Full Opinion

Reversed; Rendered; Remanded and Opinion Filed November 17, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-01031-CV PROCARSA TUBE & PIPE COMPANY, INC., INDUSTRIAL PROCARSA, S.A. DE C.V., AND PROCARSA S.A. DE C.V., Appellant V. BLUE RACER MIDSTREAM, LLC, Appellee On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-07310 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Barbare, and Lee Opinion by Justice Lee Blue Racer Midstream, LLC sued appellants Procarsa Tube & Pipe Co., Inc. (Tube & Pipe)1, Industrial Procarsa S.A. de C.V. (Industrial)2, Procarsa S.A. de C.V. (Procarsa)3 (collectively, appellants4) under tort and contract-based theories. Tube & Pipe brought a third-party action against third-party defendant Steel Professionals, 1 Tube & Pipe is a Texas sales and distribution company that quoted the pipe, transmitted the terms and conditions, invoiced Steel Professionals, and acted as the sales agent/distributor. 2 Industrial is a Mexican steel mill that physically manufactured the pipe and supplied it into the distribution chain. 3 Procarsa is an API license holder and manufacturer who performed testing, certification, and applied the API monogram to its pipe. 4 While appellants submitted a joint appellate brief, when necessary we treat them as distinct parties by name. LLLP5 for declaratory relief, statutory indemnity, and contribution. Following a jury verdict generally favoring Blue Racer, the trial court entered judgment against appellants in the amount of $810,590.10 plus $508,000 in attorney’s fees. Appellants appeal. Appellants raise three issues: (1) that the trial court erred in submitting Blue Racer’s tort claims when the economic loss rule precluded recovery in tort; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to submit appellants’ affirmative defenses based on the disclaimer-of-warranties and limitation-of-remedies provisions; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees because recovery of attorney’s fees was foreclosed by contract. We sustain each of appellants’ issues and reverse the trial court’s judgment. We remand the case for a new trial on the on the contract and warranty claims. I. BACKGROUND Blue Racer, a natural gas transportation and processing company, sought quotations from Steel Professionals and other potential vendors for epoxy-coated, 24-inch-diameter pipe, for construction of a new pipeline. Blue Racer specified that the pipe comply with the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) 5L standard, which prescribes requirements for material strength, construction, and factory testing and certification before shipment. 5 Steel Professionals is not a party to this appeal. –2– Steel Professionals and the Upstream Supply Chain Steel Professionals contacted Industrial, the steel mill that manufactured the pipe, regarding Blue Racer’s required specifications. Industrial, through its sales agent Tube & Pipe, provided Steel Professionals a quote for uncoated API 5L pipe. The purchase agreement included a warranty disclaimer providing that, subject to standard manufacturing variations, the pipe would conform to specifications, but all other express and implied warranties, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, were disclaimed. The agreement also contained a limitation-of-remedies provision stating that the buyer’s exclusive remedy for any claim, whether sounding in contract, warranty, tort, statute, common law, or otherwise, was replacement of nonconforming goods or, at the seller’s option, refund of the purchase price. The provision further excluded liability for incidental, consequential, exemplary, punitive, or special damages and stated that no contractual relationship existed with any nonparty. Although the agreement defined “seller,” “we,” and “us” as Tube & Pipe, Tube & Pipe later asserted that the agreement was actually made on behalf of Industrial and functioned as a manufacturer pass-through, with Tube & Pipe acting solely as a sales intermediary. Steel Professionals received, reviewed, and accepted the original manufacturer terms and conditions and that they governed the purchase. –3– Blue Racer and Steel Professionals Because Blue Racer required fusion-bonded epoxy coating and Tube & Pipe’s quotation was for bare pipe, Steel Professionals modified its quote to Blue Racer to include the coating. Steel Professionals secured a third party to modify the pipe by affixing the coating. The contract between Blue Racer and Steel Professionals required acknowledgment of all express and implied warranties and obligated Steel Professionals to cover damages arising from defects in the pipe. Blue Racer was unaware of the terms contained in the Tube & Pipe-Steel Professionals agreement. Procarsa supplied material test reports certifying that the pipe complied with API 5L requirements when it left the factory, and each pipe segment bore Procarsa’s API monogram. Pipeline Failure As construction of the pipeline neared completion, Blue Racer conducted hydrostatic pressure testing. Before the pipeline reached its minimum test pressure, one segment ruptured, creating a large crater and flooding the surrounding property subject to Blue Racer’s right-of-way easement. The failed segment of pipe was replaced. The failure required additional testing, and Blue Racer purchased approximately 428,000 gallons of water for a subsequent retest and to decontaminate the pipeline. –4– To clean and retest the pipeline, Blue Racer was required to: (1) cut the pipeline at both ends; (2) weld temporary fittings to launch and receive cleaning devices known as “pigs”; (3) remediate and restore the excavated right-of-way; (4) reconnect the pipeline; and (5) conduct additional testing. Testing was successfully completed and the pipeline entered service. Subsequent testing of the failed pipe segment, observed by representatives of Blue Racer and Procarsa, revealed that the rupture originated from a seam defect created during the manufacturing process. Trial Blue Racer sued appellants, alleging products liability, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Before trial, Blue Racer moved to exclude evidence of warranty disclaimers and limitations of remedies allegedly asserted by Industrial, arguing that any such disclaimer or limitation was required to be in writing under section 2.316 of the Business and Commerce Code and that appellants had produced no written evidence establishing those terms. The trial court granted the motion. Appellants sought exclusion of Blue Racer’s negligence, strict liability, and negligent misrepresentation claims, arguing that the damages constituted economic losses under the economic loss rule, not recoverable in tort. Blue Racer responded –5– that the rule did not apply because the defective pipe caused damage to property beyond the failed pipe segment itself, including the remainder of the pipeline, a pig, and the surrounding right-of-way. The trial court charged the jury on manufacturing defect and negligent misrepresentation theories but declined to submit negligence. Appellants also requested jury questions concerning the disclaimer of implied warranties and limitation-of-remedies. Their proposed questions asked the jury to determine whether implied warranties had been disclaimed and whether Blue Racer’s recovery was contractually limited. Blue Racer objected that the proposed questions improperly treated all defendants as a single entity and failed to identify which contractual provisions applied to which parties. Blue Racer further argued that any upstream agreement between appellants and Steel Professionals did not govern Blue Racer’s contractual relationship with Steel Professionals. The trial court declined to submit appellants’ proposed questions. The jury found in favor of Blue Racer and awarded $810,590.10 in damages. The jury found that both Industrial and Procarsa were manufacturers of the pipe.6 The jury found that a manufacturing defect existed in the segment of pipe at the time the pipe left the possession of each of appellants and of Steel Professionals; found that Procarsa, Industrial, and Steel Professionals made negligent misrepresentations; apportioned negligent-misrepresentation responsibility at 50% to Procarsa, 40% to 6 This finding is not challenged on appeal. –6– Industrial, and 10% to Steel Professionals; found each defendant liable for breach of express warranty; and found Procarsa and Industrial liable for breach of implied warranty. The trial court additionally awarded Blue Racer $508,000.00 in attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS We address each of appellants’ issues in order. BLUE RACER’S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS In their first issue, appellants contend the trial court erred by submitting Blue Racer’s tort claims to the jury because the economic loss rule bars recovery. We agree. Applicable Law In actions for unintentional torts, the common law restricts recovery of purely economic damages unaccompanied by injury to the plaintiff or his property, a doctrine referred to as the economic loss rule. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., Inc., 435 S.W.3d 234, 235 (Tex. 2014). Whether the economic loss rule bars a tort claim presents a question of law which we review de novo. See House of Reaford Farms, Inc. v. SOMMA Food Grp., LLC, No. 05-22-01231-CV, 2024 WL 396609, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Eagle Oil & –7– Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, 549 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. dism'd)). The Texas Supreme Court has noted that whether and how to apply the economic loss rule to negligent misrepresentation claims does not lend itself to easy answers or broad pronouncements. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 245. Rather, the application of the rule depends on an analysis of its rationales in a particular situation. Id. at 245–46. The rule has two primary rationales: (1) because purely economic harm is not self-limiting like physical injury is, allowing its recovery in tort could lead to indeterminate and disproportionate liability that discourages economic activity; and (2) the risks of economic losses are well suited to allocation by contract, where parties familiar with their own economic needs may protect themselves through insurance or indemnity agreements and price their transactions accordingly. House of Raeford, 2024 WL 396609, at *3. The first rationale is commonly referred to as the indeterminate and disproportionate liability rationale and the second the deference to contract rationale. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 240–41. Here, we discuss the second rationale as it is dispositive of appellant's first issue. The economic loss rule has been applied to prevent a plaintiff from asserting tort claims against a defendant for disappointed economic expectations arising from a contractual relationship or in a setting in which a contractual allocation of risks reasonably should be expected or encouraged. See, e.g., id. at 241 (applying the economic loss rule to bar a negligent misrepresentation claim by a general contractor –8– against an architect in connection with errors in the architect's plans that resulted in increased costs of performing contractor's construction contract and specification); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986) (“The Reeds' injury was that the house they were promised and paid for was not the house they received. This can only be characterized as a breach of contract.”); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2007) (“The rule is based on the proposition that commercial parties may negotiate for whatever warranty or liability limits they choose, and adjust their price accordingly.”); Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex. 2014) (“The economic loss rule generally precludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from a party's failure to perform under a contract when the harm consists only of the economic loss of a contractual expectancy.”). Risks of economic loss tend to be especially well-suited to allocation by contract. First, economic injuries caused by negligence often result from a decision by the victim to rely on a defendant's words or acts when entering some sort of transaction. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 240. A potential plaintiff making such a decision has a full chance to consider how to manage the risks involved, whether by inspecting the item or investment, obtaining insurance against the risk of disappointment, or making a contract that assigns the risk of loss to someone else. Id. at 240–41. Second, money is a complete remedy for an economic injury. Id. at 241. Insurance benefits, indemnification by agreement, or other replacements of –9– money payments are just as good as the money lost in a transaction that turns out badly. Id. This fungibility makes those other ways of managing risk—insurance, indemnity, and the like—more attractive than they might be to a party facing a prospect of personal injury. Id. Those same points often will make it hard for a court to know what allocation of responsibility for economic loss would best serve the interests of the parties to a risky situation. Id. A contract that settles responsibility for such a risk will therefore be preferable in most cases to a judicial assignment of liability after harm is done. Id. The contract will better reflect the preferences of the parties and help prevent the need for speculation and litigation later. Id. Contracts also are governed by a body of commercial law that has been developed to address economic loss and thus will often be better suited for that task than the law of torts. Id. As a result, courts generally do not recognize tort liability for economic losses caused by the breach of a contract between the parties and often restrict the role of tort law in other circumstances in which protection by contract is available. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has noted, “the Restatement7 concludes, while there is ‘no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of economic loss, the duty may exist when the rationales…for limiting recovery are ‘weak or absent’.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court further noted that the Restatement now concludes generally that “there is no 7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012). –10– liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties.” Id. at 243. Concerning the rationale of deference to contract, the Texas Supreme Court explained that the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort when the parties used, or could have used, contracts to clarify the duties and liabilities of each participant in a commercial enterprise: Though there remains the possibility that a contractor may not do so, we think the availability of contractual remedies must preclude tort recovery in the situation generally because, as stated above, “clarity allows parties to do business on a surer footing”. “Where contracts might readily have been used to allocate the risk of a loss,” the Restatement observes, “a duty to avoid the loss is unlikely to be recognized in tort—not because the economic loss rule applies, but simply because courts prefer, in general, that economic losses be allocated by contract where feasible.” We see no reason not to apply the economic loss rule to achieve this end. Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b, § 3 cmt. f.). Accordingly, where a contract might readily have been used to allocate the risk of loss, a duty to avoid the loss is unlikely to be recognized in tort and the economic loss rule should apply. Id. Moreover, and while Texas courts have not formally adopted as binding authority the Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, the Texas Supreme Court has cited it extensively as persuasive authority, particularly to articulate the rationales underlying the economic loss rule, the risk of indeterminate and disproportionate liability from recognizing open-ended tort duties in commercial –11– settings, and deference to contract, reflecting the principle that parties negotiating a deal have a full chance to consider how to manage the risks involved. See id. at 240– 41. With respect to contract negotiations specifically, the Restatement Third “does not recognize liability for negligent misrepresentations made in the course of negotiating or performing a contract between the parties.” Kinder Morgan Treating, LP v. North Park Advantage Walden MRU, LLC, No. 05-24-01447-CV, 2026 WL 1897810, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2026) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5). In addition, a negligent misrepresentation claim arising from the negotiation process faces the economic loss rule and will fail unless the plaintiff can establish an injury independent of the contractual expectancy. See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 973 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1998); see also Signature Ind. Servs., LLC v. Int'l Paper Co., 638 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. 2022) (“Damage for breach of contract may include both direct and consequential damages.”). Our body of law traditionally recognizes three types of recovery to compensate for a breach of contract: expectancy, reliance, and restitution damages. Atrium Med. Ctr., LP v. Houston Red C LLC, 595 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. 2020). Thus, merely because a plaintiff suing for negligence or negligent misrepresentation opts to sue for reliance damages does not mean that such damages are not, in essence, “contract” damages or that those damages constitute an independent injury. See Sealy Emerg. Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emerg. Room Mgrs. of Am., L.L.C., No. 01-21-00008-CV, –12– 2024 WL 3973428, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (rejecting argument the economic loss rule did not bar plaintiffs' negligence claim seeking reliance rather than expectancy damages because reliance damages are a measure of contract damages.”). This case involves a chain of commercial transactions in which each participant allocated risk by contract. Blue Racer purchased the pipe from Steel Professionals. Steel Professionals purchased the pipe from Industrial through Tube & Pipe, and Procarsa participated in manufacturing, testing, and certifying the pipe. The contracts governing those transactions allocated risk through warranties, disclaimers, indemnity obligations, and remedial limitations. Blue Racer’s agreement with Steel Professionals imposed warranty and indemnity obligations, while the upstream agreement limited remedies and disclaimed implied warranties. Because the parties used contracts to allocate the risk of loss, a duty to avoid that loss should not be recognized in tort, and the economic loss rule applies. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 248. A. Strict Products Liability The jury found that Industrial and Procarsa were manufacturers of the pipe, that all appellants (and Steel Professionals) were sellers of the pipe, and there was a manufacturing defect in the segment of pipe at the time the pipe left the possession of each appellant (and Steel Professionals). Blue Racer argues that the verdict establishes its right to recover in strict liability in tort. –13– Although the jury found a manufacturing defect, the evidence establishes there was no personal injury and no damage to property other than the pipeline itself and Blue Racer’s right-of-way easement. The claimed damages consisted of replacing the failed pipe segment, dewatering and cleaning the pipeline, purchasing additional water, conducting further testing, and restoring the excavation area after the rupture. These are costs associated with obtaining conforming goods and completing the project as intended. Such losses are economic in nature and are properly addressed through contract and warranty remedies rather than strict- liability principles. Allowing tort recovery under these circumstances would reallocate commercial risks that the parties addressed through contract. B. Negligent Misrepresentation The jury found that Procarsa made a factual representation about the pipe that was incorrect and that Industrial and Tube & Pipe made negligent misrepresentations on which Blue Racer relied. The alleged misrepresentations concern the pipe’s compliance with API 5L standards, the same representations underlying Blue Racer’s warranty claims. The damages sought, including costs associated with replacement, cleaning, dewatering, retesting, and restoration, arise from Blue Racer’s expectation that it would receive conforming pipe. Those damages are economic losses tied to the parties’ commercial expectations rather than an injury independent of the contractual undertaking. A party may not avoid the economic loss rule by recasting benefit-of-the-bargain –14– damages as negligent misrepresentation damages. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 243. Because the alleged injury is purely economic and arises from Blue Racer’s expectations concerning the quality and performance of the pipe, the economic loss rule bars the negligent misrepresentation claim. Accordingly, we sustain appellants’ first issue. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES, LIMITATION OF REMEDIES, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES In their second and third issues, appellants contend the trial court erred by refusing to submit their defenses based on the disclaimer-of-warranties and limitation-of-remedies provisions contained in the agreement governing Steel Professionals’ purchase of the pipe and by awarding attorney fees on the contract claims. A trial court has wide discretion in submitting instructions and jury questions. MRT, Inc. v. Vounckx, 299 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009). The trial court is required to submit the questions, instructions, and definitions raised by the pleadings and the evidence. See Harris Cnty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 236 (Tex. 2002). We review the trial court’s exclusion of legally correct definitions, instructions, and questions for an abuse of discretion. Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. 2009). A party is entitled to a jury question, instruction, or definition if the pleadings and evidence raise an issue. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278; Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002). A judgment will not be reversed for charge error –15– unless the error was harmful because it probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict or probably prevented the party from properly presenting the case to the appellate courts. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012). Charge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue. Columbia Rio Grande, 284 S.W.3d at 856. A trial court may refuse to submit a question only if no evidence exists to warrant its submission. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992) (Rule of Civil Procedure 278 “provides a substantive, non-discretionary directive to trial courts requiring them to submit requested questions to the jury if the pleadings and any evidence support them.”). If there is some evidence to support a jury question and the trial court does not submit the question, the trial court has committed reversible error. Id. Texas law permits sellers to disclaim implied warranties and limit available remedies. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 2.316, 2.719. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that a downstream purchaser cannot obtain broader warranty rights than those possessed by the original purchaser. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows, 434 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. 2014). In MAN Engines, the Court explained that when a seller effectively disclaims implied warranties, “such express language necessarily applies downstream to subsequent purchasers, as Buyer #2 cannot tenably boast a greater warranty than that given to Buyer #1.” Id. at 134. –16– Appellants plead various affirmative defenses, among them disclaimer of express and implied warranties and limitations-of-remedies pursuant to the purchase agreement between Tube & Pipe and Steel Professionals. Appellants introduced evidence that the purchase agreement by which Steel Professionals obtained the pipe from appellants disclaimed implied warranties and limited available remedies. One of the owners of Steel Professionals, who was called as a witness by Blue Racer, admitted receipt by Steel Professionals of the terms and conditions of the purchase agreement. Blue Racer’s warranty claims arise through this same chain of distribution. Accordingly, Blue Racer could not seek the benefit of warranty rights derived from that chain while avoiding the limitations accompanying those rights. See id. at 140. The charge inquired whether appellants provided an express warranty, whether there was a breach of the implied warranty by Industrial and by Procarsa, and whether there was a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by Industrial and by Procarsa. Prior to submission of the charge, appellants presented the trial court a number of proposed instructions and questions for submission of their affirmative defenses. Among these were: • An instruction tracking Bus. & Comm. Code §2.316 and § 2.719, regarding exclusion of warranties and limitation of remedies; • An instruction tracking Bus. & Comm. Code § 2.314, regarding the implied warranty of merchantability; –17– • An instruction tracking Bus. & Comm. Code § 2.315, regarding the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; • A question whether each of the appellants disclaimed any implied warranty of merchantability; • A question whether each of the appellants disclaimed any implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; and, • An instruction regarding limitation of remedies for breach of warranty. At the charge conference, the court heard extensive objections to the overall focus of the charge, namely that the court was submitting the case primarily on tort, rather than contract theories, and appellants presented their proposed instructions and questions. In addition, appellants provided written briefing concerning the proposed express and implied warranty instructions and questions. The court confirmed receipt of and consideration of the briefing. The court overruled the objections and refused to include the instructions and questions. Because evidence was raised regarding the applicability and effect of the disclaimer-of-warranties and limitation-of-remedies provisions of the purchase agreement, appellants were entitled to have those defenses submitted to the jury. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 278 (“The court shall submit the questions, instructions and definitions in the form provided by Rule 277, which are raised by the written pleadings and evidence.”). As we have explained, the judgment cannot be sustained by the affirmative findings on Blue Racer’s tort theories, due to the economic loss –18– rule; so the judgment can only be sustained on the express and implied warranty findings made by the jury. The trial court’s refusal to include in the charge the requested instructions and questions prevented the jury from resolving contested issues regarding appellants’ affirmative defenses which could have defeated or substantially limited Blue Racer’s warranty recovery. Therefore, we must remand for a new trial on the express and implied warranty theories. See Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 243 . For the same reason, Blue Racer’s attorney’s fee recovery cannot stand. To the extent Blue Racer’s fee claim depended on warranty rights arising from the sale of the pipe, that claim remained subject to any contractual limitations accompanying those rights. We must remand for a new trial on Blue Racer’s entitlement to and amount of attorney fees. We sustain appellants’ second and third issues. CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the contract and warranty claims. /Mike Lee/ MIKE LEE JUSTICE –19–