PGE v. Public Utility Comm.

54 September 16, 2026 No. 869 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company, request for a general rate revision. PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON and Oregon Citizens’ Utility Board, Respondents. Public Utility Commission of Oregon UE435; A186771 Argued and submitted June 30, 2026. Iván Resendiz Gutierrez argued the cause for petitioner. Also on the briefs were Jessica Ann Bernardini and Miller Nash LLP. Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge. JACQUOT, J. Affirmed. Cite as 353 Or App 54 (2026) 55 JACQUOT, J. Portland General Electric Company (PGE) seeks judicial review of a final order from the Public Utility Commission of Oregon (PUC), raising one assignment of error. The dispute regards the meaning of “associated energy storage,” within ORS 469A.120(2)(a), which enables quali- fied electric utility companies to recover certain expenses— those related to renewable energy—through an automatic process, rather than through a general rate case.1 PGE argued to the PUC that expenses for standalone energy storage projects are recoverable through the automatic pro- cess as “associated energy storage.” The PUC rejected that argument. On appeal, PGE argues that the PUC errone- ously interpreted the statute and improperly denied auto- matic cost recovery for standalone energy storage projects. The PUC responds that it “correctly concluded that ORS 469A.120(2)(a) does not allow [automatic] cost recovery for standalone energy storage” and that a general rate case is the correct mechanism to seek recovery of such expenses. For the reasons provided below, we affirm. We begin our analysis by examining the background of the Oregon Renewable Energy Act (OREA) and the parties’ arguments. We then turn to the text and context of the dis- puted provision of ORS 469A.120. Subsequently, we discuss relevant legislative history, concluding that when the legis- lature enacted and amended OREA, it intended a meaning for the term “associated” that is incompatible with PGE’s proffered interpretation. Under a correct reading of the stat- ute, the term “associated” does not refer to all energy storage investments; rather, cost recovery under ORS 469A.120(2)(a) is available for capital investments in the construction or acquisition of “facilities that generate electricity from renew- able energy sources” and the transmission and storage costs 1 A general rate case is a quasi-judicial process whereby a utility company files a request to increase or decrease utility rates, interested parties can inter- vene, there are opportunities for public comment, an administrative law judge reviews evidence and testimony, and ultimately, the PUC votes whether to approve, deny, or modify the utility’s request. See generally OAR ch 860. The Citizens’ Utility Board, also known as CUB, has the right to intervene as an advocate on behalf of Oregon utility consumers. ORS 774.180. The automatic recovery process also allows for oversight, particularly if the utility seeks to increase consumer costs. ORS 469A.120(3)(b). 56 PGE v. Public Utility Comm. associated with those particular facilities. Accordingly, we affirm PUC’s final order. I. BACKGROUND A. Enactment and Amendments of OREA OREA was enacted in 2007. Or Laws 2007, ch 301, § 13. It established a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which requires large utilities—such as PGE—to increase utilization of electricity generated from renewable sources, with at least 50 percent of energy sold to customers being derived from renewable sources by 2040. ORS 469A.052(1) (h). “The desired objectives of [the] RPS include: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, diversifying fuel sources, devel- oping new technologies, and improving rural economies.” Staff Measure Summary, House Committee on Energy and the Environment, SB 838 C, May 18, 2007.2 Section 13 of OREA, which was codified as ORS 469A.120, was titled “Cost Recovery.” Or Laws 2007, ch 301, § 13. The first subsection provided that, except for a limita- tion specified in another provision of OREA, “[A]ll prudently incurred costs associated with compliance with [the RPS] are recoverable in the rates of an electric company, including interconnection costs, costs associated with using physical or financial assets to integrate, firm or shape renewable energy sources on a firm annual basis to meet retail electricity needs and other costs associated with transmission and delivery of qualifying electricity to retail electricity consumers.” Or Laws 2007, ch 301, § 13. Another subsection directed the PUC to “establish an automatic adjustment clause” for cer- tain electric company expenses. Id. That same subsection explained that the automatic process “allows timely recovery of costs prudently incurred by an electric company to con- struct or otherwise acquire facilities that generate electric- ity from renewable energy sources and for associated elec- tricity transmission.” Id. Subsequently, the PUC established the Renewable Automatic Adjustment Clause (RAAC), a 2 Although staff measure summaries are not adopted or officially endorsed by the legislature, such summaries can “be important sources for understanding legislative intent[.]” State v. Gardner-Rolph, 345 Or App 681, 698, 584 P3d 270 (2025), rev den, 375 Or 261 (2026). Cite as 353 Or App 54 (2026) 57 mechanism that allows utilities to recover certain expendi- tures through rate increases without having to go through a complete general rate case. PUC Order No 24-091 (2024). According to the PUC, by submitting a RAAC schedule, a utility company may “recover the actual and forecasted rev- enue requirement for [an] eligible plant that is in service as of the date of the proposed rate change.” Id. In 2016, the legislature amended the automatic adjustment provision contained in ORS 469A.120(2).3 Or Laws 2016, ch 28, § 11. The operative language is: “[The RAAC process] allows timely recovery of costs pru- dently incurred by an electric company to construct or otherwise acquire facilities that generate electricity from renewable energy sources [and for], costs related to asso- ciated electricity transmission and costs related to asso- ciated energy storage.” Id. (with deleted material italicized and in brackets, and new material in boldface). Neither the word “associated” nor the phrase “associated energy storage” is defined by statute. B. Energy Costs at Issue There are two categories of energy storage rele- vant to this matter: co-located and standalone. Co-located energy storage facilities are connected directly to an energy- generating facility; typically, co-located energy storage is a collection of batteries located in close physical proxim- ity to an energy-generating facility such as a solar panel array. See Oregon Department of Energy, Energy Facility Siting Council Agenda Item C: Overview of Battery Energy Storage Systems for the May 16, 2025, Energy Facility Siting Council Meeting, 1-3, https://www.oregon.gov/energy/ facilities/Council%20 Meetings/2025-05-16-EFSC-Item-C-Staff-Report-Battery- Storage-Technology-Overview.pdf (accessed July 31, 2026) (listing a summary of examples). In contrast, standalone energy storage is not directly connected to any one energy- generating facility; rather, standalone energy storage is tied 3 ORS 469A.120 was also amended in 2010. Or Laws 2010, ch 79, § 1. The 2010 amendments changed language related to “above-market costs” and renum- bered subsections. Id. 58 PGE v. Public Utility Comm. directly into transmission lines, and is often supplied by energy generated from a variety of sources and facilities. PGE asserts, and the PUC does not contend otherwise, that both types of storage are necessary for the overall function- ing and stability of an electrical grid that relies on many different sources of energy generation. In 2024, PGE sought to recover capital investments for two standalone energy storage projects, along with other investments and expenditures, through the RAAC process. PGE concurrently filed a general rate case and stated that the primary drivers of its rate case were capital investments intended “to provide system reliability and resiliency, safety, and security for our customers.” PGE argued that although the standalone energy storage projects were not exclusively connected to renewable resource generation facilities, the standalone energy stor- age was needed to reliably integrate renewable electricity into the grid. PGE therefore asked the PUC to conclude that “the definition of ‘associated energy storage’ ” encompassed PGE’s standalone energy storage projects. The PUC entered a final order that considered and rejected PGE’s proffered interpretation. The order provides: “PGE’s interpretation would render the term ‘associated’ meaningless, because every storage resource within a power system that includes renewable resources would effectively be captured; for that matter, all new transmis- sion would be captured as well. As [PUC staff] point[ ] out, the plain meaning of the term ‘associated’ suggests some- thing akin to co-location; it does not suggest that any stor- age would qualify as ‘associated’ regardless of its location on the grid. Having concluded that the statute is clear in its intent to cover only storage and transmission more directly connected to the renewable energy resource for which recovery is sought, we reject PGE’s interpretation.” PUC Order No 24-454 (2024). II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review PGE challenges only the PUC’s legal interpre- tation and application of ORS 469A.120. We review such Cite as 353 Or App 54 (2026) 59 challenges to determine whether the agency has “errone- ously interpreted a provision of law.” ORS 183.482(8)(a). “Our standard of review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute depends on whether the statutory term at issue is an exact term, an inexact term, or a delegative term.” Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay, 363 Or 354, 360, 423 P3d 60 (2018). Here, as both parties agree, the disputed word is an inexact term, meaning that the legislature used the words to express “a complete legislative meaning but with less precision” than if it had used an exact term.4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of the legisla- ture’s intent regarding an inexact term is a question of law. PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ, 371 Or 673, 695, 540 P3d 523 (2023). On review, we interpret the meaning of inexact terms anew, without deference to the agency’s interpreta- tion, under the framework set out in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc., 356 Or 577, 584, 341 P3d 701 (2014). Although inexact terms embody a complete expres- sion of legislative meaning, that meaning may not always be obvious, and it is the task of the agency—and ultimately of the court—to determine what the legislature intended by using those words. Coast Security Mortgage Corp. v. Real Estate Agency, 331 Or 348, 353-54, 15 P3d 29 (2000). Legislative intent may be evidenced by the text and context of the statute and any legislative history that is useful to the analysis. Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72. “[W]e have an inde- pendent duty to correctly interpret any statute that comes before us, regardless of the arguments and interpretations offered by the parties.” Strasser v. State of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 260, 489 P3d 1025 (2021). 4 In this case, “associated” is not defined within the statutory scheme and is open to various interpretations. See Coast Security Mortgage Corp. v. Real Estate Agency, 331 Or 348, 354, 15 P3d 29 (2000) (concluding that the term “act in the capacity of an escrow agent” is an inexact term because “parts of that phrase are defined by statute and embody a complete expression of legislative meaning, [yet] the phrase is open to various interpretations.”); cf. Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District, 341 Or 401, 412-13, 144 P3d 918 (2006) (finding that the terms “unreasonable” and “clearly an excessive remedy” are delegative terms because the terms are not statutorily defined and “express incomplete legislative mean- ing” that the agency must resolve). 60 PGE v. Public Utility Comm. B. Text and Context In analyzing the legislature’s use of terms of com- mon usage, we presume those terms “to have [their] plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.” Gaines, 346 Or at 175. When an express definition of a statutory term is not pro- vided by the legislature, we employ other interpretive meth- ods. See State v. Kimble/Berkner, 236 Or App 613, 618-19, 237 P3d 871 (2010); Jenkins v. Board of Parole, 356 Or 186, 194, 335 P3d 828 (2014) (dictionary definitions can provide useful insight about ordinary meaning). In considering the statutory context, we may look at other provisions of the statute, other statutes in the same chapter, related areas of law, other provisions of the bill in which the statute was enacted, and the like. State v. Gardner-Rolph, 345 Or App 681, 690-91, 584 P3d 270 (2025), rev den, 375 Or 261 (2026). “The legislative history of other related statutes is considered part of the broader context of a statute.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We agree with PGE that the applicable, ordinary definition of “associated” is “closely connected, joined, or united with another (as in interest, function, activity, or office).” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 132 (unabridged ed 2002); see Jenkins, 356 Or at 194 (consulting dictionary for ordinary definitions). Based on that definition, PGE argues that the term “associated” does not require a phys- ical connection between two items and it therefore follows that ORS 469A.120 does not require that energy storage be co-located to be eligible for recovery through the RAAC pro- cess. We agree that nothing in the text, context, or legisla- tive history of ORS 469A.120 requires physical co-location for RAAC eligibility. However, PGE’s conclusion that costs for standalone energy storage facilities can be recovered through the RAAC process does not follow. PGE rests its case on an argument that the meaning of “associated energy storage” in ORS 469A.120(2)(a) refers back to text in ORS 469A.120(1). ORS 469A.120(1) reads, in relevant part: “ [A]ll prudently incurred costs associated with complying with [the RPS] are recoverable in the rates of an electric Cite as 353 Or App 54 (2026) 61 company, including interconnection costs, costs associated with using physical or financial assets to integrate, firm or shape renewable energy sources on a firm annual basis to meet retail electricity needs, above-market costs and other costs associated with transmission and delivery of qualify- ing electricity to retail electricity consumers.” Specifically, PGE argues that “[t]he plain language of the statute allows electric utilities to timely recover the costs ‘associated’ with ‘using physical or financial assets to inte- grate, firm or shape renewable energy sources’ that were ‘prudently incurred costs associated with complying with’ the RPS.” However, PGE’s argument that “associated energy storage” in subsection (2)(a) refers back to “prudently incurred costs associated with complying with” the RPS in subsection (1) is at odds with a simple grammatical analysis of ORS 469A.120. The phrase “associated energy storage” refers to an earlier part of the same sentence of subsec- tion (2)(a) in which that phrase is found: “costs prudently incurred by an electric company to construct or otherwise acquire facilities that generate electricity from renewable energy sources[.]” Said differently, through the RAAC pro- cess, utility companies can recover prudently incurred costs to construct or acquire renewable energy source facilities, costs that are “associated” with storing energy from those specific facilities, and costs that are “associated” with trans- mitting energy to or from those specific facilities.5 5 We additionally reject PGE’s argument that the word “associated” was intended by the legislature to have the exact same meaning each time it is used within ORS 469A.120. PGE argues that “interpreting ‘associated’ to mean closely connected, as in a function, would allow the text in context of the statute to apply consistently throughout * * *.” We generally “assume that the legislature intended the same word to have the same meaning throughout related statutes unless something in the text or context of the statute suggests a contrary intention.” Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 164, 175, 339 P3d 428 (2014) (emphasis added). ORS 469A.120 presents one of the instances where the text of the statute indi- cates that the legislature intended the same word to have different meanings in different subsections of the statute. The term “associated” is used differently in subsection (1) than it is in sub- section (2)(a). In subsection (1), “associated” modifies “costs”; in subsection (2)(a), “associated” modifies “electricity transmission” and “energy storage,” which are more technical terms. The former usage of “associated” functions similarly to in the process of or related to complying with the RPS (i.e., costs prudently incurred 62 PGE v. Public Utility Comm. That there is a meaningful distinction between what is described in subsection (1)—”all prudently incurred costs associated with” RPS compliance—and what is described in subsection (2)(a)—costs that are recoverable through the RAAC process—is further evidenced by language in subsec- tion (3)(a): “An electric company must file with the [PUC] for approval of a proposed rate change to recover costs under the terms of an automatic adjustment clause or other method of timely recovery of costs established under subsection (2) of this section.” (Emphasis added). That determination is consistent with the context of ORS 469A.120 and utility rate regulation as a whole. Through general rate cases, as governed by ORS chapter 757 and the PUC, utilities can seek rate changes that are “fair, just and reasonable,” see, e.g., ORS 757.210 (governing the process for review of requests to establish or modify util- ity rates or rate schedules), based on the utility’s revenue, requested return on capital and return on equity, changes to operations, and more, OAR 860-022-0019 (so listing). Alternatively, the RAAC process, which is provided in a different chapter of law, ORS chapter 469A, carves out a special process that may allow more streamlined recovery for certain RPS-related expenses, leaving utilities to seek recovery of other prudent expenses through the general rate case process. With that context in mind, we also consider context provided by ORS 469A.120(1), which describes costs related to compliance with the RPS that can be recovered through the general rate case process—costs for “interconnection,” “physical or financial assets to integrate, firm or shape renewable energy sources,” and “transmission and delivery of qualifying electricity.” Put simply, ORS 469A.120 explic- itly authorizes utility companies to seek rate increases to recover expenses incurred to generate and transmit renew- able energy. It does not abrogate chapter 757 or disturb the long-standing role that the PUC plays in the complex pro- cess of utility rate regulation. in the process of or related to the act of complying with the RPS), but the latter usage in subsection (2)(a) is used to indicate relationships between “electricity transmission” and “energy storage” to “facilities that generate electricity from renewable energy sources.” Cite as 353 Or App 54 (2026) 63 Subsection (2)(a) carves out a smaller subset of costs that are recoverable through the RAAC process—as an exception to the general rate case process—costs for “con- struct[ion] or acqui[sition] of facilities” that generate renew- able energy, and transmission and energy storages costs “associated” with those facilities. Even if standalone stor- age facilities are necessary to support the overall strength and reliability of a grid that utilizes renewable energy, it does not necessarily follow that the legislature intended for such costs to be automatically recovered through the RAAC carve-out rather than through a general rate case. C. Legislative History A careful review of the legislative history reveals that the legislature considered and rejected statutory lan- guage that would support PGE’s proffered interpretation.6 In 2007, when OREA was first proposed as a bill, section 13a of SB 838 A-Engrossed (Apr 6, 2007) provided 6 Furthermore, it is clear that the legislature intended to protect the PUC’s broad discretion and authority in rate setting. Given that the RPS mandate requires an increasing reliance on renewable energy sources for all large utili- ties that operate in Oregon, PGE’s proffered interpretation of ORS 469A.120(2) (a) would significantly undercut the existing general rate case process. If PGE’s proffered interpretation were accepted, virtually all new energy storage facili- ties and transmission line costs would be recoverable through the RAAC process because they would, in some way, be contributing to renewable energy utilization and reliability. Nothing in the legislative history of OREA or ORS 469A.120 sug- gests that the legislature intended for so much of the general rate case process to be circumvented by the RAAC process. Rather, the legislature intended to protect the PUC’s broad authority and discretion in utility rate setting. See, e.g., Audio Recording, House Committee on Energy and Environment, SB 838, Apr 30, 2007, at 29:40 (comments of Lee Sparling, Director of the Utility Program at the PUC, explaining that the lan- guage creates more explicit opportunities for the parties to be heard before the PUC during even the RAAC procedure), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Aug 3, 2026); Audio Recording, Senate Committee on Environment and Natural Resources, SB 373, Mar 15, 2007, at 30:12 (statement of Lee Beyer, then- chair of the PUC, explaining that about 70 percent of OREA’s administration will fall upon the PUC to implement), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed July 29, 2026); Video Recording, House Committee on Rules, SB 1547, Feb 25, 2016, at 3:19 (statement from Sen Lee Beyer, explaining that the language was drafted to “make sure that the issues of having the PUC having their authority to control things and protect rate payers was in place; so we strengthened that language in the bill and made it very clear that they were there.”), https://olis.oregonleg- islature.gov (accessed Aug 3, 2026); id. at 6:10 (statement of Sen Lee Beyer, “I have great faith in the commission’s ability to control those costs.”), https://olis. oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Aug 3, 2026). 64 PGE v. Public Utility Comm. that “[use of an automatic adjustment clause * * * approved by [the PUC], * * * shall apply to all prudently incurred costs described in section 13 (1) of this 2007 Act * * *.” Said differ- ently, that version of the bill explicitly stated that the auto- matic adjustment process could be applied to all prudent costs used to “integrate, firm or shape renewable energy sources * * *.” Id. at § 13(1). Subsequently, the House Amendments to SB 838 A-Engrossed (May 9, 2007), amended section 13a of the bill: “The [automatic] clause or method shall apply to all pru- dently incurred costs described in section 13(3) of this 2007 Act * * *.” (Emphasis added). At that time, section 13(3) pro- vided for the creation of the automatic clause or process and described costs “to construct or otherwise acquire facilities that generate electricity from renewable energy sources and for associated electricity transmission.” Id. During a 2007 work session regarding the House Amendments, a legislative counsel staff member explained “we also corrected a refer- ence in section 13a that used to refer to costs as required under section 13(1). That was an incorrect reference and [it has] been corrected to section 13(3) as far as which costs are being recovered under the automatic adjustment clause.” Audio Recording, House Committee on Energy and the Environment, SB 838, Apr 30, 2007, at 26:31 (comments of Dave Hendricks, Senior Deputy Legislative Counsel), https:// olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Aug 3, 2026). That cor- rection was maintained throughout the remaining legisla- tive process and the passage of OREA. Or Laws 2007, ch 301, § 13a. As previously noted, subsequent amendments to ORS 469A.120 have involved renumbering of subsections, but the distinction between the broad cost categories described in subsection (1) and the more narrow cost categories described in the automatic adjustment subsection has remained. See Or Laws 2009, ch 79, § 1; Or Laws 2016, ch 28, § 11. Considering the text, context, and that the legisla- ture expressly considered and rejected text that would sup- port PGE’s argument, we are not persuaded by PGE’s prof- fered interpretation of ORS 469A.120(2)(a). In our reading of the statute, we do not believe that co-location is necessary for RAAC recovery, but neither can the term “associated” refer Cite as 353 Or App 54 (2026) 65 to all energy storage investments incurred after the estab- lishment of the RPS. Rather, RAAC recovery is available for capital investments in the construction or acquisition of “facilities that generate electricity from renewable energy sources” and the transmission and storage costs associated with those particular facilities. As a result, we affirm PUC’s final order. Affirmed.