Full Opinion

NO. 12-26-00076-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS R4U VENTURES, LLC; R4U 25, LLC; § APPEAL FROM THE 173RD R4U ACM, LLC; R4U ABNB, LLC; R4U RANCH, LLC; R4U RENTALS, LLC; U RENTALS-A1, LLC; R4U RENTALS A- 2, LLC; R4U REALTY GROUP, LLC; AND R3ACH, LLC, § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT APPELLANTS V. JENNIFER ANN MARIE WHITE, § HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION R4U Ventures, LLC, R4U 25, LLC, R4U ACM, LLC, R4U ABNB, LLC, R4U Ranch, LLC, R4U Rentals, LLC, U Rentals-A1, LLC, R4U Rentals A-2, LLC, R4U Realty Group, LLC, and R3ACH, LLC (collectively R4U) appeal an order compelling arbitration and dismissing their case with prejudice. R4U presents four issues on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. BACKGROUND On August 21, 2025, Jennifer White and Michael White executed a partial mediated settlement agreement (PMSA) as part of their divorce proceeding in Kaufman County. The PMSA resolved certain property disputes, including Jennifer’s responsibilities to the R4U entities. Under the relevant terms of the PMSA, Jennifer agreed to document her various duties and processes to assist the R4U entities as she transitioned out of the businesses and relinquished her twenty-five percent ownership interest. Before entry of the agreed order pursuant to the PMSA, however, the parties disagreed as to the scope and specific requirements of Jennifer’s duties pertaining to operation of the R4U entities. In accordance with the PMSA’s arbitration clause, the issue was submitted to the mediator/arbitrator in November. Specifically, the arbitration clause provides: 4. Should any future disputes arise in interpreting the terms of this partial mediated settlement agreement while drafting the agreed order, the parties agree that their respective attorneys, if any, shall attempt to resolve such dispute by telephone conference with the mediator who facilitated this agreement. Any disputes which remain unresolved shall be submitted to the mediator who facilitated this agreement who shall be designated as an arbitrator and shall decide such disputes, with such decision being binding on the parties. In a letter dated November 19, 2025, the mediator/arbitrator detailed the scope of the arbitration, setting out both sides’ arguments, Jennifer’s duties under the PMSA, and his interpretation of her duties: 1. Scope - This arbitration is limited to interpretation of the PMSA language set forth hereinbelow for purposes of drafting an Agreed Decree of Divorce. This Award does not modify, change, expand, add, reduce, or limit any party’s duties and obligations written in the PMSA. 2. Disputed Language - The specific provision the Arbitrator is asked to interpret, for purposes of drafting the agreed order, is Paragraph 4 of Exhibit “A” which states: 4. In exchange for the terms described in Section 3, for at least six (6) months following the date of this agreement, Wife agrees to assist R4U with the transition of any of Wife’s current R4U duties. Specifically, Wife agrees to the following: a. Wife will document her current R4U duties; and b. Wife will document any processes associated with her current R4U duties. 3. Husband’s Position - Husband argues that this provision, when read in conjunction with the other terms of the PMSA, requires Wife to continue her normal and customary job duties with R4U, in addition to documenting those processes and duties, for at least six (6) months following the date of the agreement. Husband states that it was always intended to be a period of time to get a new person trained on those duties and transition them smoothly. Husband seeks clarification from the arbitrator on the term “transition” and requests that the language of the order make clear that Wife should be fulfilling her “current R4U duties” and not simply writing them down. 4. Wife’s Position – Wife argues that, inter alia, this provision of the PMSA only requires Wife to complete the following tasks during a transition period of at least six months beginning August 21, 2025: 1. Wife will document her current R4U duties; and 2. Wife will document any processes associated with her current R4U duties. Wife further argues that no other duties are imposed on Wife by this particular provision of the PMSA. 2 5. Interpretation – To the extent it may be unclear what the parties intended by saying “…Wife agrees to assist R4U with the transition of any of Wife’s current R4U duties…” the subsequent language specifically delineating Wife’s assumed duties makes clear the intent of the parties. If the parties had intended for Wife to continue to perform whatever her duties were at the time of the agreement, that duty could have easily been stated in the clear language of the duties she actually did agree to complete. This interpretation is consistent with general rules of construction including that if specific items, rights, privileges, duties, obligations, are listed, anything not listed is typically excluded. Further, when read in conjunction with the other provisions of the PMSA, it is clear that Wife’s obligations set forth in paragraph 4 are limited to “assist[ing] R4U with the transition of any of Wife’s current R4U duties” by, specifically documenting what those duties were and further documenting any processes associated with those R4U duties. The inclusion of those 2 specific duties tends to limit her contractual obligations over any other general or unspecified duties since, if a specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific provision controls. Other provisions of the PMSA reinforce the limitation of Wife’s duties with respect to R4U beginning the date of its execution. Paragraph 2 of the PMSA provides that “[b]y awarding to Husband all of Wife’s individual 25% interest in R4U, Wife understands and agrees that Wife shall no longer have any individual ownership interest in R4U, that Wife shall no longer have any duties relating to R4U once her documenting and transfer of duties as described in a later section are completed.” Wife does not assume or agree to continue to perform her “current R4U duties” for any period of time as full or partial consideration for conveying her ownership interest in R4U to Husband. She merely agreed to assist the transition of those duties by documenting the specific duties she performs and the processes by which she performs them. Paragraph 5 of the PMSA further states that, “[i]n the event the transition described in Section 4 takes longer than 6 months following the date of this agreement, Wife and R4U agree to mutually determine fair and reasonable compensation for Wife for any additional time needed for the transition. The parties did not agree by this language to negotiate further compensation for Wife’s continued performance of Wife’s “current R4U duties” other than to “assist R4U with the transition of any of Wife’s current R4U duties” by completing the 2 duties specified in paragraph 4, if they were not able to be completed in the 6 month window provided in paragraph 4 for some reason. The parties’ respective obligations are detailed with specificity throughout other provisions of the PMSA, particularly in paragraph 3. Notably, nowhere in the PMSA is Wife obligated to continue to perform her “current R4U duties” after the date the PMSA was executed. If the parties had intended for Wife to continue to perform those duties, that requirement could have been included in paragraph 4 and compensation for further performance of those duties could have been included in paragraph 5, if transition was not completed within the stated 6 month period. In his award, the arbitrator instructed that specific language be included in the order: IT IS ORDERED that, during the period beginning August 21, 2025, and ending February 21, 2026, Wife shall assist R4U with the transition of any of Wife’s current R4U duties. Specifically, Wife shall: a. Document Wife’s current R4U duties (as of August 21, 2025) and provide same to R4U; and b. Document any processes associated with Wife’s current R4U duties (as of August 21, 2025) and provide same to R4U. 3 The divorce court signed an order confirming the arbitrator’s award and an interlocutory order on the PMSA on February 17, 2026. Prior to the divorce court’s order, R4U filed this lawsuit in Henderson County on December 16, 2025, against Jennifer alleging that she breached her duties under the PMSA. Specifically, R4U asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and declaratory judgment. According to R4U, the lawsuit “is a commercial contract action brought by the R4U business entities against [Jennifer] for her material breaches of duties she owed under the August 21, 2025, [PMSA] executed with [Michael].” R4U continued, “The PMSA required Jennifer to transition her operational duties to R4U, document company processes, and assist with management for six months, in exchange for ongoing payments and benefits.” R4U alleged that Jennifer failed almost immediately to perform duties for R4U. R4U further asserted that Jennifer “abandoned her obligations and began actively undermining R4U’s operations” immediately after executing the PMSA. R4U claims Jennifer refused to deposit company checks and diverted receivables, failed to pay vendors and utility bills, disregarded contractual approval processes for expenditures, and falsified or omitted information in weekly operational reports. R4U sought damages and a “declaratory judgment confirming that Jennifer’s breaches excuse any further payments under the PMSA.” R4U did not serve Jennifer with the lawsuit until January 26, 2026. Jennifer filed an answer on February 13, asserting among numerous other defenses, that R4U’s claims are barred by the PMSA’s arbitration provision. Also on February 13, Jennifer filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the PMSA’s arbitration clause. Jennifer’s motion urged that she immediately transferred her ownership interests in R4U pursuant to the PMSA. Although she agreed that she had a duty to document her current R4U duties and any processes associated with those duties, she denied having a duty to continue working for R4U for six months. Jennifer also urged that the order on the PMSA demonstrated that the divorce court previously addressed and denied R4U’s arguments. She additionally contended that many of the R4U entities filed a previous suit against her on November 10, 2025, in Kaufman County, but the R4U entities non-suited the initial Kaufman County suit in early December. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Jennifer’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed R4U’s claims with prejudice. This appeal followed. 4 ARBITRATION R4U asserts the trial court erred in compelling arbitration because (1) the arbitration clause is a “narrow clause confined to disputes arising ‘while drafting the agreed order’ in a divorce and therefore does not encompass post-decree business-tort and contract claims” (issue one); and (2) “the narrow drafting-phase clause had already been invoked, arbitrated to an award, and confirmed by the divorce court, and was therefore exhausted by its own terms” (issue two). Standard of Review and Applicable Law We may review a trial court’s order to compel arbitration as part of an appeal of a final judgment. See In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 842–43 (Tex. 2009); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 586–87 & n.9 (Tex. 2008); Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2007) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89, 121 S. Ct. 513, 521, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000)). 1 We review a trial court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse of discretion; in this regard, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are supported by the evidence, but we review its legal determinations de novo. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 642–43 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); see Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 585–87 & n.15. Where an abuse of discretion standard applies, and, as in this case, the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its ruling, all facts necessary to support the trial court’s judgment and which are supported by the evidence are implied. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); see also Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 643. We review de novo whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013); Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 643. A party moving to compel arbitration must establish (1) the existence of a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement and (2) that the claims asserted fall within the scope of that agreement. In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (addressing movant’s burden under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)); In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Both Texas and federal law require 1 We acknowledge that we lack jurisdiction of an interlocutory appeal to consider the trial court’s grant of a motion to compel. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.014, 171.098(a); Darlington v. Darlington, No. 03-16-00780-CV, 2017 WL 4478215, *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 6, 2017, no pet) (citing Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W.3d 830, 833-34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). However, in this case, the trial court dismissed R4U’s claims with prejudice. Therefore, we have jurisdiction because the trial court’s order constitutes a final judgment. 5 the enforcement of valid agreements to arbitrate. 9 U.S.C. § 2; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021. If the movant establishes that an arbitration agreement governs the dispute, the burden then shifts to the party opposing arbitration to establish a defense to the arbitration agreement. In re Provine, 312 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding). Arbitration agreements are treated like any other contract and are interpreted under traditional contract principles. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. 2010). When construing a written contract, our primary objective is to ascertain the parties’ true intentions as expressed in the language they chose. Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2014). In doing so, we consider the entire writing in harmonizing and giving effect to all contract provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless, superfluous, or mere surplusage. Id.; see also Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 420 S.W.3d 30, 37 (Tex. 2014). We give a contract term its plain and ordinary meaning unless other factors in the contract indicate that the parties intended to give the term a different meaning. Reeder v. Wood Cty. Energy, LLC, 395 S.W.3d 789, 794-95 (Tex. 2012). No single provision taken alone is given controlling effect; rather, each provision must be considered in the context of the instrument as a whole. Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 7. If, after applying the pertinent contract construction rules, the contract can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous, and we will construe the contract as a matter of law. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011). If, however, a contract “is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after applying the pertinent rules of construction, the contract is ambiguous, creating a fact issue on the parties’ intent.” J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003). When determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of an arbitration clause, courts employ a strong presumption in favor of arbitration. Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 225; see also In re Kellogg Brown & Root Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (stating “[d]oubts regarding an agreement’s scope are resolved in favor of arbitration because there is a presumption favoring agreements to arbitrate under the FAA”) (emphasis in original). The presumption in favor of arbitration “is so compelling that a court should not deny arbitration unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an 6 interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.” Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotation deleted) (emphasis in original); see also Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 116 (Tex. 2018) (recognizing presumption favoring arbitration and policy to construe arbitration agreements broadly). Application According to R4U, the arbitration clause is narrowly tailored and only applies to disputes related to drafting the agreed order. Specifically, R4U argues, “[t]he arbitration mechanism existed solely as a drafting tool to resolve wording disputes in the decree.” Because the decree had been drafted before filing of the suit, R4U urges the arbitration clause does not apply. We disagree. The arbitration clause limits itself in two ways. First, the arbitration clause only covers future disputes concerning interpretation of the PMSA. The term “dispute” is defined as a verbal controversy, debate, or quarrel. Dispute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2026). Second, the arbitration clause limits itself to disputes while drafting the agreed order. The term “while” means during the time, that, or as long as. While, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2026). With these definitions in mind, along with the arbitration clause’s scope and the presumption favoring arbitration, we construe the arbitration clause to cover disputes involving the interpretation of the PMSA from the date it was executed (August 21, 2025) through the date that the divorce court reduced the PMSA to a partial decree (February 17, 2026). With this range established, we address each of R4U’s claims, beginning with R4U’s breach of contract claim. The breach of contract claim covers an issue of interpretation of the PMSA. Specifically, R4U contends that the PMSA contractually obligates Jennifer to “assist with management for six months, in exchange for ongoing payments and benefits.” Jennifer contends that the PMSA did not obligate her to perform such duties. Moreover, according to R4U’s petition, the breach of contract dispute arose “almost immediately” after the PMSA was signed. Jennifer did not need to present evidence that R4U filed suit regarding the dispute during the time period covered by the arbitration agreement, but here, she did. The breach of contract 7 dispute certainly arose during the requisite timeframe of August 21, 2025 (but after the signing of the PMSA) and February 17, 2026. 2 Regarding R4U’s contention that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration because “the narrow drafting-phase clause had already been invoked, arbitrated to an award, and confirmed by the divorce court, and was therefore exhausted by its own terms,” we disagree. The arbitration clause does not limit itself to one-time use. Instead, it covers all disputes concerning the interpretation of the PMSA that arose during the relevant time period. We also note that R4U leaves no doubt that it seeks a second opinion as to Jennifer’s contractual duties under the PMSA. In the petition, R4U alleges that the PMSA required Jennifer to “assist with R4U operations for at least six months, likely longer.” R4U in essence seeks an interpretation of the clause, “while drafting the agreed order,” to mean for purposes of drafting the agreed order only. Consistent with that extremely narrow reading of the arbitration clause, R4U believes that a trial court can interpret the PMSA for purposes of this suit. However, R4U’s narrow interpretation is flawed in that it is inconsistent with the purpose of arbitration and the presumption that favors the arbitrability of disputes. See Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 737. Accordingly, we overrule R4U’s first and second issues as they relate to R4U’s breach of contract cause of action against Jennifer. We next turn our analysis to R4U’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, which asserts that “until completion of the transition period, [Jennifer] owed fiduciary duties to [R4U] as an officer or agent.” R4U further alleges that “by deliberately failing to carry out her duties, misrepresenting information, and interfering with R4U operations, [Jennifer] breached those fiduciary obligations.” R4U argues Jennifer’s liability under this claim derives from independent, extra-contractual duties and post-agreement misconduct. Conversely, Jennifer asserts that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is “factually intertwined” with the breach of contract claim because, for Jennifer to owe fiduciary duties to R4U, she must have been an officer or agent of R4U, which she urges is against a specific provision of the PMSA. She continues that R4U’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based on a differing interpretation of her duties under the PMSA. 2 According to Jennifer, even before the arbitrator made his decision, many of the R4U entities sued her in Kaufman County. Even if we only consider this suit, the R4U entities filed the Henderson County suit on December 16, 2025. 8 Giving effect to every allegation in R4U’s petition, R4U’s breach of fiduciary duty claim appears based on the relatively short time period after the PMSA was signed, but before Jennifer transferred her ownership interest in R4U. To the extent Jennifer failed to perform duties imposed upon her as a fiduciary of R4U during this time period, that claim does not involve a dispute regarding any terms of the PMSA. Accordingly, we sustain the portion of R4U’s first issue concerning its claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 3 Finally, on the declaratory judgment action, R4U asserts on appeal that a “real controversy exists regarding the enforceability of the PMSA’s arbitration clause and the continuing validity of R4U’s payment obligations.” R4U sought declarations that Jennifer’s material breaches excuse any further performance by R4U or Michael and that all continuing payment obligations are terminated. 4 R4U’s declaratory judgment action is based on the contention that Jennifer breached the PMSA. Given our conclusion that the breach of contract claim is subject to the PMSA’s arbitration clause, R4U’s declaratory judgment claim is necessarily subject to the clause as well. Therefore, we overrule R4U’s first and second issues as it relates to the declaratory judgment action. DIRECT BENEFITS ESTOPPEL In issue three, R4U asserts that they cannot be bound to the arbitration clause as non- signatories to the PMSA. Applicable Law No party may be compelled to arbitrate unless they have agreed to arbitrate or are bound by principles of agency or contract law to do so. Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Group, Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 640 (Tex. 2018). Whether a party is bound by an arbitration agreement is normally a function of the parties’ intent as expressed in the agreement’s terms. Id. at 633. Additionally, courts have articulated six scenarios in which arbitration with non-signatories may by required: (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3), agency, (4) alter ego, (5) equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party beneficiary. Id. When relying on a contract to compel arbitration, the moving party must first establish the existence of a valid and enforceable 3 Because we sustain R4U’s first issue regarding its breach of fiduciary duty claims, we need not address its second and third issues regarding this claim. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 4 Below, R4U also urged the PMSA’s arbitration clause is void as violative of “mediator-neutrality rules” and public policy. They do not reassert this argument on appeal. 9 arbitration agreement. Id. Within this element is the question of whether the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable against a non-signatory. See id. Second, the claims at issue must fall within the arbitration agreement’s scope. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized direct benefits estoppel as a type of equitable estoppel that may be used to compel arbitration. Id. at 636. Direct benefits estoppel applies to parties who seek to derive a direct benefit from a contract with an arbitration agreement. Id. at 637. A non-signatory may be compelled to arbitrate if it (1) seeks to derive a direct benefit from the contract through the lawsuit or (2) deliberately seeks and obtains substantial direct benefits from the contract itself. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 131-32 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). When a claim depends on the contract’s existence and cannot stand independently—that is, the alleged liability arises solely from the contract or must be determined by reference to it—equity prevents a person from avoiding the arbitration clause that was part of that agreement. Jody James Farms, 547 S.W.3d at 637. However, when the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts, and other common law duties, or federal law, direct benefits estoppel is not implicated even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract or would not have arisen but for the contract’s existence. Id. Application R4U concedes that their breach of contract claim falls within direct benefits estoppel because they are suing for breach of the PMSA. In the petition, R4U asserted, “R4U, although not a signatory, was an intended third-party beneficiary because the PMSA imposes duties and confers benefits directly for its benefit.” Because a party “cannot have its contract and defeat it too,” we agree. See id. R4U seeks to enforce Jennifer’s duties under the PMSA via the PMSA itself; therefore, its claim depends on the PMSA’s existence and does not stand independently. See id. Accordingly, we overrule R4U’s third issue as to R4U’s breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. STAY AS OPPOSED TO DISMISSAL In its fourth issue, R4U contends the trial court erred by dismissing R4U’s claims with prejudice rather than staying the claims pending arbitration. Jennifer concedes that this was error. 10 In its order sending the case to arbitration, the trial court dismissed R4U’s case with prejudice. However, Texas law dictates that the trial court shall stay a proceeding that involves an issue subject to arbitration if the issue is severable from the remainder of the proceeding. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.021(c), 171.025. Therefore, the trial court erred by dismissing the entire proceeding with prejudice. A claim is properly severable if (1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990). We sustain R4U’s fourth issue. DISPOSITION Having sustained R4U’s first issue as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim and fourth issue, and having overruled R4U’s first, second, and third issues as to the breach of contract and the declaratory judgment claims, we reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and compelling the breach of fiduciary duty claim to arbitration and affirm the order compelling the breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims to arbitration. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. C. MICHAEL DAVIS Justice Opinion delivered November 10, 2026. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Davis, J. 11 COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS JUDGMENT NOVEMBER 10, 2026 NO. 12-26-00076-CV R4U VENTURES, LLC; R4U 25, LLC; R4U ACM, LLC; R4U ABNB, LLC; R4U RANCH, LLC; R4U RENTALS, LLC; U RENTALS-A1, LLC; R4U RENTALS A-2, LLC; R4U REALTY GROUP, LLC; AND R3ACH, LLC, Appellants V. JENNIFER ANN MARIE WHITE, Appellee Appeal from the 173rd District Court of Henderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. CV25-0652-173) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record, oral arguments, and the briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this court that there was error in the judgment of the court below. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and order compelling the breach of fiduciary duty claim to arbitration be reversed, the portions of the order compelling the breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims to arbitration be affirmed, and the case be remanded for further proceedings consist with this opinion and that all costs of this appeal are taxed against the party incurring same; and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance. C. Michael Davis, Justice. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Davis, J.