City of Jarrell, Texas v. BE Theon East Partnership No. 3, Ltd.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket03-25-00953-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00953-CV
City of Jarrell, Texas, Appellant
v.
BE Theon East Partnership No. 3, Ltd., Appellee
FROM THE 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 20-0125-C425, THE HONORABLE BETSY F. LAMBETH, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The City of Jarrell appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of
BE Theon East Partnership No. 3, Ltd. (BE Theon) and ordering specific performance. The City
asserts that the development agreement (the Development Agreement) between the parties was
void ab initio and that even if the Development Agreement was not void, the proper remedy was
disannexation rather than specific performance. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2008, the City and BE Theon entered into the Development Agreement
concerning an undeveloped 24.4-acre property (the Property) that BE Theon owned near the
intersection of Ronald Reagan Boulevard and Interstate 35 (I-35) in Williamson County.
BE Theon agreed to voluntarily allow the City to annex the Property, and the City agreed to
provide water and wastewater capacity to the Property (the Water and Wastewater Provision):
Section 3.01 Construction. The City shall provide sufficient water and
wastewater capacity and sufficient approach mains to the northwest corner of the
Land within three years after the completion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its
intersection with IH-35. “Sufficient water and wastewater” shall mean sufficient,
as reasonably anticipated by Owner and the City’s engineer, for the uses planned
for the Land at the time of the City’s invitation(s) for bids for construction of such
approach mains. To the extent that onsite water and wastewater lines are required
to be oversized for service to properties other than the Land, the City shall pay for
all costs reasonably attributed to such oversizing.
The city council authorized the mayor to sign the Development Agreement, the mayor signed the
Development Agreement, the city council approved the Property’s annexation by ordinance, and
the Development Agreement was publicly recorded in the real property records of Williamson
County. In July 2018, the Property’s plat map, which the city manager signed and approved,
also was recorded in the real property records of Williamson County. It expressly states: “The
city of Jarrell will provide water and wastewater to this site subject to the Development
Agreement between the City of Jarrell, TX and [BE Theon], dated 11/4/2008.”
In August 2019, BE Theon, through its counsel, provided a letter to the City with
the “capacities it deemed sufficient for the planned uses of the Property” as calculated pursuant
to “the City’s Unified Development Code.” The City did not respond to the letter and has not
provided water or wastewater services to the Property.
In January 2020, BE Theon sued the City seeking specific performance of the
Development Agreement or, alternatively, damages. BE Theon alleged that Ronald Reagan
Boulevard at its intersection with I-35 had been completed for over three years and that the City
had breached the Development Agreement by not complying with the Water and Wastewater
Provision or, alternatively, that the City’s promises in that provision were enforceable by
promissory estoppel. BE Theon referenced a “ribbon cutting for the completion of the final,
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northern portion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard and the intersection at Interstate 35 [that] took
place on March 5, 2014.” BE Theon also referenced emails from the City manager in May 2019
that were BE Theon’s “first indication that the City would not fulfill its obligations under the
Development Agreement.”
In February 2020, the City answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial
court denied the plea. The City appealed that ruling, and this Court concluded that the trial court
did not err in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction as to BE Theon’s breach of contract and
promissory estoppel claims. See City of Jarrell v. BE Theon E. P’ship No. 3, Ltd. (BE Theon II),
No. 03-21-00651-CV, 2023 WL 2588567, at *9, 11 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 22, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). In October 2020, BE Theon filed in the trial court: (1) a supplement to its
first amended petition seeking mandamus relief against the City to compel the City to perform
the ministerial act of providing a certificate pursuant to Subsection 212.009(d) of the Texas
Local Government Code, see Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 212.009(d); and (2) a traditional motion
for partial summary judgment on its request for a writ of mandamus. In March 2021, the trial
court granted BE Theon’s motion for partial summary judgment and ordered that a writ of
mandamus issue. See City of Jarrell v. BE Theon E. P’ship No. 3, Ltd. (BE Theon I),
No. 03-21-00292-CV, 2021 WL 3555974 at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction appeal of order granting motion for partial
summary judgment and writ of mandamus).
In March 2025, BE Theon moved for traditional summary judgment on its claim
for breach of contract and sought specific performance and later amended its petition to abandon
its claim for promissory estoppel. In response to the motion for summary judgment, the City
argued that (1) the Development Agreement failed “to supply all necessary and material terms to
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make this contract unilaterally enforceable by Theon,” (2) “‘sufficient’ capacity remains
unestablished” because “the City’s engineer has never agreed what constitutes ‘sufficient,’” and
(3) there is a fact question regarding when the Ronald Reagan Boulevard intersection was
completed. After the hearing on the motion but before the trial court ruled, the City filed a
post-hearing brief in which it argued that BE Theon’s remedy for breach would be disannexation
and that specific performance could not be awarded because “there is no way to discern what
constitutes ‘sufficient’ water and wastewater capacity within the four corners of the contract
when the parties entered it, and . . . no dollar figure to pay for this performance has ever been
ascertained.” The trial court signed a final judgment in November 2025 granting BE Theon’s
motion for summary judgment and ordering the City to “invite and award bids for the
construction of water and wastewater utilities to the Property with sufficient approach mains, in
compliance with Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code, and with such utilities
having no less than the” capacities specified in BE Theon’s August 2019 letter. The
City appeals.
ANALYSIS
First, the City asserts that the Development Agreement was void ab initio because
the Water and Wastewater provision “violates the reserved powers doctrine because it
impermissibly delegates to a private developer and the City’s engineer the discretionary,
governmental power to set the level of public expenditure required to fund water, wastewater,
and fire-protection services in perpetuity” and “is unenforceable as a matter of law because it
constitutes an unenforceable agreement to agree, leaving the material terms of ‘sufficient’
capacity and the corresponding cost to the City to future negotiation.” The City then argues that
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the trial court’s judgment “violates the separation of powers doctrine as applied to Texas Local
Government Code Section 212.172(j).” Next, the City argues that the proper remedy for
BE Theon is disannexation, not specific performance. Finally, the City writes in its statement of
facts that “Whether ‘the completion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its intersection with IH-35’
occurred on the date of the March 5, 2014 ribbon-cutting ceremony . . . is a genuinely disputed
material fact.”
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s summary-judgment ruling de novo. See Zive
v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 2022); Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture,
145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). Under this standard, we view “the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, crediting evidence favorable to the non-movant if reasonable jurors
could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Zive, 644 S.W.3d
at 173.
“A party moving for traditional summary judgment must prove that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Xerox State & Loc. Sols., Inc., 663 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2023); see Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(c).1 “A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence ‘rises to a level that would
enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.’” First United
1The Texas Supreme Court recently amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, but
“[o]ther than the deadline changes, Rule 166a’s rewrite is not intended to substantively change
the law.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. to 2026 change. The amendments renumbered the rule’s
provisions. See 89 Tex. B.J. 286, 289–92 (2026). Because the amendments apply only to
summary-judgment motions filed on or after March 1, 2026, and the filing of Appellees’
summary-judgment motion preceded the amendments, we refer to the provisions of Rule 166a in
effect at the time of filing. See id. at 286.
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Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). “The evidence does not create
an issue of material fact if it is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or
suspicion’ that the fact exists.” Id. (quoting Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 875
(Tex. 2014)).
Void ab initio
The City asserts that the Development Agreement was void ab initio because the
Water and Wastewater provision “violates the reserved powers doctrine because it impermissibly
delegates to a private developer and the City’s engineer the discretionary, governmental power to
set the level of public expenditure required to fund water, wastewater, and fire-protection
services in perpetuity” and “is unenforceable as a matter of law because it constitutes an
unenforceable agreement to agree, leaving the material terms of ‘sufficient’ capacity and the
corresponding cost to the City to future negotiation.”
We first address the City’s argument that the Water and Wastewater Provision “is
void ab initio under the reserved powers doctrine.” See Love Terminal Partners, LP v. City of
Dallas, 256 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“If an action is void or void ab
initio, the transaction is a nullity.”). “Under the reserved powers doctrine, certain legislative and
governmental powers ‘are conferred on government entities for public purposes, and can neither
be delegated nor bartered away. Government entities cannot cede away such powers through
contracts with others so as to disable them from the performance of their public duties.” City of
San Antonio v. San Antonio Firefighters’ Ass’n, Local 624, 533 S.W.3d 527, 543 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (quoting Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth.,
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320 S.W.2d 829, 843 (Tex. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “A city
contract that does so is not binding and is terminable at will.” Id. (citing Kirby Lake Dev.,
320 S.W.2d at 842; Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385, 391
(Tex. 1977)).
In Clear Lake City Water Authority v. Clear Lake Utilities, the Texas Supreme
Court held that an agreement between the Authority and a utility company was not binding
because it had “the effect of potentially controlling and embarrassing [the] Authority in the
exercise of its governmental powers.” 549 S.W.2d at 392. The agreement in that case obligated
the Authority to meet all water and sewage treatment needs for the Utilities, while precluding it
from extending those services directly to the landowners themselves, “under terms and rates that
it deems best.” Id. The Supreme Court therefore found that the Authority had bargained away
its governmental power to determine “whether, on any particular date, it is in the best interests of
all of its customers and the public in general, to extend water and sewer service to a particular
person or entity.” Id.
BE Theon emphasizes the distinction between an agreement to provide water
infrastructure capable of meeting certain capacities—which is how BE Theon interprets the
Development Agreement—and an agreement to meet water and wastewater needs of future
customers, which BE Theon emphasizes “is not part of the subject matter of the Development
Agreement.” We need not address whether BE Theon’s contracting to receive water and
wastewater capacity from the City for the Property without restricting the City’s right to bill
customers directly for usage violates the prohibition on ceding governmental powers because the
City did not raise the reserved powers doctrine in its response to or at the hearing on the motion
for summary judgment. It has therefore not preserved this issue for review. Tex. R. App. P.
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33.1; see Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (“As a rule, a claim, including a
constitutional claim, must have been asserted in the trial court in order to be raised on appeal.”).
We next turn to the City’s argument that the Water and Wastewater provision “is
unenforceable as a matter of law because it constitutes an unenforceable agreement to agree,
leaving the material terms of ‘sufficient’ capacity and the corresponding cost to the City to
future negotiation.” “To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material
terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C.,
479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345
(Tex. 1955)).
“[W]hether a contract contains all the essential terms for it to be enforceable is a
question of law.” Parker Drilling Co. v. Romfor Supply Co., 316 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); see Pearson v. Fullingim, No. 03-03-00524-CV,
2006 WL 358230, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 17, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hether a
contract is enforceable is a question of law.”). In determining whether the contract includes all
the essential terms, we look to the language of the parties’ agreement. See Barrow-Shaver Res.
Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019) (“In construing a contract, we
must look to the language of the parties’ agreement.”). We construe the contract “as a whole,”
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811 (Tex. 2005), evaluating “the overall agreement to
determine what purposes the parties had in mind at the time they signed” it. Kirby Lake Dev.,
320 S.W.3d at 841.
“[B]ecause the law disfavors forfeitures, we will find terms to be sufficiently
definite whenever the language is reasonably susceptible to that interpretation.” Fischer,
479 S.W.3d at 239. “Thus, if the parties clearly intended to agree and a ‘reasonably certain basis
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for granting a remedy’ exists, we will find the contract terms definite enough to provide that
remedy.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 cmt. b). When parties’ actions
“show conclusively that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, even though one or
more terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon[,] . . . courts endeavor, if possible, to attach
a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 cmt. a.
To avoid forfeiture, “we may imply terms that can reasonably be implied.” Fischer, 479 S.W.3d
at 239. Courts often imply a term setting a reasonable time of payment or a reasonable time
during which the contract will remain effective. Id.; see Tanenbaum Textile Co. v. Sidran,
423 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Where a contract is silent as
to the time it is to run, or provides that it is to run for an indefinite term, . . . the law will imply
that a reasonable time is meant.”). A term that “appears to be indefinite may be given precision
by usage of trade or by course of dealing between the parties.” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 33 cmt. a; see ATOFINA Petrochems., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 185 S.W.3d 440,
443 (Tex. 2005) (holding the contract requiring building to “furnish . . . insurance” was
“sufficiently definite for the parties to understand their obligations” based on parties’ past
dealings though contract did not identify type of insurance required or any coverage terms).
In addition,
we are guided by the principle that “[p]art performance under an agreement may
remove uncertainty and establish that a contract enforceable as a bargain has been
formed.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34(2). And in fact, the parties’
actions “in reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate
even though uncertainty is not removed.” Id. § 34(3). When the parties’ actions
demonstrate that they intended to “conclude a binding agreement, even though
one or more terms . . . are left to be agreed upon . . ., courts endeavor, if possible,
to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain.” Id. § 33(2) cmt. a. The
law favors finding agreements sufficiently definite for enforcement, “particularly
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. . . where one of the parties has performed his part of the contract.” Tanenbaum
Textile, 423 S.W.2d at 637.
Fischer, 479 S.W.3d at 240.
Here, city council authorized the City to enter into the Development Agreement
with BE Theon in 2008, the City passed an ordinance to annex BE Theon’s Property in 2009,
and BE Theon filed a plat, which was signed and approved by the city manager in 2018.
BE Theon has stated that it is ready, willing, and able to provide easements for utility lines, and
the recorded plat notes that a ten-foot public utility easement “abutting and along the street side
property line is hereby dedicated for all street side property lots shown hereon.” For over a
decade, the parties performed as though a valid contract had been formed. BE Theon presented
uncontroverted evidence that in 2019, “[b]ecause the City has not contacted the Owner regarding
its view on the matter of ‘sufficient capacity,’ we have consulted the City of Jarrell’s Unified
Development Code” to calculate its proposed water and wastewater capacities. Thus, in the
absence of cooperation from the City, BE Theon represents, and the City did not dispute, that
BE Theon used the City’s published method for calculating water and wastewater capacities for
the Property. On this record, we conclude the terms of the Development Agreement were
sufficiently certain to create a binding contract for the City to provide water and wastewater
infrastructure. We overrule the City’s issue asserting that the Development Agreement was void
ab initio.
Separation of Powers
The City contends that the trial court’s judgment “violates the separation of
powers doctrine as applied to Texas Local Government Code Section 212.172(j).” Specifically,
the City “raises an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of sec. 212.172’s specific
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performance remedy as it relates to the” Water and Wastewater Provision. The City did not raise
this issue in its response to the motion for summary judgment. At the hearing, the City’s counsel
stated, “They’re asking you to issue an order for the City to go and provide them with some
amount of water and wastewater by some date certain. That, frankly, also implicates some
separation of powers issues, right?” The only other mention of separation of powers was when
the trial court asked what case the City cited regarding separation of powers, and counsel
responded, “I didn’t cite a case for that purpose.” We conclude that, on this record, the City did
not preserve a complaint relating to separation of powers. See Dreyer, 871 S.W.2d at 698.
Disannexation
The City argues that the proper remedy for BE Theon is disannexation, not
specific performance. The City contends that Section 43.0672 of the Local Government Code
requires the city to provide water and wastewater service to the Property within three years of the
date of completion of the intersection of Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its intersection with I-35.
Section 43.0672 applies when the “governing body of the municipality” “elects to annex an
area under [Subchapter C-3].” Subchapter C-3 was enacted in 2017; the City does not
explain how this Subchapter applies to the agreed annexation of the Property in 2009. See Act of
Aug. 13, 2017, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, § 1, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4512–13 (codified at
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 43.0671–.0673). The City further argues that Alexander Oil Co. v. City
of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. 1991), stands for the proposition that, under Section
43.141 of the Local Government Code, the “only express remedy for failure to provide services
to” an area annexed under Subchapter C-3 “is disannexation.” But unlike Alexander Oil, this
case does not involve involuntary annexation.
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Instead, BE Theon’s pleadings alleged that the trial court has jurisdiction over its
breach of contract claim under Section 212.172 of the Texas Local Government Code.
Subsection 212.172(c) of the Local Government Code requires a contract to be in writing,
contain an adequate legal description of the land, be approved by the governing body of the
municipality and the landowner, and be recorded in the applicable real property records. See
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 212.172(c). BE Theon included as exhibits to its pleadings copies of the
Development Agreement identifying and containing a legal description of the Property, minutes
from the city council authorizing the mayor to sign the Development Agreement, and the
recording of the plat map and the Development Agreement in the real property records. And, as
the City concedes, Subsection 212.172(j) provides that “specific performance . . . may be granted
in an adjudication brought against a municipality for breach of a contract.” Having held that the
terms of the contract were sufficiently certain to create a binding contract for the City to provide
water and wastewater infrastructure, we further conclude that Subsection 212.172(j) allows a
party with a valid contract under Subsection 212.172(c) to be granted specific performance.
Completion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its intersection with I-35
The City writes in its statement of facts that “Whether ‘the completion of Ronald
Reagan Boulevard at its intersection with IH-35’ occurred on the date of the March 5, 2014
ribbon-cutting ceremony . . . is a genuinely disputed material fact.” BE Theon asserts that the
City has waived this argument because the City “did not raise an argument on the issue” in its
opening brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (brief must contain clear and concise argument for
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and record). Assuming the City’s
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comment in its statement of facts preserved this issue, we nonetheless conclude that the evidence
does not create an issue of material fact.
As we noted in Theon II, the Development Agreement states that the City “shall
provide sufficient water and wastewater capacity and sufficient approach mains to the northwest
corner of the Land within three years after the completion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its
intersection with IH-35.” 2023 WL 2588567, at *10. BE Theon’s pleadings alleged that Ronald
Reagan Boulevard was completed at its intersection with I-35 in 2014, referring to “the ribbon
cutting for the completion of the final, northern portion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard and the
intersection of I-35.” Correspondence from Williamson County dated February 28, 2014, noted
that certain punch list and other “final” items would be completed “next week.” In addition,
BE Theon introduced as summary-judgment evidence images showing the existence of Ronald
Reagan Boulevard at the intersection of I-35 from 2014, and an image showing cars traversing
Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its intersection with I-35 dated 2017.
Relying on the website pages from Williamson County and the Texas Department
of Transportation, the City contends that this evidence conclusively established that construction
work at the intersection was “ongoing” when BE Theon filed suit in January 2020 and not
anticipated to be complete until the summer of 2020 or the middle of 2021. But the City’s
summary-judgment evidence showed that the project it asserts raises a fact issue as to the
completion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard—the “Ronald Reagan Boulevard at IH35 Phase I
Bridge Replacement”—would “replace the existing two-lane bridge with dual bridges at the
intersection.” Thus, even the City’s proffered evidence shows that Ronald Reagan Boulevard at
the intersection had already been completed at an earlier date. Similarly, the website pages from
the Texas Department of Transportation on February 22, 2020, providing information about
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“I-35 at Ronald Reagan Boulevard (Theon Road),” supports that the “Ronald Reagan Boulevard
(Theon Road) bridge” already existed because it was to be “replaced with new eastbound and
westbound bridges.” Based on the summary-judgment evidence, the trial court did not err in
concluding that BE Theon met its burden to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the completion of Ronald Reagan Boulevard at its intersection with I-35 and that it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We overrule the City’s assertion regarding the
existence of a fact issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s final judgment.
__________________________________________
Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: November 17, 2026
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