PacifiCorp v. Public Utility Comm.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledAugust 12, 2026
DocketA183803
JudgeAoyagi
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 756 August 12, 2026 105
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
PACIFICORP,
dba Pacific Power,
Petitioner,
v.
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON;
Alliance of Western Energy Consumers;
Calpine Solutions, LLC;
The Klamath Water Users Association;
The Oregon Citizens’ Utility Board; Sierra Club;
and Vitesse, LLC,
Respondents.
Public Utility Commission of Oregon
UE420;
A183803
Argued and submitted October 2, 2025.
Dallas DeLuca argued the cause for petitioner. Also on
the briefs were Joseph M. Levy and Markowitz Herbold PC.
Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent Public Utility Commission of Oregon.
Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
No appearance for respondents Alliance of Western
Energy Consumers, Calpine Solutions, LLC, The Klamath
Water Users Association, The Oregon Citizens’ Utility
Board, Sierra Club, and Vitesse, LLC.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
106 PacifiCorp v. Public Utility Comm.
Cite as 352 Or App 105 (2026) 107
AOYAGI, P. J.
PacifiCorp seeks judicial review of a final order of the
Public Utility Commission of Oregon (PUC). As relevant here,
the order excludes from Oregon electricity rates certain costs
incurred by PacifiCorp to comply with the Washington Climate
Commitment Act (CCA), RCW 70A.65.005 to 70A.65.901,
with respect to electricity generated at PacifiCorp’s natu-
ral gas power plant in Chehalis, Washington, and delivered
to customers in Oregon. See ORS 756.040(1) (the PUC is to
set public utility rates). For the reasons explained below, we
reverse and remand for reconsideration.
We review PUC orders as orders in contested cases
in accordance with ORS 183.480 to 183.497. ORS 756.610(1).
“As such, our review is ‘confined to the record,’ and we will
‘not substitute [our] judgment for that of the [PUC] as to any
issue of fact or agency discretion.’ ” Calpine Energy Solutions
LLC v. PUC, 298 Or App 143, 156, 445 P3d 308 (2019)
(Calpine) (quoting ORS 183.482(7) (brackets in Calpine)). We
review for legal error and for whether the order is supported
by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(a), (c);
Calpine, 298 Or App at 156.
In the order on review, the PUC excluded from
Oregon electricity rates the costs of PacifiCorp’s compliance
with the CCA. The PUC did so based on its interpretation of
the 2020 PacifiCorp Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol
(Protocol), an agreement between a variety of stakeholders
and government entities that was approved by the PUC in
PUC Order No. 20-024 (Jan 23, 2020), amended by PUC
Order No. 23-229 (June 30, 2023). The PUC concluded that
CCA compliance costs are costs associated with a state-spe-
cific initiative and that, under section 3.1.2.1 of the Protocol,
they should be assigned entirely to Washington.
PacifiCorp contends that the PUC misinterpreted
the Protocol. Under PacifiCorp’s reading, the Chehalis power
plant is a system resource, and the costs of CAA compliance
are to be assigned as provided in section 3.1.2.2. PacifiCorp
views the CCA compliance costs as akin to a tax and argues
that they should be treated as “[g]eneration-related dispatch
costs” subject to section 3.1.7.
108 PacifiCorp v. Public Utility Comm.
As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to
whether we should defer to the PUC’s interpretation of the
Protocol—on the theory that the PUC’s approval of the
Protocol made it a rule or akin to a rule—if such interpreta-
tion is a plausible one. See Don’t Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy
Facility Siting, 320 Or 132, 142, 881 P2d 119 (1994) (explain-
ing that courts will defer to an agency’s plausible interpre-
tation of an administrative rule in some circumstances). We
need not resolve that point of procedure, however, because
we agree with PacifiCorp that the PUC’s interpretation of
the Protocol is not plausible, such that the disposition would
not be affected by resolving that issue.
A “resource” is defined in the Protocol as “a
Company-owned generating unit, plant, mine, long-term
Wholesale Contract, Short-Term Purchase and Sale, Non-
firm Purchase and Sale, or QF Contract.” The parties
agree that this case involves an “Interim Period Resource.”
Section 3.1.2 provides that “Interim Period Resources will
be allocated to one of two categories for inter-jurisdictional
allocation purposes: State Resources or System Resources.”
It goes on to describe three types of state resources, pro-
vides that all other types of interim period resources are
system resources, and notes that the substantial majority
of PacifiCorp’s resources are system resources. It then lays
out how “[b]enefits and costs associated with each category
and type of Interim Period Resources will be assigned or
allocated to States.”
Section 3.1.2.1 addresses state resources, and sec-
tion 3.1.2.2 addresses system resources. Those sections
state as follows, in relevant part:
“3.1.2.1 Interim Period State Resources
“Benefits and costs associated with the three types of
State Resources will be assigned or allocated as follows:
“ Demand-Side Management (DSM) Programs:
* * *.
“ Portfolio Standards: The portion of costs associ-
ated with Interim Period Resources acquired
to comply with a State’s Portfolio Standard
adopted, either through legislative enactment
Cite as 352 Or App 105 (2026) 109
or by a State’s Commission, that exceed
the costs PacifiCorp would have otherwise
incurred, will be allocated on a situs basis
to the Jurisdiction adopting the Portfolio
Standard.
“ State-Specific Initiatives: Costs and benefits
associated with Interim Period Resources
acquired in accordance with a State-specific
initiative will be allocated and assigned on
a situs basis to the State adopting the ini-
tiative. State-specific initiatives include, but
are not limited to, the costs and benefits of
incentive programs, net-metering tariffs,
feed-in tariffs, capacity standard programs,
solar subscription programs, electric vehicle
programs, and the acquisition of renewable
energy certificates.
“3.1.2.2 Interim Period System Resources
“All Interim Period Resources that are not State
Resources are System Resources and will be allocated
[between the various states in specified ways].”
Interpreting those provisions, the PUC concluded
that the CAA—viewed in its context, which includes the
Washington Clean Energy Transformation Act, RCW
19.405.010 to 19.405.901—is properly understood as “a pro-
gram that implements a State-specific initiative.” That is,
it falls under the third bullet point in section 3.1.2.1. From
there it follows, according to the PUC, that the costs of
CAA compliance should be allocated “on a situs basis” to
Washington, as “the State adopting the initiative.”
As PacifiCorp points out, however, section 3.1.2.1
applies only to interim period resources acquired in accor-
dance with a state-specific initiative: “Costs and benefits
associated with Interim Period Resources acquired in accor-
dance with a State-specific initiative will be allocated and
assigned on a situs basis to the State adopting the initia-
tive.” It is silent as to other costs associated with state-spe-
cific initiatives. And any interim period resources not cov-
ered by section 3.1.2.1 are automatically covered by Section
3.1.2.2, which provides for a different allocation of costs.
110 PacifiCorp v. Public Utility Comm.
Here, the Chehalis plant was acquired long before
the CCA’s enactment, so we do not see how it could have
been “acquired in accordance with” the CCA. To the extent
that the PUC viewed the CCA itself, or its associated costs,
as the interim period resource, that is inconsistent with
the Protocol’s definition of “resource” as “a Company-owned
generating unit, plant, mine, long-term Wholesale Contract,
Short-Term Purchase and Sale, Non-firm Purchase and
Sale, or QF Contract.”
Because the PUC relied on section 3.1.2.1 of the
Protocol in reaching its decision, and because its interpreta-
tion of that provision was legally erroneous (and implausible
based on the plain text), we reverse and remand to the PUC
for reconsideration of its order.
In doing so, we acknowledge that the Protocol con-
tains a provision that “[t]he proposed allocation of a par-
ticular expense or investment to a State under the 2020
Protocol is not intended to and will not prejudge the pru-
dence of that cost or the extent to which any particular cost
may be reflected in rates.” The PUC is statutorily required
to “balance the interests of the utility investor and the
consumer in establishing fair and reasonable rates.” ORS
756.040(1). To be “fair and reasonable,” rates must provide
adequate revenue for both operating expenses and capital
costs, with a return to the equity holder that meets certain
standards. Id. At the same time, the PUC is to “represent
the customers of any public utility * * * and the public gen-
erally in all controversies respecting rates” and is to “make
use of the jurisdiction and powers of the office to protect
such customers, and the public generally, from unjust and
unreasonable exactions and practices and to obtain for them
adequate service at fair and reasonable rates.” Id. Because
the PUC thought that it was acting in accordance with the
Protocol, it never reached the issue whether deviating from
the allocation provided by the Protocol was necessary to
achieve fair and reasonable rates. Cf. PacifiCorp v. Idaho
Public Utilities Commission, 579 P3d 904, 906 (Idaho 2025)
(relying on the Idaho Public Utilities Commission’s gen-
eral ratemaking authority in affirming a commission order
excluding CCA compliance costs from Idaho rates, without
Cite as 352 Or App 105 (2026) 111
addressing the commission’s alternative reasoning under
the Protocol). That is necessarily an issue for the PUC to
address on remand, as PacifiCorp acknowledged at oral
argument.
Reversed and remanded.