Full Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Gazi Abdulhay, Ali Abdulhay, : Nabil Abdulhay, and Valley Land : Holdings, LLC, : Appellants : : v. : : Upper Macungie Township : Zoning Hearing Board and : Allentown SMSA L.P. d/b/a : No. 1313 C.D. 2024 Verizon Wireless : Argued: September 10, 2025 BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: July 1, 2026 Gazi Abdulhay, Ali Abdulhay, Nabil Abdulhay, and Valley Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, Objectors) appeal from the September 20, 2024 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (Common Pleas) affirming a decision of the Upper Macungie Township (Township) Zoning Hearing Board (Board). Based on the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA),1 which forbids local zoning ordinances to materially inhibit cellular service and improvement thereof, the Board granted to Allentown SMSA L.P. d/b/a Verizon Wireless (Applicant) a use variance, a dimensional height variance, and a requested 1 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-624 & 641-646. variance to allow the construction of a driveway to service a proposed 190-foot cellular tower (Tower) in the Township’s RU3 Zoning District, in which the Tower is not a permitted use and also exceeds the 50-foot height limitation. Objectors argue that the Board erred because Applicant failed to provide substantial evidence to support the variances under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC).2 Upon review, we affirm Common Pleas’ order, albeit on a somewhat different basis. I. Background Applicant requested three use and dimensional variances related to its proposed erection of the Tower3 on a tract of land (Property) in the Township’s RU3 Zoning District, which is a rural district where commercial cell towers and towers over 50 feet are not permitted. See UPPER MACUNGIE TWP., PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 27 (Zoning Ordinance), §§ 27-301, 27-306, 27-402 & 27-802 (1994, as amended). The Board found that Verizon satisfied the requirements of Section 910.2 of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10910.2,4 and granted the variances with conditions.5 Objectors appealed to Common Pleas, which affirmed without taking additional evidence, finding that the testimony of Applicant’s engineers relating to signal strength and cell coverage in the area constituted substantial evidence in support of the Board’s decision. Objectors then appealed to this Court. 2 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202. 3 The Tower itself would be 185 feet tall and would be topped by a 5-foot lightning rod. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 6a. 4 Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329. 5 The Tower would need to be enclosed by a fence, equipment would need to be placed at the bottom of the Tower, and the driveway would need to be 10 feet wide and follow a pre-existing road across the Property. See R.R. at 6a. 2 II. Issues On appeal,6 Objectors offer several arguments. First, Objectors assert that the Board erred by granting the requested variances because the application for the use, dimensional, and driveway variances was not supported by substantial evidence. Next, Objectors contend that the Board erred by ruling that the TCA compelled the issuance of the requested variances. Finally, Objectors argue that the Board erred by considering the testimony of Applicant’s proffered witnesses as expert testimony when the witnesses were not qualified as experts. In response, Applicant contends that a denial of its variance requests would materially inhibit its ability to provide adequate cell service to the area, in violation of the TCA. Applicant insists the evidence and testimony established that the proposed location of the Tower was the only feasible solution to satisfy the design objectives and improve cell service for the area in question. Further, Applicant maintains that substantial evidence established the need to locate the Tower on the Property to improve inadequate cell service for the area. III. Discussion A. The Board’s Variance Analysis “A variance is an extraordinary exception and should be granted sparingly[.]” Heisterkamp v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lancaster, 383 A.2d 1311, 1314 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). Section 910.2(a) of the MPC provides that a zoning hearing 6 In zoning appeals where a common pleas court has taken no additional evidence, this Court’s review is generally limited to determining whether the zoning hearing board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence or whether the zoning hearing board made an error of law in rendering its decision. Twp. of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Exeter Twp., 962 A.2d 653, 659 (Pa. 2009). 3 board may grant a requested variance only where it finds that an applicant has established all of the following conditions: (1) That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the particular property and that the unnecessary hardship is due to such conditions and not the circumstances or conditions generally created by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or district in which the property is located. (2) That because of such physical circumstances or conditions, there is no possibility that the property can be developed in strict conformity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the reasonable use of the property. (3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the [applicant]. (4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood or district in which the property is located, nor substantially or permanently impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent property, nor be detrimental to the public welfare. (5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent the minimum variance that will afford relief and will represent the least modification possible of the regulation in issue. 53 P.S. § 10910.2(a). In zoning matters, “determinations as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to evidence are matters left solely to the [Board] in the performance of its factfinding role.” Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Dorrance Twp., 987 A.2d 1243, 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (internal brackets omitted). Further, “the Board has the power to reject even uncontradicted testimony 4 if it finds it lacking in credibility[.]” Lower Allen Citizens Action Grp., Inc. v. Lower Allen Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 500 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). The determination of whether an applicant has adduced evidence sufficient to allow a zoning hearing board to grant a variance is the function of the Board and will not be overturned on appeal unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. In re Towamencin Twp., 42 A.3d 366, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 1. Use Variances Because a use variance involves a “proposal to use the property in a manner that is wholly outside the zoning regulation,” our courts have required strict proof to obtain a use variance, without employing the relaxed standard for finding hardship that has been permitted for dimensional variances. Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43, 47 (Pa. 1998). Normally, a use variance applicant must prove that there is a unique hardship affecting the property; that granting the requested variance will not result in an adverse effect on the public health, safety, or general welfare; and that the requested variance is the minimum variance that will afford relief with the least modification possible. See Marshall v. City of Phila., 97 A.3d 323, 329 (Pa. 2014); see also Metal Green, Inc. v. City of Phila., 266 A.3d 495, 508 (Pa. 2021). Notably, a variance “is appropriate only where the property, not the person, is subject to hardship.” Yeager v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Allentown, 779 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (quoting Szmigiel v. Kranker, 298 A.2d 629, 631 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 2. Dimensional Variances For a dimensional variance, as opposed to a use variance, although the same elements must be established, our Supreme Court has articulated a more relaxed standard for granting a variance requiring a lesser quantum of proof. Under this relaxed standard, when addressing the element of unnecessary hardship, “[c]ourts may consider multiple factors, including the economic detriment to the applicant if the variance was denied, the financial hardship created by any work necessary to bring the building into strict compliance with the zoning requirements and the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood.” Hertzberg, 721 A.2d at 50. However, the requirement remains that “[a] variance, whether labeled dimensional or use, is appropriate only where the property, not the person, is subject to hardship.” Yeager, 779 A.2d at 598 (quoting Szmigiel, 298 A.2d at 631) (emphasis in original). Further, a conflict between dimensional zoning requirements and a landowner’s personal preference regarding property use alone does not create a hardship meriting a variance. Id. (denial of dimensional variance affirmed where appellant proved “nothing more than that adherence to the [applicable zoning] ordinance imposes a burden on his personal desire to sell vehicles for [a specific automaker]”). 3. Evidence Submitted for Variances Here, a commercial cellular tower is not a permitted use in the RU3 Zoning District. See Zoning Ordinance § 27-306.2 (Permitted Use Table). Additionally, communication towers above 50 feet are not allowed in residential districts like the RU3 Zoning District. See Zoning Ordinance § 27-402(R)(2) (“A freestanding commercial communications tower with a height greater than 50 feet 6 above the natural ground level shall not be located in a residential district.”). Further, commercial driveways are not allowed in the Township’s residential districts. See Zoning Ordinance § 27-809 (“A driveway or accessway serving a commercial or industrial use shall be deemed to be integral with such use and shall not be a permitted use in a residential district. This restriction shall not apply to a driveway or accessway that will be clearly limited to use by only emergency vehicles.”). Thus, Applicant’s proposed Tower requires multiple variances, both use and dimensional. Bryan Grebis, Verizon’s radio-frequency design expert, testified concerning the purportedly limited cellular service in the area to be serviced by the Tower. Grebis explained that the topography of the area resulted in dropped calls and weak or no cell signal, with difficulties being exacerbated by tree coverage and in inclement weather. He explained that the Tower would boost the signal strength in the area and fill gaps in existing coverage. He maintained that the Property was the only viable placement of the Tower due to its central location and topography. Grebis further contended that simply placing the Tower in a neighboring light industrial district would not solve the problem, but would simply duplicate existing coverage. Grebis also testified to the need for the variance from the maximum height allowance in the RU3 district. Grebis explained that the Property presents serious terrain challenges for constructing an effective but still compliant cell tower. Grebis testified that wireless is a line of sight technology, and thus requires a higher tower to see above the topography of the area. Terrain increases in the north portion of the Property require a tower of the height requested. A tower shorter than the one requested, Grebis explained, would not be able to reliably connect the RU3 area with existing areas of cell phone coverage (the network). Grebis also explained that the 7 Tower’s proposed height is the absolute minimum that would accomplish a high percentage of the site’s design goals. Applicant also presented the testimony of Matthew Graubart, a civil engineer who explained that the proposed driveway would be an extension of a pre- existing road already connected to the Property. Graubart explained that the plan regarding the driveway was merely to expand and extend the pre-existing road and then connect the expanded road to a new section of road connecting to the Tower site. Graubart explained that the driveway would be a 10-foot access road that would allow for maintenance of the Tower every 4 to 6 weeks, and that such infrequent traffic would not be burdensome and would, in fact, create less traffic than if the Property were used for residential purposes. The Board analyzed this evidence presented under the MPC requirements in conjunction with the TCA. The Board found “a compelling, unnecessary hardship which satisfies 53 P.S. § 10910.2(a)(2) by showing a reasonable use for this property in a global communication system, while its original primary use, residential, remains unchanged.” Br. of Appellants, Appendix A (Board Decision) at 11. The Board further found that “science and engineering,” not Applicant, “created this hardship in satisfaction of 53 P.S. § 10910.2(a)(3).” Id. The Board determined that the Tower would not alter the character of the neighborhood, impair appropriate use of neighboring properties, or be detrimental to the public welfare. Id. The Board also found that the Tower represented the least modification possible of the Zoning Ordinance. Id. Common Pleas, without taking additional evidence, similarly found that, by granting the use variance, the Board “prevented a material inhibition of providing personal wireless services to residents and visitors of the RU3 district.” 8 Br. of Appellants, Appendix C (Common Pleas Opinion) at 7. Common Pleas found that the existing cell towers are insufficient to service the RU3 district and that new towers in other districts would not solve the problem but would instead merely duplicate the existing issues. Id. Common Pleas further found that the Property’s location in the center of the coverage map made it the preeminent location for the Tower. Id. Common Pleas found that these factors compelled the grant of the requested variance and, thus, constituted substantial evidence supporting the Board’s grant of the use variance. Id. Common Pleas further found that the denial of the height variance would be a material inhibition to providing cell service to area residents. See Common Pleas Opinion at 9. Common Pleas observed that topographical challenges exist at the Property and that the proposed height of the Tower represents the minimum deviation from the Zoning Ordinance needed to provide residents of the RU3 district with adequate reliable cell service. See id. Accordingly, Common Pleas found that the TCA compelled the Board’s grant of the requested dimensional variance and, thus, that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See id. Common Pleas similarly found that the Board’s grant of the driveway variance proscribed a material inhibition to Applicant providing cell service to individuals living in the RU3 district. See Common Pleas Opinion at 10. Common Pleas found that, while the proposed driveway is a clear violation of the Zoning Ordinance, it “is a necessary component of the Tower and one cannot exist without the other.” Id. Common Pleas noted that a commercial communications tower must be maintained once built, and that the proposed driveway would therefore be 9 indispensable to the Tower and is the least restrictive modification possible. See id. at 10-11. We agree with the Board, albeit not fully. As stated above, the hardship criterion of a variance analysis requires a finding of unique physical circumstances or conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the particular property and that the unnecessary hardship is due to such conditions and not the circumstances or conditions generally created by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or district in which the property is located. 53 P.S. § 10910.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Here, the Board failed to consider the hardship element of variance relief properly. Instead of considering whether the evidence showed unnecessary hardship due to physical circumstances or conditions of the Property, the Board analyzed hardship in terms of Applicant’s alleged gap in cell service. Our review of the record reveals no evidence concerning unique circumstances or conditions of the Property itself. Thus, despite the Board’s determination that Applicant satisfied the remaining elements of variance relief, it is evident that Applicant failed to establish the unnecessary hardship required under the MPC to obtain a use variance for placement of the Tower. With regard to the other requested variances, we agree that the need for them was dependent on the grant of the variance for the Tower. Accordingly, the related additional variances stand or fall with the Tower use variance. Although Applicant did not meet the MPC’s hardship criterion for the Tower variance, Applicant also contends that the application of the TCA required the Board to grant relief from the limitations of the Zoning Ordinance. Accordingly, we must determine whether, considering the interplay of the TCA with the effect of 10 the Zoning Ordinance, the Board properly granted relief from zoning requirements to allow placement of the Tower. B. Interplay of the TCA and Local Zoning Restrictions Generally Section 332(c)(7) of the TCA provides, in pertinent part: (A) General authority Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities. (B) Limitations (i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof-- (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services; and (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) & (B)(i)(I-II). Thus, under the TCA, state and local governments retain general zoning authority but must comply with certain federal requirements. Municipalities cannot, through zoning ordinances, unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services, nor can they prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services. See Fairview Twp. v. Fairview Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 233 A.3d 958 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (en banc). Accordingly, “while Section 332(c)(7) of the TCA 11 preserves state and local governments’ authority to regulate zoning, it places limitations on the general authority of state or local governments or instrumentalities thereof to make decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.” Id. at 967 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, as discussed further below, any interpretation of the TCA that would give excessive deference to a wireless service provider without any balancing of local government interests and concerns would have the impermissible effect of eliminating the intended balancing of the totality of the circumstances in favor of virtually unfettered siting choice for the service provider. See APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1999). We must, therefore, consider the meaning of the TCA’s provisions as they affect the authority of local zoning provisions. The FCC has offered position statements concerning its interpretation of the TCA’s provisions, advising that, under the TCA, a local government impermissibly prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless service and entitles an applicant to zoning relief where a provider shows such relief is needed to cover a gap in that provider’s coverage or allow it to improve service so as to compete more effectively with other providers.7 See Fairview Twp., 233 A.3d at 966 & 968 (citing and discussing various FCC position statements). These statements would previously have been entitled to deference from courts construing provisions of the TCA, under the doctrine of judicial deference to administrative interpretations announced by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Judicial interpretation of an agency’s governing statute under Chevron 7 For convenience, our references herein to coverage “gaps” include both absences of cell signals and weak signals or other conditions necessitating service improvement. 12 required courts to determine whether Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 379 (2024) (citing and discussing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). Then, if the statute was unclear, i.e., silent or ambiguous regarding the question at issue, Chevron dictated that courts should defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute, provided that the agency’s interpretation was “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 379- 80 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (additional quotation marks omitted). Recently, however, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron’s deference doctrine in Loper, holding that the judiciary “must exercise . . . independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority . . . .” 603 U.S. at 412. Courts are free to consider an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute but, under Loper, a court “may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” Id. at 412- 13. The Supreme Court explained: Courts, after all, routinely confront statutory ambiguities in cases having nothing to do with Chevron—cases that do not involve agency interpretations or delegations of authority. Of course, when faced with a statutory ambiguity in such a case, the ambiguity is not a delegation to anybody, and a court is not somehow relieved of its obligation to independently interpret the statute. . . . So instead of declaring a particular party’s reading “permissible” in such a case, courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity. In an agency case as in any other, though, even if some judges might (or might not) consider the statute ambiguous, there is a best reading all the same—“the reading the court would have reached” if no agency were involved. Chevron, 467 U.S.[] at 843[] n. 11 . . . . It therefore makes no sense to speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying 13 all relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best. In the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible. Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do. . . . Chevron gravely erred . . . in concluding that the inquiry is fundamentally different just because an administrative interpretation is in play. Id. at 400-01. Accordingly, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Loper, we must determine, independent of the FCC’s position, the best interpretation of the TCA’s effect on local zoning ordinances. This Court previously considered the effect of the TCA on a local zoning ordinance in Fairview Township. There, the zoning ordinance at issue allowed cell towers only in the township’s various industrial districts, which totaled only about eight percent of the township’s area. 233 A.3d at 960. Both the zoning hearing board and, on appeal, the county court of common pleas granted variances for placement of a cell tower outside the permitted districts, concluding that the TCA prohibited denial of the variances. Id. at 960-61. The common pleas court granted the variances despite having found that the applicant failed to satisfy three of the five requirements for variance relief under the MPC. Id. at 961. The common pleas court concluded that “a denial of the variances would effectively prohibit [the applicant] from providing seamless wireless service in [the t]ownship in violation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the TCA.” Id. at 965 (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, the common pleas court relied on the application of Chevron deference by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in its pre-Loper decision in Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., LLC, 544 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 2008), in which the federal court concluded that “if a court of appeals interprets an ambiguous statute one way, 14 and the agency charged with administering that statute subsequently interprets it another way, even that same court of appeals may not then ignore the agency’s more recent interpretation.” Fairview Twp., 233 A.3d at 968 (quoting Levy, 544 F.3d at 502) (additional quotation marks omitted). On review, this Court observed that the applicant had failed to address the issue of unnecessary hardship and, thus, had not established that required element of variance relief. Id. at 962-64. We then considered the effect of the TCA on the availability of zoning relief, specifically the meaning of the TCA’s provision that local government may not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.” Id. at 965 (quoting Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the TCA, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (additional quotation marks omitted)). We relied, in part, on the FCC’s position that “where a bona fide local zoning concern, rather than the mere presence of other carriers, drives a zoning decision, . . . the TCA does not ‘trump’ the MPC with respect to the placement of wireless telecommunications towers.” Id. at 969 (quoting In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B) to Ensure Timely Siting Review and to Preempt Under Section 253 State and Local Ordinances that Classify All Wireless Siting Proposals as Requiring a Variance, 24 F.C.C.R. 13994 ¶ 56-61 (Nov. 18, 2009) at 14018 ¶ 62) (additional quotation marks omitted). We observe that Fairview Township and the FCC position statements and caselaw on which our Fairview Township decision was based were decided prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Loper. Accordingly, this Court followed Chevron and deferred to the FCC’s position statements. In light of the abrogation of Chevron deference by the Loper decision, however, we conclude that 15 our analysis in Fairview Township is not fully applicable here, as it was based on Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCA.8 In 2023, still before Loper, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Cellco Partnership v. White Deer Township Zoning Hearing Board, 74 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023). There, the Third Circuit again applied Chevron deference, observing that the TCA’s provision was not unambiguous and that the FCC’s interpretation of it was reasonable. 74 F.4th at 102-06. The Third Circuit explained that “[u]nder the [FCC’s] ‘materially inhibit’ standard, local government action ‘constitutes an effective prohibition if it materially limits or inhibits the ability of any competitor or potential competitor to compete in a fair and balanced legal and regulatory market.’” Id. at 102 (quoting FCC standard). The Third Circuit was critical of this Court’s decision in Fairview Township, suggesting it was inconsistent with the FCC’s position. Id. at 106. Thus, the Third Circuit’s criticism of Fairview Township was based on its application of Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation. Like Fairview Township, the Cellco decision is inapplicable here to the extent that it was based on Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation. In its analysis of whether Chevron was applicable, however, the Third Circuit in Cellco also discussed its previous application of a two-part test (which was not dependent on any FCC position) for determining whether a local zoning ordinance had the “effect of prohibiting” the provision of cell phone service. Cellco, 74 F.4th at 102-03 (first citing APT, 196 F.3d at 479; and then citing Sprint Spectrum, 8 We observe that our decision here does not improperly overrule prior decisions. Loper constitutes a sweeping abrogation of Chevron deference. As such, it has fundamentally changed how courts must view administrative interpretations of agencies’ governing statutes. Loper mandates that our interpretations of such statutes henceforward must be independent rather than deferring to agency interpretations. If such independent interpretations conflict with previous decisions, that is a necessary consequence of complying with the holding of Loper. 16 L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 639 (2d Cir. 1999)). Under this two-part test, “[f]irst, the provider must prove there is a significant gap in wireless service and, second, the provider must show it is filling that gap in the least intrusive manner.” Cellco, 74 F.4th at 100. Notably, the Third Circuit explained in Cellco that it had adopted the Second Circuit’s two-part Willoth test in APT as “persuasive . . . because it was ‘[t]he most thoughtful discussion we have found’ and the reading that ‘effects the best accommodation of the two primary goals of the TCA.’” Cellco, 74 F.4th at 102 (quoting APT, 196 F.3d at 479-80). Thus, the Third Circuit’s reasoning in APT appears to have been consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent directive in Loper that a court, rather than deferring to an administrative agency, must itself “determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper, 603 U.S. at 373. Other than decisions of the United States Supreme Court, federal court decisions construing federal statutes are not binding precedents for state courts, but “such decisions in factually similar cases with persuasive legal analysis may inform our disposition of the matter before us.” Commonwealth v. Monsanto Co., 269 A.3d 623, 639 n.14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). Accordingly, we will examine the reasoning of APT and Willoth to determine the persuasiveness of the two-part “effect of prohibiting” test. As this Court has explained, “[t]he TCA strikes a balance between two competing aims—to facilitate nationally the growth of wireless telephone service and to maintain substantial local control over siting of towers.” Fairview Twp., 233 A.3d at 971-72 (quoting Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 430 F.3d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted)). In analyzing this balance and whether a zoning ordinance has “the effect of prohibiting 17 the provision of personal wireless services” in violation of the TCA, the Third Circuit reasoned: [E]very municipality’s denial of an application to build a wireless service facility will have, to a degree, the “effect of prohibiting personal wireless service” because it will preclude the applicant provider from building a facility to serve its customers. Interpreting the TCA’s “effect of prohibiting” clause to encompass every individual zoning denial simply because it has the effect of precluding a specific provider from providing wireless services, however, would give the TCA preemptive effect well beyond what Congress intended. See Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Comm[c’ns] Enter[s.], Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Obviously, an individual denial is not automatically a forbidden prohibition violating the ‘effects’ provision.”); . . . Willoth, 176 F.3d [at] 639 (rejecting claim that individual denial violates “effects” provision because it would require court to “read the TCA to allow the goals of increased competition and rapid deployment of new technology to trump all other important considerations, including the preservation of the autonomy of states and municipalities.”); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Any reading of subsection(B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local authority by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) applications . . .”); OmniPoint Comm[c’ns], Inc. v. Scranton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (“Were courts to hold that merely because there are some gaps in service in an area . . . the public interest necessarily tips the balance in favor of allowing a variance, local boards would be obliged to approve virtually every application.”) (quoting Cellular Tel[.] Co. v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359, 374-75 (D.N.J. 1998)); Primeco Pers[.] Comm[c’ns] Ltd. P[’]ship, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22603, No. 97-208- CIV- OC-10B, 1998 WL 565036, at *12 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (“§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) is intended to limit general bans or policies that prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services. Any decision to the contrary would be at odds with the plain text of 18 § 332(c)(7)(A), which expressly reserves the bulk of zoning authority to local governing bodies.”); Virginia Metronet Inc. v. B[d.] of Supervisors of James City Co., 984 F. Supp. 966, 971 (E.D. Va. 1998) (accepting argument that § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) applies simply to individual denials “would be tantamount to the complete preemption of local authority in areas previously unserved by cellular services [and would be] at odds with the plain text of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A), which expressly reserves the bulk of zoning authority to local governing bodies[]”). We agree with these courts that the “effect of prohibiting” clause cannot be so construed. To do so would provide wireless service providers with a wildcard that would trump any adverse zoning decision that impaired their ability to provide wireless service, and would thereby create the proverbial “exception that swallowed the rule” that would be entirely inconsistent with § 332(c)(7)’s structure. . . . This does not mean, however, that a provider can never establish that an individual adverse zoning decision has the “effect” of violating § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Rather, it only means that the provider must bring additional proof to the court to demonstrate that the denial is representative of a broader policy or circumstance that precludes the provision of wireless service. . . . APT, 196 F.3d at 478-79. We agree with much of the reasoning of APT. In particular, as we previously stated in Fairview Township, the TCA is expressly intended to create a balance between the need for cell service and the retention of local municipal autonomy. Fairview Twp., 233 A.3d at 971-72. As stated above, the APT court relied on the Second Circuit’s analysis in Willoth to determine how to strike this balance, explaining: After parsing the text of the TCA, the Court [in Willoth] described the focus of subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)’s prohibition in the following terms: 19 By speaking in terms of communications between land stations (cell sites that connect directly to land- lines) and mobile stations (wireless telephones) and access to facilities necessary to make and receive phone calls, the plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a user in a given remote location to reach a facility that can establish connections to the nation