Eva-Maria Frohn v. Shell US Hosting Company; Shell Trading (US) Company
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 13, 2026
Docket01-24-00571-CV
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Opinion issued November 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00571-CV
———————————
EVA-MARIA FROHN, Appellant
V.
SHELL US HOSTING COMPANY AND SHELL TRADING (US)
COMPANY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 234th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-07028
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal concerns whether Eva Frohn’s employment with Shell ended
because of “redundancy.” If so, conditional bonus agreements allowed her to obtain
certain bonus payments—and then Shell would have breached the applicable
Agreements by not making such payments.
A jury concluded that Shell did not breach the Agreements. Under the plain
terms of the contract and this record, the jury’s finding was supported. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Frohn’s employment and Bonus Agreements.
Frohn began working for Shell in London in 2001. Frohn was an at-will
employee. In 2010, she accepted a long-term international assignment in Houston as
a trading manager. Shell and Frohn extended her assignment several times. Frohn
worked in Houston for approximately 11 years until her November 2021 departure.
As a member of Shell’s trading organization, Frohn participated in Shell’s
Conditional Bonus Plan and Performance Share Plan, under which Shell issued
employees conditional cash bonuses (called Conditional Bonus Award Certificates)
and stock awards (called Performance Share Plan Award Certificates). The
conditional bonuses and performance shares were dependent on the employee’s
performance and required a three-year vesting period before the employee could
receive the award. Employees had to affirmatively accept the award and the terms
and conditions upon which awards were granted. Frohn received several conditional
bonus and share awards during her time with Shell.
No party disputes that Frohn received and accepted six awards from Shell at
issue here: her 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates and her
2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award Certificates (collectively, the
2
“Bonus Agreements”). Frohn’s 2019 conditional bonus vested on August 31, 2022,
Frohn’s 2020 conditional bonus vested on August 31, 2023, and Frohn’s 2021
conditional bonus vested on August 31, 2024. Frohn’s 2019 share award vested on
January 1, 2022, Frohn’s 2020 share award vested on January 1, 2023, and Frohn’s
2021 share award vested on January 1, 2024.
Critically, the Bonus Agreements provide that if an employee leaves Shell
before the vesting period, then those awards, as a general matter, lapse, and the
award recipient does not receive any portion of those awards.
The Bonus Agreements provide limited exceptions to the rule above.
Specifically, Frohn’s bonus certificates state she may receive her conditional
bonuses:
[i]f your employment ends because of your retirement (as determined
by the Committee), disability, injury, ill-health or redundancy . . . .
(Emphasis added).1
Frohn’s performance share certificates likewise state that she may receive her
share awards if she:
1
Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates are nearly
identical and provide, in relevant part, as follows:
If your employment ends because of your retirement (as determined by the
Committee), disability, injury, ill-health or redundancy, the Award will
continue subject to the Performance Condition but any growth element of
your Award will be prorated to reflect the time between the beginning of the
Performance Period and the date of termination of employment (for
avoidance of doubt, the notional amount of the Award will not be pro-rated).
3
leave[s] the Shell group before the end of the [vesting period] by reason
of . . . . Retirement (as determined by RDS), redundancy, disability,
injury, ill health or completion of a fixed-term contract . . . .
(Emphasis added).2
The question presented is whether Frohn’s employment ended because of
“redundancy.”
B. Events preceding Frohn’s departure.
Evidence showed the following (among other things). In March 2020, Frohn
informed her supervisor that she intended to leave Shell. Shell persuaded her to
remain by increasing her salary grade and granting additional conditional
compensation. According to Shell, the resulting compensation package aimed to
retain Frohn in Houston “for years to come.”
On June 22, 2021, Frohn informed Shell that she wished to end her Houston
assignment and repatriate to London for personal reasons. Shell expressed its desire
that she remain in Houston but agreed to assist with repatriation. The parties agreed
that Frohn would remain in her Houston position through November 30, 2021. She
worked through that date.
As the November 30 end date approached, Shell explored potential roles for
Frohn in London. Shell identified two potential positions associated with London.
2
Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award Certificates are
nearly identical as they apply here.
4
The first was a leadership role in “Project Punk,” a new initiative designed to
modernize Shell’s trading technology and systems. The second was the General
Manager of Low Carbon Fuels position.
Shell presented evidence that the Project Punk position was based in London,
maintained Frohn’s salary grade and commercial-bonus eligibility, drew upon her
crude-oil-trading experience, and permitted her to pursue other Shell positions if
they became available. Evidence showed that Shell wanted her in the position and
did not require Frohn to apply. Frohn considered the position but did not accept it.
Shell also encouraged Frohn to pursue the General Manager of Low Carbon
Fuels position in London. Shell presented evidence that the position involved trading
and management and carried the same salary grade. And while the position’s
description could have required Frohn to split time between London and Rotterdam,
Netherlands, the position’s description stated that “some flexibility regarding the
location of the role may be exercised depending on the mobility of the candidate.”
Frohn did not apply for the position or contact the person Shell identified to discuss
its location requirements.
After Frohn declined or failed to pursue the identified positions, Shell
classified her departure as a resignation. It determined that her unvested conditional
bonuses and performance shares had lapsed. Frohn did not submit a written
resignation or expressly state that she was resigning.
5
C. The Trial and Judgment.
Frohn sued Shell for breach of contract, fraud, and declaratory relief, alleging
that Shell improperly classified her departure as a resignation. The case went to trial.
Question No. 1 to the jury asked: “Did Shell fail to comply with the Bonus
Agreements?”3 The jury answered “No.” The jury also found in favor of Shell on
Frohn’s other claims. The trial court rendered a final take-nothing judgment in
Shell’s favor. Frohn appealed.
DISCUSSION
There is no dispute that the 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award
Certificates and the 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award
Certificates constitute valid and enforceable contracts between Frohn and Shell. The
parties dispute whether Shell breached those agreements. On appeal, Frohn argues
that her employment ended by reason of redundancy and that she therefore remained
entitled to the bonuses provided in the agreements. Frohn also argues that the trial
court improperly excluded evidence addressing redundancy. We disagree and
address each contention in turn.
3
The jury charge defined the “Bonus Agreements” as Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021
Conditional Bonus Award Certificates and her 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance
Share Plan Award Certificates.
6
A. Under its plain meaning, employment ends because of redundancy when
it ends because the employee is no longer needed.
Frohn contends that whether she left Shell by reason of redundancy presents
a question of contract construction that we review de novo, rather than a factual
question controlled by the jury’s verdict. She is correct that the meaning of
“redundancy” under the Bonus Agreements presents a question of law. But whether
her departure satisfies that meaning depends on the facts established at trial. We
begin with the meaning of the contractual term.
Neither Frohn nor Shell argue that the Bonus Agreements are ambiguous; they
are not. See URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018). We
interpret an unambiguous contract according to its “‘plain, ordinary, and generally
accepted meaning’ unless the instrument directs otherwise.” Id. at 764 (quoting
Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)). We examine
the entire writing and attempt to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that
none is rendered meaningless. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd.,
574 S.W.3d 882, 889 (Tex. 2019).
Here, the Bonus Agreements do not define the phrase employment ends
because of “redundancy.” We accord the “plain, ordinary, and generally accepted
meaning.” URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 764; accord Pathfinder Oil & Gas, 574 S.W.3d
at 888.
7
“Redundancy” means no longer being needed or useful. See, e.g.,
Redundancy, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1464 (3d ed. 2010) (“[T]he state
of being no longer needed or useful.”); see also Redundancy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1330 (12th ed. 2026) (“[T]he quality or state of being
redundant : superfluity.”). “Redundant,” in turn, means “no longer needed or useful:
superfluous.” Redundant, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1464 (3d ed. 2010).
Similarly, in the employment context, dictionaries define “redundancy” to
mean that an employee is no longer needed. See, e.g., Redundancy, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “redundancy” as, inter alia, “[a] situation in
which an employee is laid off from work because their employer no longer needs the
employee”); Redundancy, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/redundancy (defining
“redundancy” as “a situation in which someone loses their job because their
employer does not need them”); see also Redundancy, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY 1464 (3d ed. 2010) (“[C]hiefly Brit. the state of being no longer
employed because there is no more work available.”).
8
Accordingly, under the Bonus Agreements, Frohn’s employment ended
because of redundancy if her employment ended because Shell no longer needed
her—not if she unilaterally chose to leave for personal reasons.4
This interpretation does not resolve the appeal. Contract interpretation is a
question of law, but whether a party’s conduct constitutes compliance with the
contract may present questions of fact. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Stewart,
967 S.W.2d 419, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“The
court submits disputed fact questions to the jury only as far as a dispute exists
concerning a party’s failure to perform the contract.”).
With this interpretation in mind, we turn to whether legally and factually
sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Shell did not fail to comply with
the Bonus Agreements.
B. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that
Shell did not breach the Bonus Agreements.
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
on an issue on which it bears the burden of proof, the party “must demonstrate on
appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of
4
This meaning accords with other language in the Bonus Agreements. For example,
Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates state that
conditional bonus awards are “used by Members of [Shell] as, among other things,
an employment retention tool.” (Emphasis added). By creating a three-year vesting
period, Shell incentivized employees to work and give full effort for the entire
period.
9
the issue.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). “In
reviewing a ‘matter of law’ challenge, the reviewing court must first examine the
record for evidence that supports the [jury’s] finding, while ignoring all evidence to
the contrary.” Id. If there is no evidence to support the finding, then the reviewing
court will “examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is
established as a matter of law.” Id.
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of an
adverse finding on an issue on which it bears the burden of proof, the party must
show “that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 242. The reviewing court “must consider and weigh all of the
evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding
is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly
wrong and unjust.” Id. Under this standard, “a court must not merely substitute its
judgment for that of the jury” because “the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Golden Eagle Archery, Inc.
v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).
Here, legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that
Shell did not breach the Bonus Agreements in denying Frohn payments that she
could have obtained only if (as applicable here) her employment ended because of
redundancy.
10
Shell presented the following evidence:
• Frohn’s Houston position was not eliminated;
• Shell undertook a global restructuring known as Project Reshape, but that
Project Reshape did not affect Frohn’s position;
• Shell considered Frohn a valuable employee;
• Shell previously increased her compensation in March 2020 to retain her;
Frohn’s manager, John Dimech, expressed to Shell’s leadership his hope
that with the increased compensation package, “Eva will now anchor
herself in the US market and that will pay dividends for years to come.”
• Shell wanted her to remain in Houston in her position. Frohn testified that
after she told Dimech she wanted to repatriate to London, Dimech told her
“No, we really like what you’re doing. We would like for you to stay.”
Frohn similarly testified that “Shell wanted me to continue my assignment,
which would have been in that role.”5
• Frohn requested to repatriate to London for personal reasons;6
• Shell then identified a London-based Project Punk position for Frohn that
maintained her same salary grade and bonus eligibility; the Project Punk
position drew upon her experience, and one of the Project’s leaders
5
Evidence at trial also included an email from Dimech to Frohn stating:
Your role and assignment continue to exist in the US, and as per our
discussions. [sic] It is currently anticipated that your assignment will
conclude at the end of December 2021, given the critical role you play
in the team. Consequently, we do not wish to terminate your
assignment with STUSCO or give you notice to repatriate to the UK
at this time. . . . Given that you are a real talent in the T&S community
the company is seeking to ensure it retains you [as] an employee if it
can.
Additionally, Dimech emailed HR personnel, that “[t]he plan is for [Frohn]
to remain in her current role and her assignment date will be adjusted
thereafter.”
6
Frohn testified that her father was unwell and that she needed to be able to spend
more time with him.
11
recommended Frohn for the position. Evidence showed Frohn was a strong
fit for the position, and she did not have to apply for it. Frohn considered
the position but did not accept it.
• Shell identified the General Manager of Low Carbon Fuels position as
another possible opportunity in London; the position had the same salary
grade as her position in Houston and required the same experience and
expertise Frohn had. And while the position’s description could have
required Frohn to split time between London and Rotterdam, Netherlands,
the position’s description stated that “some flexibility regarding the
location of the role may be exercised depending on the mobility of the
candidate.” Frohn did not apply for the position or contact Shell to discuss
its location requirements; and
• Shell personnel concluded that Frohn’s rejection of those opportunities did
not qualify her for the redundancy exception under the Bonus Agreements.
Viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, reasonable and
fair-minded jurors could conclude that Frohn did not prove that she left by reason of
redundancy, i.e., that her employment ended because she was no longer needed. See
Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241; City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.
2005). Legally sufficient evidence thus supports the jury’s finding.
Factually sufficient evidence supports it, too. The jury’s finding is not against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at
242. Frohn presented evidence supporting her redundancy theory, including the
conclusion of her Houston assignment, the absence of the same position, Shell’s
initial use of the repatriation process, and her lack of a formal resignation. But the
jury also heard contrary evidence that Shell wanted her to remain employed, that
12
Shell wanted to retain her in Houston, and that Shell identified employment
opportunities for her in London (when she expressed a desire to move to London).
The jury was entitled to weigh the evidence, evaluate the testimony, and
resolve conflicts in testimony. See id.; Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761–
62. On this record, we cannot conclude that the jury’s finding was so contrary to the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242.
C. Frohn cannot use Shell’s policy and guidance documents to alter the
Bonus Agreements’ meaning of “redundancy.”
Frohn relies heavily on three policy and guidance documents not referenced
or incorporated in the Bonus Agreements to support her claim that she left by reason
of redundancy: Shell’s U.K. Redundancy Hub policy, International Mobility policy,
and the Project Reshape FAQs. Frohn argues that under these polices, when a U.K.
Based Country employee reaches the end of their international assignment, like
Frohn here, the employee leaves by reason of redundancy even if the employee
rejects an offer of suitable alternative employment. Frohn thus argues that these
policies establish that she left Shell by reason of redundancy because her
international assignment ended. We disagree.
“The parol evidence rule bars consideration of evidence that contradicts,
varies, or adds to the terms of an unambiguous written agreement.” Barrow-Shaver
13
Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. 2019). As the Texas
Supreme Court has aptly explained:
Parties cannot rely on extrinsic evidence to give the contract a meaning
different from that which its language imports, add to, alter, or
contradict the terms contained within the agreement itself, make the
language say what it unambiguously does not say, or show that the
parties probably meant, or could have meant, something other than
what their agreement stated.
URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 769 (citation modified); see also Devon Energy
Prod. Co. v. Sheppard, 668 S.W.3d 332, 343 (Tex. 2023) (unambiguous contracts
must be enforced as written without considering extrinsic evidence).
We have construed the phrase employment ends because of “redundancy” in
accordance with its plain meaning: when employment ends because the employee is
no longer needed. Frohn cannot use separate policies to alter the plain meaning of
“redundancy” established by the Bonus Agreements or add a separate exception to
the agreements’ vesting requirements. See URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 769.
Moreover, we note that, not only were these policies not incorporated into or
referenced in the Bonus Agreements at issue, but in an employment-at-will situation
under Texas law, generally, an “employee policy handbook or manual does not, of
itself, constitute a binding contract for the benefits and policies stated” unless the
manual uses language clearly so stating. Parviz-Khyavi v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 395
S.W.3d 376, 381–82 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (quoting source
omitted); see also Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex.
14
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“Generally, employee handbooks and
policy manuals do not create implied contracts that modify the at-will-employment
relationship.”).
Here, the Bonus Agreements do not cite, reference, or incorporate the policy
documents in any way. The documents she references do not even refer to or discuss
conditional bonuses, share awards, vesting periods, or state an entitlement to any
bonuses or shares. Further, Frohn was not a party to and did not sign the polices;
they are general employment policies. Put simply, the polices do not form the basis
of the Bonus Agreements or create a contractual right to the disputed compensation.
See Parviz-Khyavi, 395 S.W.3d at 382; see also Washington v. Naylor Indus.
Services, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)
(“[Employee] had no employment contract with [Employer]. He was employed at
will. [Employer’s] internal policies do not constitute a contract with appellant.”).
If that were not enough, even if this Court were to consider such evidence,
there is still legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding.
Shell’s U.K. Redundancy Hub/Leaving Employment policy. This policy
provides: a job may become redundant for several reasons, including if:
• Its scope or nature of the job is required, due to business reasons, to
substantially change,
• The job is relocated to a different area or jurisdiction,
15
• The job no longer exists or there are fewer roles following a reorganisation
of the workplace, or,
• There is a closure of the work location.
Considering this policy, there was still legally and factually sufficient evidence
supporting the jury’s finding. Evidence showed that Frohn’s Houston position
continued to exist, Project Reshape did not affect that position, Shell wanted her to
remain in it, and Frohn initiated repatriation for personal reasons.
International Mobility – Long-Term International Assignment – End of
Assignment Policy. Frohn likewise relies on language from this document
discussing “severance situations,” which it describes as encompassing the following
(among others): “Where the expatriate’s assignment comes to an end either as
planned or unexpectedly and where they and the parent business have been
unsuccessful in securing a new position.” Frohn does not explain why or how this
policy (and its discussion of severance or redundancy in that context) would control
the meaning of the phrase “employment ends because of redundancy” in the Bonus
Agreements at issue (even if this were not parol evidence). Moreover, considering
all of the evidence set forth above and this policy, Shell presented sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s finding that Frohn’s employment did not end because of
redundancy.
Project Reshape FAQs. Next, Frohn relies on the following paragraph from
the Project Reshape FAQs:
16
We will assist potentially impacted employees in securing suitable,
alternative employment where available. If suitable alternative
employment is found, a UK local employee is free to accept/reject an
offer of alternative employment. If accepted, the employee is treated as
not having been dismissed. An offer of alternative employment can be
rejected, in which case the employee will be able to apply for positions
in the proposed Supplementary Resourcing round. If the employee
remains unplaced and if a position is rejected unreasonably and, in the
opinion of the Shell employing company, the offer was of suitable
alternative employment, the employee loses the right to statutory
redundancy payment but is still dismissed by reason of redundancy. In
these circumstances the Shell employing company would consider (as
is within its discretion to do so) not paying any enhanced discretionary
redundancy payments.
(Emphasis added). This language does not apply to Frohn’s departure for several
reasons. First, evidence at trial showed that Project Reshape applied only to local
employees and positions in the United Kingdom; evidence also showed that Frohn
was not a local U.K. employee, and Frohn’s position in Houston was not impacted
by Project Reshape. Frohn’s Houston position remained intact. Second, evidence
established that the above language applied to U.K. employees who left Shell under
Project Reshape. Finally, the FAQs do not address vesting under the Conditional
Bonus Plan or Performance Share Plan. The document does not state that an
employee classified as redundant under the FAQs satisfies the redundancy exception
in the Bonus Agreements at issue. The FAQs do not conclusively establish Frohn
satisfied the Bonus Agreements’ redundancy exception.7
7
Frohn also argues that she never submitted a written resignation and never expressly
stated orally that she was resigning. Frohn relies on the UK Resignation Policy,
17
Shell’s policy documents did not alter the Bonus Agreements’ meaning of
“redundancy,” create an additional exception to their vesting requirements, or entitle
Frohn to the disputed awards.
D. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding excerpts
of articles on redundancy.
Frohn says the trial court abused its discretion in excluding excerpts from
articles concerning U.K. redundancy practices. Frohn argues her expert relied on the
articles, which, she says, support her position that an employee who unreasonably
rejects suitable alternative employment remains dismissed by redundancy.
A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it rules “without regard for any guiding rules or
principles.” Id. (quoting source omitted). The reviewing court “must uphold the trial
court’s evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling.” Id.
Additionally, an appellate court “will not reverse a trial court for an erroneous
evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper
which states: “You may terminate your employment at any time by giving, to your
manager, written notice as detailed in your contract of employment.” (Emphasis
added.). That argument likewise fails. The policy uses the permissive term “may.”
It does not state that written notice is the exclusive means by which an employee
may voluntarily relinquish employment. Also, Frohn, an at-will employee, did not
have a “contract of employment.” Further, Frohn’s argument assumes that because
she did not formally resign, she necessarily left by reason of redundancy. On this
record, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding.
18
judgment.” Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Diamond Offshore Servs. v.
Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 551 (Tex. 2018).
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(18) imposes prerequisites as to statements from
publications like the articles Frohn sought to introduce. It states:
Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A
statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross
examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination; and
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s
admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by
judicial notice.
TEX. R. EVID. 803(18). Even when those requirements are satisfied, “the statement
may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.” Id.
On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court reviewed
Dr. Werner’s (Frohn’s expert’s) deposition and found that he did not rely on the
articles (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 52 and 53) in forming his opinion (rather than viewing
them as confirming an opinion he had already reached). The trial court further found
that Dr. Werner did not know and had never used or relied on Personnel Today, the
publication from which the articles were drawn, and did not establish that the articles
were reliable authorities on the question at issue. Frohn does not dispute the trial
court’s findings. The trial court’s decision not to admit these articles for use in the
expert’s testimony does not reflect an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Robinson v.
19
Warner-Lambert, 998 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.)
(upholding exclusion when no expert testified that he relied on the article); see also
In re R.F., 650 S.W.3d 600, 606–07 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (upholding
exclusion when expert had not been questioned about the published articles or that
he relied upon them). Moreover, to the extent Frohn offered the articles themselves
as exhibits, Rule 803(18) foreclosed their admission; qualifying passages could have
been read to the jury, not used exhibits.8
In any event, the exclusion here was also harmless. “Exclusion [of evidence]
is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative or if the rest of the evidence was
so one-sided that the error likely made no difference in the judgment.” Gunn v.
McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 668 (Tex. 2018). Frohn describes the two excluded articles
as “offer[ing] additional corroboration that Frohn left by reason of redundancy.”
(Emphasis added). More precisely, the articles allegedly corroborated her
proposition that an employee who unreasonably rejects suitable alternative
employment may remain dismissed by reason of redundancy.
The jury heard substantially the same proposition from evidence admitted at
trial. The excluded articles would have been cumulative. See, e.g., Interstate
8
The trial court also ruled under Rule 203. Under that rule, the trial court determines
foreign law. TEX. R. EVID. 203. Rule 203 requires a party raising foreign law to
provide written notice and timely furnish the materials on which the party intends
to rely. Id.
20
Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily, this
Court will not reverse a judgment because a trial court excluded evidence when the
evidence in question is cumulative and not controlling on a material issue dispositive
to the case.”); Rawson v. Oxea Corp., 557 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2016, pet. dism’d) (affirming exclusion of evidence; appellant failed to show
that the evidence was not cumulative of other evidence).
Moreover, the excluded articles addressed general U.K. redundancy principles
or practices. Frohn did not establish that those principles governed the Bonus
Agreements or that Frohn satisfied the exception in those agreements. Even if the
articles supported the general proposition Frohn asserted, they would not have
resolved the dispositive contractual inquiry here. Frohn has not shown that exclusion
of the articles probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP.
P. 44.1(a)(1); Williams, 542 S.W.3d at 551; Malone, 972 S.W.2d at 43.9
9
We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Frohn’s request for attorney’s fees under Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code and under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. A party must
prevail on a contract claim and recover damages to obtain attorney’s fees under
Section 38.001. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001; 1/2 Price Checks
Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 344 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Tex. 2011). She did not.
Further, a party may not use the UDJA to obtain attorney’s fees unavailable for a
“matured breach of contract” claim merely by recasting the same dispute as one for
declaratory relief. MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660,
670 (Tex. 2009) (rejecting request for attorney’s fees under Section 37.009).
Frohn’s requested declarations concerned the contractual rights and alleged breach
presented in her contract claim. See id. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
21
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jennifer Caughey
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil.
22