Full Opinion

11/19/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE February 28, 2025 Session METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY v. OFF THE WAGON TOURS, LLC ET AL. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 23MD1, 23C1330 Clifton David Briley, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2023-01722-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ The trial court held a business and its owner in criminal contempt for operating an unlicensed entertainment transportation vehicle in violation of an injunction. On appeal, the business and its owner challenge both the injunction and the contempt findings on the basis that the injunction was unlawful or otherwise void. Despite the injunction being certified as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we conclude that we lack subject matter jurisdiction to review it. We affirm the findings of criminal contempt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and Remanded. W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined. Bryant Kroll, Pegram, Tennessee, for the appellants, Off the Wagon Tours, LLC and Charles Curtis Carney. Catherine J. Pham, Kelli F. Woodward, and Abby Greer, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County. OPINION I. The State of Tennessee authorizes its metropolitan governments to pass ordinances “licensing, controlling, and regulating” passenger transportation services, such as taxicabs, limousines, and other vehicles for hire within their geographical limits under the Tennessee Passenger Transportation Services Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1003(a) (2024). In 2022, the State extended this authority to low-speed entertainment transportation vehicles or ETVs, which are commonly used for tourist activities. 2022 TENN. PUB. ACTS 514 (ch. 666); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1007 (2024). In accordance with this authority, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, or Metro Nashville, passed ordinances regulating ETVs codified in Chapter 6.77 of its code. See Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., Code §§ 6.77.010 to 77.430 (2023) (hereinafter “Metro Code”). The Metropolitan Transportation Licensing Commission, a Metro Nashville board, was delegated the authority to license and regulate ETVs. See Metro Code §§ 2.100.010, -.030 (2023) (creating the Licensing Commission and granting it “exclusive jurisdiction over the licensing and regulation of all vehicles for hire”). Off the Wagon Tours, LLC and its owner, Charles Curtis Carney, (collectively “Off the Wagon”) operated a business known as the “Nashville Party Wagon.” Its party wagons met the definition of ETVs, which were required to have a permit under Metro Nashville’s ordinance. The Licensing Commission set a deadline for existing ETV operators to file for vehicle permits. Off the Wagon was aware of the deadline, missed it, yet continued to operate its ETVs. Licensing Commission inspectors issued over 30 citations to Off the Wagon for operating its ETVs without a permit (called a certificate of public convenience and necessity) in violation of the Metro Code. When Off the Wagon continued operating without permits, Metro Nashville filed a civil warrant in the environmental division of general sessions court seeking cessation of Off the Wagon’s operations and an injunction prohibiting future violations. The parties agreed to remove the case to circuit court, and Metro Nashville amended the warrant with a formal complaint. In its complaint, Metro Nashville reiterated its request for temporary and permanent injunctions ordering Off the Wagon and Mr. Carney to cease all ETV operations until permits were obtained. Metro Nashville also sought a $50 fine for each violation and disgorgement of any profits from unlicensed activities. The trial court granted the requested temporary injunction, concluding the relevant ordinances were lawfully enacted and that Metro Nashville could seek enforcement of its ordinances via injunctive relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.04. Despite the temporary injunction, Off the Wagon continued to operate its ETVs in Nashville. Metro Nashville moved to hold Off the Wagon in criminal contempt for multiple violations of the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Carney and Off the Wagon willfully disobeyed the injunction. As a sanction, it sentenced Mr. Carney to 40 days in jail, five days for each of eight separate acts of contempt. Off the Wagon appealed. About two weeks later, the trial court resolved a second contempt motion. The parties agreed that Off the Wagon had willfully disobeyed the injunction in 30 separate instances and that $1,500, $50 for each instance, was an appropriate sanction. In the same 2 order, the court made the temporary injunction permanent.1 It also denied Off the Wagon’s request that Metro Nashville post a bond as moot because a permanent injunction was now in place. The order states it “serves as a Final Order” and assesses costs. Off the Wagon moved to alter or amend the order on the second contempt motion. The court granted relief by amending its order to specify that Off the Wagon’s concession that a violation of the injunction occurred did not waive its rights on appeal, including any argument that Metro Nashville lacked standing or the authority to seek an injunction. The court also added language certifying its order as “a final judgment . . . regarding Metro’s claim for injunctive relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02” and that there was “no just reason for delay.” But it was “retaining jurisdiction over Metro’s claim for damages.” Off the Wagon then filed a second notice of appeal. II. Off the Wagon raises three issues on appeal. The first two issues relate to either the court’s authority to issue or Metro Nashville’s authority to seek an injunction to enforce its permitting ordinance. Its third issue posits that, even if the court had the authority to issue an injunction and Metro Nashville had the authority to seek an injunction, Metro Nashville failed to meet its burden of proof under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Off the Wagon asks that the injunction “be dissolved and set aside” and that the findings of criminal contempt be reversed. A. We begin with Off the Wagon’s request for relief from the permanent injunction. While our review generally extends only to the issues presented by the parties, our first consideration is whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from the injunction. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(b); In re Est. of Boykin, 295 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing that an appellate court “may consider its own subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte” (citations omitted)). Here, the injunction was not part of a final judgment, rather the trial court certified the judgment as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Appellate courts only have subject matter jurisdiction over final judgments, “[u]nless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute.” Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Miller, 491 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Tenn. 1973)). “A final judgment is one that resolves all the claims between all the parties.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 “permits the trial 1 The court made the injunction permanent as part of a default for Off the Wagon’s failure to comply with discovery deadlines. 3 court, without permission from the appellate court, to certify an order as final and appealable, even if parts of the overall litigation remain pending in the trial court.” Johnson v. Nunis, 383 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). But to do so, the court must make “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and . . . an express direction for the entry of judgment.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 54.02(1); Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tenn. 2000). The order certified as final must also “dispose of at least one entire claim or resolve all of the claims against at least one party.” E Sols. for Bldgs., LLC v. Knestrick Contractor, Inc., No. M2017-00732-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1831116, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2018) (citing Konvalinka v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., No. E2011- 00896-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1080820, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012)). Here, the order in which the trial court entered the permanent injunction does not dispose of all claims against a party, so the issue is whether the order resolves an entire claim. Determining whether a judgment, certified as final under Rule 54.02, resolves a separate claim is a question of law, which we review de novo. Ingram v. Wasson, 379 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Christus Gardens, Inc. v. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., No. M2007-01104-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3833613, at *3-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2008)). Like federal courts, Tennessee courts define a claim for Rule 54.02 purposes as the “aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.” Christus Gardens, Inc., 2008 WL 3833613, at *5 (quoting McIntyre v. First Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati, 585 F.2d 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1978)); accord Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 557 (explaining that, because the rules are substantially identical, federal court opinions interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) are persuasive authority in interpreting Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02). “[A] complaint asserting only one legal right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that right, states a single claim for relief.” Christus Gardens, Inc., 2008 WL 3833613, at *5 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 n.4 (1976)). We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified the order granting a permanent injunction as final. It identified the “claim for injunctive relief” as final. Yet, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a claim. And it is not the only remedy that Metro Nashville seeks for its ordinance violation claim. Disgorgement damages are still under review by the trial court. Rule 54.02 “‘cannot be used to appeal a part of a single claim or . . . to test a single legal theory of recovery.’” Christus Gardens, Inc., 2008 WL 3833613, at *5 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also E Sols. for Bldgs., LLC, 2018 WL 1831116, at *4 (recognizing that “[a]n award as to only one facet of the total damages is not properly certifiable” (citation omitted)). Because the order containing the injunction is interlocutory and there is no statute or rule that authorizes an appeal, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the injunction. B. 4 This Court does have appellate jurisdiction over the criminal contempt orders. An order imposing punishment for contempt “is a final appealable order in its own right, even though the proceedings in which the contempt arose are ongoing.” Coffey v. Coffey, No. E2012-00143-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1279410, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013) (citations omitted); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-4-108(b) (2021) (granting the court of appeals appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal contempt arising out of civil matters). The trial court held Off the Wagon in criminal contempt in two separate orders. In the first, after an evidentiary hearing, the court found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Off the Wagon willfully violated the temporary injunction by operating ETVs without Licensing Commission issued permits. The second contempt order reflects that the parties agreed there was “sufficient evidence” that Off the Wagon “willfully disobeyed” the temporary injunction 30 additional times. A contempt finding stemming from the violation of a court order has “four essential elements.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); accord Furlong v. Furlong, 370 S.W.3d 329, 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). The order allegedly violated must be lawful. Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354. The order must also be clear and unambiguous. Id. The individual charged “must have actually disobeyed . . . the order.” Id. at 355. And the violation must be willful. Id. Off the Wagon challenges only the threshold issue of whether the temporary injunction was lawful. To be lawful, the order must be “issued by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the case and the parties.” Id. (first citing Vanvabry v. Staton,2 12 S.W. 786, 791 (Tenn. 1890); and then citing Churchwell v. Callens, 252 S.W.2d 131, 136-37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952)). “[A]n order entered without either subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties is void and cannot provide the basis for a finding of contempt.” Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tenn. 1955)). Whether a particular order is lawful is a question of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. Off the Wagon’s arguments for why the injunction was unlawful focus on the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Essentially, it claims that the court lacked jurisdiction because an injunction was not an available remedy and Metro Nashville lacked legal authority and standing to request an injunction. Off the Wagon also claims that Metro Nashville failed to meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65 for seeking a temporary injunction. A court derives subject matter jurisdiction from the Tennessee Constitution or legislative act. Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tenn. 2016). “[P]arties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a trial . . . court by 2 As noted by our supreme court, the style of the case is reported differently in the official reporters. Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 355 n.16. Like the supreme court, we used the style as it originally appeared in the TENNESSEE REPORTS. 5 appearance, plea, consent, silence, or waiver.” Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). The existence of subject matter jurisdiction depends “on the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.” Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted). When challenged, a court must “determine the gravamen of the case and identify the source of its power to adjudicate that type of controversy.” Word v. Metro Air Servs., Inc., 377 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tenn. 2012) (citation omitted). The gravamen here is a violation of Metro Nashville’s ordinance requiring permits for ETVs. See Metro Code § 6.77.020 (2023).3 Metro Nashville finds its authority to issue “a citation or civil warrant” for ordinance violations under state law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 7- 3-501 (2024). State law also gives metropolitan governments the power to authorize their general sessions courts to hear ordinance violations. Id. § 7-3-311(f) (2024) (providing that metropolitan government charters may vest general sessions court with “jurisdiction to hear, try and dispose of all cases arising under the laws, ordinances and resolutions of the metropolitan government”); Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Ollis, No. M2010-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2991616, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2011). Metro Nashville did just that in its charter. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., Charter § 14.02 (2023) (granting the “general sessions court . . . exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try and dispose of cases involving the breach of any and all ordinances, regulations, resolutions and private acts of the metropolitan government”). So the general sessions court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims that Off the Wagon violated Metro Nashville’s ordinance. A general sessions case may be removed to “a court having jurisdiction of appeals from courts of general sessions.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-732(a) (2021). Circuit courts have appellate jurisdiction over general sessions courts. Id. at §§ 16-10-112 (2021); 27-5- 108(a) (Supp. 2018); see also City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 259 (Tenn. 2001) (recognizing that the violation of municipal ordinances has been considered civil for the purposes of procedure and appeal). So the circuit court acquired subject matter 3 Metro Code § 6.77.020A-B provides as follows: A. No entertainment transportation vehicle shall be used or operated on a for hire basis by any person in the territorial jurisdiction of the metropolitan government without an owner or operator having first obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Each certificate shall be valid for one year and shall be subject to renewal pursuant to the provisions set forth in this article. Applications will be reviewed and considered at an annual meeting on a date set by the [Licensing Commission]. B. It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or offer to transport passengers in any entertainment transportation vehicle which does not have affixed to the entertainment transportation vehicle a valid permit issued through the [Licensing Commission]. 6 jurisdiction once the parties agreed to removal. See Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that, in adjudicating appeals under Tennessee Code § 16-10-112, the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction is the same as the general sessions court); Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-732(a) (stating that “[a] case properly removed pursuant to this section shall be tried by the appellate court in the same manner as appeals from general sessions court civil actions are currently tried”). Off the Wagon counters that subject matter jurisdiction depends, not only on the nature of the cause of action, but also on the relief sought. See Landers, 872 S.W.2d at 675. Thus, “if the relief sought is not available by statute or ordinance, the court is without subject jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy before it.” Here, Off the Wagon claims that neither a statute nor the ordinance authorizes injunctive relief to enforce the ETV permitting requirement. Other courts do “extend[] notions of subject matter jurisdiction beyond that which is required to initiate a proceeding to the type of relief granted by the court.” Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988); see, e.g., Comm’r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 6 (1987) (describing “relief that the Tax Court itself had no jurisdiction to provide”); In re Adoption of Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 1980) (holding that, “[w]hen a court acts without legal authority to do so, it lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter” (citation omitted)). But “[c]ourts are not unanimous . . . in treating the granting of relief beyond the authority of the court as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Martineau, supra, at 20. We conclude that the court’s authority to grant a specific type of relief is distinct from its authority to decide a particular type of controversy. See Word, 377 S.W.3d at 674 (observing that a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction requires a court to “identify the source of its power to adjudicate the type of controversy” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Off the Wagon’s argument that the trial court had no power to enter a temporary or permanent injunction is an assertion of error rather than lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Hartt v. Hartt, 397 A.2d 518, 520 (R.I. 1979) (finding that an argument asserting that the lower court did not have authority to grant the relief it granted is an argument that “presents an assertion of error rather than a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the [court] to enter such an order”). Off the Wagon also contends that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because Metro Nashville did not have standing to request an injunction. It asserts that, under Metro Nashville’s ETV ordinances, “only the [Licensing Commission] and its inspectors have standing to cite alleged violators.” Subject matter jurisdiction and standing are “two distinct concepts,” which are sometimes conflated. SunTrust Bank, Nashville v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Grant v. Anderson, No. M2016-01867-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2324359, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018). While “subject matter jurisdiction implicates a 7 court’s authority to hear and decide a particular type of case,” standing is “used to determine whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief.” SunTrust Bank Nashville, 46 S.W.3d at 221, 222 (citations omitted); see also City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tenn. 2013) (explaining that a standing determination focuses on “a party’s right to bring a cause of action” (citation omitted)). A “lack of standing does not usually defeat a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Jarnigan v. Moyers, 568 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). We describe lack of standing as not usually defeating subject matter jurisdiction because sometimes “a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may bring [the] action.” Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004). In those situations, “the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Id. (citing Grom v. Burgoon, 672 A.2d 823, 824 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)); Jarnigan, 568 S.W.3d at 589. Off the Wagon claims that standing was a jurisdictional prerequisite here based on the Metro Code. It notes that, under the Metro Code, the Licensing Commission’s staff is tasked with either reporting violations of the permitting ordinance or issuing a citation. Metro Code § 6.74.440. And the Licensing Commission possesses the authority to enforce the ordinances regulating vehicles for hire. Id. § 6.74.500. Off the Wagon’s argument fails, however, because the Metro Code provisions it relies on do not create a cause of action. Rather, the provisions reflect a partial delegation of Metro Nashville’s authority under the Tennessee Passenger Transportation Services Act to the Licensing Commission. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1003(a) (authorizing a governmental entity “to protect the public health, safety, and welfare by licensing, controlling, and regulating by ordinance or resolution each private passenger-for-hire vehicle providing transportation services operated within the jurisdiction of the . . . other governmental entity”). As noted above, a statute grants Metro Nashville the authority to issue a civil warrant for ordinance violations. See id. § 7-3-501. Finally, Off the Wagon claims that the injunction fails to meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Procedurally, it asserts that the temporary injunction was void for lack of the required injunction bond. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 65.05(1); S. Cent. Tenn. R.R. Auth. v. Harakas, 44 S.W.3d 912, 918-22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing that Rule 65 requires a preliminary injunction bond to cover damages if a party is wrongfully restrained). Substantively, it asserts that, as a municipal corporation, Metro Nashville had no “rights” that were being violated and, thus, could not suffer immediate and irreparable harm. See TENN. R. CIV. P. § 65.04(2).4 4 TENN. R. CIV. P. 65.04(2) provides: When Authorized. A temporary injunction may be granted during the pendency of an action if it is clearly shown by verified complaint, affidavit or other evidence that the 8 While either of Off the Wagon’s arguments might mean the injunction is subject to reversal on appeal, it does not mean the judgment was unlawful in the sense that the court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the parties. See Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 355. As our supreme court explained, “[a]n order is not rendered void or unlawful simply because it is erroneous or subject to reversal on appeal.” Id. (citations omitted). While the injunction remained in force, Off the Wagon was required to abide by it. See id. That is why, “even though the trial judge’s order is erroneous and is reversed on appeal, an adjudication of contempt for failure to obey that order will be sustained.” State v. Jones, 726 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tenn. 1987). C. Metro Nashville argues that this appeal is frivolous and seeks damages. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2017); see also Whalum v. Marshall, 224 S.W.3d 169, 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (describing a frivolous appeal as an appeal that “has no reasonable chance of success or is so utterly devoid of merit as to justify the imposition of a penalty” (citations and quotations omitted)). Metro Nashville makes this request in a footnote to the conclusion of its brief. The request is not mentioned elsewhere. When an appellee is not seeking relief from the judgment below and presenting its own statement of the issues, a request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal must be presented “by raising it in the body of the brief, adequately developing the argument, and specifying that relief in the brief’s conclusion.” Charles v. McQueen, 693 S.W.3d 262, 284 (Tenn. 2024) (citing TENN. R. APP. P. 27(a)(7)(A), (a)(8), (b)). Because Metro Nashville did not raise the request in the body of its brief or adequately develop its argument, we deem the request waived. III. We conclude the injunction was lawful, so we affirm the trial court’s findings of criminal contempt for violations of the injunction. The case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion. s/ W. Neal McBrayer W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE movant’s rights are being or will be violated by an adverse party and the movant will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage pending a final judgment in the action, or that the acts or omissions of the adverse party will tend to render such final judgment ineffectual. 9