Sajida Corporation, Shareef Enterprises Inc., and Imaad Thouseef v. Seawall Investors, LLC as Assignee of Omair Bashir and JB Rental Properties, LLC
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 3, 2026
Docket14-24-00936-CV
JudgeAntú
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and Memorandum
Opinion filed November 3, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-24-00936-CV
SAJIDA CORPORATION, SHAREEF ENTERPRISES INC., AND IMAAD
THOUSEEF, Appellants
V.
SEAWALL INVESTORS, LLC AS ASSIGNEE OF OMAIR BASHIR, AND
JB RENTAL PROPERTIES, LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 10th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 21-CV-1655
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case involves the sale of two convenience stores between two sets of
entities. In their lawsuit, appellees Seawall Investors, LLC, as assignee of Omair
Bashir, and JB Rental Properties, LLC alleged that appellants Sajida Corporation,
Shareef Enterprises Inc., and Imaad Thouseef breached an agreement regarding the
two properties and also committed various torts. Among their relief, they sought
specific performance of the agreement to sell one of the properties, as well as
monetary relief allegedly caused by the delay in performance of the agreement. In
response, appellants raised defenses and counterclaims. After a jury trial, the jury
returned a verdict favorable to appellees, and the trial court entered judgment in
accordance with the verdict.
In six issues, appellants contend that appellees were not entitled to recover
under their contract or tort theories or to receive declaratory relief, the equitable
relief of specific performance, or a combination of specific performance and
monetary relief; that appellants proved their contract claims as a matter of law; and
that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. Finding error in the award of
attorney’s fees, we reverse and remand that portion of the judgment for further
proceedings and affirm the remainder of the judgment.
Background
Thouseef and his brother Asif are the principals in two companies involved
in this case, Sajida and Shareef. In 2021, each company owned a combination
convenience store and gas station across the street from each other in Galveston,
Texas. Sajida owned a Chevron at 601 Broadway, and Shareef owned a Mobil at
602 Broadway.
Bashir is the head of a family business that owns and operates a large
number of convenience stores. Among their companies, the family owns JB
Rental, which in turn owns numerous properties, and Seawall, which was created
to conduct the transaction resulting in this lawsuit.
In his trial testimony, Bashir explained that between 601 Broadway and 602
Broadway, 601 Broadway was the more desirable location. It had significantly
higher sales and was better placed as the last convenience store before the beach,
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while 602 Broadway was across the street and next door to a larger Circle K
location. Further, according to Bashir, when he approached Thouseef about
purchasing a store in 2017, Thouseef insisted that any transaction be for both
properties because he did not want to be stuck owning just the less desirable 602
Broadway. The potential deal in 2017, however, never materialized.
But, in Fall 2020, Thouseef agreed to sell the two stores to Bashir for a
combined $3.6 million ($2.1 million for 601 Broadway and $1.5 million for 602
Broadway). In drafting the purchase and sale agreements, both sides were
represented by attorney Ted Cox. The transaction was intended to be a package
deal, and the sale agreements each included provisions making the sales contingent
on each other. Each contract also required Bashir to assume the fuel supply
contract for the particular store, personally guarantee any obligations under the fuel
contracts, and secure release of the seller and guarantors from the fuel agreements.
Bashir and Thouseef signed both sales contracts, each with 60-day feasibility
periods ending December 9, 2020, and deadlines to close by January 8, 2021. The
contracts also included rights of inspection and were contingent on Bashir
obtaining third-party financing. As he was permitted to do under the contracts,
Bashir assigned the 602 Broadway contract to JB Rental, and the 601 Broadway
contract to Seawall.
In January 2021, during an environmental inspection, contamination was
discovered at 601 Broadway, the more desirable property. Cox opened a claim
with Sajida’s insurance carrier, and a proposal was received for remediation
estimated at $43,500. Because of the delay caused by the contamination revelation
and the fact Bashir’s lender would not close until the contamination was
remediated, Cox suggested replacing the contract for sale of 601 Broadway with a
lease containing an option to buy once the contamination issue was resolved. Cox
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testified that the intent of the leasing arrangement was ultimately “to facilitate their
goal of making sure that both properties were transferred to the buyer.” In March
2021, Cox sent a draft of the proposed lease to both parties and subsequently
incorporated changes requested by each side. Also in March 2021, apparently
before the lease had been prepared, Bashir signed a proactive ten-year sublease of
601 Broadway to Beach Store Investments.
Under the terms of the proposed lease from Sajida, Seawall was to take
possession of 601 Broadway at closing and operate the business with the option to
purchase the land once the contamination was remediated. The lease provided its
term would begin on April 2, 2021, and end on April 1, 2023, but it also allowed
for a six-month extension if the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality had
not issued a “no further action closure letter” by the end of the term. Rent was set
at $15,000 a month—“payable in advance, without demand”—and the proposed
lease reflected that Seawall had delivered a $100,000 security deposit to Sajida.
The lease also prohibited subleasing without prior written consent and made an
attempt to sublet without permission an “Event of Default.” The lease further
required that Seawall perform all of Sajida’s obligations under the existing fuel
supply agreement for 601 Broadway and indemnify Sajida for any claims arising
from that agreement, but the lease did not permit Seawall to execute a new fuel
supply agreement or make any amendments, modifications, or changes to the
existing agreement. Lastly, as noted above, the proposed lease provided Seawall an
option to purchase 601 Broadway for $1.9 million after subtracting credit for the
security deposit. This option commenced on the lease’s effective date and
terminated either when the lease term ended or Sajida terminated Seawall’s right to
possession due to default.
According to Bashir, as closing approached on the purchase of 602
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Broadway, he reached out to see when Thouseef would sign the lease, as the two
properties were a package deal. Thouseef reportedly told Bashir that he would
come to Bashir’s offices to sign the lease at 3 or 4 p.m. on April 2, 2021 (the day
after the scheduled closing on 602 Broadway), and based on that representation,
Bashir instructed his bank to fund the purchase of 602 Broadway. Bashir insisted
he would not have gone through with the purchase of 602 Broadway if he had
known Thouseef never intended on signing the lease for 601 Broadway. Bashir
also explained that because the title company was not insuring title to 601
Broadway as part of the lease transaction, it had informed the parties that the lease
should be signed separately by the parties and not as part of closing on 602
Broadway.
Bashir further testified that on April 2, 2021, Thouseef arrived at Bashir’s
office; Bashir handed Thouseef the lease, which was executed by every necessary
entity except for Sajida, the landlord, and a check for the required $100,000
security deposit; but Thouseef then claimed he was not authorized to sign for
Sajida, and his brother Asif would need to sign instead. According to Bashir,
Thouseef promised he would take the lease home, have his brother sign it, and
have it delivered over the weekend or the following week. In his testimony,
Thouseef denied that he received a check for the security deposit from Bashir and
asserted this was one of the reasons he declined to sign the lease as it inaccurately
reflected a deposit had been received. It is undisputed that appellees never paid the
first month’s rent on the lease and, as will be discussed in more detail below, there
is some dispute regarding the required assumption of the fuel contracts.
Bashir additionally testified that on April 5, 2021, the parties completed the
planned inventory of 602 Broadway, and Thouseef turned over the keys to that
property to Bashir’s district manager. But Thouseef refused to conduct the planned
5
inventory for 601 Broadway or turn over the keys for that location, allegedly
because he was concerned the insurance carrier would not pay for the remediation.
Bashir said that Thouseef then asked for a few more days to finalize the insurance
claim before transferring possession of the store. When pressed about the lease,
Thouseef reportedly again said that he would get Asif to sign it soon and then
would deliver it. According to Bashir, at no point during these conversations did
Thouseef indicate that Sajida was refusing to sign the lease because Seawall had
not delivered the deposit, paid the first month’s rent, or obtained an assignment of
either the 601 or 602 Broadway fuel contracts.
Bashir asserted that he eventually became frustrated with Thouseef’s stalling
on the lease and decided to simply purchase 601 Broadway as the parties had
originally agreed. He managed to secure financing for the purchase at a higher rate
despite the presence of contamination on the property. Bashir ordered an updated
title commitment, which the title company then forwarded to all parties.
Meanwhile, Sunoco, which had the fuel supply contract for 601 Broadway,
requested an update on the closing. In his testimony, Thouseef asserted he would
have been willing to sell the property had appellees fulfilled the stated conditions
of assuming the fuel supply contract and paying for the inventory.
Bashir, however, maintained that from May to September 2021, he emailed,
texted, called, and met with Thouseef to finalize the transaction, but Thouseef
ultimately refused to close on the purchase or deliver an executed lease. In fact,
appellees contended at trial that Thouseef never intended to sign or honor the lease
and option agreement for 601 Broadway, as shown by evidence Thouseef claimed
he had reported the contamination to TCEQ but actually never had and failed to
provide requested documentation to the insurer for the claim Cox had filed on
Sajida’s behalf. The contamination claim was eventually denied. Thouseef also
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admitted nothing had been done to remediate the contamination, which had
prevented closing on 601 Broadway in the first place. By letter dated September
18, 2021, Sajida sent Seawall a “notice of default and termination of contract” as to
601 Broadway, and a “notice of breach of contract; demand for specific
performance” as to 602 Broadway.
Ultimately, from appellees’ perspective, they ended up owning the lesser
602 Broadway property but not the more desirable 601 Broadway property, when
the two properties were always intended to be part of a package deal. On
September 27, 2021, JB Rental and Seawall filed the present lawsuit against
Sajida, Shareef, Thouseef, and Asif. Seawall also filed a lis pendens in the
Galveston County property records regarding 601 Broadway. In January 2022,
Sajida leased 601 Broadway to Zain N Enterprises LLC for $19,000 a month plus
expenses, which were estimated to be around $3,000 a month. Sajida subsequently
transferred ownership of 601 Broadway to Taji Investments, and this transaction
was financed by Sajju Investments. Taji and Sajju are both owned by Thouseef and
Asif.
In their lawsuit, appellees asserted claims for breach of contract, common
law and statutory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and declaratory relief, among
other things, and sought damages, a declaratory judgment, and specific
performance concerning the sale and purchase of 601 Broadway. Appellants
asserted several counterclaims and added Bashir as a defendant. Appellees added a
money-had-and-received claim during trial.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court defined “Agreement” to include both
the lease with option to buy for 601 Broadway and the agreement to purchase 602
Broadway. In response to the 22-question charge, the jury found that Sajida and
Thouseef committed common law and statutory fraud and negligent
7
misrepresentation against Seawall; Shareef and Thouseef committed common law
and statutory fraud and negligent misrepresentation against JB Rental; Seawall
suffered $185,000 in lost profits as a result; and the difference between what JB
Rental paid for 602 Broadway and its fair market value was $118,000. The jury
further found that the agreement was not unenforceable due to JB Rental or Bashir
failing to perform a condition precedent; Sajida and Shareef failed to comply with
the agreement, and such failure was not excused; and Seawall, JB Rental, and
Bashir did not fail to comply with the agreement. And, the jury found that JB
Rental and Seawall were ready, willing, and able to comply with the agreement,
and Shareef held $112,099.87 that rightfully belonged to JB Rental (related to fuel
contract credits). Ten members of the twelve-person jury signed the verdict form.
Attorney’s fees were tried to the judge through the submission of affidavits.
In its final judgment, the trial court found, in regard to appellees’ request for
specific performance, that they had no adequate remedy at law due to the unique
nature of 601 Broadway, Sajida had repudiated the lease, and any further
performance by Seawall would have been futile. The court therefore ordered Sajida
and Seawall to close on the sale of 601 Broadway pursuant to the agreement. As
declaratory relief, the trial court declared that
a. the Lease is an enforceable contract between Seawall and Sajida;
b. Seawall . . . fully performed its obligations under the Lease;
c. Seawall . . . was ready, willing, and able to perform its obligations
under the Lease, including closing on 601 Broadway in compliance
with its option to purchase contained therein;
d. any agreement by Sajida . . . or Taji . . . to lease 601 Broadway
made after September 29, 2021, is void and of no force and effect; and
e. the Deed[s] of Trust dated March 6, 2023, [and] August 15,
8
2023, . . . are void and of no force and effect. 1
For monetary relief, the trial court ordered Sajida and Thouseef to pay
Seawall $185,000, and ordered Shareef to pay JB Rental $112,099.87. Regarding
attorney’s fees and expenses, the court awarded a lump sum of $236,093.50 to
Seawall, JB Rental, and Bashir, to be paid, jointly and severally, by Sajida,
Shareef, and Thouseef. In the event of an appeal by appellants, the trial court
awarded additional, contingent attorney’s fees to appellees for each stage of the
appeals process. The court ordered that $10,000 in earnest money, the monetary
award of $185,000, and the $236,093.50 in attorney’s fees and expenses be
credited toward the specific performance purchase of 601 Broadway. Lastly, the
trial court stated that “none of the amounts of money awarded herein as lost rental
income, money had and received, attorneys’ fees, or interest are for monetary
damages, but are losses recoverable in addition to the remedy of specific
performance or . . . attorney fees recoverable under Texas law and the applicable
contracts.”
Discussion
In their six issues, appellants contend that (1) the trial court erred in
awarding Seawall specific performance, (2) Seawall is not entitled to any relief
under its contract claims, (3) Seawall’s declaratory relief must be vacated, (4)
Sajida and Shareef’s contract claims were proven as a matter of law, (5) Seawall
and JB Rental are not entitled to any relief under their tort claims, and (6) the trial
court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. We will address each issue and its
attendant subissues in turn. As will become clear, several of appellants’ issues are
based on the same basic arguments or positions.
1
Declaration (e) concerned Sajida’s subsequent transfer of 601 Broadway to Taji.
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I. Specific Performance
In their first issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in ordering
specific performance on the sale of 601 Broadway from Sajida to Seawall. Because
much of appellants’ argument on this issue concerns when specific performance
can be combined with a monetary award, we will first set out some relevant law on
that subject before turning to appellants’ specific complaints.
A. Governing Law on Equitable Remedies
In a recent opinion, the Texas Supreme Court addressed when a monetary
award can be made in addition to the equitable remedy of specific performance.
See White Knight Dev., LLC v. Simmons, 718 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. 2025). The court
explained that “while an award of specific performance usually precludes a
monetary award,” such an award may be granted in conjunction with specific
performance when it is necessary to compensate for expenses caused by a delay in
performance of a contract for the sale of real property. Id. at 206. Under such
circumstances, the monetary award is an equitable one designed “to restore the
party seeking specific performance to the position it would have occupied had the
other party’s performance been timely.” Id.
Review of such an award is conducted under a bifurcated standard: while the
nature and contours of an equitable award are within the trial court’s discretion, the
predicate legal question of whether an adequate remedy is available on a given set
of facts is typically reviewed de novo. Credit Suisse AG v. Claymore Holdings,
LLC, 610 S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. 2020); see also White Knight, 718 S.W.3d at 208.
Disputed issues of fact, however, may require resolution by the jury when raised in
a jury trial. See Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d
882, 887 (Tex. 2019).
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Specific performance itself is an equitable breach of contract remedy that
may be awarded as an alternative to legal damages. Id. It does not constitute a
separate cause of action but is a substitute for when monetary damages would be
inadequate. White Knight, 718 S.W.3d at 209. A breach of contract plaintiff must
elect to seek either legal damages or specific performance; if it seeks legal
damages, it elects to treat the contract as terminated and to seek compensation; if it
seeks specific performance, it affirms the contract and requests the contract be
effectuated. Id. Under either option, the goal is to place the party in the position it
would have been in, had there been no breach. See MSW Corpus Christi Landfill,
Ltd. v. Gulley-Hurst, L.L.C., 664 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex. 2023).
When an equitable monetary award accompanies specific performance, the
goal should be to offset any losses caused by the delay in performance of the
contract; the rationale being that the contract is being enforced retrospectively and
the equities adjusted accordingly, thus putting the parties as nearly as possible in
the position they would have been had performance occurred as required by the
contract. See White Knight, 718 S.W.3d at 210. Done properly, such an award
neither alters the principle that specific performance is an alternative to legal
damages nor violates the one satisfaction rule, which provides a plaintiff is only
entitled to one recovery for any harm suffered. Id. at 210–11. This is so because
the recoverable, equitable expenses are not coextensive with the damages available
at law for breach of contract; the equitable award compensates not for the total
breach but merely for the delay in performance. See id. at 211.
The court in White Knight concluded that
a trial court does not abuse its discretion by awarding an equitable
monetary award (regardless of its label) alongside a decree of specific
performance for breach of a contract for the sale of real estate so long
as the monetary award is necessary to place the parties in the same
11
position as if the contract had been performed in full and on time.
Each category of expenses awarded must be (1) directly traceable to
the defendant’s delay in performance, (2) foreseeable at the time of
contracting, and (3) commercially reasonable.
Id. at 213. With these principles in mind, we now turn to appellants’ specific
arguments in this case.
B. Availability of Specific Performance and Monetary Relief
Under their first issue, appellants first assert that in finding Seawall
sustained $185,000 in lost profits due to breach of the agreement by Sajida, the
jury in effect found that Seawall had an adequate remedy at law for such breach;
thus, Seawall was not eligible to receive specific performance as relief. As
discussed above, equitable remedies such as specific performance are not available
when alleged harm can be fully redressed by an adequate remedy at law. See
Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 423 (Tex. 2011).
However, as also discussed, under appropriate circumstances, an equitable
monetary award can accompany specific performance when necessary to put the
parties in the position they would have been in had performance occurred as the
contract required. See White Knight, 718 S.W.3d at 210.
The award of specific performance in this case, i.e., ordering the sale of 601
Broadway to Seawall, was relief for Sajida’s breach of the agreement in not selling
601 Broadway to Seawall. The lost profits found by the jury did not purport to
account for the full measure of damages caused by this breach; instead, the award
of lost profits appears designed to compensate Seawall only for the losses it
incurred due to the delay in performance of the contract. See id. at 211. As will be
discussed in more detail below, appellees requested that the jury award $185,000
as lost profits based on the amount Seawall could have collected as rent on 601
Broadway after Sajida and Thouseef refused to honor the option to purchase the
12
property. Accordingly, under the principles of White Knight, the award of “lost
profits” did not bar Seawall from also obtaining specific performance as a remedy;
the trial court reasonably concluded that both forms of equitable relief were
necessary to place Seawall in the position it would have been in had the agreement
been timely performed.
Seawall additionally suggests that “lost profits,” in particular, can never be
awarded as equitable relief in conjunction with specific performance, but we have
found no such redline prohibition in the relevant case law. To the contrary, White
Knight itself cites cases in which courts have awarded lost profits in addition to
specific performance when necessary to place a party in the position it would have
been in had the contract been timely performed. See id. at 209, 211 (citing TLC
Hosp., LLC v. Pillar Income Asset Mgmt., Inc., 570 S.W.3d 749, 771 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2018, pet. denied) (holding trial court could properly award lost profits,
among other things, as delay damages), and Byram v. Scott, No. 03-07-00741-CV,
2009 WL 1896076, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin July 1, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(noting with apparent approval that trial court used “lost rentals” as an offset to
expenses incurred by opposing party)); see also Paciwest, Inc. v. Warner Alan
Props., LLC, 266 S.W.3d 559, 575 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied)
(listing among expenses that can be recovered in addition to specific performance
“the rental value of property from the time of [the] demand for performance and
tender of the purchase price” and explaining that “these are not in the nature of
benefit of the bargain damages, but rather an accounting between the parties
pending performance of the contract”). Cf. World Food Imports, Inc. v. HHO
United Grp., Inc., No. 05-22-01160-CV, 2024 WL 4553211, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Oct. 23, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting award of lost profits in
addition to specific performance but only because the calculation used was not
13
aimed at putting the plaintiff in the position it would have been had it acquired the
subject grocery store as anticipated in the contract). The mere fact that the trial
court awarded monetary compensation found by the jury as “lost profits” in
addition to specific performance does not mean that Seawall received a double
recovery.
Next, appellants argue that in requesting money damages in the form of lost
profits, appellees made an election of actual damages as their remedy for breach of
the agreement and therefore were barred from also seeking specific performance,
citing City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield Development Co., 55 S.W.3d 158, 165
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (“[A]n election between remedies occurs, at
the latest, when a party proceeds to final judgment on one claim with knowledge of
an inconsistent claim or remedy.”). This argument, however, is merely a different
shade of the argument already addressed positing that Seawall’s monetary and
specific performance awards were inconsistent, and it could not receive both. As
discussed, under the circumstances, the trial court reached the reasonable
conclusion that both specific performance and an equitable monetary award were
necessary to retrospectively enforce the agreement and adjusted the equities such
that the parties were placed as nearly as possible in the position they would have
been in had performance occurred as required by the contract. See White Knight,
718 S.W.3d at 210.
C. Alleged Breaches of Contract by Seawall
Appellants next contend that Seawall was not entitled to specific
performance because it failed to substantially perform its own obligations under
the agreement or otherwise breached the agreement. Specifically, appellants
contend that Seawall (1) failed to pay the first month’s rent for 601 Broadway,
which appellants assert was a condition precedent under the agreement; (2)
14
attempted to sublet the premises without permission in violation of the lease terms;
and (3) failed to assume the fuel supply contracts. Appellants further assert that to
the extent Seawall relies on appellants’ repudiation of the agreement, it failed to
plead repudiation. We find no merit in these arguments.
In Texas, to obtain specific performance based on a breach of contract, a
party must plead and prove that it was ready, willing, and able to timely perform its
obligations under the contract. See DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588, 593
(Tex. 2008); Baizer v. Shaw, 727 S.W.3d 554, 574 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2025, no pet.). It is also a general rule of equity jurisprudence in Texas that a
party must show that it has complied with its obligations under the contract to be
entitled to specific performance. DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 594. Therefore, a
plaintiff seeking specific performance, as a general rule, must actually tender
performance as a prerequisite to obtaining specific performance. Id. However, as a
corollary to this rule, when a defendant refuses to perform or repudiates a contract,
the plaintiff may be excused from actually tendering performance before seeking
specific performance. Id. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is excused from
tendering performance pre-suit and may simply plead that performance would have
been tendered but for the defendant’s refusal to perform or repudiation. Id. This
exception to the general rule—that actual tender of performance is a prerequisite to
obtaining specific performance—is grounded in the idea that actual pre-suit tender
of performance should be excused when it would be a useless or futile act. Id. But,
even when pre-suit tender of performance is excused, a plaintiff still must plead
and prove that he is ready, willing, and able to perform at all relevant times before
specific performance may be awarded. Id. at 595.
Here, appellees pleaded both that Sajida had refused to perform and that
Seawall “has been and is ready, willing, and able to fully perform pursuant to the
15
terms of this contract.” And the jury found that Seawall was indeed “ready,
willing, and able to comply with the Agreement.” We now turn to appellants’
specific allegations of breaches by Seawall.
1. First month’s rent
Appellants first assert that Seawall’s obligation to pay the first month’s rent
was a condition precedent, which Seawall failed to satisfy. A condition precedent
is an event that must happen before a right may accrue to enforce performance of a
contract. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118
S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Conditions
precedent are generally disfavored in Texas, and whether one exists in a particular
contract depends on the parties’ intentions as expressed in the contract. Id.
Typically, to make performance under a contract conditional, a term such as “if,”
“provided that,” “on condition that,” or another similar phrase of conditional
language must be used. Solar Applications Eng’g, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp.,
327 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex. 2010). When no conditional language appears and
another reasonable interpretation of the contract is possible, terms are usually
construed as a covenant in order to prevent a forfeiture. Id.
In arguing that paying the first month’s rent was a condition precedent,
appellants rely on the fact the lease agreement required Seawall to pay rent in order
to peaceably enjoy the lease premises and provided the rent was to be paid in
advance each month. Appellants also specifically cite the following language from
lease paragraph 3.01 (titled “Term”) as creating a condition precedent based on
payment of the first month’s rent:
Subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and unless sooner
terminated pursuant to the terms hereof the term (the “term”) of this
Lease shall be for twenty-four (24) months, and such term shall, along
with Tenant’s obligation to pay rent hereunder, shall [sic] begin on
16
April 2, 2021, (the “Commencement Date”) and end on April 1, 2023,
(the “Expiration Date”).
Although this passage provides that the obligation to pay rent begins on the day
that the lease term commences, we see no language expressing an intent that
prepayment of the first month’s rent was a condition precedent as opposed to being
a lease covenant. Indeed, appellants themselves do no more than quote the passage
in asserting it contains language creating a condition precedent.
In support of their position, appellants also cite testimony from Ted Cox, the
attorney who drafted the lease. In the cited portion, Cox opined that payment of the
security deposit was a condition precedent to Sajida signing or honoring the lease
terms. Although the payment of rent is also mentioned in some of the questions at
this point in his testimony, he is never asked specifically whether he believed
payment of the first month’s rent itself was a condition precedent. The lease as a
whole certainly treated the security deposit and the payment of rent separately, as it
recites that the security deposit was given to the landlord on the day of execution
but makes no such claim regarding the first month’s rent. Based on the lease
language, Cox asserted Sajida could have refused to sign the lease if the security
deposit was not paid beforehand, but he did not make this assertion regarding the
rent.
Given that conditions precedent are disfavored in Texas law and appellants
have cited no provision of the agreement making payment of the first month’s rent
a condition precedent, we find no merit in their condition precedent argument. See
Solar Applications, 327 S.W.3d at 109; Tractebel Energy, 118 S.W.3d at 70.
2. Purported sub-lease
Next, appellants contend that Seawall attempted to sublet the premises
without permission in violation of the lease terms. Paragraph 14.01 of the lease
17
provides that “Tenant . . . shall not sublet the Lease Premises . . . without the
express prior written consent of the Landlord, which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld[,] conditioned[,] or delayed by Landlord.” It is undisputed
that Sajida never gave Seawall express written permission to sublease 601
Broadway.
There are, however, a couple of interesting things to note about the
agreement that appellants rely on in arguing appellees breached the no-sublease-
without-permission lease provision. First, while the lease for 601 Broadway was
between Sajida and Seawall, the lease agreement appellants rely on as a “sublease”
was between JB Rental and Beach Store Investments. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the JB Rental/Beach Store agreement was executed on March 1, 2021,
several weeks before there was even a draft lease agreement for 601 Broadway and
over a month before the final version of the 601 Broadway lease agreement was to
be signed. Although appellants cite Bashir’s testimony in which he revealed that
the ultimate goal after Seawall bought 601 Broadway was to transfer it to JB
Rental, appellants offer no explanation as to how a leasing agreement between
nonsignatories to the 601 Broadway lease and executed before a draft of the 601
Broadway lease was even in existence could constitute a breach of the 601
Broadway lease. We decline to make such an argument for them. See Tex. R. App.
P. 38.1(i); Hotze v. IN Mgmt., LLC, 651 S.W.3d 19, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). The JB Rental/Beach Store agreement was clearly an
anticipatory agreement contingent on Seawall (or perhaps Bashir) purchasing 601
Broadway at some point and then transferring it to JB Rental; it was not a sublease
of the premises. Accordingly, we find no merit in appellants’ arguments regarding
a sublease.
3. Fuel supply contracts
18
Lastly regarding alleged breaches of the agreement by appellees, appellants
point out that appellees never assumed the fuel supply contracts for either 601 or
602 Broadway. Although appellants intermingle their arguments in discussing
these contracts, we will address the contracts separately for clarity purposes.
Under the lease agreement for 601 Broadway, Seawall agreed “to assume
the existing fuel agreement for the store[,] perform all obligations of [Sajida] as set
forth in the fuel agreement[, and] indemnify and hold [Sajida] harmless from any
loss claim or damages arising under the fuel agreement.” Seawall further agreed
that it had “no right or authority to execute any amendment, modification or
change to the existing fuel agreement and ha[d] no right or authority to execute a
new or different fuel agreement.” Appellants allege that Seawall never assumed the
fuel contract for 601 Broadway.2 As explained above, however, when a defendant
refuses to perform or repudiates a contract, a plaintiff may be excused from
actually tendering performance before seeking specific performance. See
DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 594. In such cases, the plaintiff may simply plead that
performance would have been tendered but for the defendant’s breach or
repudiation. Id.
Here, there was evidence that Sajida refused to sign the lease, turn over
possession of the store, or honor the option to buy. The evidence also supported the
conclusion that appellants were refusing to honor the larger agreement between the
parties that the purchase of the two stores was to be a package deal. Even more
important for our purposes here, it would not have made commercial sense for
Seawall to have assumed Sajida’s obligation under the fuel supply contract when
2
This section of appellants’ brief is a little hard to follow, but it does not appear that they
cite any evidence in support of this allegation. Although appellees appear to concede that they
did not initially assume obligations under the fuel contract for 601 Broadway, they assert that
once the option to purchase was exercised, they in fact made arrangements to assume the
contract.
19
Sajida was refusing to sign the lease or turn the store over to Seawall as the lease
required. Moreover, Seawall pleaded, presented evidence, and obtained a jury
verdict that it was ready, willing, and able to perform. Seawall also pleaded that it
was not required to perform due to Sajida’s refusal to do so. Although appellants
argue that Seawall was also required to obtain a jury finding on whether Sajida
refused to perform or repudiated, they do not cite any authority supporting that
assertion. This question is typically treated as a matter for the court to determine in
its exercise of equity jurisdiction, with only the ready, willing, and able inquiry
being reserved for the jury. See id. at 594–96; Chapman v. Olbrich, 217 S.W.3d
482, 491–92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Comm. on
Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Business,
Consumer, Insurance & Employment PJC 115.57 (2024).3 Accordingly, we see no
merit in appellants’ arguments regarding the fuel contract for 601 Broadway. 4
In the sales contract for 602 Broadway, the parties agreed that “the Seller
will assign, and the Buyer will assume, Fuel Agreement for fuel sales and
purchases at the Property. In connection with such assumption Buyer . . . shall
personally guarantee the obligations of the Buyer and shall secure the release of
Seller and its guarantors.” The Buyer was defined as Bashir or his assignee, which
ended up being JB Rental. Regarding the fuel contract for 602 Broadway,
appellants again generally assert that appellees (Bashir and JB Rental in this
instance) never assumed the contract, declined assignment of the contract, and
3
To the extent a jury question may have been required on refusal to perform or
repudiation, it would be deemed found under the circumstances presented. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
279.
4
To the extent appellants also intended to argue that Seawall’s failure to pay rent for 601
Broadway was a breach of the lease that prohibited specific performance as relief—in addition to
arguing that paying rent was a condition precedent—the same refusal-to-perform analysis applies
to resolve that argument. Seawall was not required to pay rent while Sajida was refusing to sign
the lease or turn over possession of the store.
20
instead came to a “mutual agreement” with the distributor to cont