Full Opinion

Reverse and Render and Opinion Filed November 17, 2026. S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00620-CV SOUTHGATE HOMES DFW, LLC; SOUTHGATE HOMES-BROCKDALE LLC; AND GREEN BRICK PARTNERS, INC., Appellant V. SHERMAN GUILLEMA AND EUNICE GUILLEMA, Appellee On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 429-01002-2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Garcia, Breedlove, and Rossini Opinion by Justice Rossini This lawsuit involves alleged disclosures and nondisclosures concerning the contemplated purchase and sale of a home: it is undisputed that appellees Sherman Guillema and Eunice Guillema offered in writing to purchase a home and that the offer was never accepted by the seller. Appellants Southgate Homes, DFW, LLC, Southgate Homes-Brockdale LLC, and Green Brick Partners, Inc. appeal the trial court’s final judgment incorporating the jury verdict and award of damages in favor of the Guillemas on their claims for violations under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act and fraud by non-disclosure. In three issues, appellants (1) question whether the Guillemas may bypass application of the Statute of Frauds by pleading their claims as a violation of the DTPA or fraud, (2) challenge the jury’s liability findings, specifically, whether there is sufficient evidence of an actionable misrepresentation by appellants to the Guillemas, and (3) dispute recoverability on the judgment’s two damage awards, for “lost increase in market value” and the “reasonable value” of the Guillemas’ time.1 For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the Guillemas’ “lost increase in market value” damages are unrecoverable as a matter of law and there is legally insufficient evidence to support their award for the “reasonable value” of their time. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that the Guillemas take nothing on their claims. BACKGROUND Southgate Homes-Brockdale LLC (Brockdale) is a special-purpose entity, created to own lots and construct homes in the Brockdale Estates residential community located in Lucas, Texas. Brockdale is a wholly owned subsidiary of Southgate Homes DFW, LLC (Southgate), which is a luxury residential homebuilder. Green Brick Partners, Inc. is the parent company of Southgate. 1 The jury awarded the Guillemas these two elements of damages under their DTPA claim and fraud by non-disclosure claim but in different amounts. The jury awarded no damages under the element related to the Guillemas’ reasonable and necessary expenses for either claim. –2– The Guillemas were California residents with plans to move to Texas, specifically, the area within the Lovejoy Independent School District. In early January 2021, the Guillemas traveled to Texas to look at homes with real estate agent Paige Owens. After visiting Brockdale Estates, the Guillemas decided to select a lot and contract for the construction of a semi-custom home. Richard Heckenlaible, Brockdale’s community sales manager, prepared the sales contract. Under the terms of the contract, Brockdale agreed to construct a home at 1508 Samantha Trail, the lot chosen by the Guillemas, and sell and convey the completed home to the Guillemas for $767,030, a price that included the floorplan and exterior selections they made but not the interior design selections or upgrades that could be made. The contract also required the Guillemas to deposit $23,000 in Earnest Money by a certain date. The Guillemas signed the contract on January 15, 2021. Once Owens and Heckenlaible signed the contract and the Guillemas paid the Earnest Money, Heckenlaible submitted the contract to Southgate for execution; Heckenlaible did not sign on Southgate’s behalf. Paragraph 17 of the contract stated that “[t]his Contract shall not be binding upon [Brockdale] until accepted and executed by one of its duly authorized officers. No other employee or agent is authorized to enter into any contract for construction of the improvements and sale of the Property on behalf of [Brockdale].” Sherman testified that based on that provision, he understood that no binding contract existed on January 15, 2021, and Eunice confirmed that she knew the contract was not –3– binding until signed by corporate. Both Sherman and Eunice acknowledged that Heckenlaible had not signed on behalf of Southgate. Sherman and Eunice also recounted that Heckenlaible indicated that corporate’s signature, which they understood was needed to bind Southgate, was just a formality. According to Sherman, Heckenlaible told them it would not take long for Southgate corporate to sign the contract. Heckenlaible also testified that, as of the time Guillemas were considering entering the contract, Heckenlaible had never had a sales contract that he submitted for review and approval rejected by corporate, and he believed that Southgate would sign the Guillemas’ contract because “[Southgate had] always signed the contract.” Forty-eight days later, on March 4, 2021, Heckenlaible notified Owens that Southgate rejected the Guillemas’ contract. Jed Dolson, who serves as Green Brick’s Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of Southgate and Brockdale, made the decision not to move forward with building the Guillemas’ home after learning that the former Division President, Steve Pittard, and former Vice President of Sales, Clint Byrum, had accumulated approximately sixty unsigned sales contracts. These were contracts that buyers had submitted and signed but that Southgate had not yet signed. When he became aware of the problem, Dolson fired Pittard and Byrum for “[n]ot accurately reporting sales” and determined that based on the backlog and Southgate’s problems servicing existing clients due to supply chain issues, Southgate needed to pause sales, focus on building twenty –4– homes per month for those contracts Southgate had already signed, and not sign any of the “60-something” unsigned contracts waiting for approval. He described the problem as “too big for [Southgate] as a small company to handle.” After he fired Pittard and Byrum, Dolson appointed Chad Morrison, Southgate’s Director of Architecture, and others to work through the approximately sixty unsigned contracts, which involved speaking to customers whose contracts were not accepted. In a phone call with Sherman, Morrison explained that Southgate would not build the Guillemas’ home because of capacity issues, stating that Southgate was not “set up to build that many homes” per month. Sherman testified that his phone call with Morrison, during which Morrison relayed that Pittard and Byrum had previously been telling the sales staff to keep selling even though Southgate was overextended and could not build the homes on the lots sold, made him “feel like [he] had been lied to the whole time.” During the forty-eight days while their sales contract was pending, the Guillemas worked with Heckenlaible on the next steps in the design process, including: approving the floorplan; looking through the design center catalog; and meeting with him to review selections such as the electrical, plumbing, interior trim, exterior paint colors, front door style and color, garage door style, and the metal roof color. And because they believed they “had a home” with Southgate, the Guillemas stopped monitoring the real estate market. –5– After learning that Southgate would not accept their offer to contract for the purchase of the home, the Guillemas restarted their home search. Owens described the housing market at that time as “busy” with “little inventory” because of the COVID-19 pandemic and a lot of people were moving to the area for the schools. Eunice testified that she spent “almost all of [her] time looking for another home,” which took attention away from her family. Over the next four and a half months, the Guillemas put in offers on multiple homes as well as continued to negotiate for a “reasonable resolution” with Southgate. On July 13, 2021, the Guillemas put in an offer to buy a home the parties refer to as the Highland house. Their offer was accepted, and the Guillemas bought the Highland house for $1,075,000. The Highland house was bigger than the Samantha Trail home, had more rooms, sat on a larger lot, and included a barn, but because it was an older home, it required renovations. The Guillemas filed suit against appellants and Heckenlaible2 on March 1, 2022, alleging claims for violations of the DTPA, statutory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, and conspiracy. The Guillemas asserted they would not have stopped their home search or signed the proposed contract if appellants had been forthright about their inability to build homes on all the sold lots. They claimed that they and others were “duped” when 2 Heckenlaible was nonsuited from the case two days before the jury trial began. –6– they relied on appellants’ false representations that corporate would be signing the contracts, “only to later learn that Corporate would not.” They maintained that because of appellants’ deception, they were “without the new home that they thought they would be moving into.” They alleged damages consisting of travel expenses, lost time, and “increased costs for a comparable home based on current market conditions.” In September 2023, the Guillemas nonsuited their claims for statutory fraud and breach of express warranty under the DTPA. And on October 25, 2023, the case proceeded to a jury trial on their remaining claims for violations of the DTPA, negligent misrepresentation, common law fraud, and fraud by non-disclosure.3 The jury found appellants violated certain provisions of the DTPA and committed fraud by non-disclosure and, on both causes of action, awarded the Guillemas damages for the “lost increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home” and for the “reasonable value” of the Guillemas’ time.4 The jury also awarded attorneys’ fees. The Guillemas elected to recover on their DTPA claim, and on March 8, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding the Guillemas total damages in the amount of $82,734.08 plus prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees. 3 The Guillemas nonsuited their claim for negligent misrepresentation during trial. 4 Although the jury was charged with the materially same definition of “lost increase in market value” and the same definition of “reasonable value of time” in connection with both DTPA and fraud-by-nondisclosure damages, the jury found different damages amounts for each. –7– Appellants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied by order dated May 17, 2024. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Appellants contend the verdict rendered on the Guillemas’ DTPA and fraud by non-disclosure claims and damages awards have no support in the evidence and should be disregarded. We read their arguments as asserting a legal-sufficiency challenge consistent with their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied by the trial court.5 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for JNOV under the same standard that governs an appellate challenge of legal insufficiency of the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822–23, 827 (Tex. 2005). Under that standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, credit favorable evidence that reasonable jurors could believe, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. at 822, 827. “Evidence is legally insufficient to support a jury finding when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere 5 A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only when there is no evidence supporting one or more jury findings necessary to establish liability or when a legal principle otherwise bars recovery. Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Sheehan v. Adams, 320 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); cf. Palla v. Bio-One, Inc., 424 S.W.3d 722, 725 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (stating rule that trial court “should disregard a jury finding if the evidence is legally insufficient to support it, or if a directed verdict would have been proper because a legal principle precludes recovery” and citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 301). –8– scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018); Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 455–56 (Tex. 2017); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994); Sheehan, 320 S.W.3d at 895. Evidence that amounts to no more than mere surmise or suspicion is only a scintilla, and thus, no evidence. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983); Guillory v. Dietrich, 598 S.W.3d 284, 293 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied). DISCUSSION In their first issue, appellants contend the Guillemas cannot assert claims for fraud or violations of the DTPA to circumvent application of the Statute of Frauds. Appellants raised this argument throughout the underlying proceedings, including in their motion for JNOV. They base this argument on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001), that “the Statute of Frauds bars a fraud claim to the extent the plaintiff seeks to recover as damages the benefit of a bargain that cannot otherwise be enforced because it fails to comply with the Statute of Frauds.” Id. at 799. They reason the analysis also applies to claims asserted under the DTPA and that, because the Guillemas’ “lost increase in market value” –9– damages award is functionally a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages, the award allowed the Guillemas to impermissibly use fraud and DTPA theories to recover the financial equivalent of contractual performance. The Guillemas respond that the Statute of Frauds, by its terms and as construed in Haase, requires an agreement. And because appellants took the position that the form contract signed by the Guillemas was merely an offer that appellants rejected, there is no agreement, so appellants’ Statute of Frauds defense fails. 6 Here, the parties agree that no contract was formed. Appellants highlight the language in the sales contract that the contract was not binding until accepted and executed by an authorized representative, and Dolson testified that Southgate did not sign the contract. Further, both Sherman and Eunice testified that they understood that they did not have an agreement until corporate signed the contract. The parties also agree that if the “lost increase in market value” damages awarded are determined to be benefit-of-the-bargain damages, then the legal consequence of that determination is the reversal of that portion of the damages award. The Guillemas’ counsel conceded this point during oral argument. Thus, we 6 The Guillemas also contend that even if this Court concluded that the parties otherwise had an unenforceable agreement, the trial properly rejected appellants’ Statute of Frauds theory because “Southgate, as the movant had the burden of establishing that the only damages the Guillemas sought and could recover were benefit of the bargain damages” and appellants “did not submit any evidence establishing that the damages sought were only benefit-of-the-bargain damages.” The Guillemas cite Lam v. Phuong Nguyen, 335 S.W.3d 786, 791–92 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). Lam does not support this proposition. Lam is an appeal from a traditional summary judgment and states the general summary- judgment burden rule. Id. at 789–90. In addition, on the pinpoint pages cited, this Court held that plaintiffs bear the burden of raising a fact issue on whether the damages asserted are something other than benefit- of-the-bargain, and in Lam, those plaintiffs failed to carry it. –10– need not decide on the application of the Statute of Frauds on these facts because the parties agree on the legal premise that a benefit-of-the-bargain recovery requires a bargain. The crux of the parties’ disagreement, therefore, is over the characterization of what the jury actually awarded. This question is part of appellants’ third issue. Appellants contend the law does not permit the Guillemas to recover the increase in market value of a home they did not own and for which they had no contract to purchase. Appellants maintain that the “lost increase in market value” of such a home (that is, the Samantha Trail home) is a benefit-of-the-bargain recovery in substance because it represents the appreciation the Guillemas would have captured had the sales contract been performed. Appellants argue that because there is no bargain and the damages awarded are, in form, benefit-of-the-bargain damages, there are no recoverable damages. The Guillemas counter that the “lost increase in market value” damages are consequential damages. They describe their damages as the harm they suffered from “being kept out of a rising market” because they were prevented from purchasing any home during the six-week period due to Southgate’s misrepresentations. They assert that the measure of damages awarded, which they support with Owens’s market analysis, represents the overall market appreciation, not a specific property’s value minus the purchase price. They allow that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are unavailable in this case because there is no bargain. But because the Guillemas –11– suffered “real monetary loss in which the Property appreciated in value and only Southgate, and not the Guillemas, received that value,” these damages represent a consequential harm that exist independent of any bargain. Although the Guillemas elected to recover under the DTPA, the jury awarded “lost increase in market value” damages for both the DTPA and fraud by non- disclosure liability findings. Specifically, the jury awarded $75,484.08 in “lost increase in market value” damages under the DTPA and $50,000 in “lost increase in market value” damages for fraud by non-disclosure. Thus, the damages characterization issue affects both claims equally. Applicable Law “The proper measure of damages is a question of law” that we review de novo. Signature Indus. Servs., LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 638 S.W.3d 179, 187 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Allied Vista, Inc. v. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 1999, pet. denied)). We may reverse a damages award as a matter of law when the legal theory supporting it does not conform to the law governing damages. Id. We also may reverse the damages award if the evidence of damages is legally insufficient. Id. As established by the Texas Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997), “actual damages are either ‘direct’ or ‘consequential.’” Id. at 816 (quoting Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. 1992) (Phillips, C.J., concurring)); see also Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, –12– 221 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tex. 2007). Direct damages are those that naturally and necessarily result from the defendant’s wrongful act. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. They compensate the plaintiff for losses that the law conclusively presumes the defendant foresaw as a result of that act. Id. (citing Bynum, 836 S.W.2d at 163 (Phillips, C.J., concurring)). In contrast, consequential damages are losses that arise naturally, but not necessarily, from the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Id.; Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636; Defterios v. Dallas Bayou Bend, Ltd., 350 S.W.3d 659, 673 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, pet. denied). These losses need not be the usual result of the wrong, Arthur Andersen 945 S.W.2d at 816, and they are recoverable when “properly pleaded and proved” if they are “foreseeable and directly traceable” to the wrong and result from it. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 49 n.1 (Tex. 1998). In Texas, actual damages in fraud and DTPA cases generally fall into three categories: out-of-pocket damages,7 benefit-of-the-bargain damages, and consequential damages. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 817; see also Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 49; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.45(11) (defining economic damages as “compensatory damages for pecuniary loss”) & § 7 An out-of-pocket measure of damages is not at issue in the case. For both causes of action, the jury found the Guillemas incurred $0.00 in out-of-pocket losses for their “reasonable and necessary travel-related expenses” suffered “as a result of Defendants’ conduct.” –13– 17.50 (“Relief for Consumers”); see also Matheus v. Sasser, 164 S.W.3d 453, 459 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating that under the DTPA, “[o]ther damages may be allowed to ensure that the plaintiff is made whole.”). Benefit-of- the-bargain damages, which are rooted in an expectancy theory, Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636–37, are those damages that “compensate a party for the loss of a benefit the party expected to receive as a result of the agreement.” Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673. These damages “evaluate the difference between the value that was represented and the value actually received.” Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636. Importantly, “absent an enforceable contract, a fraud claimant may not recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages.” Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (citing Haase, 62 S.W.3d at 799–800); see also Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018) (explaining that that if a promise to perform is unenforceable, “the benefit-of-the-bargain measure is not available because one can have no compensable expectancy from a bargain that is not binding”). Damages, such as out-of-pocket losses, are recoverable in connection with a bargain that is not binding as long as those damages are not part of the benefit promised under the contract. See Haase, 62 S.W.3d at 799–800. Unlike benefit-of-the-bargain damages, consequential damages “do not compensate a party for the benefits the party expected to receive; they compensate a party for damages incurred as a proximate cause of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673. Although foreseeability is not an element –14– of producing cause under the DTPA, damages that are “too remote, too uncertain, or purely conjectural” are not recoverable. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. When, as here, we must determine whether the damages awarded by the jury are benefit-of-the-bargain or consequential, we look to the damages question submitted to the jury. See, e.g., Zorilla, 469 S.W.3d at 154 (noting damages question based on unenforceable oral agreement); Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 665, 673 (analyzing jury charge to conclude that damages awarded were consequential because the charge asked what losses were suffered as a consequence of the fraud). We analyze whether the damages awarded derive from an expectancy theory, in which the damages compensate the plaintiffs for what they would have received had the bargain been performed, or whether they compensate for actual losses the plaintiffs incurred as a proximate consequence of the defendants’ wrongful conduct. Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636; Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673; cf. Transcon. Realty Invs., Inc. v. John T. Lupton Tr., 286 S.W.3d 635, 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (noting that inquiry is whether “plaintiff seeks to recover the benefit of the alleged false representations, or its out-of-pocket costs expended in reliance on those representations”). We examined this distinction in Defterios v. Dallas Bayou Bend, Ltd., a case in which a group of commercial property owners sued a real estate company and their broker for fraud in the inducement, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 663. The property owners claimed the broker made –15– fraudulent misrepresentations, which induced them to take their properties off the market. Id. During that time, the market declined, and the properties lost value. Id. The jury considered three categories of damages (change in value, capital investment, and operating cash flow) and awarded $12 million in consequential damages, specifically finding no direct benefit-of-the-bargain damages. Id. at 663, 665. This Court upheld the consequential damages award because the jury was asked to consider the damages as a proximate consequence of the fraud rather than what the plaintiffs expected to receive, which was asked in a separate question. Id. at 673. We also highlighted the fact that the jury considered those elements of damage after the contract date. Id. Analysis A. Characterization of the “Lost Increase in Market Value” Damages In this case, the jury was asked the following in Question No. 4, addressing DTPA damages: “What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Plaintiffs for their damages, if any, that resulted from such conduct?” The question then instructed the jury to “[c]onsider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other” which included: The lost increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home that Plaintiffs would have received between January 15, 2021, the date they submitted the offer to Southgate Brockdale, and March 4, 2021, the date Southgate Brockdale notified the Plaintiffs it would not execute their offer. –16– The jury answered $75,484.08 for “Lost Increase in Market Value” damages.8 Looking to the question, it asks the jury to measure the increase in market value on the specific Samantha Trail property that the Guillemas “would have received” over the forty-eight-day period from the date of the offer submission to the refusal. Stated another way, it asks, how much did the value of the specific property on which the Guillemas submitted an offer and tried to purchase increase during the period appellants misled them into thinking that the offer would be accepted. We conclude this is a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages. Benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure the difference between the value that was represented and the value actually received. Baylor Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 636. In a real estate dispute, the measure involves the difference between the price of the property and its market value at the time of the breach. See Matheus, 164 S.W.3d at 460 (looking at damages based on price per square foot). Here, the jury heard comparable market analysis testimony from Owens in which she testified about the difference in the fair market value of the Samantha Trail home on January 15, 2021, versus the fair market value of comparable homes in the neighborhood in different periods post-January 15th, as measured in price per square foot. Owens testified that 8 Question No. 4 followed the jury’s findings that appellants violated the DTPA. Question No. 10 closely mirrors Question No. 4, except it pertains to the jury’s fraud by non-disclosure finding. Question Nos. 4 and 10 contain materially identical instructions, quoted above, concerning “lost increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home.” For Question No. 10, the jury awarded $50,000.00 in “Lost Increase in Market Value” damages. –17– the price per square foot on the Samantha Trail home on the date of the offer was $179, and based on market conditions after that time, the market value of comparable homes was $209.58 per square foot, a difference of $30.58 per square foot. Appellants’ real estate expert, Jamie Wickliffe, also testified to an increase in the price per square foot of homes during that time, but because some of the homes in Owens’s analysis were not comparable to the Samantha Trail home, Wickliffe testified that the increased price was really $196.62 per square foot, a difference of $17.62 per square foot. In closing, the Guillemas’ counsel argued the jury could award “lost market appreciation damages of $131,004.72,” using the $30.58 delta testified to by Owens and multiplied by the square footage of the Samantha Trail home, or alternatively, the jury could use the delta of $17.62 testified to by Wickliffe to come up with damages in the amount of $75,484.08.9 Thus, the jury was invited to consider the price per square foot of the Samantha Trail home on January 15, 2021 (the value of the property as represented) and the price per square foot of comparable homes, which increased because of market conditions (the value the Guillemas “would have received” had the sales contract been accepted); the jury was instructed to award the difference in market value on the Samantha Trail home. 9 The Samantha Trail home was listed on the sales contract as 4,284 square feet. The jury awarded $75,484.08 in “lost increase in market value” damages under the DTPA, consistent with choosing the alternative calculation offered by the Guillemas’ counsel: $196.62 per square foot minus $179 per square foot = $17.62 per square foot multiplied by 4,284 = $75,484.08. –18– Our conclusion that the damages awarded by the jury for “lost increase in market value” are benefit-of-the-bargain damages is supported by Sherman’s testimony about the damages the Guillemas incurred. Sherman testified to the damages they were seeking and explained that “lost market appreciation” is “[t]he amount of appreciation that [they] would have benefitted from had Southgate performed under the contract and built [us] the home.” He also affirmatively answered that they were “entitled to the benefit of any market appreciation on the house [they] would have built at 1508 Samantha Trail had [their] offer been accepted.” Notably, the damages question asked of the jury and Sherman’s description of their damages are significantly different than what the Guillemas pleaded as damages in this case. See Formosa Plastics Corp., 960 S.W.2d at 49 n.1 (consequential damages must be properly pleaded). In their First Amended Petition, which was the live pleading at the time of trial, the Guillemas sought economic damages “comprised of travel expenses, lost time, and increased costs for a comparable home based on current market conditions.” The last category of damages describes additional costs the Guillemas had to pay for a different, comparable home because real estate market prices rose. The pleaded measure looks at how the Guillemas were harmed and represents more of a forward-looking consequence of being kept out of the market because of appellants’ misrepresentations; in other –19– words, the measure pleaded reads more like consequential damages.10 These damages as alleged track what the Guillemas argue now on appeal. That is, the damages awarded by the jury represent the costs to the Guillemas of being kept out of the market during a time when the overall market appreciated. But even though Owens testified that the Guillemas’ harm was that they “had to pay a higher price for a home,”11 the jury was not asked to consider how much more the Guillemas had to spend on a comparable home after their offer was rejected. See Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673 (noting jury charge instructed to consider elements of damages incurred after contract date). Rather, the jury was asked about the increase in value on the specific Samantha Trail property over a defined period of when the sales contract was pending. When we focus on what the Guillemas were actually compensated for, it further supports a conclusion that the damages awarded reflect an expectancy interest. The jury awarded $75,484.08 for the increase in market value on a home the Guillemas did not own but hoped to purchase. Although we held in Defterios that a “change in value” as an element of loss after a contract date represented a 10 In addition to being properly pleaded, consequential damages must also be “foreseeable and directly traceable to the fraud and result from it.” Formosa Plastics Corp., 960 S.W.2d at 49 & n.1. Our description of the Guillemas’ pleaded damages as representing a consequential measure of damages, however, should not be construed as reflecting any position whether damages incurred from being kept out of a rising real estate market generally are directly traceable and result from misrepresentations or fraud related to a particular house and the offer put in for that house. 11 Owens also testified that the home the Guillemas purchased (the Highland house) and the “home that they didn’t get to purchase” (the Samantha Trail home) were not comparable, stating “they’re an apple and an orange.” –20– consequential loss, the owners in Defterios owned the property at issue and therefore suffered an actual loss when the property declined in value. Defterios, 350 S.W.3d at 673. In this case, the jury was asked to award the Guillemas for the lost increase in market value on property they never owned. And by awarding them damages, the Guillemas received the appreciation they “would have received” if the offer been accepted. We conclude the damages awarded by the jury for the “lost increase in market value on the Samantha Trail home” are a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages. The parties agree that there is no contract in this case. And here, because there is no bargain that is binding, there can be no recovery for these benefit-of-the-bargain damages. See Zorrilla, 469 S.W.3d at 153; see also Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 614. Accordingly, we need not determine whether the Guillemas’ “lost increase in market value” damages have support in the evidence because these damages are unrecoverable as a matter of law. See Signature Indus. Servs., LLC, 638 S.W.3d at 187. B. “Reasonable Value of Time” Damages Under the DTPA damages question, the jury also awarded the Guillemas $7,250.00 for the “reasonable value of the time for which Plaintiffs missed work –21– attempting to have Southgate Brockdale execute their offer.”12 In the second part of their third issue, appellants question whether the law permits the Guillemas to recover the reasonable value of the time they spent pursuing the purchase of the home when appellants had no obligation to accept the Guillemas’ offer. They also assert that there is no evidence to support the jury’s award for these damages and that we should disregard the findings. We need not determine whether the “reasonable value of time” damages are recoverable as a matter of law because, even if they represent an available measure of damages under these facts, there is legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s award for such damages here. The Guillemas contend the testimony of their “lost time damages” consists of the time they “were induced to spend . . . reviewing selections and on the phone and Internet reviewing the extensive design process.” They claim this preparation was in reliance of Southgate’s promises, and the time the Guillemas “invested in this process caused real damages to their entire family.” The Guillemas rely on Eunice’s testimony to support their argument that the jury considered this time spent and the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion for JNOV. Eunice testified to making design selections and that they were trying to meet the deadlines to receive incentives. She also testified to reviewing the floorplan and 12 Under Question 10, addressing the fraud by non-disclosure damages, the jury awarded the Guillemas $5,000 for the “reasonable value of time for which Plaintiffs missed work attempting to have Southgate Brockdale execute their offer.” –22– to a telephone meeting that was being scheduled in late February with Heckenlaible to review not only the selections made at the time the contract was signed, but also to discuss other items, such as electrical, plumbing, interior trim, as well as exterior paint colors, front door style and color and garage door style. She further said that she asked Heckenlaible “several times” about when the contract would be signed. Finally, Eunice testified to how, after learning the sales contract would not be executed, she “spent almost all of [her] time looking for another home” at the expense of time she needed to devote to her children. And because of their scheduled move to Dallas, finding a replacement home was a “top priority,” and she spent several hours every day looking at any new homes that came on the market. None of Eunice’s testimony about making selections or communicating with Heckenlaible, however, quantified the time she spent. Further, neither she nor her counsel gave the jury any guidance on how much her time was worth. Importantly, Eunice provided no testimony about time spent “attempting to have Southgate Brockdale execute their offer.” Rather, in addition to time spend finding a replacement home, the Guillemas directly attribute Eunice’s time as time “to design a home;” Eunice explained that if they made final decisions with respect to the Samantha Trail home in a timely manner they would receive incentives. Sherman testified that he personally spent about sixty hours on “efforts to try to purchase the Samantha Trail home.” He came up with that estimate by looking through his notes and emails about calls with Heckenlaible and how long those calls –23– took. He also factored in how much time he spent before and after the calls. He further stated that he