Full Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0305p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; FORD MOTOR ┐ COMPANY, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, │ > Nos. 25-1971/1985 │ v. │ │ │ INTERMOTIVE, INC.; GREGORY E. SCHAFER, │ Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint. No. 4:17-cv-11584—Terrence George Berg, District Judge. Argued: October 22, 2026 Decided and Filed: November 16, 2026 Before: KETHLEDGE, Chief Judge; CLAY and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Jonathan D. Hacker, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Ford Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company. Andrew M. Grove, HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for InterMotive, Inc. and Gregory E. Schafer. ON BRIEF: Jonathan D. Hacker, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., Thomas Harris, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Newport Beach, California, for Ford Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company. Andrew M. Grove, Joseph W. Barber, HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for InterMotive, Inc. and Gregory E. Schafer. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Ford Global Technologies, LLC and Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) appeal: (1) the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law on a trade secret claim; and (2) the jury’s unjust enrichment award. Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants InterMotive, Inc. and Gregory E. Schafer (“InterMotive”) cross-appeal: (1) the district court’s cancellation of its jury award under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.); (2) the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest on the cancelled Lanham Act award; (3) the district court’s denial of enhanced damages for trademark infringement; (4) the district court’s determination that InterMotive could not recover disgorgement damages for breach of a non-disclosure agreement; and (5) the district court’s grant of a motion in limine excluding InterMotive’s implied contract theory from trial. We AFFIRM the district court on all issues raised. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background 1. Upfitter Interface Modules and InterMotive’s Business The Upfitter Interface Module (UIM) is a type of electronic control module, a standard component used in the automotive manufacturing aftermarket by companies known as “upfitters,” or specialty vehicle manufacturers. The “upfit” marketplace adapts partially unfinished vehicles, sold by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) like Ford, into specialty vehicles such as work trucks, transit vehicles, police vehicles, ambulances, fire trucks, and school buses. Upfitters typically have to add their own control systems—like UIMs—to a vehicle in order to configure and sell it for its intended purpose. Greg Schafer founded InterMotive in 1996, after previously working for Ford as a design engineer and field service engineer. InterMotive “design[s] and manufacture[s] automotive Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 3 electronic control systems almost exclusively for commercial vehicles.” Trial Tr. Vol. 5, R. 251, Page ID # 9792:23–25. Customers of InterMotive are typically companies that purchase unfinished commercial vehicles from OEMs, who then perform final-stage manufacturing on vehicles and sell them to end users purchasing a series of vehicles. InterMotive’s products are designed to be “plug and play,” meaning the manufacturer “do[es]n’t have to cut into any OEM wires.” Trial Tr. Vol. 5, R. 251, Page ID # 9793:23–25. Ford also sells modules, as do several other companies. As described by the district court, InterMotive’s trade secret was embodied in their UIM product, which was “designed as a programmable ‘plug and play’ module that has inputs and outputs for the aftermarket equipment, as well as the ability to ‘interface’ with the vehicle and eliminate the need to splice into the vehicle’s wiring to access vehicle data.” Order Denying JMOL, R. 295, Page ID # 13174. The UIM works by providing a plug-in interface with the vehicle on-board network to obtain Controller Area Network (“CAN”) data for controlling added specialty equipment. “In lay terms, the UIM could simply plug into the semi-finished vehicle and detect the signals on the vehicle’s onboard network that the upfitter needed to control the equipment it was adding, and then use those signals to control the equipment.” Second Br., ECF No. 46, 7. The UIM, and other modules like it, provide a way for users to customize a vehicle’s features. 2. Ford and InterMotive’s Collaboration In 2011, Ford and InterMotive began a business relationship wherein InterMotive would design a UIM specifically for Ford. Ford and InterMotive’s preliminary discussions were governed by a Confidential Disclosure Agreement (the “CDA”). In 2012, Ford and InterMotive agreed to a three-phase project. The “Phase 1 UIM” was produced within six weeks and consisted of InterMotive taking their preexisting UIM product and adding enhancements specific to Ford CAN data. This UIM was produced quickly so that Ford could show it at the NTEA 2012 Work Truck tradeshow. At this show, Ford presented the Phase 1 UIM to a room of “about 400-plus people.” Trial Tr. Vol. 5, R. 251, Page ID # 9799:11. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 4 Ford engaged in other promotion of the Phase 1 UIM at its booth for the remainder of the tradeshow. The “Phase 2 UIM” was intended to include Ford-compliant hardware and InterMotive firmware. InterMotive developed a specification for the Phase 2 UIM in early March 2012. The Phase 2 UIM included the trade secret at issue in this case, the use of programmable inputs in the UIM device. After months of discussion between InterMotive and Ford regarding the design for the Phase 2 UIM, InterMotive provided Ford with the Phase 2 UIM specification pursuant to the CDA in December 2012. InterMotive produced 12 prototypes of the Phase 2 UIM, one of which was left with Ford following InterMotive’s demonstration of it at this December 2012 meeting. The “Phase 3 UIM” would have included both Ford-compliant hardware and Ford- compliant firmware. However, in early 2013 Ford informed InterMotive it would not be moving forward with the project and InterMotive stopped development toward the Phase 3 UIM model. 3. Following Ford and InterMotive’s Split Years later, at the 2016 NTEA tradeshow, Ford publicly announced that several of its 2017 vehicles would include a “UIM” that would make it easier for upfitters to work on the electrical systems in Ford vehicles. This announcement caused InterMotive to suspect Ford had taken and copied InterMotive’s confidential information from the Phase 2 UIM specification. InterMotive brought these concerns to Ford, and Ford responded by filing the instant suit. B. Procedural History 1. Pre-Trial Ford filed its district court case against InterMotive and Mr. Schafer on May 17, 2017. Ford asserted claims of trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, trademark dilution, and cancellation of trademark registration. In its answer, InterMotive asserted counterclaims of trademark infringement, unfair competition under federal and state law, breach of contract, false advertising, and trade secret misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA), Mich. Comp Laws § 445.1901 et. seq. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 5 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on nearly every claim asserted. These motions were denied except with respect to one part of InterMotive’s claim for false advertising.1 Ford additionally filed motions challenging InterMotive’s damages model for failure to apportion damages, asserting that InterMotive bore the burden to prove what portion of Ford’s profits are attributable specifically to the trade secret elements allegedly contained within Ford’s UIM devices. The district court rejected these arguments and held that InterMotive could present its damages theory based on the entirety of Ford’s profits for selling vehicles with UIM devices. Finally, the district court granted Ford’s motion in limine seeking to “exclude an implied contract theory from InterMotive’s breach of contract counterclaim.” Final Pretrial Tr., R. 218, Page ID # 8197:1–2. 2. Trial The case proceeded to trial from October 18, 2023 to November 1, 2023. A theory significant to this appeal that Ford presented at trial is that InterMotive’s Programmable Relay Power Center (“PRPC”) practices the claimed trade secret and disclosed it to the public when the PRPC was released in 2014. The district court defined the claimed trade secret to the jury as “the use of programmable inputs in a device like the Upfitter Interface Module.” Trial Tr. Vol. 11, R. 266, Page ID # 11154. Among its instructions to the jury, the district court gave the following instructions regarding damages for InterMotive’s trade secret misappropriation claim: If you find InterMotive has proven that Ford misappropriated its trade secret, you must decide the damages, if any, to which InterMotive is entitled. If InterMotive has not proven misappropriation of its claimed trade secret, your verdict must be for Ford on that question and you must not consider trade secret damages. InterMotive has the burden of proving its damages with reasonable certainty. Damages not based on evidence presented in this case or on speculation and conjecture are not recoverable, but damages are not speculative merely because they cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision. 1The district court also, at an earlier point in the case, dismissed with prejudice Ford’s claim of trademark cancellation. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 6 In this case InterMotive is seeking damages based on the unjust enrichment caused by Ford’s misappropriation. In order to prove entitlement to unjust enrichment or disgorgement damages, InterMotive must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both (1) that Ford’s use of the trade secret caused Ford to make additional vehicle sales, and (2) a reasonable estimation of the actual amount of additional vehicle sales caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret. Alternatively, InterMotive seeks to recover the profits Ford gained from the sale of Ford’s modules caused by the misappropriation of InterMotive’s trade secret. If InterMotive meets this burden with evidence as to the amount of additional vehicle or module sales that were caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret, the burden will then shift to Ford to prove its setoffs and deductions to arrive at the amount of vehicle or module profits from sales that were actually caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret. For example, if InterMotive seeks a damages award based on a certain percentage or amount of Ford’s vehicle or Ford’s module profits, then InterMotive must prove that the trade secret drove that percentage or amount of vehicle or module sales. If you find that InterMotive has not met its burden of proof in showing that Ford’s unjust enrichment was caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret, a damages award based on Ford’s vehicle or module profits would necessarily be speculative and therefore impermissible. But if you find that InterMotive has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Ford’s use of the trade secret caused additional vehicle or module sales, and that the evidence provides a reasonable estimation of the amount of additional vehicle or module sales caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret, then you must award unjust enrichment damages to InterMotive in an amount of Ford’s profits from such sales after deducting any setoffs or costs that Ford has shown should not be included in calculating the net profit. Id. at Page ID # 11158–60. Ford sought a jury instruction that the burden rested on InterMotive to further apportion its damages to the incremental benefit of Ford’s modules that only the trade secret provided, but this request was overruled. In addition, the district court provided the following instruction to the jury regarding potential overlap between a damages award for trade secret misappropriation versus unfair competition: In answering questions about damages, answer each question separately. Do not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of your answer to any other question about damages. Do not speculate about what a party’s ultimate recovery Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 7 may be, may or may not be. Overall recovery, if any, will be determined by the Court when it applies the law to your answers at the time of judgment. Trial Tr. Vol. 11, R. 266, Page ID # 11164–65. On November 1, 2023, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found for InterMotive on its trademark infringement claim, including that Ford’s infringement was willful, deliberate, and intentional, but found that none of Ford’s profits from the sale of the UIM were caused by Ford’s trademark infringement. The jury then found for InterMotive on its breach of contract claim and awarded nominal damages of $1.00 as instructed. The jury did not find that InterMotive had proven its false advertising claim. Finally, the jury found for InterMotive on its trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition claims. The jury determined that $13,209,300 of Ford’s profits from the sale of Ford’s modules were caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret, and that $349,867 of Ford’s profits from the sale of its modules were caused by unfair competition under the Lanham Act.2 The jury found that none of Ford’s profits from the sale of its modules were caused by unfair competition under Michigan law. 3. Post-Trial In its final judgment, the district court sua sponte reduced the jury award by $349,867. The court did so on the basis that the $349,867 amount “represents a percentage of Ford’s profits which [had] already been included in the $13,209,300 award for trade secret misappropriation representing the full amount of Ford’s profits.” Final J., R. 282, Page ID #11652. Accordingly, the court reduced the damages award “to prevent double or duplicative recovery of Ford’s profits for both trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition under the Lanham Act.” Id. Ford filed a motion for a renewed judgment as a matter of law and a new trial directed to InterMotive’s trade secret misappropriation counterclaim, and unjust enrichment damages award 2InterMotive’s damages expert, Mark Robinson, testified that Ford’s profits on its sales of the accused modules in North America were $15,913,350. Ford’s damages expert, Sara Rinke, testified that Ford’s profits on sales of the accused modules worldwide were $13,209,300. Rinke further testified that InterMotive had a market reach of 3%, meaning that Ford’s profits attributable to its use of the UIM name were $349,867. Accordingly, the jury selected the same damages figures as Rinke presented to them for both the trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition claims—Ford’s entire profits for the modules for trade secret misappropriation, and 3% of these profits for unfair competition. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 8 under the MUTSA and unfair competition counterclaims under the Lanham Act. The district court denied the motion in its entirety. InterMotive filed a motion to amend the final judgment, seeking a reinstitution of the $349,867 jury award for Lanham Act unfair competition, and prejudgment interest (including on the $349,867 unfair competition award). The district court granted this motion in part, awarding $3,011,092 in prejudgment interest on the jury’s award for trade secret misappropriation under the MUTSA, and otherwise denied InterMotive’s motion. This appeal followed. Ford filed a timely notice of appeal on October 24, 2025, and InterMotive filed a timely notice of cross appeal on October 28, 2025. II. DISCUSSION A. InterMotive’s Trade Secret Claim 1. Standard of Review This Court first considers whether the district court erred in denying Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding InterMotive’s trade secret claim. We review the denial of a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 306 (6th Cir. 2016). “In so doing, we may not weigh the evidence, question the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our own judgment for that of the jury.” Id. (citing Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Invs., Inc., 787 F.3d 797, 804 (6th Cir. 2015). Reversal is only appropriate where no reasonable mind could agree with the jury’s verdict, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Ermold v. Davis, 130 F.4th 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts, LLC, 774 F.3d 1065, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014)). 2. Analysis A “trade secret” under the MUTSA is “information that derives independent economic value from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who could obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,” and such Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 9 information must be “the subject of reasonable efforts under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Dice Corp. v. Bold Techs., 556 F. App’x 378, 385 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1902(d)). Trade secret law does not protect “an idea which is well known or easily ascertainable.” Id. (quoting Manos v. Melton, 100 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Mich. 1960)). However, not all trade secrets become “plainly visible merely by looking at the units.” Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975). Ford argues that the undisputed evidence shows that InterMotive’s trade secret lost its trade secret status by the time Ford released its UIM-like product in 2016 because InterMotive itself had already disclosed the idea in its own PRPC prototype in 2014. Ford asserts that the public use of programmable units in InterMotive’s PRPC device is not disputed, and that the PRPC device is sufficiently similar to the Phase 2 UIM such that the PRPC device publicly disclosed the trade secret. In particular, Ford argues that while the PRPC device disclosed additional elements, these elements were irrelevant to disclosure of this trade secret, and that InterMotive’s own witnesses admitted the added size, power, and functions of the PRPC device were not themselves trade secrets. InterMotive responds both that expert testimony and other evidence at trial demonstrated that the mere sales of the PRPC do not reveal the use of programmable units, and that the PRPC had critical differences from the trade secret and the Phase 2 UIM. The jury heard evidence that the PRPC prototype required other modules to function like the UIM, and that it was physically “much bigger” than the Phase 2 UIM. Trial Tr. Vol. 5, R. 264, Page ID #10764. Professor Juan Pimentel, serving as an expert for InterMotive, testified before the jury that this distinction between the PRPC product and the Phase 2 UIM was significant, because the PRPC cannot be hooked directly to a CAN bus like the UIM—that “to perform the functions it’s intended for,” the PRPC requires “a LIN communication between this and yet another module.” Id at Page ID # 10765. Professor Pimentel specifically clarified that while CAN and LIN are not confidential in and of themselves, “the way you use a CAN bus in a specific design such as this one for a specific end user, that is confidential.” Id. at Page ID # 10770. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 10 Professor Pimentel further testified that it is “extremely hard to figure out how [the PRPC is] made,” such that public availability of the PRPC does not entail public availability of the trade secret technology it contains. Id. at Page ID # 10765. He expressly stated to the jury that it would be difficult to reverse-engineer such a product and had not heard testimony that Ford had managed to achieve such reverse engineering. Id. Ford argues in its reply that the “inner workings” of the UIM-like device are irrelevant, and that other witnesses testified that it would not be difficult to reverse-engineer the PRPC. However, the standard of review requires this Court to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and reverse only where there is no genuine dispute of material fact. In this case, InterMotive put forth evidence that the PRPC device (1) did not practice the trade secret, and (2) would have been difficult enough to reverse-engineer that it would not have disclosed the trade secret even if it did practice it. The jury was permitted to credit such testimony from InterMotive’s expert over other testimony and evidence in reaching its verdict. Accordingly, this Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict on InterMotive’s trade secret claim. B. The Trade Secret Misappropriation Award 1. Standard of Review The Court next considers whether the district court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding damages for trade secret misappropriation, and whether it erred in denying Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law directed to the sufficiency of InterMotive’s evidence on damages at trial. “We review the legal accuracy of jury instructions de novo… and the denial of the proposed jury instruction for abuse of discretion.” Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 305 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole, and the reversal of a judgment on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction may occur only if the instructions viewed as a whole were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial. Smith v. Joy Techs., Inc., 828 F.3d 391, 397 (6th Cir. 2016). Further, this Court’s review of a jury’s damages award “is extremely deferential, and we will not order a remittitur or new trial unless the award ‘is contrary to all reason.’” Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 413 (6th Cir. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 11 2006) (quoting In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 1988)). The denial of a Rule 50(b) motion is reviewed de novo. Smith, 813 F.3d at 306. 2. Analysis Ford raises two distinct challenges regarding the $13.2 million trade secret misappropriation damages award to InterMotive. First, Ford argues that the district court erred when it did not require InterMotive to apportion Ford’s UIM profits between the protected and unprotected elements of the UIM, which renders the jury’s verdict improper as a matter of law. Second, Ford argues that even if the district court properly instructed the jury on the law, the jury’s verdict should be overturned as it is unsupported by the evidence in the record. The Court takes up each of these challenges below. i. Apportionment Under the MUTSA, a plaintiff “is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1904. Ford argues that this “caused by” language imposes a mandate, borrowed from patent law, that the award for misappropriation under the MUTSA must be apportioned such that it represents only the value of the trade secret used within the product— such that in this case, the jury’s award of Ford’s entire profits from module sales is erroneous because it captures profits earned on unprotected aspects of the modules. Ford further argues that the district court erred when it instead imposed a burden-shifting framework which instructed the jury to “award unjust enrichment damages to InterMotive in an amount of Ford’s profits from [sales caused by the misappropriation of trade secrets] after deducting any setoffs or costs that Ford has shown should not be included in calculating the net profit.” First Br., ECF No. 38, 40 (citing Trial Tr. Vol. 11, R. 266, Page ID # 11159–60). The Court finds that the district court’s burden-shifting approach and instructions to the jury were not erroneous, as they were tailored to the circumstances presented by this particular case. The instructions the district court gave to the jury put an initial burden on InterMotive to demonstrate an “amount of additional vehicle or module sales that were caused by the Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 12 misappropriation of the trade secret,” and then shifted the burden to Ford “to prove its setoffs and deductions to arrive at the amount of vehicle or module profits from sales that were actually caused by misappropriation of the trade secret.” Trial Tr. Vol. 11, R. 266, Page ID # 11159. This approach borrows from the requirement in copyright law that “[i]n assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). This approach also accounts for the fact that disgorgement is a distinct remedy from those applied in patent law cases. Finally, it accounts for the reality that Ford is in a better position to provide an apportionment analysis to the jury, since it can more easily conduct a review into both which portions of its profits from the modules it believes were driven by the misappropriated trade secret versus unprotected components, and into its costs in designing the accused product. This benefit is acknowledged in Milgrim on Trade Secrets, a secondary source the district court relied on when considering this question: Where a plaintiff seeks to recover the defendant’s profits resulting from the misappropriation, its burden is only to establish that the defendant achieved revenues from the use of the trade secret. Where plaintiff meets that burden, defendant has the burden of proving permissible deductions from gross revenues. That approach makes sense because at least with respect to the expenses defendant incurred exploiting the misappropriated trade secret, it will be defendant that has both access to and knowledge of the relevant evidence and the incentive to bring that evidence forward. . . In addition to expenses, defendant may reduce its potential unjust enrichment liability by establishing that a portion of its value of its product was attributable to something other than the misappropriated trade secret. 4 Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 15.02(3)(c)(iv). This Court has previously recognized that such a burden-shifting rule is logical in the copyright context, since it “corresponds to the reality that the infringer usually possesses the information necessary to provide the victim a fair share of the profits.” Premier Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Allegiance Adm’rs, LLC, 93 F.4th 985, 994 (6th Cir. 2024). It is the defendant who further “possesses every incentive to identify as many alternative contributors to the profits as it can.” Id. at 995. Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 13 The Court is convinced that the framework the district court instructed the jury to apply adequately required InterMotive to prove that any unjust enrichment the jury finds Ford acquired was “caused by” Ford’s misappropriation as required by the MUTSA. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1904. Additionally, such an approach did not prevent Ford from putting forth the evidence and argument before a jury that it seeks; the burden just did not rest with InterMotive to adduce such evidence in this case. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error in the district court’s instructions, and no basis to award Ford judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on this issue. ii. Sufficiency of the evidence Ford further asserts that “[e]ven assuming the jury was properly instructed on InterMotive’s burden to prove unjust enrichment caused by the trade secret, the jury’s conclusion that all of Ford’s UIM sales—and hence all of its UIM profits—were caused by the UIM’s use of programmable inputs was unsupported by the record.” First Br., ECF No. 38, 43 (emphasis in original). Ford argues that InterMotive did not proffer evidence that all of Ford’s UIM sales were attributable to the UIM’s use of programmable inputs, and accordingly, the jury’s award of Ford’s entire profits from the modules—the $13,209,300 damages figure—must be vacated. InterMotive responds that when viewing the burdens of proof properly in this case—i.e., that the burden was on InterMotive to show gross sales caused by the misappropriation, and then the burden shifted to Ford to prove offsets and deductions—there is ample evidence in the record to support the jury’s award. When considering this issue in Ford’s Rule 50(b) motion, the district court determined that “[t]he jury could have reasonably found that Ford’s modules sales (and therefore module profits) were caused by Ford’s use of the trade secret, and that the stipulated number of Ford’s module sales represents the amount of additional module sales.” Order Denying JMOL, R. 295, Page ID # 13257. Although this Court reviews the denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de novo, the Court agrees with the district court’s assessment of the record and finds no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict. At trial, InterMotive adduced evidence that Ford promoted its new module with programmable inputs in advertisements, specifically highlighting the advancements the UIM Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 14 provided over others in the market. InterMotive further put forth testimony that “a customer who orders a Ford [UIM] has to specifically select that feature,” and it was “not part of any package that’s offered by Ford.” Trial Tr. Vol. 4, R. 250, Page ID # 9523–24. While Ford points to contrary evidence, it was within the province of the jury to credit this testimony and these advertisements, and conclude from them that every module Ford sold was specifically selected by a customer due to its advertised programmable inputs feature. C. The Lanham Act Award 1. Standard of Review InterMotive challenges the district court’s denial of its motion under Rule 59(e) to amend the final judgment to restore the jury’s unfair competition award under the Lanham Act. The denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, “which occurs when a district court relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact or when it improperly applies the law.” Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 552 (6th Cir. 2012). “However, to the extent that the motion to alter or amend was based on an erroneous legal doctrine, the standard of review is de novo.” Nat’l Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Since the district court relied upon “both the record at trial and … [legal] authority” in denying InterMotive’s motion, Order re 285 Mot., R. 296, Page ID #13317, the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and its application of legal doctrine is reviewed de novo. 2. Analysis “A party is not entitled to recover twice for the same loss, even if the party would otherwise be able to recover for that loss under separate theories of liability.” Johnson v. Howard, 24 F. App’x 480, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980); Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 1990)). In its final judgment, the district court found that “to prevent double or duplicative recovery of Ford’s profits for both trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, InterMotive shall not separately recover the jury’s award of $349,867.00 for unfair competition under the Lanham Act because that amount represents a percentage of Ford’s profits which has Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 15 already been included in the $13,209,300 award for trade secret misappropriation representing the full amount of Ford’s profits.” Final J., R. 282, Page ID # 11652. InterMotive argues that this finding is inconsistent with the law of this circuit, the Lanham Act, and the authority the district court relied upon. In both its motion before the district court and its appeal, InterMotive relies chiefly on this circuit’s prior decision in La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland Props. LLC, 603 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 2010). In La Quinta, this Court upheld an award of both liquidated damages for breach of contract and treble damages for trademark infringement, determining that: [Appellee’s] claims for breach of contract and trademark infringement are distinct actions, based on separate conduct and addressing disparate harms. In addition, as we have determined, the liquidated damages award fell short of the $430,000 in lost royalties that [Appellee] would have received over the remainder of the license term and, consequently, was not tantamount to a double recovery. Id. at 345. InterMotive asserts that the trade secret misappropriation in this case “is distinct and separate” from trademark infringement, because of the “two distinct acts leading to two distinct wrongs:” the theft of InterMotive’s UIM technology and the damage to its brand by applying an infringing mark to a similar product. Second Br., ECF No. 42, 31–32. InterMotive argues that the district court erred in not finding that La Quinta authorizes it to recover both jury awards in this case on that basis, and in relying on Federal Circuit precedent to reach the opposite result. The district court considered how the jury was instructed to “separately assess the amount of Ford’s profits that InterMotive was entitled to recover, without regard to duplication or overall recovery.” Order re 285 Mot., R. 296, Page ID # 13310. With the context of this instruction, the district court found that “the jury awarded the entirety of Ford’s profits on duplicative numbers of Ford’s sales.” Id. at 13311. It reached this conclusion by noting that the jury awarded $13,209,300 for trade secret misappropriation, which is “the exact amount [Ford’s expert] Rinke calculated for the entirety of Ford’s profits on sales of 92,360 modules worldwide,” and that the jury awarded $349,867 for unfair competition, which is “the exact amount Rinke calculated for Nos. 25-1971/1985 Ford Motor Co., et al. v. InterMotive, Inc., et al. Page 16 the entirety of Ford’s profits on three percent of sales of 81,554 modules in the United States.”3 Id. The district court ultimately found La Quinta inapposite to these facts, since “InterMotive chose to seek only coextensive damages measured by Ford’s profits, and it turned out that the jury awarded all of Ford’s profits for trade secret misappropriation in the amount of $13,209,300.” Id. at 13314. This Court agrees with the district court’s interpretation of La Quinta, and of the differences these facts present. In La Quinta, this Court treated as significant the fact that “the liquidated damages award fell short” of the lost royalty award the plaintiff could have otherwise received over the remainder of the license term. 603 F.3d at 345. In addition, the La Quinta court was concerned with the incentives created by cabining the damages award to a single period—when the defendant breached the contract—when there was separate harm caused by the defendant’s behavior in a second period—when the defendant became a “hold over” in the space after the agreement between the parties was terminated. Id. at 344–45. No such situation exists here, where the trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition occurred at the same time and gave rise to the same pool of profits of which InterMotive sought disgorgement. The other cases InterMotive relies on present different factual situations, are not binding on this Court, or both. InterMotive further asserts that this Court should not be persuaded by the Federal Circuit precedent on which the district court relied. However, the Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America, Inc. case cited by the district court determined that a jury verdict constituted an impermissible double recovery on very similar facts. 895 F.3d 1304 (Fed. 3InterMotive asserts for the first time in its sur-reply that Ford’s “argument” that the jury awarded the full amount of Ford’s profits in its $13.2 million award is “speculative,” because “[n]o one knows with certainty how the jury arrived at the $13.2 million number or what it represents.” Fourth Br., ECF No. 54, 3. This point from InterMotive ignores that this is a conclusion the district court reached in denying its Rule 59(e) motion, having reviewed the trial record and the verdict form, not just an argument from Ford, and was