Moreno Construction Co., Inc. v. Robin Baker

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00293-CV MORENO CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Robin BAKER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant From the 456th District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-1147-CV-C Honorable Heather H. Wright, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 23, 2026 AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART; MOTION TO REVIEW DENIED AS MOOT Appellant/cross-appellee Moreno Construction, Inc. sued appellee/cross-appellant Robin Baker, alleging that she failed to pay the full contract price for a home Moreno constructed. Baker filed counterclaims alleging that the home contained “[w]idespread design and construction deficiencies” and that Moreno “provided defective, delayed and slipshod design, construction, service and repairs[.]” After a jury trial on liability and damages and a bench trial on attorney’s  04-25-00293-CV fees, the trial court signed a judgment that awarded Baker $110,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in attorney’s fees. In this court, Moreno argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the compensatory damages award, and Baker contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s decision to award her $150,000 in attorney’s fees instead of the $325,991.01 she sought. We affirm the judgment’s award of compensatory damages to Baker. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand this matter for further proceedings on that issue. Baker’s pending motion to review a post-judgment order is denied as moot. BACKGROUND In 2017, the parties entered into a contract that called for Moreno to build a home for Baker. The fixed or “turnkey” price under the contract was $267,000, but Moreno contends the price rose to $283,000 due to changes made during the construction process. Baker moved into the home in November or December of 2017, and she has lived in it ever since. A Moreno representative testified that in a cash sale like this one, Moreno’s contracts typically call for its customers to pay in three draws: 30 percent of the contract price after the foundation is poured, 30 percent after the framing is complete, and 10 percent upon completion of the project. The parties agree that Baker timely paid the first two draws. They also agree that she made at least two additional payments, including a payment she made in December of 2017 with a check marked “final draft.” Baker contends the “final draft” check satisfied her obligations under the contract. Moreno, on the other hand, argues the December 2017 check was a payment for agreed changes and extra work, and that $26,700 of the original contract price remained unpaid. On May 26, 2020, Moreno sued Baker for breach of contract. Baker filed counterclaims for negligence, breach of contract, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and -2-  04-25-00293-CV breach of an express warranty. The trial court granted Moreno a directed verdict on Baker’s negligence action, and the parties tried their remaining claims to a Guadalupe County jury in July of 2024. After hearing the evidence, the jury found, inter alia, that: 1) Baker did not fail to comply with her obligations to pay Moreno under the parties’ agreement; 2) Moreno failed to comply with the agreement, and its failure to comply was material; 3) Moreno engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices that were a producing cause of damage to Baker; and 4) Moreno’s failure to comply with an express warranty to complete work in a workmanlike manner according to standard practices was a producing cause of damage to Baker. The jury found that $92,000 in repair costs and $18,000 in engineering and consulting fees were reasonable and necessary to compensate Baker for her damages. The parties then tried Baker’s attorney’s fee claim to the bench, and Baker presented evidence that she had incurred $325,991.01 in fees. On February 6, 2025, the trial court signed a final judgment that was consistent with the jury’s verdict as to Moreno’s liability and Baker’s compensatory damages. The judgment awarded Baker $150,000 in attorney’s fees. On February 14, 2025, Baker filed an abstract of judgment in the Guadalupe County property records for the full $260,000 recited in the judgment. Both parties subsequently filed notices of appeal. While this appeal was pending, Moreno filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of $127,710.69, which represented the compensatory damages judgment plus post-judgment interest of 7.75%. Moreno later filed a new bond that also included $9,357.06 in court costs. -3-  04-25-00293-CV On August 26, 2025, Moreno filed a motion under section 52.0011(a) of the Texas Property Code to release the lien created by Baker’s abstract of judgment. After two hearings on Moreno’s motion, the trial court signed an order granting the motion. Baker then filed an “Emergency Motion to Stay and Motion to Review Order Granting Moreno Construction Company’s Opposed Motion for Release of Lien” (“motion to review”) in this court. We temporarily stayed the trial court’s order and carried Baker’s motion to review with the appeal. ANALYSIS Moreno’s Appeal Standard of Review Moreno has not challenged the jury’s findings that it failed to comply with the construction contract; that it failed to complete its work on Baker’s home in a workmanlike manner according to standard practices; and that its failures caused damage to Baker. In its sole appellate issue, Moreno contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s award of compensatory damages to Baker. When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof at trial, it must show there is no evidence to support the challenged finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). In considering this question, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, “credit[ing] favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard[ing] contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” In re Est. of Matthews, 510 S.W.3d 106, 117 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted, alterations in original). “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d -4-  04-25-00293-CV 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). “If the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions, then jurors must be allowed to do so, and we may not substitute our judgment for” the jury’s. Est. of Matthews, 510 S.W.3d at 117 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must show there is insufficient evidence to support the finding. In re Matter of Marriage of Thrash, 605 S.W.3d 224, 230 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied). We examine all the evidence, but we may not reverse the judgment unless “the evidence which supports the jury’s finding is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” Flying J Inc. v. Meda, Inc., 373 S.W.3d 680, 690–91 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applicable Law and Application “There are two measures of damages for the breach of a construction contract: (1) remedial damages, which is the cost to complete or repair less the unpaid balance on the contract price, 1 and (2) difference-in-value damages, which is the difference between the value of the building as constructed and its value had it been constructed according to the contract.” McGinty v. Hennen, 372 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. 2012). Here, the only measure of damages Baker submitted to the jury was remedial damages. She did not seek an award of difference-in-value damages. See id. at 628 (emphasizing that “remedial damages and difference-in-value damages are not the same”). Baker thus bore the burden to “prove that the damages sought are reasonable and necessary.” Id. at 627. In the trial court, Moreno challenged the evidence supporting the reasonableness and necessity of Baker’s remedial damages. Cf. id. at 627–28 (reversing award of remedial damages because “[n]either [the plaintiff’s] damage 1 Because Moreno’s breach of contract claim alleged non-payment and the jury found Baker did not breach the contract, the jury necessarily found that there was no unpaid balance on the contract price. -5-  04-25-00293-CV expert nor any other witness testified to the reasonableness of the estimated cost”). However, Moreno has not re-urged that argument on appeal and therefore appears to have abandoned it. In this court, Moreno argues only that the evidence does not support the remedial damages finding because Texas law required Baker to measure her repair costs as of the time of the breach, 2 not as of the time of trial. As support for this position, Moreno relies on the Texas Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in Miga v. Jensen and on lower court opinions that cite Miga. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2002); see also AME & FE Invs., Ltd. v. NEC Networks, LLC, No. 04-17- 00332-CV, 2019 WL 286121, at *13 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); O.C.T.G., L.L.P. v. Laguna Tubular Prods. Corp., 557 S.W.3d 175, 190–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). In its appellate brief, Moreno purports to quote Miga and its progeny for the proposition that the “general” rule in contract cases “‘has long been that contract damages are measured at the time of breach, and not . . . as of the time of trial.’” But as Moreno’s ellipses suggest, this quotation from Miga is incomplete. The full quotation is: [T]he rule in Texas has long been that contract damages are measured at the time of breach, and not by the bargained-for goods’ market gain as of the time of trial. Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 214 (emphasis added); see also AME & FE Invs., 2019 WL 286121, at *13 (quoting Miga). Moreno’s omission removes crucial context from Miga’s analysis that helps explain why the trial court correctly concluded this “general” rule of contract damages does not control here. The dispute in Miga arose when the defendant, Jensen, refused to honor an option he had previously extended to the plaintiff, Miga, “to buy a portion of Jensen’s stock in a privately-held 2 Moreno’s opening brief repeatedly contends that Baker’s damages must be measured from the time of her breach. As noted above, however, the jury found that Baker did not breach the contract, and Moreno has not challenged that finding on appeal. -6-  04-25-00293-CV corporation.” Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 209. At some point between the parties’ agreement and Jensen’s refusal to honor the agreement, the corporation went public, and the stock’s value increased. Id. Miga sued, and he argued that his damages for Jensen’s breach should be “measured by the subsequent appreciated value of the stock,” rather than by its value at the time Jensen refused to sell. Id. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the proper measure of Miga’s damages was the price of the stock at the time Jensen refused to honor the sale, not the higher value the stock had acquired by the time of trial. Id. at 213–17. Although the court recognized that Jensen’s breach resulted in a “lost investment opportunity” for Miga, it also noted that Miga’s theory of his damages was based on a market gain that was not certain at the time of the breach: Miga argues that [the time-of-breach amount] alone, recovered today, is insufficient to compensate him for the loss he suffered due to Jensen’s contractual breach in 1994. He is right. All assets, whether property or cash, fluctuate in value over time. But the proper way to make Miga whole is not by allowing him to recover the market gain he would have reaped had he received his stock as promised, managed to pay any taxes potentially owed on his gain without selling a portion of the stock, accepted the risk that the stock would drop below the exercise price, and sold it at the perfect moment when the stock hit its peak two years later. Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 217 (emphasis added); see also AME & FE Invs., 2019 WL 286121, at *13– 14 (holding claimant was not entitled to recover damages based on value of business at time of trial). Stated differently, the court held that Miga was not entitled to recover on a “market gain” damages model that would award him a largely fortuitous windfall. See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 217. The court further explained that any injury caused by Miga’s lost investment opportunities could be fully remedied “through the award of interest on his time-of-breach damages.” Id. Subsequent appellate opinions that relied on Miga, and which Moreno cites here, reached similar conclusions. See O.C.T.G., 557 S.W.3d at 191 (holding, in a case where plaintiff bought land for a specific use -7-  04-25-00293-CV and then was unable to put the land to that use, that the proper measure of damages was the amount plaintiff actually paid for the land rather than the market value at the time of trial). We conclude, as the trial court did below, that the general rule Moreno asks us to pull from Miga and its progeny does not apply to these facts. This is because Baker did not seek to recover “the bargained-for goods’ market gain as of the time of trial.” See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 214. She sought to recover the repair costs that were reasonable and necessary to obtain exactly what she originally bargained for: a home that was constructed in a good and workmanlike manner. Because Baker presented evidence that her home remained unrepaired at the time of trial, 3 and because her damages expert testified that the materials and labor necessary to perform those repairs went up in price over the course of this litigation, the evidence in this case established that a time-of-breach measure of damages would have been insufficient to restore Baker “to the economic position [she] would have occupied had the contract been performed.” See O.C.T.G., 557 S.W.3d at 185 (describing benefit-of-the-bargain damages); see also Brown Found. Repair & Consulting, Inc. v. McGuire, 711 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding, in a DTPA case, that “[t]he jury is also free to consider that the price of repairs has increased since the cause of action occurred”). We certainly do not disagree with the holdings of Miga and its progeny under the factual circumstances of those cases. But Moreno cites no authority applying those holdings to a case where a claimant sought remedial damages for a breach of a residential construction contract, and we have found none. Nor, for that matter, has Moreno established that Miga’s analysis applies to Baker’s right to recover under her DTPA and express warranty claims, for which the jury also 3 While Moreno’s live answer alleged that Baker failed to mitigate her damages, Moreno did not seek a jury finding on that issue and has not asserted it on appeal. -8-  04-25-00293-CV found in her favor. 4 Furthermore, Baker has cited authority that is more factually analogous to this case than Miga, and that authority supports the trial court’s compensatory damages judgment. See Brown, 711 S.W.2d at 353 (holding contractor’s “failure to effect promised repairs was a continuing breach; hence the cost of repair shown at the time of trial is the proper measure [of damages] under the DTPA”); Salais v. Martinez, 603 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1980, no writ) (holding, again in a DTPA context, that a “failure to repair was a continuing breach so that the cost of repair some eleven months later would be a proper measure of damages. The cause of action for failure to repair still existed so long as they were not made.”) (emphasis added). For these reasons, we overrule Moreno’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s award of compensatory damages to Baker. Baker’s Cross-Appeal In Baker’s cross-appeal, she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to award her less than half the amount of attorney’s fees she sought. She contends that the evidence established that the amount she requested was presumptively reasonable and Moreno failed to rebut that presumption. Standard of Review “When, as in this case, a party challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which [s]he had the burden of proof, [s]he must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established the facts in [her] favor as a matter of law.” In re T.K.D.-H., 439 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). In reviewing this issue, we first consider whether the record contains evidence to support the finding. Id. We indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the judgment, and we credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder 4 The jury answered a single damages question for Baker’s breach of contract, DTPA, and warranty claims. -9-  04-25-00293-CV could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. “If there is no evidence to support the finding, we then examine the entire record to determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law.” Id. When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she bore the burden of proof, she must demonstrate that the finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. “Only if we determine, after considering all the evidence, the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust will we set aside the verdict for factual insufficiency.” Banks v. Columbia Hosp. at Med. City Dall. Subsidiary, L.P., 233 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Applicable Law “When fee-shifting is authorized, whether by statute or contract, the party seeking a fee award must prove the reasonableness and necessity of the requested attorney’s fees.” Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 484 (Tex. 2019). At a minimum, the party seeking a fee award must present evidence of “(i) the particular services performed, (ii) who performed those services, (iii) approximately when the services were performed, (iv) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (v) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing the services.” Com. St. Cap., LLC v. Durant Bancorp, Inc., No. 05-19- 00343-CV, 2020 WL 7585837, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502). When supported by sufficient evidence, a base lodestar figure of reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate “reflects the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that can be shifted to the non-prevailing party.” Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 499. - 10 -  04-25-00293-CV If the base lodestar figure is supported by sufficient evidence, a fee opponent who seeks a reduction in the fee award “bears the burden of providing specific evidence to overcome the presumptive reasonableness of the base lodestar figure.” Id. at 501. However, “[t]he Rohrmoos presumption applies only if the party seeking fees provides sufficient evidence of the reasonable hours worked and the reasonable hourly rate of those who did the work.” Com. St. Cap., 2020 WL 7585837, at *7 (emphasis in original). If the party seeking fees presents evidence that is not “contradicted by any other witness or attendant circumstances,” and the evidence is “clear, direct and positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon,” then the court, sitting as trier of fact, may award attorney’s fees as a matter of law. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). Where the evidence presented at trial would have permitted the trial court to award attorney’s fees as a matter of law and the court fails to award the full amount sought, a reviewing court “will reverse a denial or minimization of attorney’s fees and, in the interest of judicial economy, render judgment for attorney’s fees in the amount proved.” VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd. v. Gross, No. 05-19-00217-CV, 2020 WL 3248481, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882. Application After the jury returned its verdict in Baker’s favor on Moreno’s breach of contract action and Baker’s own breach of contract, DTPA, and breach of express warranty counterclaims, 5 Baker 5 Each of these causes of action permit a prevailing party to recovery her attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001(b)(8); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(d); Med. City Dall., Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 62–63 (Tex. 2008). While Moreno’s reply brief suggests that a fee award was discretionary here, the plain language of section 17.50(d) of the Business and Commerce Code mandates a fee award to a prevailing consumer in a DTPA case. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(d). Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court has held that where, as here, a party seeks attorney’s fees for a breach of contract claim under section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and - 11 -  04-25-00293-CV presented her attorney’s fee evidence to the trial court sitting as factfinder. During that hearing, Baker’s lead counsel testified and presented invoices from his law firm into evidence. Baker also presented affidavits and invoices from two appellate attorneys who provided support to her trial team. After segregating out unrecoverable fees associated with the dismissed negligence claim and removing charges for “some entries that shouldn’t be” on the invoices, Baker’s lead counsel testified that Baker had incurred $325,991.01 in attorney’s fees. While Moreno briefly cross- examined Baker’s lead counsel, it did not present any controverting evidence. The trial court ultimately awarded Baker $150,000 in fees, for a total reduction of $175,991.01. The record contains more than a scintilla of evidence upon which the trial court could have found that Baker did not establish the reasonableness and necessity of the full amount of attorney’s fees she requested. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 484. For example, while Baker requested $42,135.75 in legal assistant fees, the evidence she presented in support of that claim did not conclusively establish her right to recover those fees. Baker’s attorney’s invoices showed hundreds of hours of charges identified as “paralegal time” and “legal assistant time,” but those invoices did not describe the “particular services performed,” “who performed those services,” or “approximately when the services were performed.” 6 See id. at 502. Baker’s lead counsel’s testimony similarly offered no information on this point. See El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 763 (Tex. 2012) (“Without at least some indication of the time spent on various parts of the case, a court has little basis upon which to conduct a meaningful review of the fee award.”). Moreover, Baker did not present any evidence “about the qualifications of the legal assistants who Remedies Code, “the trial court has no discretion to deny attorney’s fees when presented with evidence of the same.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015). 6 The portion of the invoices that describes Baker’s attorney’s work contains entries such as “meeting with [legal assistant],” “conference with [legal assistant] re things to do,” and “multiple meetings with [legal assistant].” However, these descriptions: (1) cover only a fraction of the legal assistant fees Baker claimed; and (2) are far too general to support a finding that those tasks were reasonable and necessary. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 505; see also Com. St. Cap., 2020 WL 7585837, at *7. - 12 -  04-25-00293-CV worked on the case, which is also required.” Westheimer v. Ziemer, 702 S.W.3d 621, 632–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.). Accordingly, Baker has not shown—as she must to be entitled to rendition of judgment in her favor—that the evidence conclusively establishes the reasonableness and necessity of the $42,135.75 she sought in legal assistant fees. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502; Westheimer, 702 S.W.3d at 632–33. Additionally, Baker’s lead counsel testified that as of November 12, 2024, he had performed 770.4 hours of reasonable and necessary work at a rate of $400 an hour, for a total fee of $308,160 for his work on this case. But his invoices, which cover the time from June 20, 2020 through October 31, 2024, show total fees of only $303,495 for his work. See Swarovski v. Enger, No. 05-17-00398-CV, 2018 WL 1357483, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “even if evidence is uncontradicted, if it is unreasonable, incredible, or its belief is questionable, then the evidence raises only a fact issue”). While the approximately two-week time gap between the invoices and counsel’s testimony presumably accounts for some of this discrepancy, counsel offered only limited testimony about the work he performed in that two-week period. See Westheimer, 702 S.W.3d at 632–33 (holding fee evidence was legally insufficient where invoices “fail[ed] to fill the gaps in [attorney’s] testimony”). As a result, Baker did not present any evidence to establish that the $4,665 difference between her lead counsel’s testimony and his invoices was reasonable and necessary. 7 We therefore cannot say that the evidence on that issue was sufficiently clear, positive, direct, and free from contradictions to conclusively establish the reasonableness and necessity of the full amount of Baker’s lead counsel’s fees. 7 We note that four of the invoices identify $8,887.50 of expenses attributed to Pulman, Cappuccio & Pullen, which is the law firm that employs one of the appellate attorneys who assisted Baker’s lead trial counsel below. However, the invoices do not describe the nature of these expenses. - 13 -  04-25-00293-CV For the reasons described above, the record contains evidence upon which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Baker’s requested attorney’s fees should be reduced by at least $46,800.75. As a result, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s refusal to award Baker the full amount of fees she requested. Nevertheless, after extensively reviewing the evidence Baker presented in support of her requested fees, we conclude the evidence is neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the trial court’s $175,991.01 reduction in Baker’s attorneys’ fees. In support of her fee claim, Baker presented more than 50 unredacted invoices from her lead counsel and additional unredacted invoices from the two appellate attorneys who also worked on this case. We have thoroughly reviewed these invoices, and with the exceptions described above, nothing in them suggests that the listed amounts were “unreasonable, incredible, or otherwise of questionable belief.” See VSDH, 2020 WL 3248481, at *7. The vast majority of the invoices’ entries described the services performed, who performed the services, and approximately when the services were performed, and Baker’s lead counsel testified without contradiction that the time spent on those tasks and the hourly rates charged for them were reasonable. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 501–02. Those invoices were thus sufficient—albeit, again, with the exceptions described above—to both presumptively establish the reasonableness of the bulk of Baker’s attorney’s fees and to shift the burden to Moreno to present controverting evidence. See id. at 499; Com. St. Cap.. 2020 WL 7585837, at *7. As Baker notes, however, Moreno did not present any evidence to controvert Baker’s fee evidence. On appeal, Moreno argues that the trial court could have rationally concluded that the full amount of fees Baker sought was unreasonable because the jury only found $110,000 in compensatory damages. But the Texas Supreme Court has held that “an enhancement or reduction - 14 -  04-25-00293-CV of the base lodestar figure cannot be based on a consideration that is subsumed in the first step of the lodestar method.” Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 500 (emphasis added). Because “the base lodestar calculation usually includes,” inter alia, a consideration of the “‘the amount involved’” and “‘results obtained,’” the difference between the compensatory damages award and the amount of fees Baker sought was not a legally sufficient reason to reduce the fee award. See id. at 500–01 (quoting Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)). If Moreno sought a reduction in the presumptively reasonable portion of Baker’s claimed fees, it “[bore] the burden of providing specific evidence to overcome the presumptive reasonableness of the base lodestar figure.” Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 501. We agree with Baker that Moreno did not satisfy that burden. For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to deny $175,991.01 of the attorney’s fees Baker requested is not supported by either legally or factually sufficient evidence. We therefore sustain the sole issue in Baker’s cross-appeal and reverse the award of attorney’s fees. However, because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support at least some reduction of Baker’s requested fee award, we cannot render judgment in her favor for the full amount she sought. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings on that issue. Abstract of Judgment Having resolved the parties’ substantive appellate issues, we now turn to the questions presented by Baker’s motion to review the trial court’s post-trial ruling regarding the abstract of judgment and judgment lien. As explained above, on February 14, 2025, Baker obtained an abstract of judgment that was recorded in the Guadalupe County property records. The filing and recording of a statutorily compliant abstract “creates a judgment lien as to a judgment debtor’s real property.” Gordon v. W. Hous. Trees, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 32, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] - 15 -  04-25-00293-CV 2011, no pet.); see also TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 52.001, 52.003. Baker’s abstract of judgment purported to create a lien in the entire amount of the original judgment, including the award of $150,000 in attorney’s fees. Moreno filed a motion that asked the trial court to release the lien pursuant to section 52.0011(a) of the Property Code: A first or subsequent abstract of a judgment rendered by a court against a defendant, when it is recorded and indexed under [chapter 52 of the Property Code], does not constitute a lien on the real property of the defendant if: (1) the defendant has posted security as provided by law or is excused by law from posting security; and (2) the court finds that the creation of the lien would not substantially increase the degree to which a judgment creditor’s recovery under the judgment would be secured when balanced against the costs to the defendant after the exhaustion of all appellate remedies. TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.0011(a). Moreno argued that it satisfied the first prong of section 52.0011(a) because it had posted a bond sufficient to supersede the judgment’s award of compensatory damages, court costs, and post-judgment interest. As to the second prong, Moreno argued that it was not required to supersede the award of $150,000 in attorney’s fees and Baker’s judgment lien therefore could not “substantially increase the degree to which [her] recovery under the judgment would be secured.” See id. Baker responded that the trial court should deny the motion because Moreno did not present any evidence to satisfy the second prong of section 52.0011(a) and its arguments that it had satisfied that burden rendered the second prong meaningless. The trial court granted Moreno’s motion and ordered the judgment lien released. Baker’s motion to review asks us to vacate the trial court’s order under our authority to review types and amounts of security under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. She also alternatively asks us to vacate the order pursuant to our authority to issue writs of mandamus. Moreno filed a response to the motion to review, and Baker filed a reply in support of it. Out of an - 16 -  04-25-00293-CV abundance of caution, on December 10, 2025, we issued an order that temporarily stayed the trial court’s order. There is very little case law on the proper construction of section 52.0011(a), and the questions the parties have raised on this subject appear to present issues of first impression. However, we conclude that we cannot resolve those issues here because our disposition of Baker’s cross-appeal has rendered them moot. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012). “Since a judgment lien is statutorily created, substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is mandatory before a judgment creditor’s lien will attach. Substantial compliance allows only a minor deficiency in an element of the abstract as opposed to omitting a statutorily required element altogether.” Olivares v. Nix Tr., 126 S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (citations omitted). To create a valid lien, “[a]n abstract of a judgment must show,” inter alia, “the amount for which the judgment was rendered and the balance due[.]” TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.003(a)(8). The requirements listed in section 52.003(a) are intended “to provide a means of ascertaining the existence of judgment liens and to indicate the source from which full information may be obtained.” Rogers v. Peeler, 271 S.W.3d 372, 378 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts strictly construe the requirement that the abstract of judgment show the amount for which the judgment was rendered and the balance due thereon.” Gary E. Patterson & Assocs., P.C. v. Holub, 264 S.W.3d 180, 194–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). “If the abstract of judgment does not substantially comply with the statutory requirements, no lien is created regardless of whether the other party has actual knowledge of the abstract or the underlying judgment.” Gordon, 352 S.W.3d at 39. - 17 -  04-25-00293-CV With exceptions that do not apply here, “[t]here can be only one final judgment in a cause.” Exxon Corp. v. Garza, 981 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). The abstracted judgment at issue here is the original judgment, which we have now reversed in part and thus rendered ineffective, at least as to the award of attorney’s fees. See Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. 2013). As a result of that reversal, “the amount for which the judgment was rendered” remains to be determined. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.003(a)(8). In other words, the abstract of judgment that was filed on February 14, 2025 lists a judgment amount that simply does not exist. As a result, that abstract now effectively omits an element that is required to create a valid judgment lien. See id.; Gordon, 352 S.W.3d at 39. This goes beyond the kind of “minor deficiency” that this court and others have held were insufficient to invalidate a judgment lien. See, e.g., Olivares, 126 S.W.3d at 248–49 (abstract’s error in judgment debtor’s address did not invalidate judgment lien); Rogers, 271 S.W.3d at 378–79 (amendment of judgment to