Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00901-CV MORRELL MASONRY SUPPLY, INC., Appellant V. TETON GLOBAL INVESTMENTS SAVI HOLDINGS, E, Appellee On Appeal from the 234th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2021-47487 MEMORANDUM OPINION A materials supplier sued a property owner to foreclose on its mechanic’s and materialman’s lien. The trial court entered a take nothing judgment in favor of the property owner. We are asked to decide whether the trial court erred by either (1) improperly requiring the materialman to show its materials were incorporated in the project, or (2) refusing to award the property owner attorney’s fees. We conclude the trial court did not require the materialman to show its materials were incorporated in the project and did not abuse its discretion in denying the property owner’s request for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we affirm. BACKGROUND This case arises from a construction project (the Project) on real property (the Property). The Owner of the Property, Teton Global Investments Savi Holdings, E, hired the General Contractor, R & L Building Group, Inc., for the Project. The General Contractor in turn hired the Subcontractor, Santos Castillo. The Materialman, Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc., is a supplier of masonry materials who alleged that the Subcontractor ordered materials that were used in the Project but never paid for. The Materialman filed suit against the Owner to foreclose on a statutory mechanic and materialman’s lien on the Property under section 53.021 of the Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code § 53.021. The Owner generally denied the Materialman’s allegations and argued that the General Contractor never approved or authorized charges by the Subcontractor, that the Subcontractor used the Project to obtain materials for use on other projects, and that the Materialman’s affidavit claiming a lien was defective and thus invalid. The trial court denied motions for summary judgment filed by both parties and issued a final judgment decreeing the Materialman’s lien invalid and ordering removal of the lien after a bench trial. Although both parties sought to recover their attorney’s fees, the trial court denied both requests; it also filed extensive findings of fact and 2 conclusions of law at the Materialman’s request. The Materialman now appeals the trial court’s judgment against it, and the Owner cross appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. ANALYSIS The Materialman raises four issues on appeal. We address its fourth issue first because it impacts our disposition of the remaining issues, and we address those remaining issues in the order in which they are briefed. We address the Owner’s cross appeal last. I. Challenges to the Findings and Conclusions on Incorporation of the Materials In its fourth issue, the Materialman argues the trial court erred by requiring it to prove its materials were incorporated into the Project before recovering on the lien. The Materialman does not clarify whether it challenges the findings of fact or the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. It ultimately seeks rendition, however; we thus construe its arguments as a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” challenge. See Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176, 176-77 (Tex. 1986) (explaining well settled rule that “no evidence” points require rendition in favor of appealing party); Milton M. Cooke Co. v. First Bank & Tr., 290 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). We further construe its arguments as challenging the trial court’s conclusion of law that it was not entitled to foreclose on the lien. 3 A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Busch v. Hudson & Keyse, LLC, 312 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). We apply the same standard of review to a trial court’s fact findings as we do to a jury’s findings. Baber v. Pigg, No. 14- 10-00065-CV, 2011 WL 3667835, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 23, 2011, no pet.). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We must credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827. The factfinder is the only judge of witness credibility and the weight to give to testimony. See id. at 819. A party attacking the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it had the burden of proof must show that the evidence conclusively establishes all vital facts in support of the issue. Eurecat US, Inc. v. Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). B. The trial court did not apply the wrong legal standard To foreclose on a statutory mechanic’s lien, the lienholder must establish (1) it performed the labor or furnished the materials, (2) the debt is valid, and (3) it substantially complied with the statutory requirements for perfecting a lien. MJM Repairs, LLC v. CP2 Realty Holdings, LLC, No. 14-25-00025-CV, 2026 WL 538728, at *3 n.3 (Tex. 4 App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 26, 2026, pet. denied) (citing Crawford Servs., Inc. v. Skillman Int’l Firm, L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 265, 267 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. dism’d)). The Materialman thus has the burden of proof on appeal to establish these elements conclusively. See Schear Hampton Drywall, LLC v. Founders Com., Ltd., 586 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). The Materialman’s fourth issue addresses the first element: whether the materials were “furnished” for the Project. It argues that the trial court improperly required it to show its materials were incorporated in the project. The Materialman is correct that Texas Property Code section 53.021 does not require that the material furnished “should actually enter into the construction of the improvement.” See Astra Ventures, LLC v. Serv. Steel Warehouse Co., No. 01-23-00825-CV, 2025 WL 2470221, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 28, 2025, no pet.) (quoting Addison Urban Dev. Partners, LLC v. Alan Ritchey Materials Co., LC, 437 S.W.3d 597, 604 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.)). But that is not the standard the trial court imposed. While a materialman need not prove that the materials were “incorporated,” it does have the burden of proving “delivery of the goods to the construction site” or that it “furnished the goods to the builder for a specific job.” See Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Scott Griffin & Assocs., Inc., No. 01-09-01147-CV, 2011 WL 2089677, at *5 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2011, no pet.) (quoting Lexcon, Inc. v. Gray, 740 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)). 5 The trial court found that (1) the Subcontractor “has been getting materials from [the Materialman] and using the materials on other projects other than the Property,” and (2) the General Contractor “never sought/ordered/requested specially fabricated materials from [the Materialman] related to the Property.” These findings demonstrate the trial court looked beyond whether the materials were actually incorporated in the Project and analyzed whether the materials were furnished for the Project before concluding the Materialman was not entitled to foreclose on the lien. Therefore, the Materialman has not demonstrated the trial court applied an improper legal standard. 1 C. Legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s fact findings We also reject the Materialman’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the materials were not used at the Property, the Subcontractor had used the materials on projects other than the Property, and the General Contractor never sought, ordered, or requested specially fabricated materials related to the Property. The Materialman presented evidence at trial that the Project address and General Contractor were listed on the invoices and that the Subcontractor ordered the materials after the Subcontractor was hired for the Project. It also provided testimony that the Materialman called 1 The trial court also found that the materials “were not used at the Property,” but that finding is responsive to the Materialman’s specific allegations. Indeed, the Materialman’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law sought a finding that its materials “were incorporated into the construction work performed on the Property.” 6 the General Contractor and confirmed that the Subcontractor was working on the Project, that the materials were used in the Project, and that the admitted pictures showed the materials on the Property and incorporated into the Project. But “invoices indicating materials were for a particular job site” are “not conclusive in the face of contradicting evidence.” See Morrell Masonry Supply, 2011 WL 2089677, at *6. Here, there was contradicting evidence. The trial court admitted an unsworn declaration from the General Contractor’s owner testifying that the Subcontractor “used the Property, its address and its ongoing work to wrongfully obtain materials from [Materialman] for use on other projects” and that “[n]o unpaid furnished materials allegedly supplied by [Materialman] and referenced in this lawsuit were used on the Property.” The declaration also stated that the General Contractor “never authorized nor approved any materials from [the Materialman] for the Property.” On cross examination, the Materialman’s owner conceded he did not visit the Property in 2021—the year the materials were ordered—and was not present when any work incorporating the materials into the project was performed. He also conceded, “I guess it’s possible,” when asked if a new contractor could have obtained other materials and used those other materials on the property. As the factfinder, the trial court was the only judge of witness credibility and the weight to give to testimony. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged findings and indulging every reasonable inference that 7 would support them, the Materialman did not conclusively establish that the materials were furnished for the Project. See id. at 822; Eurecat US, 527 S.W.3d at 383 (“party attacking the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adverse finding on an issue on which it had the burden of proof must demonstrate that the evidence conclusively establishes all vital facts in support of the issue”). The trial court did not err in concluding the Materialman was not entitled to foreclose on the lien. See MJM Repairs, 2026 WL 538728, at *3 n.3 (explaining the lienholder must establish it “furnished the materials”). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment against the Materialman. We overrule the Materialman’s fourth issue. II. The Materialman’s Remaining Issues In its first two issues, the Materialman argues that because it generally averred in its pleadings that all conditions precedent had been performed or had occurred, and the Owner failed to specifically deny the performance or occurrence of any condition precedent, the trial court erred in (1) permitting Owner to contest conditions precedent and (2) “shifting the burden of proof” to the Materialman to prove the validity of its lien. The Materialman contends that “the only issue” that should have been litigated during the bench trial “was the issue of damages,” and that the Owner “waived the ability to challenge the validity of the lien, and thus [the Materialman] was not required to prove the unchallenged elements” of its claim. With these arguments, the Materialman essentially argues it was entitled to judgment as a 8 matter of law because the Owner failed to deny any specific condition precedent. The Materialman is mistaken. A “civil litigant who asserts an affirmative claim for relief has the burden to persuade the finder of fact of the existence of each element of his cause of action.” Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. 1984). Proof of performance of any conditions precedent is an essential element of a plaintiff’s case. Broesche v. Jacobson, 218 S.W.3d 267, 273 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). Under Rule 54 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party need not prove the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent when it avers generally in its pleadings that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred and the opposing party does not specifically deny that all such conditions have been performed or occurred. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 54. But proof of performance of any conditions precedent “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving the other elements of the claim.” Broesche, 218 S.W.3d at 273 n.4 (citing Grimm v. Grimm, 864 S.W.2d 160, 161-62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ)) (emphasis added). Thus, even if the Owner failed to specifically deny that the Materialman met all conditions precedent, it was not thereby entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. It still bore the burden of proving the other elements of its claim, including the “furnished” element on which the trial court made adverse fact findings. See id.; MJM Repairs, 2026 WL 538728, at *3 n.3 9 The Materialman also makes specific complaints about the validity of its lien affidavit, which is the sworn instrument through which a materialman perfects its statutory lien. See Tex. Prop. Code § 53.054; Sugarland Bus. Ctr., Ltd. v. Norman, 624 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). But even if these complaints were correct, an erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law does not require reversal if the judgment is otherwise correct on the merits. See Able v. Able, 725 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We have already concluded the trial court’s judgment may be affirmed based on its adverse findings on the “furnished” element of the Materialman’s claim. Because the judgment is otherwise correct on the merits, any potential error regarding the Materialman’s lien affidavit does not require reversal. See id. We overrule the Materialman’s first, second, and third issues. III. Cross-Appeal on Attorney’s Fees In a single issue on cross appeal, the Owner argues the trial court erred in denying its request for attorney’s fees, which it alleges are “mandatory” under Texas Property Code section 53.156. The Owner is incorrect. Section 53.156 states that a trial court “shall” award costs and reasonable fees in a proceeding to foreclose a lien “as are equitable and just.” Tex. Prop. Code § 53.156; see also Schear Hampton Drywall, 586 S.W.3d at 94. Thus, section 53.156 makes the award of attorney’s fees “discretionary and not automatic, even to a prevailing party.” Casto Lopez Concrete, LLC v. Sage Com. Grp., LLC, No. 14-20-00734- 10 CV, 2022 WL 1789806, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2022, no pet.). The Owner also argues the trial court acted “unreasonably” and thus abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees because it prevailed at trial and the Materialman allegedly engaged in misconduct during the suit. The Owner contends that the Materialman’s “conduct should not be rewarded.” But the Materialman’s conduct was not rewarded. The Materialman lost on its claim to recover more than $4,000 for allegedly unpaid materials, and the trial court denied the Materialman’s request for approximately $58,000 in attorney’s fees it allegedly incurred while unsuccessfully pursuing this claim. The Owner has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award the Owner its attorney’s fees. See generally id. (“Awarding fees in an equitable and just way is a matter squarely within the trial court’s discretion.”). CONCLUSION Having overruled the Materialman’s and the Owner’s challenges to the trial court’s judgment, we affirm the judgment. /s/ Katy Boatman Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices McLaughlin and Boatman. 11