thus, when a plaintiff dismisses all its claims against one defendant while its claims involving other defendants remain pending, the Court considers Rules 162 and 163. See C/S Sols., Inc., 274 S.W.3d at 306. Rule 162 governs the plaintiff’s abandonment of its own claims; Rule 163 additionally requires that dismissal of one of several parties not prejudice another party. Id. at 306–07 (“Rules 162 and 163 allow the plaintiff to nonsuit a party within seven days of trial without leave of court.”); see also In re United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-18-00002-CV, 2018 WL 753503, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 8, 2018, orig. proceeding) (“Nonsuiting a party to a lawsuit is litigation conduct that is expressly allowed by Rules 162 and 163 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, unless it is shown that their dismissal will prejudice a party to the suit.”). 6 While a plaintiff may nonsuit its own claims, a plaintiff’s nonsuit does not extinguish a defendant’s claims for affirmative relief. Villafani, 251 S.W.3d at 469. As the Texas Supreme Court explained, a plaintiff’s nonsuit decision “does not control the fate of a non-moving party’s independent claims for affirmative relief.” Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 162; Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868 (“[A] nonsuit does not affect any pending claim for affirmative relief or motion for attorney’s fees or sanctions.”). Accordingly, if the defendant has a pending claim for affirmative relief, the plaintiff’s nonsuit is effective for its own claims, but not for those of the defendant, which the defendant may continue to prosecute after the nonsuit. See BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 840, 842 (Tex. 1990); Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914; Le v. Kilpatrick, 112 S.W.3d 631, 633 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.). Cross-claims for affirmative relief similarly survive a nonsuit. See CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, 390 S.W.3d 299, 300 (Tex. 2013); N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. 1966). B. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment on claims the Estate had nonsuited. 1. The Estate timely exercised its right to nonsuit; the Estate’s claims against Malachite were no longer pending when the trial court granted summary judgment. The first question is whether the Estate timely exercised its right to nonsuit its claims against Malachite. The answer is yes. It is undisputed that the Estate filed its notice of nonsuit before trial and before the trial court rendered summary judgment 7 on the Estate’s claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 162; Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868; Villafani, 251 S.W.3d at 468–69; Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914 (“In the context of a summary judgment proceeding, a plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time prior to the time the court renders judgment.”). The Estate’s nonsuit was effective as to its claims against Malachite at the moment of filing. See Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 375; Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862–63; Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914. For the reasons explained below, the record does not reflect a legally sufficient basis for denying the nonsuit. Because of the nonsuit, the Estate’s claims against Malachite were no longer before the trial court at the time the trial court granted Malachite’s motion for summary judgment on those claims. See Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 375; Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862–63; Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914–15 (trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims that plaintiff nonsuited before summary judgment was granted); see also In re Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 S.W.3d at 311–12 (granting mandamus relief to vacate trial court’s orders issued after petitioner nonsuited action, explaining trial court erred in continuing to exercise jurisdiction over merits of nonsuited claims). That requires reversal. 2. The trial court erred in denying the nonsuit. On this record, the trial court lacked a legally sufficient basis to deny the nonsuit. 8 a. Malachite’s arguments concerning bad faith, evasion, and refiling did not render the nonsuit ineffective. As an initial matter, Malachite objected to the nonsuit on the basis that, Malachite argued, the Estate acted in bad faith by nonsuiting its claims to avoid an adverse ruling, evade prior rulings, and refile its claim with more favorable evidence. Malachite also emphasized the years of litigation and the expense it incurred. But these arguments did not support rejecting the nonsuit. First, as discussed, the Estate filed its notice before trial and before the trial court rendered summary judgment. Its notice therefore was timely. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 162; Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868; Villafani, 251 S.W.3d at 468–69; Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914. Neither the age of the case nor the expense already incurred rendered this notice untimely. In McQuillen v. Hughes, the plaintiff filed a trespass-to-try-title action against multiple defendants and sought a nonsuit more than seven years later. 626 S.W.2d 495, 495 (Tex. 1981). The trial court refused the nonsuit, in part because the judge believed the plaintiff “filed the motion for non-suit in bad faith.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief. Id. at 496. The duration and expense of litigation did not provide a basis for denying the nonsuit there. So too here. Malachite’s argument that the nonsuit was taken to avoid an unfavorable ruling fares no better. A plaintiff’s motive for nonsuiting could have consequences. For example, nonsuiting to avoid an unfavorable ruling may, upon defendant’s motion, result in attorney’s fees being awarded to the defendant as the “prevailing 9 party” if there is an applicable attorney’s fee statute or contractual provision. See Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 864 (defendant is not prevailing party for fee purposes when plaintiff nonsuits claim without prejudice “unless the court determines, on the defendant’s motion, that the plaintiff took the nonsuit in order to avoid an unfavorable judgment”). And a nonsuit does not affect a pending request for sanctions, attorney’s fees, or costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 162; see also Dargin v. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc., 725 S.W.3d 749, 754–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (suggesting that bad faith conduct in filing a nonsuit may be sanctionable under Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code).1 But such potential consequences did not make this nonsuit ineffective or authorize the trial court to deny the nonsuit. Our sister court recently rejected a similar argument, explaining: “[W]e do not find[] any authority permitting a trial court to wholly disregard a plaintiff’s nonsuit on the basis that it was taken to avoid an unfavorable judgment,” and “[r]egardless of his motivation, [plaintiff’s] nonsuit was effective” at the moment of filing. Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 915. 1 Two of our sister courts have held that a trial court may, on a defendant’s motion and as a sanction under Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, convert a nonsuit without prejudice to a nonsuit with prejudice when the plaintiff filed the nonsuit in bad faith to avoid an unfavorable ruling. DGF Holdings, Ltd. v. Air Clinic Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., No. 05-23-01262-CV, 2025 WL 1558886, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 2, 2025, pet. denied); Cox v. Vanderburg, No. 06-20- 00078-CV, 2021 WL 4055487, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 7, 2021, pet. denied). That issue is not before us. 10 Additionally, the possibility that the Estate might refile its claim was not a basis for denying the nonsuit. A nonsuit without prejudice ordinarily permits the plaintiff to refile subject to applicable limitations and other defenses. See Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 869 & n.8. Whether a later filed action would be timely, proper, or supported by sufficient evidence was not before the trial court when it considered nonsuit. Those questions could be addressed in any later proceeding. b. Rule 163’s prejudice standard also did not provide a basis to deny the nonsuit in this case. Malachite also argued that Rule 163 supported refusal of the nonsuit. Malachite said that the nonsuit would prevent it from being heard on and prejudice its counterclaim and cross-claims. It argued those claims depended on an adverse disposition of the Estate’s title claims, without which Malachite’s damages would not be “fixed.” But this record does not support a finding of prejudice. As set forth above, Rule 163 provides a limited qualification to Rule 162: When it will not prejudice another party, the plaintiff may dismiss his suit as to one or more of several parties who were served with process, or who have answered, but no such dismissal shall in any case, be allowed as to a principal obligor, except in the cases provided for by statute. TEX. R. CIV. P. 163. Because the Estate sought to dismiss all its claims against Malachite while leaving its claims against other defendants pending, Rule 163 applies. See id.; C/S Sols., Inc., 274 S.W.3d at 306. But Rule 163 does not blanketly prevent all nonsuits 11 of claims against one defendant; it asks whether there will be “prejudice” to another party. “Prejudice” is a well known concept—and it has been part of Rule 163’s history since its statutory predecessor of 1879.2 Around that period, “prejudice” meant “[m]ischief; hurt; damage; injury.” Prejudice, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1828, https://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Prejudice.3 Modern definitions are similar. See, e.g., Prejudice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prejudice (defining “prejudice” as “injury or damage resulting from some judgment or action of another in disregard of one’s rights,” “especially : detriment to one’s legal rights or claims”). The pertinent inquiry is whether the nonsuit would prejudice (i.e., injure) another party’s legal rights. See Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683–84 (Tex. 1956); see also Keesey v. Old, 17 S.W. 928, 929 (Tex. 1891) (upholding dismissal 2 See 1879 Revised Statutes, 16th Leg., R.S., Title 29, ch. 7, art. 1259, 1879 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 201: Art. 1259. The court may permit the plaintiff to discontinue his suit as to one or more of several defendants who may have been served with process, or who may have answered when such discontinuance would not operate to the prejudice of the other defendants; but no such discontinuance shall in any case be allowed as to a principal obligor, except in the cases provided for in article 1257. (Emphasis added). 3 See State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 245 n.13 (Tex. 2024) (Blacklock, J., concurring) (looking to 1828 Webster’s Dictionary as informative of meaning of language used in 1876 Texas Constitution). 12 of one co-defendant under Rule 163’s predecessor because it was not shown how defendants would be prejudiced by dismissal or that “injury will result”). i. Affirmative claims by Malachite. Malachite first argues that recognizing the Estate’s nonsuit would prejudice it because it would lose the opportunity to be heard on its counterclaim against the Estate and its cross-claims against the Scheffler defendants. That contention rests on an incorrect premise. As set forth above, Rule 162 confirms that a plaintiff’s nonsuit does not extinguish an adverse party’s pending claim for affirmative relief; that claim remains pending. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 162; CTL/Thompson Tex., 390 S.W.3d at 300; Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868; Villafani, 251 S.W.3d at 469; Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 840–42. As our sister court recently explained: [T]he mere existence of a defendant’s pending claim for affirmative relief at the time a plaintiff files a notice of nonsuit does not remove the plaintiff’s ability to nonsuit its own claims. Instead, the nonsuit is effective only as to the plaintiff’s claims (but does not extinguish the defendant’s outstanding claims for affirmative relief). Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 915 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The trial court would retain jurisdiction over remaining affirmative claims. Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 375; see also Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31, 38 (Tex. 2008) (“While the plaintiffs were entitled to nonsuit their own affirmative claims,” plaintiffs’ nonsuit could not extinguish intervenor’s claim for affirmative relief). 13 That an affirmative claim survives does not necessarily foreclose a showing of prejudice. But it does defeat the contention that recognizing a nonsuit would itself always eliminate the opportunity to be heard on counterclaims and cross-claims. Womack is instructive here concerning Rule 163 and surviving affirmative claims. See 291 S.W.2d at 683–84. In Womack, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the existence of other claims in a lawsuit with multiple defendants in which the plaintiff sought to nonsuit its claims against one party. Id. at 679–80. Specifically, the plaintiff nonsuited his claims against one beneficiary, Michael; Michael had pending affirmative claims against the plaintiff and a cross-action against a bank (the bank also had a cross-action involving Michael and other parties). Id. at 680–81. The Court considered Rule 163 and concluded that, “Michael will be fully protected, and the parties other than relator will not be adversely affected by such dismissal.” Id. at 683. “The dismissal of [plaintiff’s] suit against Michael does not affect the latter’s right to be heard on his claims for affirmative relief.” Id. The dismissal of [plaintiff’s] suit as to Michael does not eliminate the latter as a party defendant to such cross-action, and hence does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine, in connection with [plaintiff’s] suit, the related questions raised by the bank. Id. at 684. That is, the mere existence of a counterclaim or cross-claim did not itself require continued prosecution of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 683–84. That principle applies here. The Estate’s notice sought to dismiss only the Estate’s claims against Malachite. It did not purport to dismiss any counterclaim or 14 cross-claim belonging to Malachite.4 If Malachite asserted a claim for affirmative relief,5 that claim survived the Estate’s nonsuit. The Estate would remain a defendant to such a claim even after its own claims against Malachite had been dismissed. See, e.g., Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 840–42 (retaining defendant’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment after plaintiff nonsuited its claims). So too if Malachite filed independent cross-claims for affirmative relief against the Scheffler defendants. The Estate’s nonsuit would not prevent those claims from proceeding. See Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683–84. 4 The pleadings through which Malachite asserted its counterclaim and cross-claims are not included in the appellate record in this severed action. Assuming Malachite asserted claims for affirmative relief, the nonsuit did not extinguish those claims. 5 Not all defensive claims are claims for affirmative relief. A defensive pleading constitutes a claim for affirmative relief when it alleges an independent cause of action on which the defendant could recover benefits, compensation, or relief even if the plaintiff abandoned its cause of action or failed to establish it. Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 841; Gen. Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990). For example, a defendant’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment seeking resolution of continuing issues was a claim for affirmative relief that survived a plaintiff’s nonsuit. See, e.g., Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 840–42; see also Gaskamp v. WSP USA, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 457, 468–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. dism’d). By contrast, a defendant does not seek affirmative relief by claims that merely defend or resist the plaintiff’s cause of action. Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 841; OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d at 570; Le, 112 S.W.3d at 634–35. For example, a co-defendant’s cross-claims for offset, credit, indemnity, or contribution were purely defensive and did not qualify as claims for affirmative relief and did not survive a plaintiff’s nonsuit. See, e.g., Le, 112 S.W.3d at 634–35. 15 The Estate’s nonsuit would not have deprived Malachite of the right to be heard on its own independent claims for affirmative relief. See, e.g., Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 840–42; Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683–84. ii. Prejudice. Malachite also argued generally—and the trial court agreed—that it would be prejudiced by the nonsuit. On this record, neither the text of Rule 163 nor the caselaw applying it support that position. The Rule says: “When it will not prejudice another party, the plaintiff may dismiss his suit as to one or more of several parties who were served with process, or who have answered . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 163. That is, so long as the nonsuit will not prejudice (injure) a party, then one may nonsuit his own claims. This record does not show prejudice. The Estate need not be forced to continue prosecuting its title claims against Malachite for Malachite to be able to protect its rights. As explained, to the extent that Malachite has affirmative claims against the Estate or others (including the Scheffler defendants), those claims remain pending. To the extent another party has claims against Malachite, those claims would also continue. Moreover, to the extent there is a claim as to which Malachite is interested and presently not included, Malachite could seek to intervene to protect its rights. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 60; State v. Roberson, 409 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1966, no writ) (where plaintiff sued multiple defendants but dismissed all but one, 16 the dismissed-defendant “became a stranger to the litigation. But this did not prevent him from later intervening in the suit, which he did”); Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d at 36 (rules have no deadline for intervention). The nonsuit of the Estate’s claims against Malachite did not prevent Malachite from participating in its own litigation concerning the Scheffler defendants. On this record, the nonsuit would not have increased Malachite’s substantive liability, eliminated a statutory defense or credit, or deprived Malachite of an opportunity to litigate a claim belonging to it. Malachite did not lose a legal right merely because the Estate no longer wished to prosecute its own claims. Nor does the record show prejudice on the basis of Malachite’s assertion that its damages would not be “fixed.” Malachite seems to be arguing that dismissal of the Estate’s claim against Malachite (seeking title) would leave Malachite unable to establish the damage amount Malachite could recover from the Scheffler defendants. But Malachite offers no reason why such damages would have to be established in the Estate’s lawsuit against Malachite—as opposed to in a lawsuit between Malachite and the Scheffler defendants (or otherwise). And if Malachite wants a ruling on its title dispute with the Estate (as to damages or otherwise), even if the Estate nonsuits its claims, Malachite is free to seek a declaratory judgment on it. Finally, our conclusion is not changed by Malachite’s arguments about possible res judicata or issue-preclusion effects of the Estate’s continued litigation 17 against the Scheffler defendants. Res judicata operates to bar claims that were or could have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties. See Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862. Issue preclusion requires, among other things, that the party against whom preclusion is asserted was “a party or in privity with a party in the first action.” Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801–02 (Tex. 1994). Even if we were to assume that, through privity with the Scheffler defendants, Malachite’s rights could be affected by a judgment between the Estate and the Scheffler defendants, that is not changed by whether or not the Estate’s claims against Malachite proceed. Malachite’s argument blurs the line between its dispute against the Estate, on the one hand, and the Estate’s claims against the Scheffler defendants, on the other. The question Malachite seems to raise is whether Malachite has a means of protecting its interests by participating in the Estate-Scheffler dispute. But Malachite’s participation in that litigation does not depend on keeping the Estate’s claims against it alive. As discussed, if Malachite pleaded counterclaims or cross-claims seeking affirmative relief (including claims against the Scheffler defendants), it remained a party to the case for purposes of those claims. See Millard, 800 S.W.2d at 840–42; Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 684. Malachite may continue with (or bring) the claims it chooses, subject to ordinary legal requirements. And as noted, to the extent that Malachite otherwise seeks to participate in the dispute between the 18 Estate and the Scheffler defendants, the Estate’s nonsuit of its claims against Malachite does not preclude Malachite from doing so. See Roberson, 409 S.W.2d at 875. The nonsuit of the Estate’s claims against Malachite here did not prejudice Malachite. The record does not show prejudice under Rule 163. The trial court erred in refusing the nonsuit. We sustain the Estate’s first issue. * * * The Estate timely filed its notice of nonsuit before trial and before the trial court rendered summary judgment for Malachite. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 162; Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868; Villafani, 251 S.W.3d at 468–69; Birnbaum, 735 S.W.3d at 914. The trial court lacked a legally sufficient basis for refusing to recognize the nonsuit. Accordingly, the nonsuit became effective as to the Estate’s claims against Malachite when filed. Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 375; Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862–63. The merits of the Estate’s nonsuited claims against Malachite were therefore moot when the trial court later attempted to rule on them on summary judgment. See Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 375; Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 862–63. 19 CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Malachite and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jennifer Caughey Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 20