Full Opinion

Opinion issued November 13, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00571-CV ——————————— EVA-MARIA FROHN, Appellant V. SHELL US HOSTING COMPANY AND SHELL TRADING (US) COMPANY, Appellees On Appeal from the 234th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-07028 MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal concerns whether Eva Frohn’s employment with Shell ended because of “redundancy.” If so, conditional bonus agreements allowed her to obtain certain bonus payments—and then Shell would have breached the applicable Agreements by not making such payments. A jury concluded that Shell did not breach the Agreements. Under the plain terms of the contract and this record, the jury’s finding was supported. We affirm. BACKGROUND A. Frohn’s employment and Bonus Agreements. Frohn began working for Shell in London in 2001. Frohn was an at-will employee. In 2010, she accepted a long-term international assignment in Houston as a trading manager. Shell and Frohn extended her assignment several times. Frohn worked in Houston for approximately 11 years until her November 2021 departure. As a member of Shell’s trading organization, Frohn participated in Shell’s Conditional Bonus Plan and Performance Share Plan, under which Shell issued employees conditional cash bonuses (called Conditional Bonus Award Certificates) and stock awards (called Performance Share Plan Award Certificates). The conditional bonuses and performance shares were dependent on the employee’s performance and required a three-year vesting period before the employee could receive the award. Employees had to affirmatively accept the award and the terms and conditions upon which awards were granted. Frohn received several conditional bonus and share awards during her time with Shell. No party disputes that Frohn received and accepted six awards from Shell at issue here: her 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates and her 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award Certificates (collectively, the 2 “Bonus Agreements”). Frohn’s 2019 conditional bonus vested on August 31, 2022, Frohn’s 2020 conditional bonus vested on August 31, 2023, and Frohn’s 2021 conditional bonus vested on August 31, 2024. Frohn’s 2019 share award vested on January 1, 2022, Frohn’s 2020 share award vested on January 1, 2023, and Frohn’s 2021 share award vested on January 1, 2024. Critically, the Bonus Agreements provide that if an employee leaves Shell before the vesting period, then those awards, as a general matter, lapse, and the award recipient does not receive any portion of those awards. The Bonus Agreements provide limited exceptions to the rule above. Specifically, Frohn’s bonus certificates state she may receive her conditional bonuses: [i]f your employment ends because of your retirement (as determined by the Committee), disability, injury, ill-health or redundancy . . . . (Emphasis added).1 Frohn’s performance share certificates likewise state that she may receive her share awards if she: 1 Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates are nearly identical and provide, in relevant part, as follows: If your employment ends because of your retirement (as determined by the Committee), disability, injury, ill-health or redundancy, the Award will continue subject to the Performance Condition but any growth element of your Award will be prorated to reflect the time between the beginning of the Performance Period and the date of termination of employment (for avoidance of doubt, the notional amount of the Award will not be pro-rated). 3 leave[s] the Shell group before the end of the [vesting period] by reason of . . . . Retirement (as determined by RDS), redundancy, disability, injury, ill health or completion of a fixed-term contract . . . . (Emphasis added).2 The question presented is whether Frohn’s employment ended because of “redundancy.” B. Events preceding Frohn’s departure. Evidence showed the following (among other things). In March 2020, Frohn informed her supervisor that she intended to leave Shell. Shell persuaded her to remain by increasing her salary grade and granting additional conditional compensation. According to Shell, the resulting compensation package aimed to retain Frohn in Houston “for years to come.” On June 22, 2021, Frohn informed Shell that she wished to end her Houston assignment and repatriate to London for personal reasons. Shell expressed its desire that she remain in Houston but agreed to assist with repatriation. The parties agreed that Frohn would remain in her Houston position through November 30, 2021. She worked through that date. As the November 30 end date approached, Shell explored potential roles for Frohn in London. Shell identified two potential positions associated with London. 2 Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award Certificates are nearly identical as they apply here. 4 The first was a leadership role in “Project Punk,” a new initiative designed to modernize Shell’s trading technology and systems. The second was the General Manager of Low Carbon Fuels position. Shell presented evidence that the Project Punk position was based in London, maintained Frohn’s salary grade and commercial-bonus eligibility, drew upon her crude-oil-trading experience, and permitted her to pursue other Shell positions if they became available. Evidence showed that Shell wanted her in the position and did not require Frohn to apply. Frohn considered the position but did not accept it. Shell also encouraged Frohn to pursue the General Manager of Low Carbon Fuels position in London. Shell presented evidence that the position involved trading and management and carried the same salary grade. And while the position’s description could have required Frohn to split time between London and Rotterdam, Netherlands, the position’s description stated that “some flexibility regarding the location of the role may be exercised depending on the mobility of the candidate.” Frohn did not apply for the position or contact the person Shell identified to discuss its location requirements. After Frohn declined or failed to pursue the identified positions, Shell classified her departure as a resignation. It determined that her unvested conditional bonuses and performance shares had lapsed. Frohn did not submit a written resignation or expressly state that she was resigning. 5 C. The Trial and Judgment. Frohn sued Shell for breach of contract, fraud, and declaratory relief, alleging that Shell improperly classified her departure as a resignation. The case went to trial. Question No. 1 to the jury asked: “Did Shell fail to comply with the Bonus Agreements?”3 The jury answered “No.” The jury also found in favor of Shell on Frohn’s other claims. The trial court rendered a final take-nothing judgment in Shell’s favor. Frohn appealed. DISCUSSION There is no dispute that the 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates and the 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award Certificates constitute valid and enforceable contracts between Frohn and Shell. The parties dispute whether Shell breached those agreements. On appeal, Frohn argues that her employment ended by reason of redundancy and that she therefore remained entitled to the bonuses provided in the agreements. Frohn also argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence addressing redundancy. We disagree and address each contention in turn. 3 The jury charge defined the “Bonus Agreements” as Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates and her 2019, 2020, and 2021 Performance Share Plan Award Certificates. 6 A. Under its plain meaning, employment ends because of redundancy when it ends because the employee is no longer needed. Frohn contends that whether she left Shell by reason of redundancy presents a question of contract construction that we review de novo, rather than a factual question controlled by the jury’s verdict. She is correct that the meaning of “redundancy” under the Bonus Agreements presents a question of law. But whether her departure satisfies that meaning depends on the facts established at trial. We begin with the meaning of the contractual term. Neither Frohn nor Shell argue that the Bonus Agreements are ambiguous; they are not. See URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018). We interpret an unambiguous contract according to its “‘plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning’ unless the instrument directs otherwise.” Id. at 764 (quoting Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)). We examine the entire writing and attempt to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none is rendered meaningless. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 889 (Tex. 2019). Here, the Bonus Agreements do not define the phrase employment ends because of “redundancy.” We accord the “plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning.” URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 764; accord Pathfinder Oil & Gas, 574 S.W.3d at 888. 7 “Redundancy” means no longer being needed or useful. See, e.g., Redundancy, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1464 (3d ed. 2010) (“[T]he state of being no longer needed or useful.”); see also Redundancy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1330 (12th ed. 2026) (“[T]he quality or state of being redundant : superfluity.”). “Redundant,” in turn, means “no longer needed or useful: superfluous.” Redundant, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1464 (3d ed. 2010). Similarly, in the employment context, dictionaries define “redundancy” to mean that an employee is no longer needed. See, e.g., Redundancy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “redundancy” as, inter alia, “[a] situation in which an employee is laid off from work because their employer no longer needs the employee”); Redundancy, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/redundancy (defining “redundancy” as “a situation in which someone loses their job because their employer does not need them”); see also Redundancy, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1464 (3d ed. 2010) (“[C]hiefly Brit. the state of being no longer employed because there is no more work available.”). 8 Accordingly, under the Bonus Agreements, Frohn’s employment ended because of redundancy if her employment ended because Shell no longer needed her—not if she unilaterally chose to leave for personal reasons.4 This interpretation does not resolve the appeal. Contract interpretation is a question of law, but whether a party’s conduct constitutes compliance with the contract may present questions of fact. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“The court submits disputed fact questions to the jury only as far as a dispute exists concerning a party’s failure to perform the contract.”). With this interpretation in mind, we turn to whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Shell did not fail to comply with the Bonus Agreements. B. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Shell did not breach the Bonus Agreements. When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding on an issue on which it bears the burden of proof, the party “must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of 4 This meaning accords with other language in the Bonus Agreements. For example, Frohn’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 Conditional Bonus Award Certificates state that conditional bonus awards are “used by Members of [Shell] as, among other things, an employment retention tool.” (Emphasis added). By creating a three-year vesting period, Shell incentivized employees to work and give full effort for the entire period. 9 the issue.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). “In reviewing a ‘matter of law’ challenge, the reviewing court must first examine the record for evidence that supports the [jury’s] finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary.” Id. If there is no evidence to support the finding, then the reviewing court will “examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law.” Id. When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of an adverse finding on an issue on which it bears the burden of proof, the party must show “that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 242. The reviewing court “must consider and weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” Id. Under this standard, “a court must not merely substitute its judgment for that of the jury” because “the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). Here, legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Shell did not breach the Bonus Agreements in denying Frohn payments that she could have obtained only if (as applicable here) her employment ended because of redundancy. 10 Shell presented the following evidence: • Frohn’s Houston position was not eliminated; • Shell undertook a global restructuring known as Project Reshape, but that Project Reshape did not affect Frohn’s position; • Shell considered Frohn a valuable employee; • Shell previously increased her compensation in March 2020 to retain her; Frohn’s manager, John Dimech, expressed to Shell’s leadership his hope that with the increased compensation package, “Eva will now anchor herself in the US market and that will pay dividends for years to come.” • Shell wanted her to remain in Houston in her position. Frohn testified that after she told Dimech she wanted to repatriate to London, Dimech told her “No, we really like what you’re doing. We would like for you to stay.” Frohn similarly testified that “Shell wanted me to continue my assignment, which would have been in that role.”5 • Frohn requested to repatriate to London for personal reasons;6 • Shell then identified a London-based Project Punk position for Frohn that maintained her same salary grade and bonus eligibility; the Project Punk position drew upon her experience, and one of the Project’s leaders 5 Evidence at trial also included an email from Dimech to Frohn stating: Your role and assignment continue to exist in the US, and as per our discussions. [sic] It is currently anticipated that your assignment will conclude at the end of December 2021, given the critical role you play in the team. Consequently, we do not wish to terminate your assignment with STUSCO or give you notice to repatriate to the UK at this time. . . . Given that you are a real talent in the T&S community the company is seeking to ensure it retains you [as] an employee if it can. Additionally, Dimech emailed HR personnel, that “[t]he plan is for [Frohn] to remain in her current role and her assignment date will be adjusted thereafter.” 6 Frohn testified that her father was unwell and that she needed to be able to spend more time with him. 11 recommended Frohn for the position. Evidence showed Frohn was a strong fit for the position, and she did not have to apply for it. Frohn considered the position but did not accept it. • Shell identified the General Manager of Low Carbon Fuels position as another possible opportunity in London; the position had the same salary grade as her position in Houston and required the same experience and expertise Frohn had. And while the position’s description could have required Frohn to split time between London and Rotterdam, Netherlands, the position’s description stated that “some flexibility regarding the location of the role may be exercised depending on the mobility of the candidate.” Frohn did not apply for the position or contact Shell to discuss its location requirements; and • Shell personnel concluded that Frohn’s rejection of those opportunities did not qualify her for the redundancy exception under the Bonus Agreements. Viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, reasonable and fair-minded jurors could conclude that Frohn did not prove that she left by reason of redundancy, i.e., that her employment ended because she was no longer needed. See Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 241; City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Legally sufficient evidence thus supports the jury’s finding. Factually sufficient evidence supports it, too. The jury’s finding is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. Frohn presented evidence supporting her redundancy theory, including the conclusion of her Houston assignment, the absence of the same position, Shell’s initial use of the repatriation process, and her lack of a formal resignation. But the jury also heard contrary evidence that Shell wanted her to remain employed, that 12 Shell wanted to retain her in Houston, and that Shell identified employment opportunities for her in London (when she expressed a desire to move to London). The jury was entitled to weigh the evidence, evaluate the testimony, and resolve conflicts in testimony. See id.; Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761– 62. On this record, we cannot conclude that the jury’s finding was so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. C. Frohn cannot use Shell’s policy and guidance documents to alter the Bonus Agreements’ meaning of “redundancy.” Frohn relies heavily on three policy and guidance documents not referenced or incorporated in the Bonus Agreements to support her claim that she left by reason of redundancy: Shell’s U.K. Redundancy Hub policy, International Mobility policy, and the Project Reshape FAQs. Frohn argues that under these polices, when a U.K. Based Country employee reaches the end of their international assignment, like Frohn here, the employee leaves by reason of redundancy even if the employee rejects an offer of suitable alternative employment. Frohn thus argues that these policies establish that she left Shell by reason of redundancy because her international assignment ended. We disagree. “The parol evidence rule bars consideration of evidence that contradicts, varies, or adds to the terms of an unambiguous written agreement.” Barrow-Shaver 13 Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. 2019). As the Texas Supreme Court has aptly explained: Parties cannot rely on extrinsic evidence to give the contract a meaning different from that which its language imports, add to, alter, or contradict the terms contained within the agreement itself, make the language say what it unambiguously does not say, or show that the parties probably meant, or could have meant, something other than what their agreement stated. URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 769 (citation modified); see also Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Sheppard, 668 S.W.3d 332, 343 (Tex. 2023) (unambiguous contracts must be enforced as written without considering extrinsic evidence). We have construed the phrase employment ends because of “redundancy” in accordance with its plain meaning: when employment ends because the employee is no longer needed. Frohn cannot use separate policies to alter the plain meaning of “redundancy” established by the Bonus Agreements or add a separate exception to the agreements’ vesting requirements. See URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 769. Moreover, we note that, not only were these policies not incorporated into or referenced in the Bonus Agreements at issue, but in an employment-at-will situation under Texas law, generally, an “employee policy handbook or manual does not, of itself, constitute a binding contract for the benefits and policies stated” unless the manual uses language clearly so stating. Parviz-Khyavi v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 376, 381–82 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (quoting source omitted); see also Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex. 14 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“Generally, employee handbooks and policy manuals do not create implied contracts that modify the at-will-employment relationship.”). Here, the Bonus Agreements do not cite, reference, or incorporate the policy documents in any way. The documents she references do not even refer to or discuss conditional bonuses, share awards, vesting periods, or state an entitlement to any bonuses or shares. Further, Frohn was not a party to and did not sign the polices; they are general employment policies. Put simply, the polices do not form the basis of the Bonus Agreements or create a contractual right to the disputed compensation. See Parviz-Khyavi, 395 S.W.3d at 382; see also Washington v. Naylor Indus. Services, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (“[Employee] had no employment contract with [Employer]. He was employed at will. [Employer’s] internal policies do not constitute a contract with appellant.”). If that were not enough, even if this Court were to consider such evidence, there is still legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding. Shell’s U.K. Redundancy Hub/Leaving Employment policy. This policy provides: a job may become redundant for several reasons, including if: • Its scope or nature of the job is required, due to business reasons, to substantially change, • The job is relocated to a different area or jurisdiction, 15 • The job no longer exists or there are fewer roles following a reorganisation of the workplace, or, • There is a closure of the work location. Considering this policy, there was still legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding. Evidence showed that Frohn’s Houston position continued to exist, Project Reshape did not affect that position, Shell wanted her to remain in it, and Frohn initiated repatriation for personal reasons. International Mobility – Long-Term International Assignment – End of Assignment Policy. Frohn likewise relies on language from this document discussing “severance situations,” which it describes as encompassing the following (among others): “Where the expatriate’s assignment comes to an end either as planned or unexpectedly and where they and the parent business have been unsuccessful in securing a new position.” Frohn does not explain why or how this policy (and its discussion of severance or redundancy in that context) would control the meaning of the phrase “employment ends because of redundancy” in the Bonus Agreements at issue (even if this were not parol evidence). Moreover, considering all of the evidence set forth above and this policy, Shell presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Frohn’s employment did not end because of redundancy. Project Reshape FAQs. Next, Frohn relies on the following paragraph from the Project Reshape FAQs: 16 We will assist potentially impacted employees in securing suitable, alternative employment where available. If suitable alternative employment is found, a UK local employee is free to accept/reject an offer of alternative employment. If accepted, the employee is treated as not having been dismissed. An offer of alternative employment can be rejected, in which case the employee will be able to apply for positions in the proposed Supplementary Resourcing round. If the employee remains unplaced and if a position is rejected unreasonably and, in the opinion of the Shell employing company, the offer was of suitable alternative employment, the employee loses the right to statutory redundancy payment but is still dismissed by reason of redundancy. In these circumstances the Shell employing company would consider (as is within its discretion to do so) not paying any enhanced discretionary redundancy payments. (Emphasis added). This language does not apply to Frohn’s departure for several reasons. First, evidence at trial showed that Project Reshape applied only to local employees and positions in the United Kingdom; evidence also showed that Frohn was not a local U.K. employee, and Frohn’s position in Houston was not impacted by Project Reshape. Frohn’s Houston position remained intact. Second, evidence established that the above language applied to U.K. employees who left Shell under Project Reshape. Finally, the FAQs do not address vesting under the Conditional Bonus Plan or Performance Share Plan. The document does not state that an employee classified as redundant under the FAQs satisfies the redundancy exception in the Bonus Agreements at issue. The FAQs do not conclusively establish Frohn satisfied the Bonus Agreements’ redundancy exception.7 7 Frohn also argues that she never submitted a written resignation and never expressly stated orally that she was resigning. Frohn relies on the UK Resignation Policy, 17 Shell’s policy documents did not alter the Bonus Agreements’ meaning of “redundancy,” create an additional exception to their vesting requirements, or entitle Frohn to the disputed awards. D. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding excerpts of articles on redundancy. Frohn says the trial court abused its discretion in excluding excerpts from articles concerning U.K. redundancy practices. Frohn argues her expert relied on the articles, which, she says, support her position that an employee who unreasonably rejects suitable alternative employment remains dismissed by redundancy. A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules “without regard for any guiding rules or principles.” Id. (quoting source omitted). The reviewing court “must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling.” Id. Additionally, an appellate court “will not reverse a trial court for an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper which states: “You may terminate your employment at any time by giving, to your manager, written notice as detailed in your contract of employment.” (Emphasis added.). That argument likewise fails. The policy uses the permissive term “may.” It does not state that written notice is the exclusive means by which an employee may voluntarily relinquish employment. Also, Frohn, an at-will employee, did not have a “contract of employment.” Further, Frohn’s argument assumes that because she did not formally resign, she necessarily left by reason of redundancy. On this record, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding. 18 judgment.” Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Diamond Offshore Servs. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 551 (Tex. 2018). Texas Rule of Evidence 803(18) imposes prerequisites as to statements from publications like the articles Frohn sought to introduce. It states: Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if: (A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination; and (B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice. TEX. R. EVID. 803(18). Even when those requirements are satisfied, “the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.” Id. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court reviewed Dr. Werner’s (Frohn’s expert’s) deposition and found that he did not rely on the articles (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 52 and 53) in forming his opinion (rather than viewing them as confirming an opinion he had already reached). The trial court further found that Dr. Werner did not know and had never used or relied on Personnel Today, the publication from which the articles were drawn, and did not establish that the articles were reliable authorities on the question at issue. Frohn does not dispute the trial court’s findings. The trial court’s decision not to admit these articles for use in the expert’s testimony does not reflect an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Robinson v. 19 Warner-Lambert, 998 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (upholding exclusion when no expert testified that he relied on the article); see also In re R.F., 650 S.W.3d 600, 606–07 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (upholding exclusion when expert had not been questioned about the published articles or that he relied upon them). Moreover, to the extent Frohn offered the articles themselves as exhibits, Rule 803(18) foreclosed their admission; qualifying passages could have been read to the jury, not used exhibits.8 In any event, the exclusion here was also harmless. “Exclusion [of evidence] is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative or if the rest of the evidence was so one-sided that the error likely made no difference in the judgment.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 668 (Tex. 2018). Frohn describes the two excluded articles as “offer[ing] additional corroboration that Frohn left by reason of redundancy.” (Emphasis added). More precisely, the articles allegedly corroborated her proposition that an employee who unreasonably rejects suitable alternative employment may remain dismissed by reason of redundancy. The jury heard substantially the same proposition from evidence admitted at trial. The excluded articles would have been cumulative. See, e.g., Interstate 8 The trial court also ruled under Rule 203. Under that rule, the trial court determines foreign law. TEX. R. EVID. 203. Rule 203 requires a party raising foreign law to provide written notice and timely furnish the materials on which the party intends to rely. Id. 20 Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily, this Court will not reverse a judgment because a trial court excluded evidence when the evidence in question is cumulative and not controlling on a material issue dispositive to the case.”); Rawson v. Oxea Corp., 557 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. dism’d) (affirming exclusion of evidence; appellant failed to show that the evidence was not cumulative of other evidence). Moreover, the excluded articles addressed general U.K. redundancy principles or practices. Frohn did not establish that those principles governed the Bonus Agreements or that Frohn satisfied the exception in those agreements. Even if the articles supported the general proposition Frohn asserted, they would not have resolved the dispositive contractual inquiry here. Frohn has not shown that exclusion of the articles probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Williams, 542 S.W.3d at 551; Malone, 972 S.W.2d at 43.9 9 We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Frohn’s request for attorney’s fees under Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. A party must prevail on a contract claim and recover damages to obtain attorney’s fees under Section 38.001. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001; 1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 344 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Tex. 2011). She did not. Further, a party may not use the UDJA to obtain attorney’s fees unavailable for a “matured breach of contract” claim merely by recasting the same dispute as one for declaratory relief. MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2009) (rejecting request for attorney’s fees under Section 37.009). Frohn’s requested declarations concerned the contractual rights and alleged breach presented in her contract claim. See id. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 21 CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Jennifer Caughey Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 22