Procarsa Tube & Pipe Company, Inc., Industrial Procarsa, S.A. De C v. and Procarsa S.A. De C v. v. Blue Racer Midstream, LLC
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket05-24-01031-CV
JudgeLee
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Reversed; Rendered; Remanded and Opinion Filed November 17, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-01031-CV
PROCARSA TUBE & PIPE COMPANY, INC., INDUSTRIAL PROCARSA,
S.A. DE C.V., AND PROCARSA S.A. DE C.V., Appellant
V.
BLUE RACER MIDSTREAM, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-07310
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Barbare, and Lee
Opinion by Justice Lee
Blue Racer Midstream, LLC sued appellants Procarsa Tube & Pipe Co., Inc.
(Tube & Pipe)1, Industrial Procarsa S.A. de C.V. (Industrial)2, Procarsa S.A. de C.V.
(Procarsa)3 (collectively, appellants4) under tort and contract-based theories. Tube &
Pipe brought a third-party action against third-party defendant Steel Professionals,
1
Tube & Pipe is a Texas sales and distribution company that quoted the pipe, transmitted the terms and conditions,
invoiced Steel Professionals, and acted as the sales agent/distributor.
2
Industrial is a Mexican steel mill that physically manufactured the pipe and supplied it into the distribution
chain.
3
Procarsa is an API license holder and manufacturer who performed testing, certification, and applied the API
monogram to its pipe.
4
While appellants submitted a joint appellate brief, when necessary we treat them as distinct parties by name.
LLLP5 for declaratory relief, statutory indemnity, and contribution. Following a jury
verdict generally favoring Blue Racer, the trial court entered judgment against
appellants in the amount of $810,590.10 plus $508,000 in attorney’s fees. Appellants
appeal.
Appellants raise three issues: (1) that the trial court erred in submitting Blue
Racer’s tort claims when the economic loss rule precluded recovery in tort; (2) that
the trial court abused its discretion by failing to submit appellants’ affirmative
defenses based on the disclaimer-of-warranties and limitation-of-remedies
provisions; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees because recovery
of attorney’s fees was foreclosed by contract.
We sustain each of appellants’ issues and reverse the trial court’s judgment.
We remand the case for a new trial on the on the contract and warranty claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Blue Racer, a natural gas transportation and processing company, sought
quotations from Steel Professionals and other potential vendors for epoxy-coated,
24-inch-diameter pipe, for construction of a new pipeline. Blue Racer specified that
the pipe comply with the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) 5L standard, which
prescribes requirements for material strength, construction, and factory testing and
certification before shipment.
5
Steel Professionals is not a party to this appeal.
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Steel Professionals and the Upstream Supply Chain
Steel Professionals contacted Industrial, the steel mill that manufactured the
pipe, regarding Blue Racer’s required specifications. Industrial, through its sales
agent Tube & Pipe, provided Steel Professionals a quote for uncoated API 5L pipe.
The purchase agreement included a warranty disclaimer providing that, subject to
standard manufacturing variations, the pipe would conform to specifications, but all
other express and implied warranties, including warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose, were disclaimed.
The agreement also contained a limitation-of-remedies provision stating that
the buyer’s exclusive remedy for any claim, whether sounding in contract, warranty,
tort, statute, common law, or otherwise, was replacement of nonconforming goods
or, at the seller’s option, refund of the purchase price. The provision further excluded
liability for incidental, consequential, exemplary, punitive, or special damages and
stated that no contractual relationship existed with any nonparty.
Although the agreement defined “seller,” “we,” and “us” as Tube & Pipe,
Tube & Pipe later asserted that the agreement was actually made on behalf of
Industrial and functioned as a manufacturer pass-through, with Tube & Pipe acting
solely as a sales intermediary. Steel Professionals received, reviewed, and accepted
the original manufacturer terms and conditions and that they governed the purchase.
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Blue Racer and Steel Professionals
Because Blue Racer required fusion-bonded epoxy coating and Tube & Pipe’s
quotation was for bare pipe, Steel Professionals modified its quote to Blue Racer to
include the coating. Steel Professionals secured a third party to modify the pipe by
affixing the coating.
The contract between Blue Racer and Steel Professionals required
acknowledgment of all express and implied warranties and obligated Steel
Professionals to cover damages arising from defects in the pipe. Blue Racer was
unaware of the terms contained in the Tube & Pipe-Steel Professionals agreement.
Procarsa supplied material test reports certifying that the pipe complied with
API 5L requirements when it left the factory, and each pipe segment bore Procarsa’s
API monogram.
Pipeline Failure
As construction of the pipeline neared completion, Blue Racer conducted
hydrostatic pressure testing. Before the pipeline reached its minimum test pressure,
one segment ruptured, creating a large crater and flooding the surrounding property
subject to Blue Racer’s right-of-way easement.
The failed segment of pipe was replaced. The failure required additional
testing, and Blue Racer purchased approximately 428,000 gallons of water for a
subsequent retest and to decontaminate the pipeline.
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To clean and retest the pipeline, Blue Racer was required to: (1) cut the
pipeline at both ends; (2) weld temporary fittings to launch and receive cleaning
devices known as “pigs”; (3) remediate and restore the excavated right-of-way; (4)
reconnect the pipeline; and (5) conduct additional testing. Testing was successfully
completed and the pipeline entered service.
Subsequent testing of the failed pipe segment, observed by representatives of
Blue Racer and Procarsa, revealed that the rupture originated from a seam defect
created during the manufacturing process.
Trial
Blue Racer sued appellants, alleging products liability, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.
Before trial, Blue Racer moved to exclude evidence of warranty disclaimers
and limitations of remedies allegedly asserted by Industrial, arguing that any such
disclaimer or limitation was required to be in writing under section 2.316 of the
Business and Commerce Code and that appellants had produced no written evidence
establishing those terms. The trial court granted the motion.
Appellants sought exclusion of Blue Racer’s negligence, strict liability, and
negligent misrepresentation claims, arguing that the damages constituted economic
losses under the economic loss rule, not recoverable in tort. Blue Racer responded
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that the rule did not apply because the defective pipe caused damage to property
beyond the failed pipe segment itself, including the remainder of the pipeline, a pig,
and the surrounding right-of-way. The trial court charged the jury on manufacturing
defect and negligent misrepresentation theories but declined to submit negligence.
Appellants also requested jury questions concerning the disclaimer of implied
warranties and limitation-of-remedies. Their proposed questions asked the jury to
determine whether implied warranties had been disclaimed and whether Blue
Racer’s recovery was contractually limited. Blue Racer objected that the proposed
questions improperly treated all defendants as a single entity and failed to identify
which contractual provisions applied to which parties. Blue Racer further argued that
any upstream agreement between appellants and Steel Professionals did not govern
Blue Racer’s contractual relationship with Steel Professionals. The trial court
declined to submit appellants’ proposed questions.
The jury found in favor of Blue Racer and awarded $810,590.10 in damages.
The jury found that both Industrial and Procarsa were manufacturers of the pipe.6
The jury found that a manufacturing defect existed in the segment of pipe at the time
the pipe left the possession of each of appellants and of Steel Professionals; found
that Procarsa, Industrial, and Steel Professionals made negligent misrepresentations;
apportioned negligent-misrepresentation responsibility at 50% to Procarsa, 40% to
6
This finding is not challenged on appeal.
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Industrial, and 10% to Steel Professionals; found each defendant liable for breach of
express warranty; and found Procarsa and Industrial liable for breach of implied
warranty. The trial court additionally awarded Blue Racer $508,000.00 in attorney’s
fees.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We address each of appellants’ issues in order.
BLUE RACER’S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CLAIMS
In their first issue, appellants contend the trial court erred by submitting Blue
Racer’s tort claims to the jury because the economic loss rule bars recovery. We
agree.
Applicable Law
In actions for unintentional torts, the common law restricts recovery of purely
economic damages unaccompanied by injury to the plaintiff or his property, a
doctrine referred to as the economic loss rule. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co.,
Inc., 435 S.W.3d 234, 235 (Tex. 2014). Whether the economic loss rule bars a tort
claim presents a question of law which we review de novo. See House of Reaford
Farms, Inc. v. SOMMA Food Grp., LLC, No. 05-22-01231-CV, 2024 WL 396609,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Eagle Oil &
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Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, 549 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2018, pet. dism'd)).
The Texas Supreme Court has noted that whether and how to apply the
economic loss rule to negligent misrepresentation claims does not lend itself to easy
answers or broad pronouncements. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 245. Rather, the
application of the rule depends on an analysis of its rationales in a particular
situation. Id. at 245–46. The rule has two primary rationales: (1) because purely
economic harm is not self-limiting like physical injury is, allowing its recovery in
tort could lead to indeterminate and disproportionate liability that discourages
economic activity; and (2) the risks of economic losses are well suited to allocation
by contract, where parties familiar with their own economic needs may protect
themselves through insurance or indemnity agreements and price their transactions
accordingly. House of Raeford, 2024 WL 396609, at *3. The first rationale is
commonly referred to as the indeterminate and disproportionate liability rationale
and the second the deference to contract rationale. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 240–41.
Here, we discuss the second rationale as it is dispositive of appellant's first
issue. The economic loss rule has been applied to prevent a plaintiff from asserting
tort claims against a defendant for disappointed economic expectations arising from
a contractual relationship or in a setting in which a contractual allocation of risks
reasonably should be expected or encouraged. See, e.g., id. at 241 (applying the
economic loss rule to bar a negligent misrepresentation claim by a general contractor
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against an architect in connection with errors in the architect's plans that resulted in
increased costs of performing contractor's construction contract and specification);
Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986) (“The Reeds'
injury was that the house they were promised and paid for was not the house they
received. This can only be characterized as a breach of contract.”); see also Equistar
Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2007) (“The rule is
based on the proposition that commercial parties may negotiate for whatever
warranty or liability limits they choose, and adjust their price accordingly.”);
Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex.
2014) (“The economic loss rule generally precludes recovery in tort for economic
losses resulting from a party's failure to perform under a contract when the harm
consists only of the economic loss of a contractual expectancy.”).
Risks of economic loss tend to be especially well-suited to allocation by
contract. First, economic injuries caused by negligence often result from a decision
by the victim to rely on a defendant's words or acts when entering some sort of
transaction. LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 240. A potential plaintiff making such a
decision has a full chance to consider how to manage the risks involved, whether by
inspecting the item or investment, obtaining insurance against the risk of
disappointment, or making a contract that assigns the risk of loss to someone else.
Id. at 240–41. Second, money is a complete remedy for an economic injury. Id. at
241. Insurance benefits, indemnification by agreement, or other replacements of
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money payments are just as good as the money lost in a transaction that turns out
badly. Id. This fungibility makes those other ways of managing risk—insurance,
indemnity, and the like—more attractive than they might be to a party facing a
prospect of personal injury. Id.
Those same points often will make it hard for a court to know what allocation
of responsibility for economic loss would best serve the interests of the parties to a
risky situation. Id. A contract that settles responsibility for such a risk will therefore
be preferable in most cases to a judicial assignment of liability after harm is done.
Id. The contract will better reflect the preferences of the parties and help prevent the
need for speculation and litigation later. Id. Contracts also are governed by a body
of commercial law that has been developed to address economic loss and thus will
often be better suited for that task than the law of torts. Id. As a result, courts
generally do not recognize tort liability for economic losses caused by the breach of
a contract between the parties and often restrict the role of tort law in other
circumstances in which protection by contract is available. Id. The Texas Supreme
Court has noted, “the Restatement7 concludes, while there is ‘no general duty to
avoid the unintentional infliction of economic loss, the duty may exist when the
rationales…for limiting recovery are ‘weak or absent’.” Id. The Texas Supreme
Court further noted that the Restatement now concludes generally that “there is no
7
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1,
2012).
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liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the performance or
negotiation of a contract between the parties.” Id. at 243.
Concerning the rationale of deference to contract, the Texas Supreme Court
explained that the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort when the parties used, or
could have used, contracts to clarify the duties and liabilities of each participant in a
commercial enterprise:
Though there remains the possibility that a contractor may not do so,
we think the availability of contractual remedies must preclude tort
recovery in the situation generally because, as stated above, “clarity
allows parties to do business on a surer footing”. “Where contracts
might readily have been used to allocate the risk of a loss,” the
Restatement observes, “a duty to avoid the loss is unlikely to be
recognized in tort—not because the economic loss rule applies, but
simply because courts prefer, in general, that economic losses be
allocated by contract where feasible.” We see no reason not to apply
the economic loss rule to achieve this end.
Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b, § 3 cmt.
f.). Accordingly, where a contract might readily have been used to allocate the risk
of loss, a duty to avoid the loss is unlikely to be recognized in tort and the economic
loss rule should apply. Id.
Moreover, and while Texas courts have not formally adopted as binding
authority the Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, the Texas
Supreme Court has cited it extensively as persuasive authority, particularly to
articulate the rationales underlying the economic loss rule, the risk of indeterminate
and disproportionate liability from recognizing open-ended tort duties in commercial
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settings, and deference to contract, reflecting the principle that parties negotiating a
deal have a full chance to consider how to manage the risks involved. See id. at 240–
41. With respect to contract negotiations specifically, the Restatement Third “does
not recognize liability for negligent misrepresentations made in the course of
negotiating or performing a contract between the parties.” Kinder Morgan Treating,
LP v. North Park Advantage Walden MRU, LLC, No. 05-24-01447-CV, 2026 WL
1897810, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2026) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 5).
In addition, a negligent misrepresentation claim arising from the negotiation
process faces the economic loss rule and will fail unless the plaintiff can establish
an injury independent of the contractual expectancy. See D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro
Indep. Sch. Dist., 973 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1998); see also Signature Ind. Servs.,
LLC v. Int'l Paper Co., 638 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. 2022) (“Damage for breach of
contract may include both direct and consequential damages.”). Our body of law
traditionally recognizes three types of recovery to compensate for a breach of
contract: expectancy, reliance, and restitution damages. Atrium Med. Ctr., LP v.
Houston Red C LLC, 595 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. 2020). Thus, merely because a
plaintiff suing for negligence or negligent misrepresentation opts to sue for reliance
damages does not mean that such damages are not, in essence, “contract” damages
or that those damages constitute an independent injury. See Sealy Emerg. Room,
L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emerg. Room Mgrs. of Am., L.L.C., No. 01-21-00008-CV,
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2024 WL 3973428, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.)
(rejecting argument the economic loss rule did not bar plaintiffs' negligence claim
seeking reliance rather than expectancy damages because reliance damages are a
measure of contract damages.”).
This case involves a chain of commercial transactions in which each
participant allocated risk by contract. Blue Racer purchased the pipe from Steel
Professionals. Steel Professionals purchased the pipe from Industrial through Tube
& Pipe, and Procarsa participated in manufacturing, testing, and certifying the pipe.
The contracts governing those transactions allocated risk through warranties,
disclaimers, indemnity obligations, and remedial limitations. Blue Racer’s
agreement with Steel Professionals imposed warranty and indemnity obligations,
while the upstream agreement limited remedies and disclaimed implied warranties.
Because the parties used contracts to allocate the risk of loss, a duty to avoid that
loss should not be recognized in tort, and the economic loss rule applies. See
LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 248.
A. Strict Products Liability
The jury found that Industrial and Procarsa were manufacturers of the pipe,
that all appellants (and Steel Professionals) were sellers of the pipe, and there was a
manufacturing defect in the segment of pipe at the time the pipe left the possession
of each appellant (and Steel Professionals). Blue Racer argues that the verdict
establishes its right to recover in strict liability in tort.
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Although the jury found a manufacturing defect, the evidence establishes
there was no personal injury and no damage to property other than the pipeline itself
and Blue Racer’s right-of-way easement. The claimed damages consisted of
replacing the failed pipe segment, dewatering and cleaning the pipeline, purchasing
additional water, conducting further testing, and restoring the excavation area after
the rupture. These are costs associated with obtaining conforming goods and
completing the project as intended. Such losses are economic in nature and are
properly addressed through contract and warranty remedies rather than strict-
liability principles. Allowing tort recovery under these circumstances would
reallocate commercial risks that the parties addressed through contract.
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
The jury found that Procarsa made a factual representation about the pipe that
was incorrect and that Industrial and Tube & Pipe made negligent misrepresentations
on which Blue Racer relied.
The alleged misrepresentations concern the pipe’s compliance with API 5L
standards, the same representations underlying Blue Racer’s warranty claims. The
damages sought, including costs associated with replacement, cleaning, dewatering,
retesting, and restoration, arise from Blue Racer’s expectation that it would receive
conforming pipe. Those damages are economic losses tied to the parties’ commercial
expectations rather than an injury independent of the contractual undertaking. A
party may not avoid the economic loss rule by recasting benefit-of-the-bargain
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damages as negligent misrepresentation damages. See LAN/STV, 435 S.W.3d at 243.
Because the alleged injury is purely economic and arises from Blue Racer’s
expectations concerning the quality and performance of the pipe, the economic loss
rule bars the negligent misrepresentation claim.
Accordingly, we sustain appellants’ first issue.
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES, LIMITATION OF REMEDIES, AND ATTORNEY’S
FEES
In their second and third issues, appellants contend the trial court erred by
refusing to submit their defenses based on the disclaimer-of-warranties and
limitation-of-remedies provisions contained in the agreement governing Steel
Professionals’ purchase of the pipe and by awarding attorney fees on the contract
claims.
A trial court has wide discretion in submitting instructions and jury questions.
MRT, Inc. v. Vounckx, 299 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009). The trial
court is required to submit the questions, instructions, and definitions raised by the
pleadings and the evidence. See Harris Cnty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 236 (Tex.
2002). We review the trial court’s exclusion of legally correct definitions,
instructions, and questions for an abuse of discretion. Columbia Rio Grande
Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. 2009).
A party is entitled to a jury question, instruction, or definition if the pleadings
and evidence raise an issue. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278; Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams,
85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002). A judgment will not be reversed for charge error
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unless the error was harmful because it probably caused the rendition of an improper
verdict or probably prevented the party from properly presenting the case to the
appellate courts. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012). Charge error is
generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue. Columbia Rio
Grande, 284 S.W.3d at 856.
A trial court may refuse to submit a question only if no evidence exists to
warrant its submission. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992) (Rule of
Civil Procedure 278 “provides a substantive, non-discretionary directive to trial
courts requiring them to submit requested questions to the jury if the pleadings and
any evidence support them.”). If there is some evidence to support a jury question
and the trial court does not submit the question, the trial court has committed
reversible error. Id.
Texas law permits sellers to disclaim implied warranties and limit available
remedies. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 2.316, 2.719. The Texas Supreme Court has
recognized that a downstream purchaser cannot obtain broader warranty rights than
those possessed by the original purchaser. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v.
Shows, 434 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Tex. 2014). In MAN Engines, the Court explained that
when a seller effectively disclaims implied warranties, “such express language
necessarily applies downstream to subsequent purchasers, as Buyer #2 cannot
tenably boast a greater warranty than that given to Buyer #1.” Id. at 134.
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Appellants plead various affirmative defenses, among them disclaimer of
express and implied warranties and limitations-of-remedies pursuant to the purchase
agreement between Tube & Pipe and Steel Professionals.
Appellants introduced evidence that the purchase agreement by which Steel
Professionals obtained the pipe from appellants disclaimed implied warranties and
limited available remedies. One of the owners of Steel Professionals, who was called
as a witness by Blue Racer, admitted receipt by Steel Professionals of the terms and
conditions of the purchase agreement. Blue Racer’s warranty claims arise through
this same chain of distribution. Accordingly, Blue Racer could not seek the benefit
of warranty rights derived from that chain while avoiding the limitations
accompanying those rights. See id. at 140.
The charge inquired whether appellants provided an express warranty,
whether there was a breach of the implied warranty by Industrial and by Procarsa,
and whether there was a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose by Industrial and by Procarsa. Prior to submission of the charge, appellants
presented the trial court a number of proposed instructions and questions for
submission of their affirmative defenses. Among these were:
• An instruction tracking Bus. & Comm. Code §2.316 and § 2.719, regarding
exclusion of warranties and limitation of remedies;
• An instruction tracking Bus. & Comm. Code § 2.314, regarding the implied
warranty of merchantability;
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• An instruction tracking Bus. & Comm. Code § 2.315, regarding the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose;
• A question whether each of the appellants disclaimed any implied warranty of
merchantability;
• A question whether each of the appellants disclaimed any implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose; and,
• An instruction regarding limitation of remedies for breach of warranty.
At the charge conference, the court heard extensive objections to the overall
focus of the charge, namely that the court was submitting the case primarily on tort,
rather than contract theories, and appellants presented their proposed instructions
and questions. In addition, appellants provided written briefing concerning the
proposed express and implied warranty instructions and questions. The court
confirmed receipt of and consideration of the briefing. The court overruled the
objections and refused to include the instructions and questions.
Because evidence was raised regarding the applicability and effect of the
disclaimer-of-warranties and limitation-of-remedies provisions of the purchase
agreement, appellants were entitled to have those defenses submitted to the jury. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 278 (“The court shall submit the questions, instructions and
definitions in the form provided by Rule 277, which are raised by the written
pleadings and evidence.”). As we have explained, the judgment cannot be sustained
by the affirmative findings on Blue Racer’s tort theories, due to the economic loss
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rule; so the judgment can only be sustained on the express and implied warranty
findings made by the jury. The trial court’s refusal to include in the charge the
requested instructions and questions prevented the jury from resolving contested
issues regarding appellants’ affirmative defenses which could have defeated or
substantially limited Blue Racer’s warranty recovery. Therefore, we must remand
for a new trial on the express and implied warranty theories. See Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d
at 243 .
For the same reason, Blue Racer’s attorney’s fee recovery cannot stand. To
the extent Blue Racer’s fee claim depended on warranty rights arising from the sale
of the pipe, that claim remained subject to any contractual limitations accompanying
those rights. We must remand for a new trial on Blue Racer’s entitlement to and
amount of attorney fees.
We sustain appellants’ second and third issues.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial on
the contract and warranty claims.
/Mike Lee/
MIKE LEE
JUSTICE
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