Full Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 10, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-01079-CV XIAOSHA TIAN, Appellant V. WEI SHAO HEIRONIMUS, INDIVIDUALLY AND DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF MID-AMERICAN SUPPLY CORP., Appellee On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-14920 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Barbare, and Lee Opinion by Justice Goldstein Xiaosha Tian appeals the trial court’s default judgment in favor of Wei Shao Heironimus, individually and derivatively on behalf of Mid-American Supply Corp., entered after striking Tian’s pleadings as a discovery sanction. In three issues, Tian argues the trial court erred in granting death-penalty sanctions, the trial court violated Tian’s due process rights by failing to enter a show cause order before issuing death penalty sanctions, and the trial court lacked evidence and failed to make required findings in its contempt and sanctions order.1 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND The facts of this dispute are well known to the parties with a complex procedural history due to multiple lawsuits between the parties. We limit the factual and procedural background to those needed to address the issues on appeal. In October 2021, Heironimus filed her original petition against Tian. The following factual background is taken from Heironimus’ live petition. Mid- American is an export company established by Heironimus and Tian in 1996 as a Kansas corporation and merged into a Texas company with the same name in 2011. Tian owned 65% of Mid-American’s stock, and Heironimus owned 35%. 2019 Lawsuit In October 2019, Heironimus filed a lawsuit alleging that Tian prevented Mid- American from making certain profit distributions and “funneled significant amounts of Mid-American’s profits—to which all shareholders are entitled—into a separate entity that Tian solely owns and controls.” In December 2019, Tian filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss Heironimus’ lawsuit asserting that Heironimus lacked standing to bring derivative 1 Tian does not raise the issue of whether Heironimus had standing to bring her claims in his issues or in his arguments in his brief. Heironimus points out that, only in his statement of facts, Tian “discusses standing.” Because Tian has failed to brief this issue, we presume she has standing and do not further address the issue of Heironimus’ standing. –2– claims on behalf of Mid-American. Tian alleged that Heironimus had assigned all of her ownership interests in Mid-American to Tian and Heironimus had executed a loan agreement whereby Heironimus “had to repay a loan in full by December 31, 2018, or her equity interests in Mid-American would be automatically assigned to Tian.” In response, Heironimus alleged that, even if the loan agreement was legitimate and enforceable, its plain language established that “Heironimus would retain the majority of her ownership interests in Mid-American and, therefore, could still bring a derivative suit on behalf of Mid-American.” Heironimus alleged that Tian continued to treat Heironimus as “both a director and shareholder of Mid- American well after the alleged assignment of ownership interests.” In approximately May 2020, Tian took certain actions that resulted in the locking of Mid-American’s bank accounts at INTRUST Bank and the cessation of Mid- American’s business. In March 2021, the trial court in the 2019 lawsuit signed an order stating it had already granted Tian’s plea to the jurisdiction in February 2021 and had also granted Tian’s motion to dismiss under rule 91a Heironimus’ individual claims. Heironimus appealed to this Court, and the appeal remained pending as of Heironimus’ filing of her October 2021 original petition. In June 2021, Tian sent Heironimus notice of a special shareholder’s meeting to be held on July 7, 2021, for the purpose of removing Heironimus as a director of Mid-American and confirming Tian as the sole director of Mid-American. –3– Heironimus interpreted this meeting as Tian’s attempt “to gain sole control over Mid-American’s bank accounts (including the INTRUST Account) so that he could deplete the company’s funds and abscond with the money to China.” Heironimus attended the meeting and “prevented Tian’s unilateral efforts to remove Heironimus as a director of Mid-American and make himself the company’s sole director.” Nevertheless, on October 7, 2021, Heironimus received correspondence from INTRUST stating that Tian was the sole director of Mid-American, and Heironimus was no longer a director or officer of Mid-American and no longer had authority to control banking matters for Mid-American. The next day, Heironimus hired an attorney and advised INTRUST that there was no effective removal of Heironimus as a director or officer of Mid-American, she remained an officer of Mid-American, and she continued to have authority to control banking matters for Mid-American. 2021 Lawsuit At the time of the filing of Heironimus’ original petition, she had not received any response from INTRUST Bank. In her October 2021 verified original petition, Heironimus therefore sought declaratory judgment that: (l) Tian does not have the requisite authority to substitute himself as the sole authorized signor on the INTRUST Account, (2) INTRUST is not permitted to substitute Tian as the sole authorized signor on the INTRUST Account, (3) Tian does not have the requisite authority to solely direct the disposition of the funds in the INTRUST Account, and (4) INTRUST is not permitted to act on Tian’s instructions with respect to disposition of the funds in the INTRUST Account. –4– Heironimus also sought a temporary injunction to provide relief virtually identical to the relief she sought in her request for declaratory judgment. In November 2021, Tian filed his answer generally denying Heironimus’ claims and asserting as defenses 1) that Heironimus had “no individual standing to assert any claim against Tian either individually or derivatively;” 2) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel; 3) that Heironimus failed to comply with and cannot satisfy the mandatory prerequisites to bringing a derivative claim on behalf of Mid-American; 4) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by the business judgment rule; 5) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by consent or effective consent; and 6) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by the maxims of equity. By April 2022, Heironimus had filed multiple motions to compel Tian’s deposition testimony and discovery responses, and Heironimus filed a third motion to compel continuation of Tian’s deposition and second motion to compel discovery responses. In August 2022, a panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s March 2021 order granting Tain’s plea to the jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. In June 2024, Heironimus filed her second amended petition, the live pleading in the case, containing many of the same allegations as her original petition. In addition, the petition recounted that INTRUST Bank, recognizing a dispute regarding the funds in Mid-American’s bank accounts and the authority to control those accounts, had sought and obtained leave of court to interplead the funds at –5– issue into the trial court’s registry. The trial court dismissed INTRUST from the case with prejudice, and INTRUST interpleaded all the funds from the accounts into the trial court’s registry. The petition asserted, among other things, causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and money had and received stemming from Tian’s alleged misappropriation of Mid-American’s assets. Tian filed no amended answer in response to the additional clauses of action. On June 28, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Heironimus’ motion to compel at which Tian and his defense counsel failed to appear. Heironimus’ counsel requested (1) a continuation of Tian’s deposition that was previously taken on December 30, 2021; (2) overruling of Tian’s objections to various discovery requests and an order compelling Tian to “give [Heironimus] some discovery in this case”; and (3) an award of attorney’s fees “in relation to both the filing of this motion and the prior deposition believed to have been “defended in violation of the rules.” By order signed that same date, the trial court compelled Tian to appear for the continuation of his deposition and, within ten days, provide full and complete written responses to Heironimus’ first requests for production of documents and materials responsive to Heironimus’ first requests for production. Regarding attorney’s fees, the order provided the following: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because the initial deposition of Defendant was defended in violation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees Plaintiff incurred in relation to (l) the preparation and taking of the initial deposition of Defendant, –6– which was held on December 30, 2021, until suspended by Plaintiff’s counsel under Rule 199.5(g) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) the expenses incurred in the retrieval and return of Defendant’s document production, and (3) the preparation and filing of this Motion. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to submit evidence supporting the amount of attorney’s fees she incurred in relation to the initial deposition of Defendant within ten (10) days of the date on which this Order is signed, and the Court will rule on the amount of the attorney’s fees award by submission and separate order. On July 19, 2024, Heironimus filed a motion for contempt and motion for sanctions under Rule 215 of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. The motion alleged that, as of the date of the motion, two weeks had passed since the court’s deadline for Tian to produce written responses and responsive documents to Heironimus’ requests for production, but Tian had still not produced any documents or responses and had not provided any dates for the continuation of his deposition. The motion requested that the court issue a finding that Tian was in contempt of the court’s prior order and impose the following sanctions against Tian: (l) an order striking all of Tian’s pleadings and defenses or, in the alternative, any sanction(s) the Court deems just as a result of (i) Tian’s failure to comply with the Order and (ii) long pattern of misconduct; and (2) an order requiring Tian to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by Plaintiff in filing this Motion and/or otherwise incurred by Plaintiff due to Tian’s failure to comply with the Order. On July 26, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions. Again, neither Tian nor his counsel appeared at the hearing. Heironimus’ counsel asserted that, since the case was reversed in Heironimus’ favor by the Court of Appeals, Tian had “not engaged in the discovery process by way of –7– not responding to discovery requests and not appearing actually for a previous trial setting that was set before” the trial court. Counsel noted that the continuation of Tian’s deposition was set for the following week but complained that he “did not have a single document by which we would be able to depose [Tian] on.” The trial court questioned counsel and confirmed that counsel had “zero document production” from Tian. The trial court then ruled orally on Heironimus’ motions as follows: The Court is granting the request for sanctions. The Court finds that it has given Mr. Tian the opportunity to comply. He has had plenty of time to respond to the discovery requests and he has still failed to produce documents or comply with the Court’s order. The Court has considered and indeed imposed less severe sanctions in an attempt to seek his compliance, and he has failed to do so. So at this point, the Court believes that it’s appropriate to strike Mr. Tian’s pleadings. And the Court is awarding the attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,875. Also on July 26, 2024, the trial court signed an order (1) ordering that Tian was in contempt of the trial court’s June 28, 2024 order granting Heironimus’ motion to compel continuation of deposition and discovery responses and (2) ordering that, “due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the Order and [Tian]’s violations of the discovery rules, all of [Tian]’s pleadings and defenses are hereby stricken from the record.” On the evening of July 26, 2024, Tian’s counsel filed a response to Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions. The response asserted, among other things, that the trial court granted Heironimus’ third motion to compel –8– continuation of Tian’s deposition and discovery responses on June 28, 2024, but Tian’s counsel was “very ill for several weeks during this time and therefore did not receive the last Notice of Deposition and missed it.” On this basis, counsel argued the trial court should deny Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions. Tian’s response was not verified, and no affidavits or other evidence supported the response. On July 31, 2024, Tian filed a motion to reconsider sanctions. The motion repeated counsel’s assertion that he was “very ill” and “did not timely receive the last Notice of Deposition because the filings were done using the general email address of the Law office that is hardly being used and thereby missed it.” This time, the motion was supported by, among other things, counsel’s affidavit stating that he has high blood pressure “which sometimes results in cardiac complications which may result in difficulties in breathing,” and his “situation became more severe during the end of June 2024 and the part of the month of July 2024.” The affidavit stated that, “[d]ue to [his] illness,” counsel “did not receive the June 28, 2024, Order from the Court granting [Heironimus’] Third Motion to Compel Continuation of Deposition and Second Motion to Compel Discovery nor [Heironimus’] Notice of Deposition.” Because of this, counsel “missed the scheduled deposition and failed to timely respond to discovery.” Also attached to the motion was an undated letter from a doctor stating that counsel was “evaluated in our clinic and is being followed by our providers for chronic health issues including elevated blood pressure related –9– to work related stress,” and it was “medically necessary to stabilize [counsel’s] health in the month of July.” A letter from another doctor stated that counsel visited on “2024 Jan 05”; counsel “should not travel, pending evaluation by cardiologist”; and counsel “should refrain from travel until Feb 5, 2024, or until released by cardiologist.” On August 5, 2024, Heironimus filed a motion for final default judgment asserting that, as a result of Tian’s answer being stricken for “intransigent refusal to comply with discovery rules,” Heironimus’ petition established liability. Heironimus attached to her motion “an expert’s affidavit to prove damages” and “her own affidavit to prove the [causal] nexus between liability and damages required for default judgment.” On August 14, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Tian’s motion to reconsider. Tian’s counsel addressed the “paragraph” counsel’s “colleague . . . put about” concerning the assertion that counsel “did not receive the orders of the 28th.” Counsel asserted that was “not the intended message that [counsel] wanted to pass” because “we have all along been consistent that we have received the Court orders, but it was because of my ill health that I was unable to respond to the Court orders.” Counsel clarified that “[w]hat we did not receive” was “the hearing notice of June 28th, which we missed and that’s why we did not attend.” At this point in counsel’s remarks, the trial court interrupted, and the following exchange followed: –10– THE COURT: Counsel, do you realize, though, that in your sworn affidavit you say that I did not receive your -- COUNSEL: That is the expression “received” that I’m saying, it was misconstrued. THE COURT: That’s not misconstrued. So either that’s a correct statement or it is incorrect. COUNSEL: It is not a correct statement. What I intended saying was that I did not respond to the orders. I apologize for that wrong communication, but that is not the spirit of my submission. Even if you look at paragraph 14 of our submission, we ask consistent that we didn’t receive the order. THE COURT: Well, I’m just going based on what you swore under oath was that you did not receive it, and because of this I missed the scheduled the deposition. That’s your words in your affidavit. COUNSEL: I agree, Your Honor, but I’m saying that, that is not what I intended. THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed. Counsel continued by asserting that Tian was “ready to come and help” counsel “respond to all of the deposition” if the court reinstated Tian’s pleadings. The trial court asked counsel why Tian was not present at the hearing, and counsel responded that “arranging a flight from China is complicated.” The trial court asked what counsel had done to respond to Heironimus’ discovery, and counsel stated he wanted “to go over the document[s] with [his] clients.” The trial court noted that the court “had an entire trial remotely with all of the witnesses in China and made it work.” In light of this, the trial court stated that it was not a “valid argument” for counsel to say that he could not “communicate with [his] client well enough to respond to –11– discovery because they live in China.” Counsel reiterated that, if given the opportunity, he would “respond to the document production.” Heironimus’ counsel pointed out, among other things, that the trial court entered an order requiring Tian to produce all responsive documents almost two months before the hearing, but “[n]ot one document ha[d] ever been produced in the entirety of this lawsuit” by Tian. Heironimus’ counsel argued the trial court had imposed “less severe sanctions” in the form of “the discovery order that was not complied with” before striking Tian’s pleadings. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Tian’s motion to reconsider. On August 30, 2024, the trial court signed a final default judgment awarding Heironimus $12,517,242 for Tian’s breach of fiduciary duty and ordering all proceeds formerly held by INTRUST deposited in the court’s registry disbursed to Heironimus. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS In his first issue, Tian complains that the trial court erred in “granting death- penalty sanctions striking a pleading and entering a default judgment thereafter.” Trial judges have the authority to impose just sanctions against a party that fails to comply with proper discovery requests or with an order to provide discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b). We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. See Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014); Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). In –12– reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion, we determine whether there is a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and whether the imposed sanction is excessive. See TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding). Rule 215.2(b) lists the sanctions that a court may impose. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b). Two standards govern whether a sanction is just: (1) a direct relationship must exist between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and (2) the sanction must not be excessive. Hizar v. Heflin, 672 S.W.3d 774, 789 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2023, pet. denied). In assessing the propriety of a sanction, we also consider whether it furthers the purposes of the sanctions rule, which are to secure the parties’ compliance with the discovery rules, to deter other litigants from violating the discovery rules, and to punish parties who violate the discovery rules. Id. at 788. Sanctions that effectively adjudicate a claim or preclude a decision on the merits of the case are known as death-penalty sanctions. Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d 358, 366 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). Rule 215 authorizes death-penalty sanctions, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(5), but their use is limited by additional rules. For one, death-penalty sanctions should not be used to deny a trial on the merits unless the court finds that (1) the offensive conduct justifies a presumption that the party’s claims or defenses lack merit and (2) it would be unjust to permit the party to present the substance of its position that was the subject of the withheld discovery. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2004). For another, death-penalty –13– sanctions must be used as a last resort, after the trial judge has considered lesser sanctions and, in all but the most exceptional and egregious cases, actually tested the effectiveness of lesser sanctions. Id. at 842; Gunn, 397 S.W.3d at 374–75. Here, Tian entirely failed to produce any documents in response to discovery despite the trial court’s June 28, 2024, order compelling Tian to appear for the continuation of his deposition and, within ten days, provide full and complete written responses to Heironimus’ first requests for production of documents and materials responsive to Heironimus’ first requests for production. As a lesser sanction, the order awarded Heironimus attorney’s fees incurred in relation to (l) the preparation and taking of the initial deposition of Defendant, which was held on December 30, 2021, until suspended by Plaintiff’s counsel under Rule 199.5(g) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the expenses incurred in the retrieval and return of Defendant’s document production; and (3) the preparation and filing of Heironimus’ motion to compel. Thereafter, Tian still did not produce any documents or responses and had not provided any dates for the continuation of his deposition. Only then did the trial court grant Heironimus’ request for sanctions and sign an order providing that, “due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the Order and [Tian]’s violations of the discovery rules, all of [Tian]’s pleadings and defenses are hereby stricken from the record.” In a response to Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions, Tian’s counsel asserted he was “very ill for several weeks during this time and therefore –14– did not receive the last Notice of Deposition and missed it.” In an affidavit attached to a separate motion to reconsider sanctions, Tian’s counsel asserted he “did not receive the June 28, 2024, Order from the Court granting [Heironimus’] Third Motion to Compel Continuation of Deposition and Second Motion to Compel Discovery nor [Heironimus’] Notice of Deposition.” At a subsequent hearing on Tian’s motion to reconsider, however, Tian’s counsel asserted that “we have all along been consistent that we have received the Court orders, but it was because of my ill health that I was unable to respond to the Court orders.” In response to questioning from the trial court, counsel explained that the expression “received” was “misconstrued.” Under these circumstances, and on this record, we conclude the trial court’s sanctions furthered the purposes of the sanctions rule, which are to secure the parties’ compliance with the discovery rules, to deter other litigants from violating the discovery rules, and to punish parties who violate the discovery rules. See Hizar, 672 S.W.3d at 788–89. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing death penalty sanctions against Tian and entering a default judgment against Tian. See Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 361; Unifund CCR Partners, 299 S.W.3d at 97. We overrule Tian’s first issue. In his second issue, Tian argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to enter a show cause order before issuing death penalty sanctions. In his third issue, Tian makes the related argument that the trial court lacked evidence and failed to make required findings in its contempt and sanctions order. In asserting –15– these issues, Tian advances arguments and cites authorities relevant to the proposition that contempt proceedings “are quasi-criminal in nature and therefore the party alleged to be in contempt must be personally served with a show cause order,” and a party must have “full and unambiguous notification of the contempt accusations.” Thus, in his second issue, Tian attributes the imposition of death penalty sanctions entirely to the trial court’s contempt finding; in his third issue, Tian complains of the lack of findings related to the “contempt order.” Tian’s arguments are based on the premise that the trial court’s imposition of death penalty sanctions was based on the trial court’s “contempt order.” However, the record does not support this characterization of events. The default judgment recites that the trial court struck Tian’s pleadings as a discovery sanction. The record is clear that all of the sanctions the trial court imposed were sought and granted in response to Tian’s violation of discovery rules. The trial court’s July 26, 2024, order provided that Tian was in contempt of the trial court’s June 28, 2024, order granting Heironimus’ motion to compel continuation of deposition and discovery responses but specifically struck Tian’s pleadings and defenses “due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the Order and [Tian]’s violations of the discovery rules.” Rule 215.2(b)(6) provides in pertinent part that the court in which the action is pending may, after notice and hearing, make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: –16– (6) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; There is no dispute that the trial court provided notice and held a hearing on motions to compel, for contempt, and for sanctions. Although the trial court found Tian in contempt, the specific sanctions sought and imposed were based on the list of sanctions, including rule 215.2(b)(5) (an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,…or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party). There is a distinction with a difference between rule 215 sanctions and seeking contempt of court, whether civil or criminal. As a general matter, civil contempt is remedial and coercive in nature, whereas criminal contempt is punitive. In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011). Critically, a civil contemnor “carries the keys to the jail cell in his or her pocket since the confinement is conditioned on obedience with the court's order.” Id. The distinction between criminal and civil contempt does not turn on whether the underlying litigation is civil or criminal, but rather on the nature of the court’s punishment. Id. Tian does not assert, and the record does not reflect, that confinement for violating discovery orders that necessitate different and specific contempt proceedings was contemplated. Death penalty sanctions are available under rule 215, as is notice and opportunity to be heard. On July 26, 2024, the court held the requisite hearing, to which Tian had notice and failed to appear. Thereafter, the trial court entertained Tian’s motion to reconsider the July 26 sanctions order specifically –17– requesting to reinstate the pleadings. In response, Heironimus asserted the long history of discovery abuse outlined in the motion to compel wherein the trial court considered the parties’ arguments and imposed less severe sanctions. To the extent the trial court’s order indicates Tian was found in contempt, necessitating a different procedure, the record is clear that Tian was not harmed by this circumstance because confinement, whether remedial and coercive or punitive in nature was not requested, contemplated, or imposed as a sanction. Accordingly, because Tian cannot show he was harmed by the trial court’s proceedings, relative to contempt, under which no sanction was issued, we overrule Tian’s second and third issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Bonnie Goldstein/ BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE –18–