Full Opinion

174 November 18, 2026 No. 1134 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON David and Emma MARLIAVE, and Christopher And Monee Johnston, Individually, and Derivatively on behalf of Nominal Defendants DK3, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, and S&J Corvallis, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Iain and Tonya DUNCAN, an Oregon married couple, and Duncan Culinary Ventures, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Defendants-Appellants, and DK3, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, and S&J Corvallis, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company, Nominal Defendants. Benton County Circuit Court 19CV29021; A182541 Joan E. Demarest, Judge. Argued and submitted June 9, 2025. Dominic V. Paris argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants. Also on the opening briefs was London & Paris, LLP. Matthew D. Colley argued the cause for respondents. Also on the briefs were Britta E. Warren and Black Helterline LLP. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 175 Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* EGAN, J. Portion of the judgment requiring defendants to pay pre- vailing party attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed. ______________ * Lagesen, C. J., vice Pagán, J. 176 Marliave v. Duncan EGAN, J. In this civil case, defendants, Iain and Tonya Duncan and their company Duncan Culinary Ventures, Inc. (DCV), appeal from a judgment against them in which a jury found for plaintiffs and the trial court entered judg- ment awarding $532,000.00, plus interest, attorney fees, and costs to plaintiffs, David and Emma Marliave, Christopher and Monee Johnston, and companies they co-owned with defendants, DK3, LLC (DK3) and S&J Corvallis, LLC (S&J) (collectively, “Flat Tail”). Defendants raise nine assignments of error at various stages of the proceedings. As explained below, we reverse the trial court’s award of prevailing party attorney fees and otherwise affirm. Imposition of Time Limitation. Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the defendants’ presentation of evidence based on calendaring constraints without determining whether the proposed evi- dence would be irrelevant or redundant. We review the trial court’s exercise of control over proceedings for abuse of dis- cretion. State v. Pierce, 307 Or App 429, 432, 477 P3d 437 (2020). Trial courts have an obligation, under OEC 611(1), to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order” of trial proceedings to ensure that the trial is “effective for the ascertainment of the truth [and] avoid[s] needless consump- tion of time.” The trial court may limit the presentation of evidence if it determines that the evidence would be irrele- vant or redundant but may not do so in a way that prevents a party from effectively presenting their case. Dominguez and Fields, 286 Or App 504, 510, 399 P3d 472 (2017). In the end, the trial court’s exercise of control is reasonable “only if it is fundamentally fair and allows opportunities for a rea- sonably complete presentation of evidence and argument.” Howell-Hooyman and Hooyman, 113 Or App 548, 551, 833 P2d 328 (1992). In this case, the trial court clearly communicated to the parties at the outset the amount of time allotted for the trial. The trial court allocated one week for all the parties Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 177 to present their cases, cross-examine witnesses, and make closing arguments, a timeframe that was agreed upon sixth months prior to trial and for which the parties represented that they were ready a week before trial. Mid-way through the trial, the court provided an update, warning the parties that it would be prudent for them to use the remaining time more wisely, and provided the parties with a calculation of how each party had—up to that point—utilized their time. The trial court noted that defendants had spent nearly four hours cross-examining plaintiffs’ expert witness and caused delays of over an hour related to “exhibit issues.” The day before the close of trial, the trial court provided another update, informing defendants that they would only have the morning to complete their case-in-chief to allow time for jury deliberation. In all, defendants were provided an opportunity to cross-examine all of plaintiffs’ witnesses and were able to present a significant portion of their case-in-chief. Later, when ruling on the award of attorney fees, the court accurately summarized the record of the proceed- ings as follows: “There was tremendous waste of resources in this case due to Defendants’ conduct including not appearing for court; being late for court; having technological problems that cause[d] court to be delayed for sometimes, I think, more than 20, 30 minutes; being unprepared for trial in terms of the exhibits. That took considerable time away from our ability to manage what became a very time- crunched trial, and it * * * was inconsiderate of the jurors’ time as well. “* * * * * “The record is * * * abundant with examples of occa- sions where the same argument was made over and over and over again after the Court had clearly ruled against it, and issues were repeatedly raised that required research on the part of the Court and response on the part of the Plaintiffs that were completely red herrings for lack of a better term.” The trial court also summarized the ways that it “endeav- ored to err on the side of fairness” and “to make sure that 178 Marliave v. Duncan the [defendants] received a fair trial” by allowing late fil- ings, declining to strike related pleadings, and expending court resources to track down defendants’ tardy attorneys. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in exercising control over the proceedings pursuant to OEC 611(1) because defendants were able to complete cross-examination and present a sig- nificant portion of their case in chief and were therefore allowed “opportunit[y] for a reasonably complete presenta- tion of evidence and argument.” Howell-Hooyman, 113 Or App at 551; State v. Landon, 283 Or App 131, 132-35, 388 P3d 1157 (2016) (defendant used his time unwisely such that the court could have reasonably inferred that continuing the proceedings would not have been helpful to the resolution of the matters at issue); cf Howell-Hooyman, 113 Or App at 551 (court abused its discretion in cutting off cross-examination and denying presentation of entire case-in-chief). Motion to Strike and Disqualify Judge. Next, defen- dants argue that Judge Ashby erred in denying defendants’ motion to disqualify Judge Demarest for prejudice. Plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to utilize the procedures pro- vided by ORS 14.250 to 14.270 and that Judge Ashby prop- erly ruled on the merits. We review the denial of a motion to disqualify for legal error. State v. Ovalle, 325 Or App 538, 542, 529 P3d 278 (2023). Judges must maintain complete neutrality through- out the case. State v. Garza, 125 Or App 385, 388, 865 P2d 463 (1993), rev den, 319 Or 81 (1994). In determining whether the trial judge should be disqualified, the inquiry is “whether the judge’s conduct or words created such a like- lihood of bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the inter- est of the court and the interests of the accused.” Garza, 125 Or App at 389 (internal quotations omitted). It is not enough that a trial judge has spoken strongly or expressed frustration. We use a totality of the circumstances approach to determine whether, to a reasonable person in the parties’ position, the judge’s words or demeanor would have “created the appearance that defendant would not be treated objec- tively and without bias” or whether there is an “indication Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 179 that the judge’s rulings during the course of the trial were influenced by bias or prejudice.” Id. In this case, defendants made their motion after the time provided by ORS 14.250 to 14.270, which allow a change of judge based only on a belief of prejudice. In his decision letter, Judge Ashby acknowledged that Judge Demarest had developed frustration with defense counsel, at times speak- ing bluntly. However, Judge Ashby continued, the record showed that such frustration remained confined to defense counsel and that “there [was] no indication her displeasure with counsel extend[ed] to Defendants or the merits of the case,” concluding that “a basis for her removal certainly [could] not be found” within the substantive rulings that she had made in the case up to that point. The record supports Judge Ashby’s ruling and, therefore, we conclude that he did not err in denying defendants’ motion to disqualify Judge Demarest. Motion to Postpone Trial or, in the Alternative, Summarily Deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Sanctions. In their third assignment of error, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to postpone trial or, in the alternative, summarily deny plaintiffs’ second motion for sanctions. We review both decisions for abuse of discretion. Bailey v. State, 219 Or App 286, 293, 182 P3d 318 (2008); Budden v. Dykstra, 181 Or App 523, 529, 47 P3d 49 (2002). The trial court did not abuse its discretion to grant sanctions after defendants provided to plaintiffs, the week- end before the trial was set to begin, a substantial amount of data—hundreds of pages of Quickbooks records—that differed from a previous, condensed version of the data that had been provided. The trial court found that defendants obtained that data sometime during the previous week, that “failing to promptly disclose the existence of [the data] as soon as counsel became aware of it was willful, in bad faith, and/or fault of a similar degree,” and that plaintiffs “expended significant resources that would not have been necessary had [the data] been * * * disclosed as soon as the defense team became aware of it.” On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions. 180 Marliave v. Duncan The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to postpone trial, which was based on the new data. The court reasoned that the information “should not [have been] new” to defendants because it was based on defendants’ own evidence and defendants’ expert was able to review and report on the data within the timeline set by the court. Further, the trial court found that the parties had been prepared for trial for months. Finally, though the trial court denied the motion to postpone trial, it did extend the time allotted to defendants to respond to the motion for sanctions. Exclusion of Evidence of Social Media Post and Purported Management Agreement. We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under OEC 403 for abuse of discretion. OEC 403 provides that the court may exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Thus, the rule “provides a means to exclude distracting evidence from a trial,” not just evidence that would be unduly offen- sive. Koenig v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 315 Or App 28, 40-41, 500 P3d 68 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 507, rev den, 369 Or 733 (2022); State v. Sewell, 257 Or App 462, 469, 307 P3d 464, rev den, 354 Or 389 (2013). Here, the trial court excluded evidence of a social media post showing plaintiff, David Marliave, and other brewery employees raising a middle finger to other brew- eries. The image was provided as support for defendants’ counterclaim that Marliave breached his fiduciary duty to Flat Tail. The court decided that the probative value of the post was low, as it was unclear what social media account the image was taken from and whether the post was public or private, and that the likelihood that the evidence would confuse jurors and be a waste of time was sufficient to war- rant exclusion. That decision was within the range of per- missible outcomes and therefore not an abuse of discretion. The trial court also excluded the testimony of Jason Duranceau and a written document created either by Duranceau or Tonya Duncan, ruling that the evidence Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 181 was irrelevant. Under OEC 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination” more or less probable. We review a trial court’s decision regarding the relevance of evidence for errors of law. Scott v. Kesserling, 370 Or 1, 24, 513 P3d 581 (2022). The proponent of the evidence has the burden to establish its relevance. Koenig, 315 Or App at 41. The testimony and document were offered as evi- dence of a purported “management agreement” between DCV and DK3 and S&J that pre-dated plaintiffs’ involve- ment with the LLCs. When asked by the trial court about the nature of the document, defendants’ counsel was equiv- ocal, referring to it as a “written agreement,” a “document that references the agreement,” and one that “represented the terms of the agreement.” The trial court excluded the evidence because there was no additional evidence to show that any of the plaintiffs had ever received the document, which was unsigned and undated, or any other evidence that plaintiffs were bound by the purported agreement. The trial court stated that “if a door is opened and it becomes relevant, that would change the situation, but right now, with what’s before the Court, that’s the ruling.” On appeal, defendants content that the agreement would have shown that the parties had agreed that defen- dants would perform marketing services in exchange for payment, explaining some of the recorded money transfers reflected in accounting documents that were part of the record, and that the trial court therefore erred in exclud- ing evidence of the agreement. We disagree. The trial court did not err in excluding the evidence for lack of relevance because defendants failed to lay a foundation showing that the document was known to plaintiffs or agreed upon by them in a way that would make the purported agreement binding on the parties, thereby undermining its relevance. Denying Defendants’ and Granting Plaintiffs’ Motions for Directed Verdict. The trial court may only grant a directed verdict if there is a complete absence of proof on an essential issue. Therefore, we review the ruling for any 182 Marliave v. Duncan evidence to support the verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Miller v. Agripac, Inc., 322 Or App 202, 222, 518 P3d 957 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 827 (2023). First, the trial court denied defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs’ claim that Iain Duncan, as managing owner of DK3 and co-owner of DCV, breached the operating agreement between the parties. The trial court found that there was sufficient evidence for the claim to be decided by the jury. Some of the evidence presented that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Iain Duncan breached the operating agreement include that Duncan was a manager at DK3 with access to and awareness of transactions between DK3 and DCV; was an owner of DCV with access to and awareness of transactions between DCV and Flat Tail; had a company credit card in his name and evidence of personal expenses on the card in Hawaii; and that Duncan was named on tax accounts and had access to activities related to the company’s unmet tax responsibilities. The trial court did not err by concluding that the evidence presented was sufficient to deny defen- dants’ motion for directed verdict on plaintiffs’ claims. Second, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict on several of defendants’ counterclaims related to the sale of brewery equipment by Mr. Marliave and other business decisions made during the course of an eviction that occurred amidst the COVID-19 shutdown. The trial court determined that there was evidence to support a finding that the sale of the brewery equip- ment and other business decisions were breaches of various contractual duties. However, the court granted a series of motions for directed verdict because there was no evidence that defendants suffered damages arising out of those sales and decisions. The trial court reasoned that no evidence was presented to demonstrate losses to defendants, such as evi- dence that the equipment was sold for below market value or evidence that showed that defendants were entitled to receive debt payments in advance of other creditors. Rather, the evidence presented indicated that the proceeds from the sale of the brewery assets were used to pay off the compa- ny’s debts, which amounted to a benefit to plaintiffs and Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 183 defendants alike. The concrete damages claimed by defen- dants for which there was evidence in the record related to a breach of contract counterclaim that was decided by the jury, not the ones on which the trial court directed verdicts. The trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdicts on those counterclaims. Award of Attorney Fees to Plaintiffs as Prevailing Party. In Oregon, “the prevailing party on a breach-of- contract claim can recover its attorney fees if the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, authorize the award.” Mindful Insights, LLC v. VerifyValid, LLC, 301 Or App 256, 258, 454 P3d 787 (2019), adh’d to on recons, 302 Or App 528, rev allowed, 367 Or 257 (2020) (citing ORS 20.077; ORS 20.083; ORS 20.096). ORS 20.190 allows trial courts to award attorney fees to prevailing parties, including multi- pliers, when “a prevailing party * * * has a right to recover costs and disbursements.” ORS 20.190(2), (3). Therefore, we review the award of attorney fees for legal error. Norris v. R & T Manufacturing, LLC, 266 Or App 123, 124-25, 338 P3d 717 (2014), rev den, 357 Or 111 (2015). Whenever the award of attorney fees is authorized, trial courts have broad discretion in determining the appropriate amount, and we review the amount awarded for abuse of discretion. ORS 20.190(5); Northwest Pump & Equipment Co. v. Stach, 167 Or App 64, 69, 1 P3d 466 (2000). The parties’ operating agreements provided for arbitration as the default dispute resolution mechanism. Section 12.2 of the operating agreements provided that “[a] party substantially prevailing in the arbitration shall also be entitled to recover such amount for its costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with the arbitration as shall be determined by the arbitrator.” Section 12.10 of the agree- ments provided that “[t]he parties to this Agreement shall have all remedies available to them at law or in equity. All available remedies are cumulative and may be exercised singularly or concurrently.” Defendants argue that the operating agreements explicitly allow only for recovery of attorney fees associated with arbitration, the only dispute resolution mechanism pro- vided for by the contract. Plaintiffs argue that defendants 184 Marliave v. Duncan waived arbitration by proceeding to litigation without seek- ing to enforce that contractual provision but that the recov- ery of attorney fees is still available as provided for by the contractual dispute resolution mechanism.1 They argue, further, that defendants themselves contemplated entitle- ment to attorney fees under the contract should they have been the prevailing party, as evidenced by their answer to plaintiff’s complaint.2 A contract that provides for attorney fees for arbi- tration does not unambiguously provide for an award of attorney fees for litigation but, rather, suggests that the parties agreed to attorney fee awards related to arbitration. Accord SNJ Online, LLC v. EYEC, LLC, 313 Or App 634, 636, 496 P3d 1145 (2021) (concluding the same for attorney fees arising out of contract enforcement under ORS 20.096). Plaintiffs cited the operating agreement’s arbitration pro- vision as the basis for their entitlement to litigation-related attorney fees. Although the record shows that defendants suggested in their answer to plaintiffs’ complaint that they were entitled to attorney fees in the event that they were to become the prevailing party, the issue was not resolved by the pleadings, and plaintiffs do not explain any principle of waiver that would prevent defendants from objecting to the award of fees that were not provided for in the agreements. Therefore, the trial court erred by deciding that the contract provision that provided for an award of attorney fees related to arbitration entitled plaintiffs to attorney fees as the pre- vailing party in the litigation. Award of Attorney Fees to Plaintiffs as Sanction for Untimely Disclosure of Evidence. Defendants do not chal- lenge the award of attorney fees to plaintiffs as a sanction for defendants untimely disclosing a large QuickBooks file. However, defendants argue that the trial court abused its dis- cretion in determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees because, they argue, the expert witness fees requested by plaintiffs were unrelated to the untimely disclosure or 1 Both the complaint and answer contain in their heading the phrase, “[n]ot subject to mandatory arbitration.” 2 Both the complaint and answer assert that the pleading party is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the Third Operating Agreement, and neither party initially challenged that aspect of the opposing parties’ arguments. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 185 reflected inflationary billing practices. However, the trial court has broad discretion in determining the appropri- ate amount of attorney fees to be awarded as a sanction. Northwest Pump & Equipment Co., 167 Or App at 69. The trial court acted within its discretion in determining the appropriate amount. Although some of the fees relied upon predated the sanctionable conduct, those fees were reason- ably related to the sanctionable conduct in that the untimely disclosure required a reassessment of the evidence previ- ously assessed by the expert. It was also not unreasonable for fees to include the work of multiple attorneys and staff members because the untimely disclosure required a quick response on the eve of trial. Portion of the judgment requiring defendants to pay prevailing party attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.