Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 2, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00671-CV ——————————— AZHAR RAUF, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF AHMED JAHLIL, DECEASED, AND BR SHAWN, INC., Appellants V. MANHATTAN LIFE GROUP, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 151st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2019-27708 MEMORANDUM OPINION This suit arises from a failed real estate transaction. After a jury trial, the buyer was awarded specific performance, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. This appeal ensued. We reverse the award of exemplary damages and affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. Background Azhar Rauf1 owned property located at 5905 Guhn Road in Houston, Texas (the “Property”). The Property was improved with a large building, which historically housed the Westwind Club, a bar managed by Rauf. Rauf had inherited the Property. But it was encumbered by a lien relating to an outstanding loan. To obtain the funds to pay off the loan, Rauf engaged Steve Cumley, a commercial real estate broker, to market the Property for sale. Rauf and Cumley executed a listing agreement, which represented that Rauf would have no lease or ongoing business on the Property.2 1 In the underlying suit, Rauf was named both individually and as independent executor of the estate of Ahmed Jahlil, deceased. 2 The written listing agreement expired in April 2016—but the relationship continued under an oral agreement, and Cumley continued marketing the Property as he had been under the written agreement. 2 A few months later, in December 2016, Rauf executed a lease of the Property with BR Shawn3, an entity also controlled by Rauf.4 The lease granted BR Shawn the right to possess the Property until 2032, for rent of only $100 to $200 per month. Despite the execution of this lease, Rauf did not disengage with Cumley or otherwise inform Cumley of the new long-term tenancy which would encumber the Property. In fact, the record reflects that Rauf continued to speak with Cumley in terms that would suggest the Property was still unleased. Therefore, Cumley continued marketing the Property as fully available for use by prospective buyers. A real estate broker named Chris Grant subsequently became interested in the Property. Grant recognized the Property to be located near the office of his friend, John McGettigan, a general counsel of Manhattan. At Grant’s request, McGettigan agreed to tour the Property on Grant’s behalf. Soon thereafter, Grant made an offer on the Property and sent a letter of intent to Cumley. Grant and Cumley began negotiating the sale of the Property over email. During these negotiations, it was Cumley’s understanding that the bar which continued operations on the Property would move out upon the sale. 3 The record and briefs inconsistently refer to this party as “BR-Shawn,” “B-R Shawn,” and “BR Shawn.” We use the spelling “BR Shawn,” as it is written in the trial court’s final judgment. 4 Rauf is the only signatory to the lease, signing as both landlord and tenant. The lease was not recorded anywhere or witnessed by anyone else. It appears that the only person who knew of the lease’s existence was Rauf. 3 Grant sent Cumley a proposed sale contract for the Property. While the offer was being considered, Grant and McGettigan again toured the Property, accompanied by Cumley. During this tour, a security employee of Rauf’s told Grant that the bar had shut down and was no longer in operation. Sometime after this tour, McGettigan expressed to Grant his own interest in purchasing the Property instead of Grant. Grant agreed and assigned his rights in the proposed sale contract to McGettigan’s employer, Manhattan. Thus, Manhattan became the buyer, and Grant became Manhattan’s broker for the sale. On March 11, 2019, the sale contract was executed by Grant—as Manhattan’s authorized agent—and Rauf. Under the terms of the contract, Manhattan agreed to pay $1.1 million to Rauf for the Property. The contract form included a selection box, which would require the seller to provide copies of all current leases or information about tenants. Grant did not check this box on the contract because he believed it was nonapplicable. The marketing of the Property had already led Grant to believe the Property was free from any leases. Cumley had never disclosed the existence of a lease.5 And Grant believed Rauf would have been obligated to disclose the existence of a lease if one did exist. 5 Even Cumley was still unaware of BR Shawn’s lease at this time. 4 After an initial postponement, the closing date for the contract was set for April 15, 2019. Manhattan appeared at the scheduled closing and transferred the contracted sale price into escrow. However, Rauf did not appear. Three days later, Manhattan and Grant filed this suit against Rauf—alleging breach of the sale contract and seeking specific performance. On April 28, 2019, Rauf broke his silence with an email to the title company. Rauf’s email referred to an existing lease on Property, held by BR Shawn. The title company copied Cumley in its response to Rauf. In three years of marketing the Property for Rauf as available, this email from the title company was the first time Cumley was ever informed of a lease on the Property. Cumley subsequently forwarded the correspondence to Grant. It was not until May 7, 2019, that Cumley first received a copy of the December 2016 lease.6 Following its revelation, the deal with Manhattan fell apart. Manhattan subsequently amended this suit—now seeking to acquire the Property free from BR Shawn’s leasehold interest and adding claims for statutory and common-law fraud.7 Rauf counterclaimed, alleging that Manhattan breached 6 The lease was not generated from a typical, preprinted form or template by any real estate association. Instead, the lease consists of just two typed pages, signed only by Rauf. 7 Manhattan’s suit also named BR Shawn and the lienholder as defendants. 5 the contract by refusing to purchase the Property subject to the lease and by miscalculating the date of closing. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Manhattan on its breach of contract claim, concluding that Rauf failed to comply with the sale agreement as a matter of law. It also granted a directed verdict declaring that BR Shawn’s lease was not part of the contract. The trial court further granted Manhattan’s claim for specific performance—requiring Rauf to close the transaction without assignment of the lease.8 The jury then found Rauf liable for both common-law and statutory fraud. But it did not award any actual damages. The jury did, however, award $58,000 in exemplary damages to Manhattan. The trial court’s final judgment incorporated the jury’s verdict and the court’s prior rulings. It specifically granted specific performance to Manhattan on two bases: (1) the fraud verdicts against Rauf, and (2) Rauf’s failure to comply with the sale contract. The judgment also awarded exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to Manhattan. Sufficiency of Evidence In his first and second issues, Rauf challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury’s findings of common-law and statutory fraud. Rauf argues that 8 The trial court denied Rauf’s competing motions for directed verdict. 6 he may not be found liable for fraud because, as he claims, he never made a false statement to Manhattan or Grant, and because he disclosed the existence of the lease before the final closing of the sale.9 Relatedly, Rauf contends that he had no duty to disclose the existence of a lease on the Property before the execution of a sale contract, and the failure to do so does not constitute fraud under Texas law. Standard of Review Because Rauf is attacking the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adverse finding on an issue for which it did not have the burden of proof, he must show that no evidence supports the jury’s adverse finding. See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). Evidence is legally sufficient if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding if (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810. 9 The existence of the lease was not disclosed—or revealed, rather—until April 28, 2019, after the agreed closing date for the sale contract of April 15. However, due to Rauf’s failure to appear, the closing never occurred. 7 When reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference to support it. Id. at 822. We also credit favorable evidence if a reasonable juror could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable juror could not. Id. at 827. Applicable Law The elements of common-law fraud are: (1) that a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that the other party should act upon it; (5) the party acted in reliance on the representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered injury. Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. 2009). Similarly, statutory fraud in real estate transactions consists of a false representation of a past or existing material fact, when the false representation is made to a person for the purpose of inducing that person to enter into a contract, and relied on by that person in entering into that contract. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 27.01(a).10 Section 27.01(d) further provides: 10 The elements of statutory fraud under section 27.01(a) are essentially the same as the elements of common-law fraud, “except that section 27.01(a) does not require proof of knowledge or recklessness as a prerequisite to the recovery of actual damages.” Henning v. OneWest Bank FSB, 405 S.W.3d 950, 963 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2013, no pet.). Thus, if all elements of common-law fraud are met, all elements of statutory fraud under 27.01(a) have also been satisfied. See id. 8 A person who (1) has actual awareness of the falsity of a representation or promise made by another person and (2) fails to disclose the falsity of the representation or promise to the person defrauded, and (3) benefits from the false representation or promise commits the fraud described in Subsection (a) of this section and is liable to the person defrauded for exemplary damages. Actual awareness may be inferred where objective manifestations indicate that a person acted with actual awareness. Id. § 27.01(d). A misrepresentation may consist of the concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact when there is a duty to disclose. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex. 1974). A fact is material if it would likely affect the conduct of a reasonable person concerning the transaction in question. Id. at 142. Analysis Rauf claims that he has never made a false representation to Grant or Manhattan, because he never directly communicated with Grant or Manhattan. Thus, Rauf argues that Manhattan’s fraud allegations fail at the first element. Rauf further argues that he is not liable for fraud based on Cumley’s statements, because there was no evidence at trial that Cumley made false statements. However, the record reflects otherwise. At trial, the jury charge included the instruction that “Seller [Rauf] is responsible for the misrepresentations of his agent, Mr. Steve Cumley.” While the record reflects that Rauf objected to this instruction at trial, Rauf’s brief does not 9 directly challenge the trial court’s application of principal-agent doctrine or section 27.01(d) of the Business and Commerce Code, nor does he provide any controverting authority. Rauf’s brief also does not claim that he was somehow unaware of Cumley’s marketing of the Property from 2016 to 2019. Rauf argues that he is not liable simply because Cumley made no false representations. However, as Manhattan identifies, the trial testimony reflects multiple statements made by Cumley in the marketing and sale of the Property that range from misleading omission to explicit false representation. The record reflects that Cumley’s marketing materials for the Property described the “Total Space Available” as including the 9,000-square-foot building— i.e., the entirety of the building on the Property was marketed as available. However, this representation is directly contradicted by the existence of the lease, which had purportedly existed since 2016. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could find that a building already being leased is definitively unavailable, especially when that building is being leased at a sweetheart rate, with the tenant’s option to extend the lease until 2032. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. When faced with this contradiction, a reasonable jury could find that an unavailable 10 building being marketed as available is sufficient evidence to constitute a false representation. See id. The record further reflects that Cumley marketed the Property as available based on Rauf’s repeated and uncorrected representations to Cumley, indicating that the Property was not subject to a lease. Rauf never corrected himself or otherwise informed Cumley or anyone else that there was, in fact, a lease on the Property, until the revelation of the lease in April 2019, after the missed closing date. The record further reflects the materiality of this false representation. The existence of the lease is a fact that a reasonable buyer would regard as fundamental to the transaction. See Custom Leasing, Inc., 516 S.W.2d at 142. It materially affects Manhattan’s right to possession. See id. It compromises Manhattan’s intended use for the Property. See id. And it drastically affects the potential income stream Manhattan may derive from the Property. See id. Applying these facts to the elements of common-law fraud, evidence presented at trial reflects: (1) the Property was marketed as including a 9,000-square- foot building available for use; (2) this representation was false, as the building was already being leased; (3) Rauf knew the representation was false, as he personally signed the lease as both the landlord and tenant; (4) the false representation was communicated by Rauf, through his broker, to Grant and Manhattan in an attempt to sell the Property; (5) Manhattan entered into the sale contract under the influence of 11 the false representation, and (6) the revelation of the lease contributed to the sinking of the deal. See Aquaplex, Inc., 297 S.W.3d at 774. Rauf argues that he cannot be liable for fraud when he disclosed the existence of the lease prior to closing. However, this narrow argument ignores the existence of the affirmative false representations made through Cumley. When Manhattan entered into the sale contract under the influence of Rauf’s false representations in the marketing of the Property, the fraud was already complete. See Custom Leasing, Inc., 516 S.W.2d at 142. It is, therefore, unnecessary to address when or whether Rauf committed additional fraud by failing to disclose the existence of the lease. Based on the above, we conclude that the record reflects sufficient evidence that Rauf made one or more false representations, either directly or through Cumley, to enable a reasonable and fair-minded jury to reach the verdict finding both common-law and statutory fraud. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Accordingly, we hold that legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that Rauf committed statutory and common-law fraud.11 We overrule Rauf’s first issue. 11 Rauf’s second issue, concerning the timing of the lease’s disclosure to Manhattan, need not be addressed, as the record reflects sufficient evidence of affirmative false representations for the jury to find Rauf liable for statutory and common-law fraud. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 12 Exemplary Damages In his third issue, Rauf challenges the trial court’s exemplary damages award to Manhattan. Citing the plain language of section 41.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the general rule under Texas case law, Rauf argues that recovery of actual damages is a necessary predicate to recovery of exemplary damages. Thus, Rauf argues that because Manhattan obtained specific performance but no actual damages, it is not entitled to recover exemplary damages. In response, Manhattan relies on a distinct lineage of cases in attempt to controvert the general rule, beginning with Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association, 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1985). While Nabours clearly articulates—and adheres to—the basic rule that requires actual damages be found prior to an award of punitive damages, Manhattan argues that Nabours also opens the door to rare exceptions. Manhattan argues for a broadened interpretation of past exceptions to make way for this case. We decline to do so. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review de novo the statutory standards of recovery for exemplary damages. Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. Bruce, 689 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. 2024) (citing Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018)). Section 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits recovery of exemplary damages in cases where the harm suffered by the claimant results from 13 fraud, malice, or gross negligence. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003. However, exemplary damages may be awarded only if damages other than nominal damages are awarded. Id. § 41.004. The plain-stated principle of section 41.004 is echoed throughout Texas case law, both before and after the passage of 41.004: Exemplary damages are not recoverable without an award of actual damages. See, e.g., Nabours, 700 S.W.2d at 904; Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 753–54 (Tex. 1984).12 Specific performance, though an equitable alternative to damages, is not actual damages. See White Knight Dev., LLC v. Simmons, 718 S.W.3d 203, 206 (Tex. 2025). Specific performance is an equitable remedy used as substitute for monetary damages when such damages would not be adequate. See Scott v. Sebree, 986 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). Analysis Nothing in the record suggests that Manhattan lacked full opportunity to obtain actual damages in this case. In fact, even though specific performance had already been awarded following the directed verdict, the jury charge permitted the 12 See also Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 517 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (citing Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 71 (Tex. 2013)); Hung Tan Phan v. An Dinh Le, 426 S.W.3d 786, 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Assoc., 700 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. 1985)); Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex. 1990)). 14 jury to consider additional, supplemental monetary damages for lost rent under Jury Question Nos. 2 and 4. The jury had the opportunity to award actual damages. But they declined to do so. Manhattan references a number of cases in which courts have acknowledged a narrow set of circumstances under which exemplary damages may be recoverable even when a plaintiff seeks equitable relief in place of actual damages. Manhattan begins its analysis with Nabours, a case which predates the passage of section 41.004. In Nabours, the trial court granted the plaintiff a permanent injunction and punitive damages, but no actual damages. Nabours, 700 S.W.2d at 902–03. However, the Nabours Court ultimately adhered to the general rule and declined to permit punitive damages without actual damages. Id. at 905. Nevertheless, Manhattan argues that Nabours leaves a window open for exemplary damages in other cases involving equitable relief. As Nabours states: “Our holding in this case should not be confused with an absolute refusal to allow punitive damages in a case where equitable relief is had.” Id. Manhattan argues that the instant case should be such an exception. 15 However, just as Manhattan did here, the plaintiffs in Nabours provided the jury with the opportunity to award actual damages. Id. And just as here, the Nabours jury declined to do so.13 Id. Manhattan goes on to cite two non-binding cases from our sister courts, both of which involve an award of punitive damages along with the creation of constructive trust, despite no award of actual damages. See Procom Energy, L.L.A. v. Roach, 16 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet denied); see also Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). However, neither of these cases involve specific performance of a real estate contract. Nor does either case address section 41.004. Accordingly, we decline to depart from the plain language of section 41.004 and the longstanding general rule that actual, monetary damages predicate exemplary damages. We therefore hold that the trial court erred by rendering judgment for exemplary damages against Rauf when the jury awarded no actual damages to Manhattan. We sustain Rauf’s third issue. 13 The Court further advises that “[p]erhaps if the [plaintiffs] had not so limited the jury’s consideration of actual damages, an adequate damage finding would have been made.” Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 700 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. 1985). Similarly, perhaps if Manhattan had not so limited the jury’s consideration to lost rent, actual damages would have been awarded. 16 Attorney’s Fees In his fourth issue, Rauf contends that Manhattan is not entitled to attorney’s fees “when [Manhattan] failed to obtain the relief it sought at trial.”14 However, the foundational premise of Rauf’s challenge—that Manhattan failed to obtain the relief it sought at trial—is unsupported by the record. Section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees in a claim relating to an oral or written contract. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001. The Business and Commerce Code also permits the recovery of attorney’s fees in cases of statutory fraud. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 27.01(e). Manhattan’s third amended petition prays for a specific performance decree requiring Rauf to perform on the sale contract. Correspondingly, section III of the trial court’s final judgment explicitly orders that specific performance is granted in Manhattan’s favor.15 Thus, the record reflects that Manhattan did, in fact, obtain the relief it sought at trial. 14 Generally, we review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 850 (Tex. 2018). 15 Section III of the trial court’s judgment further dismisses Rauf’s counterclaim as a matter of law and orders that Rauf shall take nothing on its claims against Manhattan. 17 Rauf fails to provide any statute or case law that would support its assertion that the trial’s result was somehow a loss for Manhattan. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Manhattan. We overrule Rauf’s fourth issue. BR Shawn Relatedly, in the fifth issue, BR Shawn argues that the trial court erred by failing to include a finding in the final judgment identifying BR Shawn as a prevailing party. BR Shawn further asserts that the trial court erred in failing to award court costs to BR Shawn as a prevailing party. We conclude that BR Shawn’s foundational premise—that it prevailed at trial—is unsupported by the record. Rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides: The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity. . . . Judgment may, in a proper case, be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants or intervenors. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301. “A judgment is final either if ‘it actually disposes of every pending claim and party’ or ‘it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.’” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001)). 18 BR Shawn does not dispute the finality of the trial court’s judgment, which could constitute a Lehmann-style jurisdictional challenge. Rather, BR Shawn asserts that the trial court failed to render judgment for it by not including a finding that it “won the case.” However, the record reflects no independent claims asserted by BR Shawn in this matter. Section III of the trial court’s final judgment orders that “Rauf shall not require the lease [held by BR Shawn] be included as a term of the Contract or the Closing, a condition of Closing, or impediment to Closing, and the lease shall not be assigned to Manhattan as a condition of Closing.” Furthermore, section IV of the final judgment states: “This is a judgment that is final in all respects; it disposes of all of the claims and counterclaims that were alleged in the lawsuit, disposes of all parties, and is appealable.” Thus, the trial court did not fail to render judgment for BR Shawn. Judgment was specified in section III. BR Shawn lost its lease interest in the property. And to the extent any outstanding claim or party remains unaddressed by section III, it is disposed of by section IV. Nevertheless, BR Shawn asserts that the final judgment failed to identify it as a prevailing party. However, BR Shawn fails to sufficiently identify where the record reflects that it prevailed in this matter. BR Shawn’s independent conduct was not the subject of any jury question, nor did any question prompt the jury to assess 19 damages against BR Shawn. BR Shawn is only mentioned in Question No. 7 as a potential instrument of Rauf’s fraud.16 Regarding BR Shawn’s entitlement to costs, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 131 provides that “[t]he successful party to a suit shall recover of his adversary all costs incurred therein, except where otherwise provided.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 131. “Costs” usually refers to fees and charges required by law to be paid to the courts or some of their officers, in an amount fixed by statute or court rules. Petrello v. Prucka, 415 S.W.3d 420, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Generally, expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit are not recoverable as costs, unless permitted by a statute or rule. Id. (citing Sterling Bank v. Willard M, L.L.C., 221 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)). Whether a particular expense is permitted by statute or rule to be recoverable as a cost is a question of law, which we review de novo. Petrello, 415 S.W.3d at 433 (citing Ferry v. Sackett, 204 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)). 16 Jury Question No. 7 asked whether Rauf used BR Shawn “as a sham, to perpetrate a fraud, or as a means of evading an existing legal objection.” However, in this context, BR Shawn is characterized as an instrument of Rauf’s conduct. This question does not ask the jury to determine whether BR Shawn itself was independently engaged in such conduct, and no question prompts the jury to assess damages against BR Shawn. 20 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 141 provides that the trial court “may, for good cause, to be stated on the record, adjudge the costs otherwise than as provided by law or these rules.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 141. The trial court may award costs differently for good cause, but that good cause must be stated on the record. Fortitude Energy, LLC v. Sooner Pipe LLC, 564 S.W.3d 167, 189–90 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Here, BR Shawn has failed to demonstrate that it is a prevailing party. The trial court’s judgment does not award costs to BR Shawn, nor does the record include a statement of good cause indicating an intention to award costs to BR Shawn. Furthermore, as Manhattan notes, BR Shawn has failed to identify any court costs that could be taxed against Manhattan. Accordingly, BR Shawn is not entitled to recover costs pursuant to Rules 131 or 141. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to identify BR Shawn as a prevailing party in its final judgment, nor by declining to award BR Shawn costs. We overrule BR Shawn’s fifth issue. 21 Conclusion Based on the record before us, and all the reasons above, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding exemplary damages and render judgment that Manhattan take nothing as to its claim for exemplary damages. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. Terry Adams Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson. 22