Southgate Homes DFW, LLC; Southgate Homes-Brockdale LLC; And Green Brick Partners, Inc. v. Sherman Guillema and Eunice Guillema
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket05-24-00620-CV
JudgeRossini
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Reverse and Render and Opinion Filed November 17, 2026.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-00620-CV
SOUTHGATE HOMES DFW, LLC; SOUTHGATE HOMES-BROCKDALE
LLC; AND GREEN BRICK PARTNERS, INC., Appellant
V.
SHERMAN GUILLEMA AND EUNICE GUILLEMA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 429-01002-2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garcia, Breedlove, and Rossini
Opinion by Justice Rossini
This lawsuit involves alleged disclosures and nondisclosures concerning the
contemplated purchase and sale of a home: it is undisputed that appellees Sherman
Guillema and Eunice Guillema offered in writing to purchase a home and that the
offer was never accepted by the seller. Appellants Southgate Homes, DFW, LLC,
Southgate Homes-Brockdale LLC, and Green Brick Partners, Inc. appeal the trial
court’s final judgment incorporating the jury verdict and award of damages in favor
of the Guillemas on their claims for violations under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act and fraud by non-disclosure. In three issues,
appellants (1) question whether the Guillemas may bypass application of the Statute
of Frauds by pleading their claims as a violation of the DTPA or fraud, (2) challenge
the jury’s liability findings, specifically, whether there is sufficient evidence of an
actionable misrepresentation by appellants to the Guillemas, and (3) dispute
recoverability on the judgment’s two damage awards, for “lost increase in market
value” and the “reasonable value” of the Guillemas’ time.1 For the reasons discussed
below, we conclude the Guillemas’ “lost increase in market value” damages are
unrecoverable as a matter of law and there is legally insufficient evidence to support
their award for the “reasonable value” of their time. We therefore reverse the trial
court’s judgment and render judgment that the Guillemas take nothing on their
claims.
BACKGROUND
Southgate Homes-Brockdale LLC (Brockdale) is a special-purpose entity,
created to own lots and construct homes in the Brockdale Estates residential
community located in Lucas, Texas. Brockdale is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Southgate Homes DFW, LLC (Southgate), which is a luxury residential
homebuilder. Green Brick Partners, Inc. is the parent company of Southgate.
1
The jury awarded the Guillemas these two elements of damages under their DTPA claim and
fraud by non-disclosure claim but in different amounts. The jury awarded no damages under the
element related to the Guillemas’ reasonable and necessary expenses for either claim.
–2–
The Guillemas were California residents with plans to move to Texas,
specifically, the area within the Lovejoy Independent School District. In early
January 2021, the Guillemas traveled to Texas to look at homes with real estate agent
Paige Owens. After visiting Brockdale Estates, the Guillemas decided to select a lot
and contract for the construction of a semi-custom home.
Richard Heckenlaible, Brockdale’s community sales manager, prepared the
sales contract. Under the terms of the contract, Brockdale agreed to construct a home
at 1508 Samantha Trail, the lot chosen by the Guillemas, and sell and convey the
completed home to the Guillemas for $767,030, a price that included the floorplan
and exterior selections they made but not the interior design selections or upgrades
that could be made. The contract also required the Guillemas to deposit $23,000 in
Earnest Money by a certain date. The Guillemas signed the contract on January 15,
2021. Once Owens and Heckenlaible signed the contract and the Guillemas paid the
Earnest Money, Heckenlaible submitted the contract to Southgate for execution;
Heckenlaible did not sign on Southgate’s behalf.
Paragraph 17 of the contract stated that “[t]his Contract shall not be binding
upon [Brockdale] until accepted and executed by one of its duly authorized officers.
No other employee or agent is authorized to enter into any contract for construction
of the improvements and sale of the Property on behalf of [Brockdale].” Sherman
testified that based on that provision, he understood that no binding contract existed
on January 15, 2021, and Eunice confirmed that she knew the contract was not
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binding until signed by corporate. Both Sherman and Eunice acknowledged that
Heckenlaible had not signed on behalf of Southgate. Sherman and Eunice also
recounted that Heckenlaible indicated that corporate’s signature, which they
understood was needed to bind Southgate, was just a formality. According to
Sherman, Heckenlaible told them it would not take long for Southgate corporate to
sign the contract. Heckenlaible also testified that, as of the time Guillemas were
considering entering the contract, Heckenlaible had never had a sales contract that
he submitted for review and approval rejected by corporate, and he believed that
Southgate would sign the Guillemas’ contract because “[Southgate had] always
signed the contract.”
Forty-eight days later, on March 4, 2021, Heckenlaible notified Owens that
Southgate rejected the Guillemas’ contract. Jed Dolson, who serves as Green Brick’s
Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer
of Southgate and Brockdale, made the decision not to move forward with building
the Guillemas’ home after learning that the former Division President, Steve Pittard,
and former Vice President of Sales, Clint Byrum, had accumulated approximately
sixty unsigned sales contracts. These were contracts that buyers had submitted and
signed but that Southgate had not yet signed. When he became aware of the problem,
Dolson fired Pittard and Byrum for “[n]ot accurately reporting sales” and determined
that based on the backlog and Southgate’s problems servicing existing clients due to
supply chain issues, Southgate needed to pause sales, focus on building twenty
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homes per month for those contracts Southgate had already signed, and not sign any
of the “60-something” unsigned contracts waiting for approval. He described the
problem as “too big for [Southgate] as a small company to handle.”
After he fired Pittard and Byrum, Dolson appointed Chad Morrison,
Southgate’s Director of Architecture, and others to work through the approximately
sixty unsigned contracts, which involved speaking to customers whose contracts
were not accepted. In a phone call with Sherman, Morrison explained that Southgate
would not build the Guillemas’ home because of capacity issues, stating that
Southgate was not “set up to build that many homes” per month. Sherman testified
that his phone call with Morrison, during which Morrison relayed that Pittard and
Byrum had previously been telling the sales staff to keep selling even though
Southgate was overextended and could not build the homes on the lots sold, made
him “feel like [he] had been lied to the whole time.”
During the forty-eight days while their sales contract was pending, the
Guillemas worked with Heckenlaible on the next steps in the design process,
including: approving the floorplan; looking through the design center catalog; and
meeting with him to review selections such as the electrical, plumbing, interior trim,
exterior paint colors, front door style and color, garage door style, and the metal roof
color. And because they believed they “had a home” with Southgate, the Guillemas
stopped monitoring the real estate market.
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After learning that Southgate would not accept their offer to contract for the
purchase of the home, the Guillemas restarted their home search. Owens described
the housing market at that time as “busy” with “little inventory” because of the
COVID-19 pandemic and a lot of people were moving to the area for the schools.
Eunice testified that she spent “almost all of [her] time looking for another home,”
which took attention away from her family. Over the next four and a half months,
the Guillemas put in offers on multiple homes as well as continued to negotiate for
a “reasonable resolution” with Southgate. On July 13, 2021, the Guillemas put in an
offer to buy a home the parties refer to as the Highland house. Their offer was
accepted, and the Guillemas bought the Highland house for $1,075,000. The
Highland house was bigger than the Samantha Trail home, had more rooms, sat on
a larger lot, and included a barn, but because it was an older home, it required
renovations.
The Guillemas filed suit against appellants and Heckenlaible2 on March 1,
2022, alleging claims for violations of the DTPA, statutory fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, and conspiracy. The
Guillemas asserted they would not have stopped their home search or signed the
proposed contract if appellants had been forthright about their inability to build
homes on all the sold lots. They claimed that they and others were “duped” when
2
Heckenlaible was nonsuited from the case two days before the jury trial began.
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they relied on appellants’ false representations that corporate would be signing the
contracts, “only to later learn that Corporate would not.” They maintained that
because of appellants’ deception, they were “without the new home that they thought
they would be moving into.” They alleged damages consisting of travel expenses,
lost time, and “increased costs for a comparable home based on current market
conditions.”
In September 2023, the Guillemas nonsuited their claims for statutory fraud
and breach of express warranty under the DTPA. And on October 25, 2023, the case
proceeded to a jury trial on their remaining claims for violations of the DTPA,
negligent misrepresentation, common law fraud, and fraud by non-disclosure.3 The
jury found appellants violated certain provisions of the DTPA and committed fraud
by non-disclosure and, on both causes of action, awarded the Guillemas damages for
the “lost increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home” and for the
“reasonable value” of the Guillemas’ time.4 The jury also awarded attorneys’ fees.
The Guillemas elected to recover on their DTPA claim, and on March 8, 2024, the
trial court signed a judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding the Guillemas total
damages in the amount of $82,734.08 plus prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees.
3
The Guillemas nonsuited their claim for negligent misrepresentation during trial.
4
Although the jury was charged with the materially same definition of “lost increase in market
value” and the same definition of “reasonable value of time” in connection with both DTPA and
fraud-by-nondisclosure damages, the jury found different damages amounts for each.
–7–
Appellants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court
denied by order dated May 17, 2024. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellants contend the verdict rendered on the Guillemas’ DTPA and fraud
by non-disclosure claims and damages awards have no support in the evidence and
should be disregarded. We read their arguments as asserting a legal-sufficiency
challenge consistent with their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
which was denied by the trial court.5 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
JNOV under the same standard that governs an appellate challenge of legal
insufficiency of the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822–23, 827
(Tex. 2005). Under that standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, credit favorable evidence that reasonable jurors could believe, and
disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. at 822, 827.
“Evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury finding when (1) the record
discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by
rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove
a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
5
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only when there is no evidence supporting
one or more jury findings necessary to establish liability or when a legal principle otherwise bars
recovery. Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Sheehan v. Adams, 320
S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); cf. Palla v. Bio-One, Inc., 424 S.W.3d 722,
725 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (stating rule that trial court “should disregard a jury finding
if the evidence is legally insufficient to support it, or if a directed verdict would have been proper
because a legal principle precludes recovery” and citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 301).
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scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.”
Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018); Bustamante v. Ponte, 529
S.W.3d 447, 455–56 (Tex. 2017); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742,
751 (Tex. 2003). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises
to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
conclusions.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994); Sheehan,
320 S.W.3d at 895. Evidence that amounts to no more than mere surmise or
suspicion is only a scintilla, and thus, no evidence. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135
S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.
1983); Guillory v. Dietrich, 598 S.W.3d 284, 293 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet.
denied).
DISCUSSION
In their first issue, appellants contend the Guillemas cannot assert claims for
fraud or violations of the DTPA to circumvent application of the Statute of Frauds.
Appellants raised this argument throughout the underlying proceedings, including in
their motion for JNOV. They base this argument on the Texas Supreme Court’s
holding in Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001), that “the Statute of Frauds
bars a fraud claim to the extent the plaintiff seeks to recover as damages the benefit
of a bargain that cannot otherwise be enforced because it fails to comply with the
Statute of Frauds.” Id. at 799. They reason the analysis also applies to claims asserted
under the DTPA and that, because the Guillemas’ “lost increase in market value”
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damages award is functionally a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages, the
award allowed the Guillemas to impermissibly use fraud and DTPA theories to
recover the financial equivalent of contractual performance.
The Guillemas respond that the Statute of Frauds, by its terms and as
construed in Haase, requires an agreement. And because appellants took the position
that the form contract signed by the Guillemas was merely an offer that appellants
rejected, there is no agreement, so appellants’ Statute of Frauds defense fails. 6
Here, the parties agree that no contract was formed. Appellants highlight the
language in the sales contract that the contract was not binding until accepted and
executed by an authorized representative, and Dolson testified that Southgate did not
sign the contract. Further, both Sherman and Eunice testified that they understood
that they did not have an agreement until corporate signed the contract.
The parties also agree that if the “lost increase in market value” damages
awarded are determined to be benefit-of-the-bargain damages, then the legal
consequence of that determination is the reversal of that portion of the damages
award. The Guillemas’ counsel conceded this point during oral argument. Thus, we
6
The Guillemas also contend that even if this Court concluded that the parties otherwise had an
unenforceable agreement, the trial properly rejected appellants’ Statute of Frauds theory because
“Southgate, as the movant had the burden of establishing that the only damages the Guillemas sought and
could recover were benefit of the bargain damages” and appellants “did not submit any evidence
establishing that the damages sought were only benefit-of-the-bargain damages.” The Guillemas cite Lam
v. Phuong Nguyen, 335 S.W.3d 786, 791–92 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). Lam does not support
this proposition. Lam is an appeal from a traditional summary judgment and states the general summary-
judgment burden rule. Id. at 789–90. In addition, on the pinpoint pages cited, this Court held that plaintiffs
bear the burden of raising a fact issue on whether the damages asserted are something other than benefit-
of-the-bargain, and in Lam, those plaintiffs failed to carry it.
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need not decide on the application of the Statute of Frauds on these facts because the
parties agree on the legal premise that a benefit-of-the-bargain recovery requires a
bargain.
The crux of the parties’ disagreement, therefore, is over the characterization
of what the jury actually awarded. This question is part of appellants’ third issue.
Appellants contend the law does not permit the Guillemas to recover the increase in
market value of a home they did not own and for which they had no contract to
purchase. Appellants maintain that the “lost increase in market value” of such a
home (that is, the Samantha Trail home) is a benefit-of-the-bargain recovery in
substance because it represents the appreciation the Guillemas would have captured
had the sales contract been performed. Appellants argue that because there is no
bargain and the damages awarded are, in form, benefit-of-the-bargain damages,
there are no recoverable damages.
The Guillemas counter that the “lost increase in market value” damages are
consequential damages. They describe their damages as the harm they suffered from
“being kept out of a rising market” because they were prevented from purchasing
any home during the six-week period due to Southgate’s misrepresentations. They
assert that the measure of damages awarded, which they support with Owens’s
market analysis, represents the overall market appreciation, not a specific property’s
value minus the purchase price. They allow that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are
unavailable in this case because there is no bargain. But because the Guillemas
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suffered “real monetary loss in which the Property appreciated in value and only
Southgate, and not the Guillemas, received that value,” these damages represent a
consequential harm that exist independent of any bargain.
Although the Guillemas elected to recover under the DTPA, the jury awarded
“lost increase in market value” damages for both the DTPA and fraud by non-
disclosure liability findings. Specifically, the jury awarded $75,484.08 in “lost
increase in market value” damages under the DTPA and $50,000 in “lost increase in
market value” damages for fraud by non-disclosure. Thus, the damages
characterization issue affects both claims equally.
Applicable Law
“The proper measure of damages is a question of law” that we review de novo.
Signature Indus. Servs., LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 638 S.W.3d 179, 187 (Tex. 2022)
(quoting Allied Vista, Inc. v. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist. 1999, pet. denied)). We may reverse a damages award as a matter of law when
the legal theory supporting it does not conform to the law governing damages. Id.
We also may reverse the damages award if the evidence of damages is legally
insufficient. Id.
As established by the Texas Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry
Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997), “actual damages are either ‘direct’ or
‘consequential.’” Id. at 816 (quoting Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160,
163 (Tex. 1992) (Phillips, C.J., concurring)); see also Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen,
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221 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tex. 2007). Direct damages are those that naturally and
necessarily result from the defendant’s wrongful act. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d
at 816. They compensate the plaintiff for losses that the law conclusively presumes
the defendant foresaw as a result of that act. Id. (citing Bynum, 836 S.W.2d at 163
(Phillips, C.J., concurring)).
In contrast, consequential damages are losses that arise naturally, but not
necessarily, from the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Id.; Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d
at 636; Defterios v. Dallas Bayou Bend, Ltd., 350 S.W.3d 659, 673 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2011, pet. denied). These losses need not be the usual result of the wrong,
Arthur Andersen 945 S.W.2d at 816, and they are recoverable when “properly
pleaded and proved” if they are “foreseeable and directly traceable” to the wrong
and result from it. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors,
Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 49 n.1 (Tex. 1998).
In Texas, actual damages in fraud and DTPA cases generally fall into three
categories: out-of-pocket damages,7 benefit-of-the-bargain damages, and
consequential damages. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 817; see also Formosa
Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 49; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.45(11)
(defining economic damages as “compensatory damages for pecuniary loss”) & §
7
An out-of-pocket measure of damages is not at issue in the case. For both causes of action,
the jury found the Guillemas incurred $0.00 in out-of-pocket losses for their “reasonable and
necessary travel-related expenses” suffered “as a result of Defendants’ conduct.”
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17.50 (“Relief for Consumers”); see also Matheus v. Sasser, 164 S.W.3d 453, 459
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating that under the DTPA, “[o]ther
damages may be allowed to ensure that the plaintiff is made whole.”). Benefit-of-
the-bargain damages, which are rooted in an expectancy theory, Baylor Univ., 221
S.W.3d at 636–37, are those damages that “compensate a party for the loss of a
benefit the party expected to receive as a result of the agreement.” Defterios, 350
S.W.3d at 673. These damages “evaluate the difference between the value that was
represented and the value actually received.” Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636.
Importantly, “absent an enforceable contract, a fraud claimant may not recover
benefit-of-the-bargain damages.” Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143,
153 (Tex. 2015) (citing Haase, 62 S.W.3d at 799–800); see also Anderson v. Durant,
550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018) (explaining that that if a promise to perform is
unenforceable, “the benefit-of-the-bargain measure is not available because one can
have no compensable expectancy from a bargain that is not binding”). Damages,
such as out-of-pocket losses, are recoverable in connection with a bargain that is not
binding as long as those damages are not part of the benefit promised under the
contract. See Haase, 62 S.W.3d at 799–800.
Unlike benefit-of-the-bargain damages, consequential damages “do not
compensate a party for the benefits the party expected to receive; they compensate
a party for damages incurred as a proximate cause of the defendant’s wrongful
conduct.” Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673. Although foreseeability is not an element
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of producing cause under the DTPA, damages that are “too remote, too uncertain, or
purely conjectural” are not recoverable. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816.
When, as here, we must determine whether the damages awarded by the jury
are benefit-of-the-bargain or consequential, we look to the damages question
submitted to the jury. See, e.g., Zorilla, 469 S.W.3d at 154 (noting damages question
based on unenforceable oral agreement); Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 665, 673
(analyzing jury charge to conclude that damages awarded were consequential
because the charge asked what losses were suffered as a consequence of the fraud).
We analyze whether the damages awarded derive from an expectancy theory, in
which the damages compensate the plaintiffs for what they would have received had
the bargain been performed, or whether they compensate for actual losses the
plaintiffs incurred as a proximate consequence of the defendants’ wrongful conduct.
Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636; Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673; cf. Transcon. Realty
Invs., Inc. v. John T. Lupton Tr., 286 S.W.3d 635, 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no
pet.) (noting that inquiry is whether “plaintiff seeks to recover the benefit of the
alleged false representations, or its out-of-pocket costs expended in reliance on those
representations”).
We examined this distinction in Defterios v. Dallas Bayou Bend, Ltd., a case
in which a group of commercial property owners sued a real estate company and
their broker for fraud in the inducement, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.
Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 663. The property owners claimed the broker made
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fraudulent misrepresentations, which induced them to take their properties off the
market. Id. During that time, the market declined, and the properties lost value. Id.
The jury considered three categories of damages (change in value, capital
investment, and operating cash flow) and awarded $12 million in consequential
damages, specifically finding no direct benefit-of-the-bargain damages. Id. at 663,
665. This Court upheld the consequential damages award because the jury was asked
to consider the damages as a proximate consequence of the fraud rather than what
the plaintiffs expected to receive, which was asked in a separate question. Id. at 673.
We also highlighted the fact that the jury considered those elements of damage after
the contract date. Id.
Analysis
A. Characterization of the “Lost Increase in Market Value” Damages
In this case, the jury was asked the following in Question No. 4, addressing
DTPA damages: “What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and
reasonably compensate Plaintiffs for their damages, if any, that resulted from such
conduct?” The question then instructed the jury to “[c]onsider the following
elements of damages, if any, and none other” which included:
The lost increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home that
Plaintiffs would have received between January 15, 2021, the date they
submitted the offer to Southgate Brockdale, and March 4, 2021, the date
Southgate Brockdale notified the Plaintiffs it would not execute their
offer.
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The jury answered $75,484.08 for “Lost Increase in Market Value” damages.8
Looking to the question, it asks the jury to measure the increase in market
value on the specific Samantha Trail property that the Guillemas “would have
received” over the forty-eight-day period from the date of the offer submission to
the refusal. Stated another way, it asks, how much did the value of the specific
property on which the Guillemas submitted an offer and tried to purchase increase
during the period appellants misled them into thinking that the offer would be
accepted. We conclude this is a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages.
Benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure the difference between the value that
was represented and the value actually received. Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636.
In a real estate dispute, the measure involves the difference between the price of the
property and its market value at the time of the breach. See Matheus, 164 S.W.3d at
460 (looking at damages based on price per square foot). Here, the jury heard
comparable market analysis testimony from Owens in which she testified about the
difference in the fair market value of the Samantha Trail home on January 15, 2021,
versus the fair market value of comparable homes in the neighborhood in different
periods post-January 15th, as measured in price per square foot. Owens testified that
8
Question No. 4 followed the jury’s findings that appellants violated the DTPA. Question No.
10 closely mirrors Question No. 4, except it pertains to the jury’s fraud by non-disclosure finding.
Question Nos. 4 and 10 contain materially identical instructions, quoted above, concerning “lost
increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home.” For Question No. 10, the jury awarded
$50,000.00 in “Lost Increase in Market Value” damages.
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the price per square foot on the Samantha Trail home on the date of the offer was
$179, and based on market conditions after that time, the market value of comparable
homes was $209.58 per square foot, a difference of $30.58 per square foot.
Appellants’ real estate expert, Jamie Wickliffe, also testified to an increase in the
price per square foot of homes during that time, but because some of the homes in
Owens’s analysis were not comparable to the Samantha Trail home, Wickliffe
testified that the increased price was really $196.62 per square foot, a difference of
$17.62 per square foot. In closing, the Guillemas’ counsel argued the jury could
award “lost market appreciation damages of $131,004.72,” using the $30.58 delta
testified to by Owens and multiplied by the square footage of the Samantha Trail
home, or alternatively, the jury could use the delta of $17.62 testified to by Wickliffe
to come up with damages in the amount of $75,484.08.9 Thus, the jury was invited
to consider the price per square foot of the Samantha Trail home on January 15, 2021
(the value of the property as represented) and the price per square foot of comparable
homes, which increased because of market conditions (the value the Guillemas
“would have received” had the sales contract been accepted); the jury was instructed
to award the difference in market value on the Samantha Trail home.
9
The Samantha Trail home was listed on the sales contract as 4,284 square feet. The jury
awarded $75,484.08 in “lost increase in market value” damages under the DTPA, consistent with
choosing the alternative calculation offered by the Guillemas’ counsel: $196.62 per square foot
minus $179 per square foot = $17.62 per square foot multiplied by 4,284 = $75,484.08.
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Our conclusion that the damages awarded by the jury for “lost increase in
market value” are benefit-of-the-bargain damages is supported by Sherman’s
testimony about the damages the Guillemas incurred. Sherman testified to the
damages they were seeking and explained that “lost market appreciation” is “[t]he
amount of appreciation that [they] would have benefitted from had Southgate
performed under the contract and built [us] the home.” He also affirmatively
answered that they were “entitled to the benefit of any market appreciation on the
house [they] would have built at 1508 Samantha Trail had [their] offer been
accepted.”
Notably, the damages question asked of the jury and Sherman’s description
of their damages are significantly different than what the Guillemas pleaded as
damages in this case. See Formosa Plastics Corp., 960 S.W.2d at 49 n.1
(consequential damages must be properly pleaded). In their First Amended Petition,
which was the live pleading at the time of trial, the Guillemas sought economic
damages “comprised of travel expenses, lost time, and increased costs for a
comparable home based on current market conditions.” The last category of damages
describes additional costs the Guillemas had to pay for a different, comparable home
because real estate market prices rose. The pleaded measure looks at how the
Guillemas were harmed and represents more of a forward-looking consequence of
being kept out of the market because of appellants’ misrepresentations; in other
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words, the measure pleaded reads more like consequential damages.10 These
damages as alleged track what the Guillemas argue now on appeal. That is, the
damages awarded by the jury represent the costs to the Guillemas of being kept out
of the market during a time when the overall market appreciated. But even though
Owens testified that the Guillemas’ harm was that they “had to pay a higher price
for a home,”11 the jury was not asked to consider how much more the Guillemas had
to spend on a comparable home after their offer was rejected. See Defterios, 350
S.W.3d at 673 (noting jury charge instructed to consider elements of damages
incurred after contract date). Rather, the jury was asked about the increase in value
on the specific Samantha Trail property over a defined period of when the sales
contract was pending.
When we focus on what the Guillemas were actually compensated for, it
further supports a conclusion that the damages awarded reflect an expectancy
interest. The jury awarded $75,484.08 for the increase in market value on a home
the Guillemas did not own but hoped to purchase. Although we held in Defterios
that a “change in value” as an element of loss after a contract date represented a
10
In addition to being properly pleaded, consequential damages must also be “foreseeable and
directly traceable to the fraud and result from it.” Formosa Plastics Corp., 960 S.W.2d at 49 &
n.1. Our description of the Guillemas’ pleaded damages as representing a consequential measure
of damages, however, should not be construed as reflecting any position whether damages incurred
from being kept out of a rising real estate market generally are directly traceable and result from
misrepresentations or fraud related to a particular house and the offer put in for that house.
11
Owens also testified that the home the Guillemas purchased (the Highland house) and the
“home that they didn’t get to purchase” (the Samantha Trail home) were not comparable, stating
“they’re an apple and an orange.”
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consequential loss, the owners in Defterios owned the property at issue and therefore
suffered an actual loss when the property declined in value. Defterios, 350 S.W.3d
at 673. In this case, the jury was asked to award the Guillemas for the lost increase
in market value on property they never owned. And by awarding them damages, the
Guillemas received the appreciation they “would have received” if the offer been
accepted.
We conclude the damages awarded by the jury for the “lost increase in market
value on the Samantha Trail home” are a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages.
The parties agree that there is no contract in this case. And here, because there is no
bargain that is binding, there can be no recovery for these benefit-of-the-bargain
damages. See Zorrilla, 469 S.W.3d at 153; see also Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 614.
Accordingly, we need not determine whether the Guillemas’ “lost increase in market
value” damages have support in the evidence because these damages are
unrecoverable as a matter of law. See Signature Indus. Servs., LLC, 638 S.W.3d at
187.
B. “Reasonable Value of Time” Damages
Under the DTPA damages question, the jury also awarded the Guillemas
$7,250.00 for the “reasonable value of the time for which Plaintiffs missed work
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attempting to have Southgate Brockdale execute their offer.”12 In the second part of
their third issue, appellants question whether the law permits the Guillemas to
recover the reasonable value of the time they spent pursuing the purchase of the
home when appellants had no obligation to accept the Guillemas’ offer. They also
assert that there is no evidence to support the jury’s award for these damages and
that we should disregard the findings. We need not determine whether the
“reasonable value of time” damages are recoverable as a matter of law because, even
if they represent an available measure of damages under these facts, there is legally
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s award for such damages here.
The Guillemas contend the testimony of their “lost time damages” consists of
the time they “were induced to spend . . . reviewing selections and on the phone and
Internet reviewing the extensive design process.” They claim this preparation was in
reliance of Southgate’s promises, and the time the Guillemas “invested in this
process caused real damages to their entire family.” The Guillemas rely on Eunice’s
testimony to support their argument that the jury considered this time spent and the
trial court properly denied appellants’ motion for JNOV.
Eunice testified to making design selections and that they were trying to meet
the deadlines to receive incentives. She also testified to reviewing the floorplan and
12
Under Question 10, addressing the fraud by non-disclosure damages, the jury awarded the
Guillemas $5,000 for the “reasonable value of time for which Plaintiffs missed work attempting
to have Southgate Brockdale execute their offer.”
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to a telephone meeting that was being scheduled in late February with Heckenlaible
to review not only the selections made at the time the contract was signed, but also
to discuss other items, such as electrical, plumbing, interior trim, as well as exterior
paint colors, front door style and color and garage door style. She further said that
she asked Heckenlaible “several times” about when the contract would be signed.
Finally, Eunice testified to how, after learning the sales contract would not be
executed, she “spent almost all of [her] time looking for another home” at the
expense of time she needed to devote to her children. And because of their scheduled
move to Dallas, finding a replacement home was a “top priority,” and she spent
several hours every day looking at any new homes that came on the market.
None of Eunice’s testimony about making selections or communicating with
Heckenlaible, however, quantified the time she spent. Further, neither she nor her
counsel gave the jury any guidance on how much her time was worth. Importantly,
Eunice provided no testimony about time spent “attempting to have Southgate
Brockdale execute their offer.” Rather, in addition to time spend finding a
replacement home, the Guillemas directly attribute Eunice’s time as time “to design
a home;” Eunice explained that if they made final decisions with respect to the
Samantha Trail home in a timely manner they would receive incentives.
Sherman testified that he personally spent about sixty hours on “efforts to try
to purchase the Samantha Trail home.” He came up with that estimate by looking
through his notes and emails about calls with Heckenlaible and how long those calls
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took. He also factored in how much time he spent before and after the calls. He
further stated that he