Concord Surgical Care, LLC and Lori S. Aaron v. Dania Rimlawi
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket05-26-00272-CV
JudgeJackson
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Reverse and Remand and Opinion Filed November 18, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-26-00272-CV
CONCORD SURGICAL CARE, LLC AND LORI S. AARON, Appellants
V.
DANIA RIMLAWI, Appellee
On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-06189
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garcia, Barbare, and Jackson
Opinion by Justice Jackson
In this case, we address the propriety of a turnover order based solely on
evidence that a judgment exists. Concord Surgical Care, LLC and Lori S. Aaron
(collectively “Concord”) contend the trial court erred in granting Dania Rimlawi’s
application for a turnover order and appointment of a receiver because Rimlawi
failed to present evidence that Concord possessed nonexempt property as required
by section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We agree
Rimlawi did not meet her burden under section 31.002. Accordingly, we reverse the
trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.
Background
The facts of this case relevant to our analysis are as follows. On September
29, 2023, Rimlawi received an arbitration award pursuant to which she was to
receive a $22,500 severance payment, a $250,000 bonus payment, pre- and post-
judgment interest, and attorney’s fees. Rimlawi filed this suit seven months later
seeking to confirm and enforce the award against Concord. On July 22, 2024, the
trial court rendered a default judgment confirming the arbitration award in favor of
Rimlawi.
Rimlawi subsequently filed an unverified application for issuance of a
turnover order and appointment of a receiver. In support of the application, Rimlawi
submitted copies of the default judgment and the arbitration award. Concord filed a
response arguing, among other things, that Rimlawi failed to submit any evidence in
support of her application showing that Concord possessed nonexempt property
subject to turnover.
On October 29, 2025, five days before the hearing on her application,
Rimlawi filed a letter enclosing exhibits that she stated she intended to introduce at
the hearing. The unauthenticated exhibits included a one-page summary of Lori and
Phillip Aaron’s personal finances as of January 31, 2019, and a 2021 financial
statement for Minimally Invasive Surgery Institute, LLC (“MISI”). The summary
of the Aarons’ finances did not indicate the source of the information or the
authorship of the document. Nothing in the 2021 financial statement indicated how
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the assets of MISI were connected to Concord. Ultimately neither exhibit was
offered into evidence.
During the course of the hearing on the turnover application, Rimlawi’s
counsel informed the trial court that Rimlawi was willing to testify regarding
Concord’s financial worth. Rimlawi was never called to testify, however, and she
offered no other evidence in support of her application. After the trial court orally
granted the application, Concord objected to the ruling on the ground that Rimlawi
had failed to identify any nonexempt property that could be the subject of a turnover
order and receivership. Rimlawi responded that the trial court “had broad discretion
in determining whether a turnover order should be signed and a receiver appointed
based on the evidence submitted and filed in the case.” The trial court signed an
order granting the application on February 2, 2026.
Analysis
Under section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a
judgment creditor may obtain aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction, through
injunction or other means, to reach property to obtain satisfaction of a judgment if
the judgment debtor owns property that is not exempt from attachment, execution,
or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 31.002(a). The court may appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession
of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to
the extent required to satisfy the judgment. Id. § 31.002(b)(3). A turnover order is
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proper if the requirements of section 31.002 are met. HMS Dev., Inc. v. Barclay
Props., Ltd., 392 S.W.3d 749, 751 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
The initial burden under section 31.002 is on the judgment creditor to establish
(1) the existence of an underlying judgment, (2) that the underlying judgment
remains unpaid, and (3) that the judgment debtor owns nonexempt property.
Vaccaro v. Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 655 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2022, no pet.). The judgment creditor must present some substantive,
probative evidence establishing each of these elements. Id. A party’s unverified
application for turnover relief is not evidence. See Weir v. Sterling State Bank, No.
05-16-00500-CV, 2017 WL 1684634, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2017, no
pet.); Ali v. Discover Bank, No. 14-25-00912-CV, 2026 WL 2123404, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2026, no pet.). If the judgment creditor fails to
bring forth evidence establishing all three elements, the trial court abuses its
discretion if it provides relief under section 31.002. Diaz v. SMS Fin. Cap., LLC,
No. 05-21-00696-CV, 2023 WL 5604236, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2023,
no pet.).
In this case, the only evidence submitted by Rimlawi in support of her
application for a turnover order and appointment of a receiver was copies of the
arbitration award and default judgment. This evidence established only the existence
of a judgment against Concord. Although Rimlawi filed exhibits purporting to show
assets held by the Aarons and MISI years before the turnover application was filed,
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these unauthenticated documents were never offered into evidence. Because
Rimlawi failed to present evidence to establish all the elements required to show
entitlement to turnover relief, including Concord’s ownership of nonexempt
property, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting Rimlawi’s
application. See id.
Based on the foregoing, we sustain Concord’s sole issue. We reverse the trial
court’s order granting Rimlawi’s application for a turnover order and appointment
of a receiver and remand the case to the trial court.
/Earl N. Jackson/
EARL N. JACKSON
JUSTICE
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