Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Teton Global Investments Savi Holdings, E
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket14-25-00901-CV
JudgeBoatman
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00901-CV
MORRELL MASONRY SUPPLY, INC., Appellant
V.
TETON GLOBAL INVESTMENTS SAVI HOLDINGS, E, Appellee
On Appeal from the 234th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2021-47487
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A materials supplier sued a property owner to foreclose on its
mechanic’s and materialman’s lien. The trial court entered a take
nothing judgment in favor of the property owner. We are asked to
decide whether the trial court erred by either (1) improperly requiring
the materialman to show its materials were incorporated in the project,
or (2) refusing to award the property owner attorney’s fees. We
conclude the trial court did not require the materialman to show its
materials were incorporated in the project and did not abuse its
discretion in denying the property owner’s request for attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a construction project (the Project) on real
property (the Property). The Owner of the Property, Teton Global
Investments Savi Holdings, E, hired the General Contractor, R & L
Building Group, Inc., for the Project. The General Contractor in turn
hired the Subcontractor, Santos Castillo.
The Materialman, Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc., is a supplier of
masonry materials who alleged that the Subcontractor ordered
materials that were used in the Project but never paid for. The
Materialman filed suit against the Owner to foreclose on a statutory
mechanic and materialman’s lien on the Property under section 53.021
of the Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code § 53.021. The Owner
generally denied the Materialman’s allegations and argued that the
General Contractor never approved or authorized charges by the
Subcontractor, that the Subcontractor used the Project to obtain
materials for use on other projects, and that the Materialman’s affidavit
claiming a lien was defective and thus invalid.
The trial court denied motions for summary judgment filed by
both parties and issued a final judgment decreeing the Materialman’s
lien invalid and ordering removal of the lien after a bench trial.
Although both parties sought to recover their attorney’s fees, the trial
court denied both requests; it also filed extensive findings of fact and
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conclusions of law at the Materialman’s request. The Materialman now
appeals the trial court’s judgment against it, and the Owner cross
appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees.
ANALYSIS
The Materialman raises four issues on appeal. We address its
fourth issue first because it impacts our disposition of the remaining
issues, and we address those remaining issues in the order in which
they are briefed. We address the Owner’s cross appeal last.
I. Challenges to the Findings and Conclusions on
Incorporation of the Materials
In its fourth issue, the Materialman argues the trial court erred by
requiring it to prove its materials were incorporated into the Project
before recovering on the lien. The Materialman does not clarify
whether it challenges the findings of fact or the legal or factual
sufficiency of the evidence. It ultimately seeks rendition, however; we
thus construe its arguments as a legal sufficiency or “no evidence”
challenge. See Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176, 176-77
(Tex. 1986) (explaining well settled rule that “no evidence” points
require rendition in favor of appealing party); Milton M. Cooke Co. v.
First Bank & Tr., 290 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, no pet.). We further construe its arguments as challenging the
trial court’s conclusion of law that it was not entitled to foreclose on the
lien.
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A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Busch v.
Hudson & Keyse, LLC, 312 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, no pet.). We apply the same standard of review to a trial
court’s fact findings as we do to a jury’s findings. Baber v. Pigg, No. 14-
10-00065-CV, 2011 WL 3667835, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 23, 2011, no pet.).
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and
indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. See City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We must credit
favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827.
The factfinder is the only judge of witness credibility and the weight to
give to testimony. See id. at 819. A party attacking the legal
sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it had the burden
of proof must show that the evidence conclusively establishes all vital
facts in support of the issue. Eurecat US, Inc. v. Marklund, 527 S.W.3d
367, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
B. The trial court did not apply the wrong legal standard
To foreclose on a statutory mechanic’s lien, the lienholder must
establish (1) it performed the labor or furnished the materials, (2) the
debt is valid, and (3) it substantially complied with the statutory
requirements for perfecting a lien. MJM Repairs, LLC v. CP2 Realty
Holdings, LLC, No. 14-25-00025-CV, 2026 WL 538728, at *3 n.3 (Tex.
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App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 26, 2026, pet. denied) (citing Crawford
Servs., Inc. v. Skillman Int’l Firm, L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 265, 267 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, pet. dism’d)). The Materialman thus has the
burden of proof on appeal to establish these elements conclusively. See
Schear Hampton Drywall, LLC v. Founders Com., Ltd., 586 S.W.3d 80,
86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
The Materialman’s fourth issue addresses the first element:
whether the materials were “furnished” for the Project. It argues that
the trial court improperly required it to show its materials were
incorporated in the project. The Materialman is correct that Texas
Property Code section 53.021 does not require that the material
furnished “should actually enter into the construction of the
improvement.” See Astra Ventures, LLC v. Serv. Steel Warehouse Co.,
No. 01-23-00825-CV, 2025 WL 2470221, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 28, 2025, no pet.) (quoting Addison Urban Dev. Partners,
LLC v. Alan Ritchey Materials Co., LC, 437 S.W.3d 597, 604 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.)).
But that is not the standard the trial court imposed. While a
materialman need not prove that the materials were “incorporated,” it
does have the burden of proving “delivery of the goods to the
construction site” or that it “furnished the goods to the builder for a
specific job.” See Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Scott Griffin &
Assocs., Inc., No. 01-09-01147-CV, 2011 WL 2089677, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2011, no pet.) (quoting Lexcon, Inc. v. Gray,
740 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)).
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The trial court found that (1) the Subcontractor “has been getting
materials from [the Materialman] and using the materials on other
projects other than the Property,” and (2) the General Contractor “never
sought/ordered/requested specially fabricated materials from [the
Materialman] related to the Property.” These findings demonstrate the
trial court looked beyond whether the materials were actually
incorporated in the Project and analyzed whether the materials were
furnished for the Project before concluding the Materialman was not
entitled to foreclose on the lien. Therefore, the Materialman has not
demonstrated the trial court applied an improper legal standard. 1
C. Legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
fact findings
We also reject the Materialman’s challenge to the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the materials
were not used at the Property, the Subcontractor had used the
materials on projects other than the Property, and the General
Contractor never sought, ordered, or requested specially fabricated
materials related to the Property.
The Materialman presented evidence at trial that the Project
address and General Contractor were listed on the invoices and that the
Subcontractor ordered the materials after the Subcontractor was hired
for the Project. It also provided testimony that the Materialman called
1 The trial court also found that the materials “were not used at the
Property,” but that finding is responsive to the Materialman’s specific allegations.
Indeed, the Materialman’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law sought a
finding that its materials “were incorporated into the construction work performed
on the Property.”
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the General Contractor and confirmed that the Subcontractor was
working on the Project, that the materials were used in the Project, and
that the admitted pictures showed the materials on the Property and
incorporated into the Project.
But “invoices indicating materials were for a particular job site”
are “not conclusive in the face of contradicting evidence.” See Morrell
Masonry Supply, 2011 WL 2089677, at *6. Here, there was
contradicting evidence. The trial court admitted an unsworn
declaration from the General Contractor’s owner testifying that the
Subcontractor “used the Property, its address and its ongoing work to
wrongfully obtain materials from [Materialman] for use on other
projects” and that “[n]o unpaid furnished materials allegedly supplied
by [Materialman] and referenced in this lawsuit were used on the
Property.” The declaration also stated that the General Contractor
“never authorized nor approved any materials from [the Materialman]
for the Property.” On cross examination, the Materialman’s owner
conceded he did not visit the Property in 2021—the year the materials
were ordered—and was not present when any work incorporating the
materials into the project was performed. He also conceded, “I guess it’s
possible,” when asked if a new contractor could have obtained other
materials and used those other materials on the property.
As the factfinder, the trial court was the only judge of witness
credibility and the weight to give to testimony. See City of Keller, 168
S.W.3d at 819. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
challenged findings and indulging every reasonable inference that
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would support them, the Materialman did not conclusively establish
that the materials were furnished for the Project. See id. at 822;
Eurecat US, 527 S.W.3d at 383 (“party attacking the legal sufficiency of
the evidence supporting an adverse finding on an issue on which it had
the burden of proof must demonstrate that the evidence conclusively
establishes all vital facts in support of the issue”). The trial court did
not err in concluding the Materialman was not entitled to foreclose on
the lien. See MJM Repairs, 2026 WL 538728, at *3 n.3 (explaining the
lienholder must establish it “furnished the materials”). Therefore, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment against the Materialman.
We overrule the Materialman’s fourth issue.
II. The Materialman’s Remaining Issues
In its first two issues, the Materialman argues that because it
generally averred in its pleadings that all conditions precedent had
been performed or had occurred, and the Owner failed to specifically
deny the performance or occurrence of any condition precedent, the trial
court erred in (1) permitting Owner to contest conditions precedent and
(2) “shifting the burden of proof” to the Materialman to prove the
validity of its lien. The Materialman contends that “the only issue” that
should have been litigated during the bench trial “was the issue of
damages,” and that the Owner “waived the ability to challenge the
validity of the lien, and thus [the Materialman] was not required to
prove the unchallenged elements” of its claim. With these arguments,
the Materialman essentially argues it was entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law because the Owner failed to deny any specific condition
precedent. The Materialman is mistaken.
A “civil litigant who asserts an affirmative claim for relief has the
burden to persuade the finder of fact of the existence of each element of
his cause of action.” Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San
Antonio, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. 1984). Proof of performance of
any conditions precedent is an essential element of a plaintiff’s case.
Broesche v. Jacobson, 218 S.W.3d 267, 273 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
Under Rule 54 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party need
not prove the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent when it
avers generally in its pleadings that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred and the opposing party does not specifically
deny that all such conditions have been performed or occurred. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 54. But proof of performance of any conditions precedent
“does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving the other elements
of the claim.” Broesche, 218 S.W.3d at 273 n.4 (citing Grimm v. Grimm,
864 S.W.2d 160, 161-62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ))
(emphasis added).
Thus, even if the Owner failed to specifically deny that the
Materialman met all conditions precedent, it was not thereby entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See id. It still bore the burden of proving
the other elements of its claim, including the “furnished” element on
which the trial court made adverse fact findings. See id.; MJM Repairs,
2026 WL 538728, at *3 n.3
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The Materialman also makes specific complaints about the
validity of its lien affidavit, which is the sworn instrument through
which a materialman perfects its statutory lien. See Tex. Prop. Code
§ 53.054; Sugarland Bus. Ctr., Ltd. v. Norman, 624 S.W.2d 639, 641
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). But even if these
complaints were correct, an erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of
law does not require reversal if the judgment is otherwise correct on the
merits. See Able v. Able, 725 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We have already concluded the trial
court’s judgment may be affirmed based on its adverse findings on the
“furnished” element of the Materialman’s claim. Because the judgment
is otherwise correct on the merits, any potential error regarding the
Materialman’s lien affidavit does not require reversal. See id.
We overrule the Materialman’s first, second, and third issues.
III. Cross-Appeal on Attorney’s Fees
In a single issue on cross appeal, the Owner argues the trial court
erred in denying its request for attorney’s fees, which it alleges are
“mandatory” under Texas Property Code section 53.156. The Owner is
incorrect. Section 53.156 states that a trial court “shall” award costs
and reasonable fees in a proceeding to foreclose a lien “as are equitable
and just.” Tex. Prop. Code § 53.156; see also Schear Hampton Drywall,
586 S.W.3d at 94. Thus, section 53.156 makes the award of attorney’s
fees “discretionary and not automatic, even to a prevailing party.”
Casto Lopez Concrete, LLC v. Sage Com. Grp., LLC, No. 14-20-00734-
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CV, 2022 WL 1789806, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 2,
2022, no pet.).
The Owner also argues the trial court acted “unreasonably” and
thus abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees because it
prevailed at trial and the Materialman allegedly engaged in misconduct
during the suit. The Owner contends that the Materialman’s “conduct
should not be rewarded.” But the Materialman’s conduct was not
rewarded. The Materialman lost on its claim to recover more than
$4,000 for allegedly unpaid materials, and the trial court denied the
Materialman’s request for approximately $58,000 in attorney’s fees it
allegedly incurred while unsuccessfully pursuing this claim. The
Owner has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
award the Owner its attorney’s fees. See generally id. (“Awarding fees
in an equitable and just way is a matter squarely within the trial
court’s discretion.”).
CONCLUSION
Having overruled the Materialman’s and the Owner’s challenges
to the trial court’s judgment, we affirm the judgment.
/s/ Katy Boatman
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices McLaughlin
and Boatman.
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