Full Opinion

No. 1119 November 18, 2026 25 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Henry DOIBAN, member, dba Integrity Management, Petitioner, and Megan CAVES, member, Respondent below, v. OREGON LIQUOR AND CANNABIS COMMISSION, Respondent. Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission OLCC2022MJL1226; A181982 Argued and submitted November 6, 2025. William L. Ghiorso argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. 26 Doiban v. OLCC Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 27 SHORR, P. J. Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order issued by the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission (OLCC) cancelling petitioner’s marijuana producer license.1 OLCC adopted a proposed order by an administrative law judge (ALJ) in which the ALJ found that petitioner lacked good cause for failing to appear at a scheduled hearing and held that petitioner was not entitled to relief from default. Petitioner raises two assignments of error. In his first assignment, he contends that the ALJ erroneously found that technical difficulties preventing virtual hearing access did not constitute good cause under OAR 137-003-0670(2). In his second assignment, petitioner asserts that the ALJ abused their discretion by refusing to grant relief from default when evidence showed diligent efforts to participate, minimal delay in connecting, and no prejudice to other par- ties.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. The underlying facts are not in dispute. In May 2022, OLCC issued a notice of proposed license cancella- tion regarding petitioner’s marijuana producer license. Petitioner timely requested a contested case hearing. A hearing was scheduled for September 22, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. to be held via Cisco Webex video conference, and a Notice of Video Conference Hearing was sent by electronic mail to petitioner and others. The notice stated that a calendar “appointment for this hearing has been sent separately via email” and listed several email addresses that the appoint- ment had been sent to. (Boldface omitted.) The notice also stated, in part: “Important note: If you have any trouble connect- ing to the Cisco Webex Video Conference and it has been more than five minutes past the hearing start time, call 1 The final order cancelled the marijuana producer license held by Integrity Management, LLC, Henry Doiban, Member, and Megan Caves, Member, dba Integrity Management. Henry Doiban is the only licensee appearing in this peti- tion for review and all references to petitioner or licensee refer to him unless otherwise specified. 2 After our decision in Doiban v. OLCC, 347 Or App 742, 587 P3d 435 (2026), in which we imposed sanctions on petitioner’s counsel for filing a brief that con- tained fabricated case citations, petitioner’s counsel filed a replacement opening brief. It is the replacement opening brief that we have considered in rendering this decision. 28 Doiban v. OLCC the Office of Administrative Hearings immediately at (503) 947-1608. “If you fail to appear within 15 minutes of the time set for your hearing, you will be held in default and your request for hearing may be dismissed or the hearing may proceed without you.” (Boldface in original.) In early September, counsel for Integrity Management, LLC filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel. Petitioner was self-represented at the time of the scheduled September 22 hearing. At approximately 8:58 a.m. on September 22, 2022, the ALJ convened a hearing via Webex.3 The ALJ held the record open until 9:17 a.m. to allow for the appear- ance of any licensee. No licensee or legal counsel for any licensee appeared within the 15-minute grace period iden- tified in the hearing notice, and the ALJ declared peti- tioner and Integrity Management, LLC in default. At some point after that hearing, petitioner contacted the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and OLCC and asserted that he had attempted to access the hearing but was unable to do so. OLCC requested that the ALJ convene a show cause hearing to allow petitioner to present evidence of good cause for failing to appear at the designated time for the contested case hearing. A telephone hearing was held on November 17, 2022, for the purpose of determining whether petitioner had good cause for not appearing at the September 22 hearing. Petitioner testified as follows. On September 22, he did not attempt to use a computer to connect to the Webex video conference, rather, he used his telephone to attempt to call in. The first call he initiated was at 9:14 a.m. He dialed the number for the platform and then he put in the group num- ber. He does not know what happened—”maybe [he] dialed something wrong or something happened with the platform 3 The ALJ assigned to hear the matter was changed on the day before the hearing due to the unavailability of the originally assigned ALJ. However, the record does not reflect that there was any change to the access for the September 22 Webex hearing. The hearing notice dated June 23, 2022, was marked as an exhibit for the show cause hearing that took place on November 17, 2022. Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 29 and [he] was thrown off the call.” He continued to call and call, and maybe email but he does not remember, until he got into the group at 9:20 a.m. and then remained on the call until 10:41 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m. he attempted to contact OAH to report difficulty connecting to the hearing.4 He received a call back from someone at 10:41 a.m. and was told that the hearing was over. The ALJ asked petitioner why he did not call in at 9:00 a.m. He stated: “To be quite * * * honest with you, Your Honor, I don’t remember why. I was getting all my—everything together just to see, you know, where to call, how to call, because the—this was the first time that I used this particular platform. “So, compared to everything that’s visually, like, you know, easy to follow, this one was a little difficult from the instructions that were given to me, which were by that— the original judge when she provided them, and they were just hard for me—and they were just hard for me to follow. “I got thrown off the call a bunch of times. I don’t—I don’t know what else to say. That’s what happened.” Petitioner did not use the instructions in the notice of hearing when he called in. He was asked where he got the information to call in for the hearing, and he stated that to the best of his recollection “it was sent in my correspondence with the original judge on the case * * *. It was just a basic * * * call log to show me.” He did not know when he received that correspondence, but he agreed that it had come to him via email. Petitioner also testified that he thought it was rel- evant to note that the ALJ for the hearing had changed because the original ALJ had communicated with him— they had had back and forth communications when he asked questions, and he was “certain she would understand that my intent was to be on that call.” He also stated, “I 4 Petitioner explained that he had multiple telephones and was attempting to call, text, and email to figure out what was going on while he was waiting on the line for the hearing. 30 Doiban v. OLCC think it would be common sense for everyone here to put themselves in my place and understand that it’s absolutely unacceptable for there to be a default based on the facts and the intent.” In petitioner’s view, he did not fail to appear on September 22. He got “into the group part of it, delayed due to personal lack of knowledge with the technology and * * * the instructions.” At the conclusion of the show cause hearing, the ALJ took the matter under advisement. The ALJ issued a proposed order on February 7, 2023, in which they proposed that OLCC issue the following order: “[Petitioner] did not show good cause for failing to appear at the contested case hearing on September 22, 2022 and therefore is not entitled to relief from default.” The ALJ’s proposed order contained their reasoning, which states, in part: “The gravamen of [petitioner’s] argument appears rooted in his intent to participate in the hearing, as evidenced by his eventual appearance on September 22, 2022. At hear- ing, [petitioner] repeatedly stressed that the documents admitted into evidence and his own statements indicated that he intended to participate. [Petitioner’s] assertions miss the mark. The issue before this tribunal is not [peti- tioner’s] intent but rather his actions on the date in issue. “* * * * * “[Petitioner] failed to show his inability to access the hearing in a timely manner was due to excusable mis- take, surprise, excusable neglect, reasonable reliance on the statement of a party or agency relating to procedural requirements, or from fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of a party or agency participating in the pro- ceeding. Instead, the preponderant weight of the evidence indicates that—despite the technical difficulties experi- enced in his first attempt—had [petitioner] attempted to access the hearing beginning at 9:00 a.m., he likely would have been successful prior to expiration of the default period. Moreover, had [petitioner] availed himself of the assistance of OAH staff in a timely manner—as instructed in the Notice of Hearing—the OAH would have been noti- fied of his attempted participation and default could have been avoided. [Petitioner] failed to do so on the assump- tion that his intent would be clear from his eventual appearance on the Webex platform. Nonetheless, OAR Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 31 137-003-0501 makes no provision for a party’s subjective intent. Consequently, I find [petitioner’s] delay in access- ing the hearing and his failure to follow the instruction in the Notice of Hearing by contacting OAH for assistance fall outside excusable mistake or excusable neglect.” (Emphasis in original.) On May 18, 2023, the OLCC chairman and commis- sioners held a hearing to consider the ALJ’s proposed order. After remarks by the OLCC case presenter and argument by counsel for petitioner,5 there was a recess for delibera- tion. After the session resumed, the case presenter made a motion to adopt the ALJ’s proposed order and issue a final order of cancellation. That motion was agreed to by a vote of four to two, and, ultimately, the final order dated May 26, 2023, was issued. Petitioner seeks judicial review of the final order. As noted above, in petitioner’s first assignment of error, he asserts that the “ALJ erroneously found that technical dif- ficulties preventing virtual hearing access did not consti- tute good cause under OAR 137-003-0670(2).” In petitioner’s second assignment, he contends that the ALJ abused their discretion by refusing to grant relief from default despite evidence of diligent efforts to participate. OLCC argues in response that OLCC correctly applied the “good cause” stan- dard, and because petitioner failed to show good cause for failing to appear, OLCC acted within its discretion by not granting relief from default. We review for legal error whether an agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law. ORS 183.482(8) (a). If we find “that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action,” we must either (1) “[s]et aside or modify the order” or (2) “[r]emand the case to the agency for fur- ther action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law.” Id. Under ORS 183.482(8)(b), we must remand the order to the agency if we find that the agency’s exercise of discre- tion is (1) “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law”; (2) “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, 5 Petitioner was represented by counsel again by this stage of the proceedings. 32 Doiban v. OLCC if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency”; or (3) “[o]therwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory pro- vision.” In addition, we review an agency’s order for substan- tial evidence in the record to support it, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and we may not substitute our “judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion,” ORS 183.482(7). As noted above, petitioner requested a contested case hearing after receiving a notice of proposed license cancella- tion. The procedures for that hearing were governed by the Attorney General’s Model Rules of Procedure for Contested Cases Office of Administrative Hearings, which OLCC has adopted for its contested case hearings. See OAR 845-003- 0210 (adopting OAR 137-001-0005 and OAR 137-003-0501 to 137-003-0700). The rule regarding when a default order may be issued, OAR 137-003-0670, provides, in part: “(1) This rule applies when the agency issues a notice of proposed action that does not become final in the absence of a request for hearing. The agency or, if authorized, the administrative law judge may issue a final order by default: “* * * * * “(c) Except as provided in section (2) of this rule, when the agency or administrative law judge notified the party of the time and place of the hearing and the party fails to appear at the hearing; “* * * * * “(2) If the party failed to appear at the hearing and, before issuing a final order by default, the agency or admin- istrative law judge finds that the party had good cause for not appearing, the agency or administrative law judge may not issue a final order by default under section (1)(c) of this rule. In this case, the administrative law judge shall sched- ule a new hearing. If the reasons for the party’s failure to appear are in dispute, the administrative law judge shall schedule a hearing on the reasons for the party’s failure to appear.” Further, “good cause” is defined in OAR 845-003- 0220(5) as “the factors set forth under OAR 137-003-0501(7). Good cause does not include failure to perform a required act due to the press of business or ignorance of the law, Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 33 including ignorance of these rules.” OAR 137-003-0501(7) states: “For purposes of OAR 137-003-0501 to 137-003-0700, ‘good cause’ exists when an action, delay, or failure to act arises from an excusable mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, reasonable reliance on the statement of a party or agency relating to procedural requirements, or from fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of a party or agency participating in the proceeding.” On review, petitioner contends that there is compel- ling evidence that technical difficulties prevented petition- er’s timely access to the hearing despite his diligent efforts to participate. In turn, petitioner argues that those techni- cal difficulties constitute good cause for his delay in appear- ing at the Webex hearing under OAR 137-003-0501(7) and that OLCC erred in determining otherwise. In his reply brief, petitioner more explicitly characterizes his delay as being due to excusable neglect. Petitioner first argues that he initiated his attempt to join the hearing at 9:14 a.m., which was within the desig- nated grace period and is objective evidence of his effort to comply with the hearing notice requirements. Second, peti- tioner argues that his successful connection five minutes after the grace period expired demonstrates that the delay was minimal and directly attributable to technical difficul- ties rather than lack of diligence on his part. Third, peti- tioner argues that his persistence in remaining connected to the platform for over an hour demonstrates commitment to participating in the proceeding. Petitioner further contends that the ALJ legally erred by imposing an unreasonably strict standard by focusing primarily on petitioner’s failure to call the OAH help desk rather than considering the totality of the circum- stances, and that the analysis effectively created a per se rule that failure to call the help desk number precludes a finding of good cause. We conclude that the arguments made by petitioner on judicial review regarding the application of the good cause standard fail on the merits. First, petitioner’s argu- ments about the evidence of his effort to comply, diligence, 34 Doiban v. OLCC and commitment to participate in the proceeding do not engage with the “good cause” standard in the rule, which, as pertinent here, is an assessment of whether there was excusable mistake or excusable neglect on the part of the actor. See JGB Enterprises, LLC v. OLCC, 325 Or App 326, 338, 529 P3d 262 (2023) (in an action involving a licensee’s failure to timely request a hearing, licensee’s argument was untethered to the definition of “good cause” in OAR 137-003- 0501(7) and failed on the merits). As the ALJ noted—and as adopted by OLCC—“the gravamen of [petitioner’s] argu- ment appears rooted in his intent to participate in the hear- ing * * *. [Petitioner’s] assertions miss the mark. The issue before this tribunal is not [petitioner’s] intent but rather his actions on the date in issue.” That is not a misarticulation or misapplication of the good cause standard. Second, petitioner asserts that the ALJ legally erred when they erroneously focused on petitioner’s failure to call the OAH help desk and effectively created a per se rule that failure to call the help desk precludes a good cause finding. We do not understand the ALJ’s analysis to have done what petitioner contends. The ALJ focused on petitioner’s actions and failure to act, and essentially determined that (1) had petitioner taken the opportunity to attempt to call into the hearing at 9:00 a.m. instead of waiting until 9:14 a.m., the technical difficulty petitioner experienced might not have kept him from connecting to the hearing within the 15-min- ute default window, and (2) had petitioner followed the instructions in the notice of hearing and timely contacted OAH for assistance, OAH would have known of his diffi- culty connecting and he could have avoided the default. That is, the ALJ determined that those actions—which were in petitioner’s control—were the cause of petitioner’s failure to appear on time and that the failure did not arise from excus- able mistake or excusable neglect or otherwise meet the good cause standard. Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s assertion that the order misconstrued the good cause standard. We turn to petitioner’s arguments that the ALJ abused their discretion by refusing to grant relief from default. Petitioner lists several reasons why, in his view, the ALJ abused their discretion: petitioner was diligent in his Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 35 conduct, technical difficulties are a reasonable excuse, and there was no prejudice to OLCC from petitioner’s delay in connecting to the hearing. Petitioner also asserts that the ruling violates Oregon’s strong policy preference for decid- ing cases on their merits and makes broad claims about the nature of the rights at stake that are implicated by the OLCC decision. However, suggesting that broad policy con- siderations should be considered by us on judicial review mischaracterizes our role and the standard of review. As explained above, under ORS 183.482(7), we may not substi- tute our “judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion.” And when assessing whether an agency abused its discretion, our role is to remand to the agency if the exercise of discretion is (1) “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law”; (2) “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency”; or (3) “[o]therwise in violation of a constitu- tional or statutory provision.” ORS 183.482(8)(b). As we set out above, under OAR 137-003-0670(1)(c), the agency may issue a final order by default when the agency or ALJ notified the party of the time and place of the hearing and the party fails to appear at the hearing. However, under OAR 137-003-0670(2), if the agency or ALJ finds that the party had good cause for not appearing, the agency or ALJ “may not issue a final order by default.” Here, there was a finding that petitioner did not have good cause to fail to appear. According to the applicable rules, OLCC was permitted to issue a final order by default. Although OLCC could have reached a different decision, it was per- mitted to reach the decision it reached, and we may not sub- stitute our judgment for OLCC’s. Affirmed.