Xiaosha Tian v. Wei Shao Heironimus, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Mid-American Supply Corp.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket05-24-01079-CV
JudgeGoldstein
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 10, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-01079-CV
XIAOSHA TIAN, Appellant
V.
WEI SHAO HEIRONIMUS, INDIVIDUALLY AND DERIVATIVELY ON
BEHALF OF MID-AMERICAN SUPPLY CORP., Appellee
On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-14920
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Barbare, and Lee
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
Xiaosha Tian appeals the trial court’s default judgment in favor of Wei Shao
Heironimus, individually and derivatively on behalf of Mid-American Supply Corp.,
entered after striking Tian’s pleadings as a discovery sanction. In three issues, Tian
argues the trial court erred in granting death-penalty sanctions, the trial court
violated Tian’s due process rights by failing to enter a show cause order before
issuing death penalty sanctions, and the trial court lacked evidence and failed to
make required findings in its contempt and sanctions order.1 We affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this dispute are well known to the parties with a complex
procedural history due to multiple lawsuits between the parties. We limit the factual
and procedural background to those needed to address the issues on appeal.
In October 2021, Heironimus filed her original petition against Tian. The
following factual background is taken from Heironimus’ live petition. Mid-
American is an export company established by Heironimus and Tian in 1996 as a
Kansas corporation and merged into a Texas company with the same name in 2011.
Tian owned 65% of Mid-American’s stock, and Heironimus owned 35%.
2019 Lawsuit
In October 2019, Heironimus filed a lawsuit alleging that Tian prevented Mid-
American from making certain profit distributions and “funneled significant
amounts of Mid-American’s profits—to which all shareholders are entitled—into a
separate entity that Tian solely owns and controls.”
In December 2019, Tian filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss
Heironimus’ lawsuit asserting that Heironimus lacked standing to bring derivative
1
Tian does not raise the issue of whether Heironimus had standing to bring her claims in his issues or
in his arguments in his brief. Heironimus points out that, only in his statement of facts, Tian “discusses
standing.” Because Tian has failed to brief this issue, we presume she has standing and do not further
address the issue of Heironimus’ standing.
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claims on behalf of Mid-American. Tian alleged that Heironimus had assigned all of
her ownership interests in Mid-American to Tian and Heironimus had executed a
loan agreement whereby Heironimus “had to repay a loan in full by December 31,
2018, or her equity interests in Mid-American would be automatically assigned to
Tian.” In response, Heironimus alleged that, even if the loan agreement was
legitimate and enforceable, its plain language established that “Heironimus would
retain the majority of her ownership interests in Mid-American and, therefore, could
still bring a derivative suit on behalf of Mid-American.” Heironimus alleged that
Tian continued to treat Heironimus as “both a director and shareholder of Mid-
American well after the alleged assignment of ownership interests.” In
approximately May 2020, Tian took certain actions that resulted in the locking of
Mid-American’s bank accounts at INTRUST Bank and the cessation of Mid-
American’s business.
In March 2021, the trial court in the 2019 lawsuit signed an order stating it
had already granted Tian’s plea to the jurisdiction in February 2021 and had also
granted Tian’s motion to dismiss under rule 91a Heironimus’ individual claims.
Heironimus appealed to this Court, and the appeal remained pending as of
Heironimus’ filing of her October 2021 original petition.
In June 2021, Tian sent Heironimus notice of a special shareholder’s meeting
to be held on July 7, 2021, for the purpose of removing Heironimus as a director of
Mid-American and confirming Tian as the sole director of Mid-American.
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Heironimus interpreted this meeting as Tian’s attempt “to gain sole control over
Mid-American’s bank accounts (including the INTRUST Account) so that he could
deplete the company’s funds and abscond with the money to China.” Heironimus
attended the meeting and “prevented Tian’s unilateral efforts to remove Heironimus
as a director of Mid-American and make himself the company’s sole director.”
Nevertheless, on October 7, 2021, Heironimus received correspondence from
INTRUST stating that Tian was the sole director of Mid-American, and Heironimus
was no longer a director or officer of Mid-American and no longer had authority to
control banking matters for Mid-American. The next day, Heironimus hired an
attorney and advised INTRUST that there was no effective removal of Heironimus
as a director or officer of Mid-American, she remained an officer of Mid-American,
and she continued to have authority to control banking matters for Mid-American.
2021 Lawsuit
At the time of the filing of Heironimus’ original petition, she had not received
any response from INTRUST Bank. In her October 2021 verified original petition,
Heironimus therefore sought declaratory judgment that:
(l) Tian does not have the requisite authority to substitute himself as the
sole authorized signor on the INTRUST Account, (2) INTRUST is not
permitted to substitute Tian as the sole authorized signor on the
INTRUST Account, (3) Tian does not have the requisite authority to
solely direct the disposition of the funds in the INTRUST Account, and
(4) INTRUST is not permitted to act on Tian’s instructions with respect
to disposition of the funds in the INTRUST Account.
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Heironimus also sought a temporary injunction to provide relief virtually identical
to the relief she sought in her request for declaratory judgment.
In November 2021, Tian filed his answer generally denying Heironimus’
claims and asserting as defenses 1) that Heironimus had “no individual standing to
assert any claim against Tian either individually or derivatively;” 2) that
Heironimus’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel; 3) that Heironimus failed to
comply with and cannot satisfy the mandatory prerequisites to bringing a derivative
claim on behalf of Mid-American; 4) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by the
business judgment rule; 5) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by consent or effective
consent; and 6) that Heironimus’ claims are barred by the maxims of equity.
By April 2022, Heironimus had filed multiple motions to compel Tian’s
deposition testimony and discovery responses, and Heironimus filed a third motion
to compel continuation of Tian’s deposition and second motion to compel discovery
responses.
In August 2022, a panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s March 2021
order granting Tain’s plea to the jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings.
In June 2024, Heironimus filed her second amended petition, the live pleading
in the case, containing many of the same allegations as her original petition. In
addition, the petition recounted that INTRUST Bank, recognizing a dispute
regarding the funds in Mid-American’s bank accounts and the authority to control
those accounts, had sought and obtained leave of court to interplead the funds at
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issue into the trial court’s registry. The trial court dismissed INTRUST from the case
with prejudice, and INTRUST interpleaded all the funds from the accounts into the
trial court’s registry. The petition asserted, among other things, causes of action for
breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and money had and received stemming from
Tian’s alleged misappropriation of Mid-American’s assets. Tian filed no amended
answer in response to the additional clauses of action.
On June 28, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Heironimus’ motion to
compel at which Tian and his defense counsel failed to appear. Heironimus’ counsel
requested (1) a continuation of Tian’s deposition that was previously taken on
December 30, 2021; (2) overruling of Tian’s objections to various discovery requests
and an order compelling Tian to “give [Heironimus] some discovery in this case”;
and (3) an award of attorney’s fees “in relation to both the filing of this motion and
the prior deposition believed to have been “defended in violation of the rules.” By
order signed that same date, the trial court compelled Tian to appear for the
continuation of his deposition and, within ten days, provide full and complete written
responses to Heironimus’ first requests for production of documents and materials
responsive to Heironimus’ first requests for production. Regarding attorney’s fees,
the order provided the following:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because the initial deposition of
Defendant was defended in violation of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant the
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees Plaintiff incurred in relation
to (l) the preparation and taking of the initial deposition of Defendant,
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which was held on December 30, 2021, until suspended by Plaintiff’s
counsel under Rule 199.5(g) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, (2)
the expenses incurred in the retrieval and return of Defendant’s
document production, and (3) the preparation and filing of this Motion.
Plaintiff is hereby ordered to submit evidence supporting the amount of
attorney’s fees she incurred in relation to the initial deposition of
Defendant within ten (10) days of the date on which this Order is
signed, and the Court will rule on the amount of the attorney’s fees
award by submission and separate order.
On July 19, 2024, Heironimus filed a motion for contempt and motion for
sanctions under Rule 215 of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. The motion alleged
that, as of the date of the motion, two weeks had passed since the court’s deadline
for Tian to produce written responses and responsive documents to Heironimus’
requests for production, but Tian had still not produced any documents or responses
and had not provided any dates for the continuation of his deposition. The motion
requested that the court issue a finding that Tian was in contempt of the court’s prior
order and impose the following sanctions against Tian:
(l) an order striking all of Tian’s pleadings and defenses or, in the
alternative, any sanction(s) the Court deems just as a result of (i) Tian’s
failure to comply with the Order and (ii) long pattern of misconduct;
and (2) an order requiring Tian to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, incurred by Plaintiff in filing this Motion
and/or otherwise incurred by Plaintiff due to Tian’s failure to comply
with the Order.
On July 26, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Heironimus’ motions for
contempt and sanctions. Again, neither Tian nor his counsel appeared at the hearing.
Heironimus’ counsel asserted that, since the case was reversed in Heironimus’ favor
by the Court of Appeals, Tian had “not engaged in the discovery process by way of
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not responding to discovery requests and not appearing actually for a previous trial
setting that was set before” the trial court. Counsel noted that the continuation of
Tian’s deposition was set for the following week but complained that he “did not
have a single document by which we would be able to depose [Tian] on.” The trial
court questioned counsel and confirmed that counsel had “zero document
production” from Tian. The trial court then ruled orally on Heironimus’ motions as
follows:
The Court is granting the request for sanctions. The Court finds that it
has given Mr. Tian the opportunity to comply. He has had plenty of
time to respond to the discovery requests and he has still failed to
produce documents or comply with the Court’s order.
The Court has considered and indeed imposed less severe sanctions in
an attempt to seek his compliance, and he has failed to do so. So at this
point, the Court believes that it’s appropriate to strike Mr. Tian’s
pleadings. And the Court is awarding the attorney’s fees in the amount
of $2,875.
Also on July 26, 2024, the trial court signed an order (1) ordering that Tian
was in contempt of the trial court’s June 28, 2024 order granting Heironimus’ motion
to compel continuation of deposition and discovery responses and (2) ordering that,
“due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the Order and [Tian]’s violations of the
discovery rules, all of [Tian]’s pleadings and defenses are hereby stricken from the
record.”
On the evening of July 26, 2024, Tian’s counsel filed a response to
Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions. The response asserted, among
other things, that the trial court granted Heironimus’ third motion to compel
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continuation of Tian’s deposition and discovery responses on June 28, 2024, but
Tian’s counsel was “very ill for several weeks during this time and therefore did not
receive the last Notice of Deposition and missed it.” On this basis, counsel argued
the trial court should deny Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions. Tian’s
response was not verified, and no affidavits or other evidence supported the
response.
On July 31, 2024, Tian filed a motion to reconsider sanctions. The motion
repeated counsel’s assertion that he was “very ill” and “did not timely receive the
last Notice of Deposition because the filings were done using the general email
address of the Law office that is hardly being used and thereby missed it.” This time,
the motion was supported by, among other things, counsel’s affidavit stating that he
has high blood pressure “which sometimes results in cardiac complications which
may result in difficulties in breathing,” and his “situation became more severe during
the end of June 2024 and the part of the month of July 2024.” The affidavit stated
that, “[d]ue to [his] illness,” counsel “did not receive the June 28, 2024, Order from
the Court granting [Heironimus’] Third Motion to Compel Continuation of
Deposition and Second Motion to Compel Discovery nor [Heironimus’] Notice of
Deposition.” Because of this, counsel “missed the scheduled deposition and failed
to timely respond to discovery.” Also attached to the motion was an undated letter
from a doctor stating that counsel was “evaluated in our clinic and is being followed
by our providers for chronic health issues including elevated blood pressure related
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to work related stress,” and it was “medically necessary to stabilize [counsel’s]
health in the month of July.” A letter from another doctor stated that counsel visited
on “2024 Jan 05”; counsel “should not travel, pending evaluation by cardiologist”;
and counsel “should refrain from travel until Feb 5, 2024, or until released by
cardiologist.”
On August 5, 2024, Heironimus filed a motion for final default judgment
asserting that, as a result of Tian’s answer being stricken for “intransigent refusal to
comply with discovery rules,” Heironimus’ petition established liability.
Heironimus attached to her motion “an expert’s affidavit to prove damages” and “her
own affidavit to prove the [causal] nexus between liability and damages required for
default judgment.”
On August 14, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Tian’s motion to
reconsider. Tian’s counsel addressed the “paragraph” counsel’s “colleague . . . put
about” concerning the assertion that counsel “did not receive the orders of the 28th.”
Counsel asserted that was “not the intended message that [counsel] wanted to pass”
because “we have all along been consistent that we have received the Court orders,
but it was because of my ill health that I was unable to respond to the Court orders.”
Counsel clarified that “[w]hat we did not receive” was “the hearing notice of June
28th, which we missed and that’s why we did not attend.” At this point in counsel’s
remarks, the trial court interrupted, and the following exchange followed:
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THE COURT: Counsel, do you realize, though, that in your sworn
affidavit you say that I did not receive your --
COUNSEL: That is the expression “received” that I’m saying, it was
misconstrued.
THE COURT: That’s not misconstrued. So either that’s a correct
statement or it is incorrect.
COUNSEL: It is not a correct statement. What I intended saying was
that I did not respond to the orders. I apologize for that wrong
communication, but that is not the spirit of my submission. Even if you
look at paragraph 14 of our submission, we ask consistent that we didn’t
receive the order.
THE COURT: Well, I’m just going based on what you swore under
oath was that you did not receive it, and because of this I missed the
scheduled the deposition. That’s your words in your affidavit.
COUNSEL: I agree, Your Honor, but I’m saying that, that is not what
I intended.
THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.
Counsel continued by asserting that Tian was “ready to come and help” counsel
“respond to all of the deposition” if the court reinstated Tian’s pleadings. The trial
court asked counsel why Tian was not present at the hearing, and counsel responded
that “arranging a flight from China is complicated.” The trial court asked what
counsel had done to respond to Heironimus’ discovery, and counsel stated he wanted
“to go over the document[s] with [his] clients.” The trial court noted that the court
“had an entire trial remotely with all of the witnesses in China and made it work.”
In light of this, the trial court stated that it was not a “valid argument” for counsel to
say that he could not “communicate with [his] client well enough to respond to
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discovery because they live in China.” Counsel reiterated that, if given the
opportunity, he would “respond to the document production.”
Heironimus’ counsel pointed out, among other things, that the trial court
entered an order requiring Tian to produce all responsive documents almost two
months before the hearing, but “[n]ot one document ha[d] ever been produced in the
entirety of this lawsuit” by Tian. Heironimus’ counsel argued the trial court had
imposed “less severe sanctions” in the form of “the discovery order that was not
complied with” before striking Tian’s pleadings. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial court denied Tian’s motion to reconsider.
On August 30, 2024, the trial court signed a final default judgment awarding
Heironimus $12,517,242 for Tian’s breach of fiduciary duty and ordering all
proceeds formerly held by INTRUST deposited in the court’s registry disbursed to
Heironimus. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In his first issue, Tian complains that the trial court erred in “granting death-
penalty sanctions striking a pleading and entering a default judgment thereafter.”
Trial judges have the authority to impose just sanctions against a party that
fails to comply with proper discovery requests or with an order to provide discovery.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b). We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. See Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014);
Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). In
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reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion, we determine whether there
is a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and
whether the imposed sanction is excessive. See TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell,
811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
Rule 215.2(b) lists the sanctions that a court may impose. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
215.2(b). Two standards govern whether a sanction is just: (1) a direct relationship
must exist between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and (2) the
sanction must not be excessive. Hizar v. Heflin, 672 S.W.3d 774, 789 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2023, pet. denied). In assessing the propriety of a sanction, we also consider
whether it furthers the purposes of the sanctions rule, which are to secure the parties’
compliance with the discovery rules, to deter other litigants from violating the
discovery rules, and to punish parties who violate the discovery rules. Id. at 788.
Sanctions that effectively adjudicate a claim or preclude a decision on the
merits of the case are known as death-penalty sanctions. Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d
358, 366 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). Rule 215 authorizes death-penalty
sanctions, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(5), but their use is limited by additional rules.
For one, death-penalty sanctions should not be used to deny a trial on the merits
unless the court finds that (1) the offensive conduct justifies a presumption that the
party’s claims or defenses lack merit and (2) it would be unjust to permit the party
to present the substance of its position that was the subject of the withheld discovery.
Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2004). For another, death-penalty
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sanctions must be used as a last resort, after the trial judge has considered lesser
sanctions and, in all but the most exceptional and egregious cases, actually tested the
effectiveness of lesser sanctions. Id. at 842; Gunn, 397 S.W.3d at 374–75.
Here, Tian entirely failed to produce any documents in response to discovery
despite the trial court’s June 28, 2024, order compelling Tian to appear for the
continuation of his deposition and, within ten days, provide full and complete written
responses to Heironimus’ first requests for production of documents and materials
responsive to Heironimus’ first requests for production. As a lesser sanction, the
order awarded Heironimus attorney’s fees incurred in relation to (l) the preparation
and taking of the initial deposition of Defendant, which was held on December 30,
2021, until suspended by Plaintiff’s counsel under Rule 199.5(g) of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure; (2) the expenses incurred in the retrieval and return of
Defendant’s document production; and (3) the preparation and filing of Heironimus’
motion to compel. Thereafter, Tian still did not produce any documents or responses
and had not provided any dates for the continuation of his deposition. Only then did
the trial court grant Heironimus’ request for sanctions and sign an order providing
that, “due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the Order and [Tian]’s violations of
the discovery rules, all of [Tian]’s pleadings and defenses are hereby stricken from
the record.”
In a response to Heironimus’ motions for contempt and sanctions, Tian’s
counsel asserted he was “very ill for several weeks during this time and therefore
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did not receive the last Notice of Deposition and missed it.” In an affidavit attached
to a separate motion to reconsider sanctions, Tian’s counsel asserted he “did not
receive the June 28, 2024, Order from the Court granting [Heironimus’] Third
Motion to Compel Continuation of Deposition and Second Motion to Compel
Discovery nor [Heironimus’] Notice of Deposition.” At a subsequent hearing on
Tian’s motion to reconsider, however, Tian’s counsel asserted that “we have all
along been consistent that we have received the Court orders, but it was because of
my ill health that I was unable to respond to the Court orders.” In response to
questioning from the trial court, counsel explained that the expression “received”
was “misconstrued.” Under these circumstances, and on this record, we conclude the
trial court’s sanctions furthered the purposes of the sanctions rule, which are to
secure the parties’ compliance with the discovery rules, to deter other litigants from
violating the discovery rules, and to punish parties who violate the discovery rules.
See Hizar, 672 S.W.3d at 788–89. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing death penalty sanctions against Tian and entering a default
judgment against Tian. See Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 361; Unifund CCR Partners, 299
S.W.3d at 97. We overrule Tian’s first issue.
In his second issue, Tian argues that the trial court violated his due process
rights by failing to enter a show cause order before issuing death penalty sanctions.
In his third issue, Tian makes the related argument that the trial court lacked evidence
and failed to make required findings in its contempt and sanctions order. In asserting
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these issues, Tian advances arguments and cites authorities relevant to the
proposition that contempt proceedings “are quasi-criminal in nature and therefore
the party alleged to be in contempt must be personally served with a show cause
order,” and a party must have “full and unambiguous notification of the contempt
accusations.” Thus, in his second issue, Tian attributes the imposition of death
penalty sanctions entirely to the trial court’s contempt finding; in his third issue, Tian
complains of the lack of findings related to the “contempt order.”
Tian’s arguments are based on the premise that the trial court’s imposition of
death penalty sanctions was based on the trial court’s “contempt order.” However,
the record does not support this characterization of events. The default judgment
recites that the trial court struck Tian’s pleadings as a discovery sanction. The record
is clear that all of the sanctions the trial court imposed were sought and granted in
response to Tian’s violation of discovery rules. The trial court’s July 26, 2024, order
provided that Tian was in contempt of the trial court’s June 28, 2024, order granting
Heironimus’ motion to compel continuation of deposition and discovery responses
but specifically struck Tian’s pleadings and defenses “due to Defendant’s failure to
comply with the Order and [Tian]’s violations of the discovery rules.”
Rule 215.2(b)(6) provides in pertinent part that
the court in which the action is pending may, after notice and hearing,
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
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(6) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an
order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
There is no dispute that the trial court provided notice and held a hearing on
motions to compel, for contempt, and for sanctions. Although the trial court found
Tian in contempt, the specific sanctions sought and imposed were based on the list
of sanctions, including rule 215.2(b)(5) (an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof,…or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party). There
is a distinction with a difference between rule 215 sanctions and seeking contempt
of court, whether civil or criminal. As a general matter, civil contempt is remedial
and coercive in nature, whereas criminal contempt is punitive. In Re Reece, 341
S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011). Critically, a civil contemnor “carries the keys to the
jail cell in his or her pocket since the confinement is conditioned on obedience with
the court's order.” Id. The distinction between criminal and civil contempt does not
turn on whether the underlying litigation is civil or criminal, but rather on the nature
of the court’s punishment. Id.
Tian does not assert, and the record does not reflect, that confinement for
violating discovery orders that necessitate different and specific contempt
proceedings was contemplated. Death penalty sanctions are available under rule 215,
as is notice and opportunity to be heard. On July 26, 2024, the court held the requisite
hearing, to which Tian had notice and failed to appear. Thereafter, the trial court
entertained Tian’s motion to reconsider the July 26 sanctions order specifically
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requesting to reinstate the pleadings. In response, Heironimus asserted the long
history of discovery abuse outlined in the motion to compel wherein the trial court
considered the parties’ arguments and imposed less severe sanctions.
To the extent the trial court’s order indicates Tian was found in contempt,
necessitating a different procedure, the record is clear that Tian was not harmed by
this circumstance because confinement, whether remedial and coercive or punitive
in nature was not requested, contemplated, or imposed as a sanction. Accordingly,
because Tian cannot show he was harmed by the trial court’s proceedings, relative
to contempt, under which no sanction was issued, we overrule Tian’s second and
third issues.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Bonnie Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE
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