Doiban v. OLCC
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA181982
JudgeShorr
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1119 November 18, 2026 25
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Henry DOIBAN,
member, dba Integrity Management,
Petitioner,
and
Megan CAVES,
member,
Respondent below,
v.
OREGON LIQUOR AND CANNABIS COMMISSION,
Respondent.
Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission
OLCC2022MJL1226;
A181982
Argued and submitted November 6, 2025.
William L. Ghiorso argued the cause and filed the briefs
for petitioner.
Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Affirmed.
26 Doiban v. OLCC
Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 27
SHORR, P. J.
Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order
issued by the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission
(OLCC) cancelling petitioner’s marijuana producer license.1
OLCC adopted a proposed order by an administrative law
judge (ALJ) in which the ALJ found that petitioner lacked
good cause for failing to appear at a scheduled hearing and
held that petitioner was not entitled to relief from default.
Petitioner raises two assignments of error. In his first
assignment, he contends that the ALJ erroneously found
that technical difficulties preventing virtual hearing access
did not constitute good cause under OAR 137-003-0670(2).
In his second assignment, petitioner asserts that the ALJ
abused their discretion by refusing to grant relief from
default when evidence showed diligent efforts to participate,
minimal delay in connecting, and no prejudice to other par-
ties.2 For the following reasons, we affirm.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. In May
2022, OLCC issued a notice of proposed license cancella-
tion regarding petitioner’s marijuana producer license.
Petitioner timely requested a contested case hearing. A
hearing was scheduled for September 22, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.
to be held via Cisco Webex video conference, and a Notice
of Video Conference Hearing was sent by electronic mail
to petitioner and others. The notice stated that a calendar
“appointment for this hearing has been sent separately via
email” and listed several email addresses that the appoint-
ment had been sent to. (Boldface omitted.) The notice also
stated, in part:
“Important note: If you have any trouble connect-
ing to the Cisco Webex Video Conference and it has been
more than five minutes past the hearing start time, call
1
The final order cancelled the marijuana producer license held by Integrity
Management, LLC, Henry Doiban, Member, and Megan Caves, Member, dba
Integrity Management. Henry Doiban is the only licensee appearing in this peti-
tion for review and all references to petitioner or licensee refer to him unless
otherwise specified.
2
After our decision in Doiban v. OLCC, 347 Or App 742, 587 P3d 435 (2026),
in which we imposed sanctions on petitioner’s counsel for filing a brief that con-
tained fabricated case citations, petitioner’s counsel filed a replacement opening
brief. It is the replacement opening brief that we have considered in rendering
this decision.
28 Doiban v. OLCC
the Office of Administrative Hearings immediately at (503)
947-1608.
“If you fail to appear within 15 minutes of the time
set for your hearing, you will be held in default and your
request for hearing may be dismissed or the hearing may
proceed without you.”
(Boldface in original.)
In early September, counsel for Integrity
Management, LLC filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel.
Petitioner was self-represented at the time of the scheduled
September 22 hearing.
At approximately 8:58 a.m. on September 22,
2022, the ALJ convened a hearing via Webex.3 The ALJ
held the record open until 9:17 a.m. to allow for the appear-
ance of any licensee. No licensee or legal counsel for any
licensee appeared within the 15-minute grace period iden-
tified in the hearing notice, and the ALJ declared peti-
tioner and Integrity Management, LLC in default. At some
point after that hearing, petitioner contacted the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) and OLCC and asserted
that he had attempted to access the hearing but was unable
to do so. OLCC requested that the ALJ convene a show cause
hearing to allow petitioner to present evidence of good cause
for failing to appear at the designated time for the contested
case hearing.
A telephone hearing was held on November 17,
2022, for the purpose of determining whether petitioner had
good cause for not appearing at the September 22 hearing.
Petitioner testified as follows. On September 22, he did not
attempt to use a computer to connect to the Webex video
conference, rather, he used his telephone to attempt to call
in. The first call he initiated was at 9:14 a.m. He dialed the
number for the platform and then he put in the group num-
ber. He does not know what happened—”maybe [he] dialed
something wrong or something happened with the platform
3
The ALJ assigned to hear the matter was changed on the day before the
hearing due to the unavailability of the originally assigned ALJ. However, the
record does not reflect that there was any change to the access for the September
22 Webex hearing. The hearing notice dated June 23, 2022, was marked as an
exhibit for the show cause hearing that took place on November 17, 2022.
Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 29
and [he] was thrown off the call.” He continued to call and
call, and maybe email but he does not remember, until he
got into the group at 9:20 a.m. and then remained on the call
until 10:41 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m. he attempted to
contact OAH to report difficulty connecting to the hearing.4
He received a call back from someone at 10:41 a.m. and was
told that the hearing was over.
The ALJ asked petitioner why he did not call in at
9:00 a.m. He stated:
“To be quite * * * honest with you, Your Honor, I don’t
remember why. I was getting all my—everything together
just to see, you know, where to call, how to call, because
the—this was the first time that I used this particular
platform.
“So, compared to everything that’s visually, like, you
know, easy to follow, this one was a little difficult from the
instructions that were given to me, which were by that—
the original judge when she provided them, and they were
just hard for me—and they were just hard for me to follow.
“I got thrown off the call a bunch of times. I don’t—I
don’t know what else to say. That’s what happened.”
Petitioner did not use the instructions in the notice
of hearing when he called in. He was asked where he got the
information to call in for the hearing, and he stated that to
the best of his recollection “it was sent in my correspondence
with the original judge on the case * * *. It was just a basic
* * * call log to show me.” He did not know when he received
that correspondence, but he agreed that it had come to him
via email.
Petitioner also testified that he thought it was rel-
evant to note that the ALJ for the hearing had changed
because the original ALJ had communicated with him—
they had had back and forth communications when he
asked questions, and he was “certain she would understand
that my intent was to be on that call.” He also stated, “I
4
Petitioner explained that he had multiple telephones and was attempting to
call, text, and email to figure out what was going on while he was waiting on the
line for the hearing.
30 Doiban v. OLCC
think it would be common sense for everyone here to put
themselves in my place and understand that it’s absolutely
unacceptable for there to be a default based on the facts and
the intent.” In petitioner’s view, he did not fail to appear on
September 22. He got “into the group part of it, delayed due
to personal lack of knowledge with the technology and * * *
the instructions.”
At the conclusion of the show cause hearing, the
ALJ took the matter under advisement. The ALJ issued a
proposed order on February 7, 2023, in which they proposed
that OLCC issue the following order: “[Petitioner] did not
show good cause for failing to appear at the contested case
hearing on September 22, 2022 and therefore is not entitled
to relief from default.” The ALJ’s proposed order contained
their reasoning, which states, in part:
“The gravamen of [petitioner’s] argument appears rooted
in his intent to participate in the hearing, as evidenced by
his eventual appearance on September 22, 2022. At hear-
ing, [petitioner] repeatedly stressed that the documents
admitted into evidence and his own statements indicated
that he intended to participate. [Petitioner’s] assertions
miss the mark. The issue before this tribunal is not [peti-
tioner’s] intent but rather his actions on the date in issue.
“* * * * *
“[Petitioner] failed to show his inability to access the
hearing in a timely manner was due to excusable mis-
take, surprise, excusable neglect, reasonable reliance on
the statement of a party or agency relating to procedural
requirements, or from fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of a party or agency participating in the pro-
ceeding. Instead, the preponderant weight of the evidence
indicates that—despite the technical difficulties experi-
enced in his first attempt—had [petitioner] attempted to
access the hearing beginning at 9:00 a.m., he likely would
have been successful prior to expiration of the default
period. Moreover, had [petitioner] availed himself of the
assistance of OAH staff in a timely manner—as instructed
in the Notice of Hearing—the OAH would have been noti-
fied of his attempted participation and default could have
been avoided. [Petitioner] failed to do so on the assump-
tion that his intent would be clear from his eventual
appearance on the Webex platform. Nonetheless, OAR
Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 31
137-003-0501 makes no provision for a party’s subjective
intent. Consequently, I find [petitioner’s] delay in access-
ing the hearing and his failure to follow the instruction in
the Notice of Hearing by contacting OAH for assistance fall
outside excusable mistake or excusable neglect.”
(Emphasis in original.)
On May 18, 2023, the OLCC chairman and commis-
sioners held a hearing to consider the ALJ’s proposed order.
After remarks by the OLCC case presenter and argument
by counsel for petitioner,5 there was a recess for delibera-
tion. After the session resumed, the case presenter made a
motion to adopt the ALJ’s proposed order and issue a final
order of cancellation. That motion was agreed to by a vote
of four to two, and, ultimately, the final order dated May 26,
2023, was issued.
Petitioner seeks judicial review of the final order.
As noted above, in petitioner’s first assignment of error, he
asserts that the “ALJ erroneously found that technical dif-
ficulties preventing virtual hearing access did not consti-
tute good cause under OAR 137-003-0670(2).” In petitioner’s
second assignment, he contends that the ALJ abused their
discretion by refusing to grant relief from default despite
evidence of diligent efforts to participate. OLCC argues in
response that OLCC correctly applied the “good cause” stan-
dard, and because petitioner failed to show good cause for
failing to appear, OLCC acted within its discretion by not
granting relief from default.
We review for legal error whether an agency has
erroneously interpreted a provision of law. ORS 183.482(8)
(a). If we find “that the agency has erroneously interpreted
a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels
a particular action,” we must either (1) “[s]et aside or modify
the order” or (2) “[r]emand the case to the agency for fur-
ther action under a correct interpretation of the provision of
law.” Id. Under ORS 183.482(8)(b), we must remand the order
to the agency if we find that the agency’s exercise of discre-
tion is (1) “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the
agency by law”; (2) “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an
officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice,
5
Petitioner was represented by counsel again by this stage of the proceedings.
32 Doiban v. OLCC
if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency”; or
(3) “[o]therwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision.” In addition, we review an agency’s order for substan-
tial evidence in the record to support it, ORS 183.482(8)(c),
and we may not substitute our “judgment for that of the
agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion,” ORS
183.482(7).
As noted above, petitioner requested a contested case
hearing after receiving a notice of proposed license cancella-
tion. The procedures for that hearing were governed by the
Attorney General’s Model Rules of Procedure for Contested
Cases Office of Administrative Hearings, which OLCC has
adopted for its contested case hearings. See OAR 845-003-
0210 (adopting OAR 137-001-0005 and OAR 137-003-0501
to 137-003-0700). The rule regarding when a default order
may be issued, OAR 137-003-0670, provides, in part:
“(1) This rule applies when the agency issues a notice
of proposed action that does not become final in the absence
of a request for hearing. The agency or, if authorized, the
administrative law judge may issue a final order by default:
“* * * * *
“(c) Except as provided in section (2) of this rule, when
the agency or administrative law judge notified the party
of the time and place of the hearing and the party fails to
appear at the hearing;
“* * * * *
“(2) If the party failed to appear at the hearing and,
before issuing a final order by default, the agency or admin-
istrative law judge finds that the party had good cause for
not appearing, the agency or administrative law judge may
not issue a final order by default under section (1)(c) of this
rule. In this case, the administrative law judge shall sched-
ule a new hearing. If the reasons for the party’s failure to
appear are in dispute, the administrative law judge shall
schedule a hearing on the reasons for the party’s failure to
appear.”
Further, “good cause” is defined in OAR 845-003-
0220(5) as “the factors set forth under OAR 137-003-0501(7).
Good cause does not include failure to perform a required
act due to the press of business or ignorance of the law,
Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 33
including ignorance of these rules.” OAR 137-003-0501(7)
states:
“For purposes of OAR 137-003-0501 to 137-003-0700,
‘good cause’ exists when an action, delay, or failure to act
arises from an excusable mistake, surprise, excusable
neglect, reasonable reliance on the statement of a party or
agency relating to procedural requirements, or from fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of a party or agency
participating in the proceeding.”
On review, petitioner contends that there is compel-
ling evidence that technical difficulties prevented petition-
er’s timely access to the hearing despite his diligent efforts
to participate. In turn, petitioner argues that those techni-
cal difficulties constitute good cause for his delay in appear-
ing at the Webex hearing under OAR 137-003-0501(7) and
that OLCC erred in determining otherwise. In his reply
brief, petitioner more explicitly characterizes his delay as
being due to excusable neglect.
Petitioner first argues that he initiated his attempt
to join the hearing at 9:14 a.m., which was within the desig-
nated grace period and is objective evidence of his effort to
comply with the hearing notice requirements. Second, peti-
tioner argues that his successful connection five minutes
after the grace period expired demonstrates that the delay
was minimal and directly attributable to technical difficul-
ties rather than lack of diligence on his part. Third, peti-
tioner argues that his persistence in remaining connected
to the platform for over an hour demonstrates commitment
to participating in the proceeding.
Petitioner further contends that the ALJ legally
erred by imposing an unreasonably strict standard by
focusing primarily on petitioner’s failure to call the OAH
help desk rather than considering the totality of the circum-
stances, and that the analysis effectively created a per se
rule that failure to call the help desk number precludes a
finding of good cause.
We conclude that the arguments made by petitioner
on judicial review regarding the application of the good
cause standard fail on the merits. First, petitioner’s argu-
ments about the evidence of his effort to comply, diligence,
34 Doiban v. OLCC
and commitment to participate in the proceeding do not
engage with the “good cause” standard in the rule, which,
as pertinent here, is an assessment of whether there was
excusable mistake or excusable neglect on the part of the
actor. See JGB Enterprises, LLC v. OLCC, 325 Or App 326,
338, 529 P3d 262 (2023) (in an action involving a licensee’s
failure to timely request a hearing, licensee’s argument was
untethered to the definition of “good cause” in OAR 137-003-
0501(7) and failed on the merits). As the ALJ noted—and
as adopted by OLCC—“the gravamen of [petitioner’s] argu-
ment appears rooted in his intent to participate in the hear-
ing * * *. [Petitioner’s] assertions miss the mark. The issue
before this tribunal is not [petitioner’s] intent but rather his
actions on the date in issue.” That is not a misarticulation or
misapplication of the good cause standard.
Second, petitioner asserts that the ALJ legally erred
when they erroneously focused on petitioner’s failure to call
the OAH help desk and effectively created a per se rule that
failure to call the help desk precludes a good cause finding.
We do not understand the ALJ’s analysis to have done what
petitioner contends. The ALJ focused on petitioner’s actions
and failure to act, and essentially determined that (1) had
petitioner taken the opportunity to attempt to call into the
hearing at 9:00 a.m. instead of waiting until 9:14 a.m., the
technical difficulty petitioner experienced might not have
kept him from connecting to the hearing within the 15-min-
ute default window, and (2) had petitioner followed the
instructions in the notice of hearing and timely contacted
OAH for assistance, OAH would have known of his diffi-
culty connecting and he could have avoided the default. That
is, the ALJ determined that those actions—which were in
petitioner’s control—were the cause of petitioner’s failure to
appear on time and that the failure did not arise from excus-
able mistake or excusable neglect or otherwise meet the good
cause standard. Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s assertion
that the order misconstrued the good cause standard.
We turn to petitioner’s arguments that the ALJ
abused their discretion by refusing to grant relief from
default. Petitioner lists several reasons why, in his view, the
ALJ abused their discretion: petitioner was diligent in his
Cite as 355 Or App 25 (2026) 35
conduct, technical difficulties are a reasonable excuse, and
there was no prejudice to OLCC from petitioner’s delay in
connecting to the hearing. Petitioner also asserts that the
ruling violates Oregon’s strong policy preference for decid-
ing cases on their merits and makes broad claims about
the nature of the rights at stake that are implicated by the
OLCC decision. However, suggesting that broad policy con-
siderations should be considered by us on judicial review
mischaracterizes our role and the standard of review. As
explained above, under ORS 183.482(7), we may not substi-
tute our “judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of
fact or agency discretion.” And when assessing whether an
agency abused its discretion, our role is to remand to the
agency if the exercise of discretion is (1) “[o]utside the range of
discretion delegated to the agency by law”; (2) “[i]nconsistent
with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or
a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained
by the agency”; or (3) “[o]therwise in violation of a constitu-
tional or statutory provision.” ORS 183.482(8)(b).
As we set out above, under OAR 137-003-0670(1)(c),
the agency may issue a final order by default when the
agency or ALJ notified the party of the time and place of
the hearing and the party fails to appear at the hearing.
However, under OAR 137-003-0670(2), if the agency or ALJ
finds that the party had good cause for not appearing, the
agency or ALJ “may not issue a final order by default.” Here,
there was a finding that petitioner did not have good cause
to fail to appear. According to the applicable rules, OLCC
was permitted to issue a final order by default. Although
OLCC could have reached a different decision, it was per-
mitted to reach the decision it reached, and we may not sub-
stitute our judgment for OLCC’s.
Affirmed.