Full Opinion

25-603 SEC v. Laura UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 25-603 JOSEPH M. LAURA, ANTHONY R. SICHENZIO, Defendants-Appellants, WALTER GIL DE RUBIO, Defendant. _____________________________________ For Defendants-Appellants: ROBERT KNUTS, Gungnir Law PLLC, Greenport, NY. For Plaintiff-Appellee: WILLIAM K. SHIREY (J. Russell McGranahan, General Counsel; Jeffrey B. Finnell, Deputy General Counsel; Tracey A. Hardin, Solicitor, on the brief), United States Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, DC. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Hector Gonzalez, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the January 16, 2025 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Joseph M. Laura and Anthony R. Sichenzio appeal the district court’s judgment imposing disgorgement orders based on consent judgments finding them civilly liable for violating federal securities law. They argue that the court’s disgorgement calculations of $3,431,860 for Laura and $1,629,369 for Sichenzio exceeded their net profits from the fraud. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. 2 “We review disgorgement orders for abuse of discretion.” SEC v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379, 395 (2d Cir. 2023). “An abuse of discretion may consist of an erroneous view of the law, a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts, or a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 2013), as amended (Nov. 26, 2013). We give “wide latitude” to the district court’s discretion in calculating disgorgement. SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Disgorgement is” an equitable remedy by which a court “forc[es] a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.” Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is limited to the “wrongdoer’s net profits.” Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71, 75 (2020). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the Securities & Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to “seek, and any [f]ederal court [to] order, disgorgement” for any violation of federal securities law. Ahmed, 72 F.4th at 395 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7)). In this way, “[d]isgorgement serves to remedy securities law violations by depriving violators of the fruits of their illegal conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, the SEC “need only” show that “the amount of disgorgement” is “a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.” 3 SEC v. Fowler, 6 F.4th 255, 267 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted). Because “determining with certainty the extent to which a defendant’s gains resulted from his frauds” is difficult, a “court need not determine the amount of such gains with exactitude.” Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 31. Instead, “the disgorgement amount” must only be “generally reasonable.” Fowler, 6 F.4th at 267. “Once the SEC has met the burden of establishing a reasonable approximation of the profits causally related to the fraud, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that his gains were unaffected by his offenses.” Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 On appeal, Laura and Sichenzio argue that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt exceeded its equitable power by ordering [them] to disgorge amounts well in excess of [their] actual net profits.” Defs.’ Br. at 23. In their view, the court’s methodology was unsound because it did not reasonably approximate their illegal profits. We disagree. 1 Laura and Sichenzio argue that Liu abrogated our Circuit’s precedent that “shifted the burden of proof to defendants” after a reasonable approximation of disgorgeable profits has been determined. Defs.’ Br. at 34. But because they failed to raise this argument below, they may not raise it for the “first time on appeal.” Green v. Dep’t of Educ., 16 F.4th 1070, 1078 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, our post-Liu caselaw makes clear that the burden shift enunciated in Razmilovic is “consistent with Liu.” See Fowler, 6 F.4th at 267. 4 The district court calculated Laura’s ill-gotten gains by summing investor funds that he sent to his personal and law firm accounts, the Companies’ funds that he sent to his bank accounts, cash that he withdrew from the Companies’ accounts, and personal expenses that were paid for with the Companies’ funds. See SEC v. Laura, 739 F. Supp. 3d 6, 14–15, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). The court then subtracted amounts that Laura had loaned to the Companies. See id. at 15, 17. Similarly, the district court calculated Sichenzio’s ill-gotten gains by summing the deposits of investor funds and the net transfers of the Companies’ funds into his personal accounts. See id. at 17, 19. The court then subtracted the amounts that Sichenzio loaned to the Companies and payments that were determined to be legitimate business expenses. See id. at 17, 19. This method of calculating net profits – by summing “the gain made upon any business or investment,” while accounting for “both . . . receipts and payments,” Liu, 591 U.S. at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted) – is “a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation,” Fowler, 6 F.4th at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we easily “locate[] [this method] within the range of permissible decisions,” we discern no abuse of discretion. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 25. 5 Laura nevertheless objects that the court erroneously denied him “any form of compensation for his work as an executive officer” and wrongly assumed that “every single dollar withdrawn from [the] Companies[’] bank accounts was used by Laura for his personal benefit and not for business expenses.” Defs.’ Br. at 28. The district court, however, grounded its decision to reject these expenses in Laura’s failure to “point[] to any specific proof of validity for each expense identified by the SEC such as contracts or consulting agreements, reimbursement reports, emails, or contemporaneous documentation reflecting a business purpose.” Laura, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 15. Even on appeal, Laura points to no contemporaneous documentation in the record that reflects legitimate business purposes – despite his burden to show the legitimacy of expenses that “should have been deducted from an otherwise reasonable disgorgement amount.” Fowler, 6 F.4th at 267. Laura leaves us to rely on only his own “say-so,” which the district court reasonably declined to accept at face value given Laura’s history of false statements. Laura, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 15. Laura also insists that the district court “improperly rejected sworn declarations and documents showing that [he] borrowed $515,000 [from the Companies] to fund litigation expenses for the benefit of [the] Companies.” Defs.’ 6 Br. at 28. In support of this contention, Laura offered the district court promissory notes as purported evidence of a legitimate business purpose. See Laura, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 15. But these documents evince no specific business purpose; at most, they show that Laura promised to repay the Companies “for value [that he] received” from them. See SEC v. Laura, No. 1:18-cv-05075 (HG) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2024), Doc. Nos. 182-23–182-27 (capitalization altered). Given Laura’s failure to document the legitimacy of these expenses – and his lack of credibility – the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting these deductions. Fowler, 6 F.4th at 267. For his part, Sichenzio contends that the district court’s calculation exceeded his net profits because the court failed to account for his combined $2.1 million in investments and transfers to the Companies. In his view, the court should have deducted these “equity investments” from his “net profits” because they essentially represented costs incurred by Sichenzio that should have been deducted from his profits in the fraudulent scheme. Defs.’ Br. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “defendants in a disgorgement action” may not “deduct costs associated with committing their illegal acts.” FTC v. Bronson Partners, 654 F.3d 359, 375 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 7 Sichenzio used his purported investments to lure victims into the scheme by asserting that he had “skin in the game.” App’x at 60 ¶ 84. These funds employed in orchestrating the fraud do not constitute legitimate business expenses. See Liu, 491 U.S. at 85. Because we accord “wide latitude” to district courts in their disgorgement calculations, we cannot say that the court here abused its discretion in declining to deduct Sichenzio’s investments and transfers from his net profits in the fraud scheme. Lorin, 76 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). * * * We have considered Laura and Sichenzio’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 8