Marliave v. Duncan
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA182541
JudgeEgan
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
174 November 18, 2026 No. 1134
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
David and Emma MARLIAVE,
and Christopher And Monee Johnston,
Individually, and Derivatively on behalf of
Nominal Defendants DK3, LLC,
an Oregon limited liability company,
and S&J Corvallis, LLC,
an Oregon limited liability company,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
Iain and Tonya DUNCAN,
an Oregon married couple,
and Duncan Culinary Ventures, Inc.,
an Oregon corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
DK3, LLC,
an Oregon limited liability company,
and S&J Corvallis, LLC,
an Oregon limited liability company,
Nominal Defendants.
Benton County Circuit Court
19CV29021; A182541
Joan E. Demarest, Judge.
Argued and submitted June 9, 2025.
Dominic V. Paris argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellants. Also on the opening briefs was London & Paris,
LLP.
Matthew D. Colley argued the cause for respondents. Also
on the briefs were Britta E. Warren and Black Helterline
LLP.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 175
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Egan, Judge.*
EGAN, J.
Portion of the judgment requiring defendants to pay pre-
vailing party attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.
______________
* Lagesen, C. J., vice Pagán, J.
176 Marliave v. Duncan
EGAN, J.
In this civil case, defendants, Iain and Tonya
Duncan and their company Duncan Culinary Ventures, Inc.
(DCV), appeal from a judgment against them in which a
jury found for plaintiffs and the trial court entered judg-
ment awarding $532,000.00, plus interest, attorney fees, and
costs to plaintiffs, David and Emma Marliave, Christopher
and Monee Johnston, and companies they co-owned with
defendants, DK3, LLC (DK3) and S&J Corvallis, LLC (S&J)
(collectively, “Flat Tail”).
Defendants raise nine assignments of error at
various stages of the proceedings. As explained below, we
reverse the trial court’s award of prevailing party attorney
fees and otherwise affirm.
Imposition of Time Limitation. Defendants argue
that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the
defendants’ presentation of evidence based on calendaring
constraints without determining whether the proposed evi-
dence would be irrelevant or redundant. We review the trial
court’s exercise of control over proceedings for abuse of dis-
cretion. State v. Pierce, 307 Or App 429, 432, 477 P3d 437
(2020).
Trial courts have an obligation, under OEC 611(1),
to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order” of
trial proceedings to ensure that the trial is “effective for the
ascertainment of the truth [and] avoid[s] needless consump-
tion of time.” The trial court may limit the presentation of
evidence if it determines that the evidence would be irrele-
vant or redundant but may not do so in a way that prevents
a party from effectively presenting their case. Dominguez
and Fields, 286 Or App 504, 510, 399 P3d 472 (2017). In the
end, the trial court’s exercise of control is reasonable “only if
it is fundamentally fair and allows opportunities for a rea-
sonably complete presentation of evidence and argument.”
Howell-Hooyman and Hooyman, 113 Or App 548, 551, 833
P2d 328 (1992).
In this case, the trial court clearly communicated to
the parties at the outset the amount of time allotted for the
trial. The trial court allocated one week for all the parties
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 177
to present their cases, cross-examine witnesses, and make
closing arguments, a timeframe that was agreed upon sixth
months prior to trial and for which the parties represented
that they were ready a week before trial. Mid-way through
the trial, the court provided an update, warning the parties
that it would be prudent for them to use the remaining time
more wisely, and provided the parties with a calculation of
how each party had—up to that point—utilized their time.
The trial court noted that defendants had spent nearly four
hours cross-examining plaintiffs’ expert witness and caused
delays of over an hour related to “exhibit issues.”
The day before the close of trial, the trial court
provided another update, informing defendants that they
would only have the morning to complete their case-in-chief
to allow time for jury deliberation. In all, defendants were
provided an opportunity to cross-examine all of plaintiffs’
witnesses and were able to present a significant portion of
their case-in-chief.
Later, when ruling on the award of attorney fees,
the court accurately summarized the record of the proceed-
ings as follows:
“There was tremendous waste of resources in this case
due to Defendants’ conduct including not appearing for
court; being late for court; having technological problems
that cause[d] court to be delayed for sometimes, I think,
more than 20, 30 minutes; being unprepared for trial in
terms of the exhibits. That took considerable time away
from our ability to manage what became a very time-
crunched trial, and it * * * was inconsiderate of the jurors’
time as well.
“* * * * *
“The record is * * * abundant with examples of occa-
sions where the same argument was made over and over
and over again after the Court had clearly ruled against it,
and issues were repeatedly raised that required research
on the part of the Court and response on the part of the
Plaintiffs that were completely red herrings for lack of a
better term.”
The trial court also summarized the ways that it “endeav-
ored to err on the side of fairness” and “to make sure that
178 Marliave v. Duncan
the [defendants] received a fair trial” by allowing late fil-
ings, declining to strike related pleadings, and expending
court resources to track down defendants’ tardy attorneys.
On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in exercising control over the
proceedings pursuant to OEC 611(1) because defendants
were able to complete cross-examination and present a sig-
nificant portion of their case in chief and were therefore
allowed “opportunit[y] for a reasonably complete presenta-
tion of evidence and argument.” Howell-Hooyman, 113 Or
App at 551; State v. Landon, 283 Or App 131, 132-35, 388
P3d 1157 (2016) (defendant used his time unwisely such that
the court could have reasonably inferred that continuing the
proceedings would not have been helpful to the resolution of
the matters at issue); cf Howell-Hooyman, 113 Or App at 551
(court abused its discretion in cutting off cross-examination
and denying presentation of entire case-in-chief).
Motion to Strike and Disqualify Judge. Next, defen-
dants argue that Judge Ashby erred in denying defendants’
motion to disqualify Judge Demarest for prejudice. Plaintiffs
argue that defendants failed to utilize the procedures pro-
vided by ORS 14.250 to 14.270 and that Judge Ashby prop-
erly ruled on the merits. We review the denial of a motion
to disqualify for legal error. State v. Ovalle, 325 Or App 538,
542, 529 P3d 278 (2023).
Judges must maintain complete neutrality through-
out the case. State v. Garza, 125 Or App 385, 388, 865
P2d 463 (1993), rev den, 319 Or 81 (1994). In determining
whether the trial judge should be disqualified, the inquiry
is “whether the judge’s conduct or words created such a like-
lihood of bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was
unable to hold the balance between vindicating the inter-
est of the court and the interests of the accused.” Garza,
125 Or App at 389 (internal quotations omitted). It is not
enough that a trial judge has spoken strongly or expressed
frustration. We use a totality of the circumstances approach
to determine whether, to a reasonable person in the parties’
position, the judge’s words or demeanor would have “created
the appearance that defendant would not be treated objec-
tively and without bias” or whether there is an “indication
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 179
that the judge’s rulings during the course of the trial were
influenced by bias or prejudice.” Id.
In this case, defendants made their motion after the
time provided by ORS 14.250 to 14.270, which allow a change
of judge based only on a belief of prejudice. In his decision
letter, Judge Ashby acknowledged that Judge Demarest had
developed frustration with defense counsel, at times speak-
ing bluntly. However, Judge Ashby continued, the record
showed that such frustration remained confined to defense
counsel and that “there [was] no indication her displeasure
with counsel extend[ed] to Defendants or the merits of the
case,” concluding that “a basis for her removal certainly
[could] not be found” within the substantive rulings that she
had made in the case up to that point. The record supports
Judge Ashby’s ruling and, therefore, we conclude that he did
not err in denying defendants’ motion to disqualify Judge
Demarest.
Motion to Postpone Trial or, in the Alternative,
Summarily Deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Sanctions. In
their third assignment of error, defendants argue that the
trial court erred in denying their motion to postpone trial
or, in the alternative, summarily deny plaintiffs’ second
motion for sanctions. We review both decisions for abuse of
discretion. Bailey v. State, 219 Or App 286, 293, 182 P3d 318
(2008); Budden v. Dykstra, 181 Or App 523, 529, 47 P3d 49
(2002).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion to grant
sanctions after defendants provided to plaintiffs, the week-
end before the trial was set to begin, a substantial amount
of data—hundreds of pages of Quickbooks records—that
differed from a previous, condensed version of the data that
had been provided. The trial court found that defendants
obtained that data sometime during the previous week,
that “failing to promptly disclose the existence of [the data]
as soon as counsel became aware of it was willful, in bad
faith, and/or fault of a similar degree,” and that plaintiffs
“expended significant resources that would not have been
necessary had [the data] been * * * disclosed as soon as the
defense team became aware of it.” On this record, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions.
180 Marliave v. Duncan
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to postpone trial, which was based on the
new data. The court reasoned that the information “should
not [have been] new” to defendants because it was based on
defendants’ own evidence and defendants’ expert was able
to review and report on the data within the timeline set by
the court. Further, the trial court found that the parties
had been prepared for trial for months. Finally, though the
trial court denied the motion to postpone trial, it did extend
the time allotted to defendants to respond to the motion for
sanctions.
Exclusion of Evidence of Social Media Post and
Purported Management Agreement. We review a trial court’s
decision to exclude evidence under OEC 403 for abuse of
discretion. OEC 403 provides that the court may exclude
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Thus,
the rule “provides a means to exclude distracting evidence
from a trial,” not just evidence that would be unduly offen-
sive. Koenig v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 315
Or App 28, 40-41, 500 P3d 68 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 507,
rev den, 369 Or 733 (2022); State v. Sewell, 257 Or App 462,
469, 307 P3d 464, rev den, 354 Or 389 (2013).
Here, the trial court excluded evidence of a social
media post showing plaintiff, David Marliave, and other
brewery employees raising a middle finger to other brew-
eries. The image was provided as support for defendants’
counterclaim that Marliave breached his fiduciary duty to
Flat Tail. The court decided that the probative value of the
post was low, as it was unclear what social media account
the image was taken from and whether the post was public
or private, and that the likelihood that the evidence would
confuse jurors and be a waste of time was sufficient to war-
rant exclusion. That decision was within the range of per-
missible outcomes and therefore not an abuse of discretion.
The trial court also excluded the testimony of
Jason Duranceau and a written document created either
by Duranceau or Tonya Duncan, ruling that the evidence
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 181
was irrelevant. Under OEC 401, evidence is relevant if it
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination” more or less probable.
We review a trial court’s decision regarding the relevance of
evidence for errors of law. Scott v. Kesserling, 370 Or 1, 24,
513 P3d 581 (2022). The proponent of the evidence has the
burden to establish its relevance. Koenig, 315 Or App at 41.
The testimony and document were offered as evi-
dence of a purported “management agreement” between
DCV and DK3 and S&J that pre-dated plaintiffs’ involve-
ment with the LLCs. When asked by the trial court about
the nature of the document, defendants’ counsel was equiv-
ocal, referring to it as a “written agreement,” a “document
that references the agreement,” and one that “represented
the terms of the agreement.”
The trial court excluded the evidence because there
was no additional evidence to show that any of the plaintiffs
had ever received the document, which was unsigned and
undated, or any other evidence that plaintiffs were bound
by the purported agreement. The trial court stated that “if
a door is opened and it becomes relevant, that would change
the situation, but right now, with what’s before the Court,
that’s the ruling.”
On appeal, defendants content that the agreement
would have shown that the parties had agreed that defen-
dants would perform marketing services in exchange for
payment, explaining some of the recorded money transfers
reflected in accounting documents that were part of the
record, and that the trial court therefore erred in exclud-
ing evidence of the agreement. We disagree. The trial court
did not err in excluding the evidence for lack of relevance
because defendants failed to lay a foundation showing that
the document was known to plaintiffs or agreed upon by
them in a way that would make the purported agreement
binding on the parties, thereby undermining its relevance.
Denying Defendants’ and Granting Plaintiffs’
Motions for Directed Verdict. The trial court may only grant
a directed verdict if there is a complete absence of proof on
an essential issue. Therefore, we review the ruling for any
182 Marliave v. Duncan
evidence to support the verdict in favor of the nonmoving
party. Miller v. Agripac, Inc., 322 Or App 202, 222, 518 P3d
957 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 827 (2023).
First, the trial court denied defendants’ motion for
a directed verdict on plaintiffs’ claim that Iain Duncan, as
managing owner of DK3 and co-owner of DCV, breached
the operating agreement between the parties. The trial
court found that there was sufficient evidence for the claim
to be decided by the jury. Some of the evidence presented
that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
Iain Duncan breached the operating agreement include
that Duncan was a manager at DK3 with access to and
awareness of transactions between DK3 and DCV; was an
owner of DCV with access to and awareness of transactions
between DCV and Flat Tail; had a company credit card in
his name and evidence of personal expenses on the card in
Hawaii; and that Duncan was named on tax accounts and
had access to activities related to the company’s unmet tax
responsibilities. The trial court did not err by concluding
that the evidence presented was sufficient to deny defen-
dants’ motion for directed verdict on plaintiffs’ claims.
Second, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
a directed verdict on several of defendants’ counterclaims
related to the sale of brewery equipment by Mr. Marliave
and other business decisions made during the course of an
eviction that occurred amidst the COVID-19 shutdown.
The trial court determined that there was evidence
to support a finding that the sale of the brewery equip-
ment and other business decisions were breaches of various
contractual duties. However, the court granted a series of
motions for directed verdict because there was no evidence
that defendants suffered damages arising out of those sales
and decisions. The trial court reasoned that no evidence was
presented to demonstrate losses to defendants, such as evi-
dence that the equipment was sold for below market value
or evidence that showed that defendants were entitled to
receive debt payments in advance of other creditors. Rather,
the evidence presented indicated that the proceeds from the
sale of the brewery assets were used to pay off the compa-
ny’s debts, which amounted to a benefit to plaintiffs and
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 183
defendants alike. The concrete damages claimed by defen-
dants for which there was evidence in the record related to
a breach of contract counterclaim that was decided by the
jury, not the ones on which the trial court directed verdicts.
The trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for
directed verdicts on those counterclaims.
Award of Attorney Fees to Plaintiffs as Prevailing
Party. In Oregon, “the prevailing party on a breach-of-
contract claim can recover its attorney fees if the terms
of the contract, whether express or implied, authorize the
award.” Mindful Insights, LLC v. VerifyValid, LLC, 301 Or
App 256, 258, 454 P3d 787 (2019), adh’d to on recons, 302 Or
App 528, rev allowed, 367 Or 257 (2020) (citing ORS 20.077;
ORS 20.083; ORS 20.096). ORS 20.190 allows trial courts to
award attorney fees to prevailing parties, including multi-
pliers, when “a prevailing party * * * has a right to recover
costs and disbursements.” ORS 20.190(2), (3). Therefore, we
review the award of attorney fees for legal error. Norris v.
R & T Manufacturing, LLC, 266 Or App 123, 124-25, 338
P3d 717 (2014), rev den, 357 Or 111 (2015). Whenever the
award of attorney fees is authorized, trial courts have broad
discretion in determining the appropriate amount, and we
review the amount awarded for abuse of discretion. ORS
20.190(5); Northwest Pump & Equipment Co. v. Stach, 167
Or App 64, 69, 1 P3d 466 (2000).
The parties’ operating agreements provided for
arbitration as the default dispute resolution mechanism.
Section 12.2 of the operating agreements provided that “[a]
party substantially prevailing in the arbitration shall also
be entitled to recover such amount for its costs and attorney
fees incurred in connection with the arbitration as shall be
determined by the arbitrator.” Section 12.10 of the agree-
ments provided that “[t]he parties to this Agreement shall
have all remedies available to them at law or in equity. All
available remedies are cumulative and may be exercised
singularly or concurrently.”
Defendants argue that the operating agreements
explicitly allow only for recovery of attorney fees associated
with arbitration, the only dispute resolution mechanism pro-
vided for by the contract. Plaintiffs argue that defendants
184 Marliave v. Duncan
waived arbitration by proceeding to litigation without seek-
ing to enforce that contractual provision but that the recov-
ery of attorney fees is still available as provided for by the
contractual dispute resolution mechanism.1 They argue,
further, that defendants themselves contemplated entitle-
ment to attorney fees under the contract should they have
been the prevailing party, as evidenced by their answer to
plaintiff’s complaint.2
A contract that provides for attorney fees for arbi-
tration does not unambiguously provide for an award of
attorney fees for litigation but, rather, suggests that the
parties agreed to attorney fee awards related to arbitration.
Accord SNJ Online, LLC v. EYEC, LLC, 313 Or App 634,
636, 496 P3d 1145 (2021) (concluding the same for attorney
fees arising out of contract enforcement under ORS 20.096).
Plaintiffs cited the operating agreement’s arbitration pro-
vision as the basis for their entitlement to litigation-related
attorney fees. Although the record shows that defendants
suggested in their answer to plaintiffs’ complaint that they
were entitled to attorney fees in the event that they were to
become the prevailing party, the issue was not resolved by
the pleadings, and plaintiffs do not explain any principle of
waiver that would prevent defendants from objecting to the
award of fees that were not provided for in the agreements.
Therefore, the trial court erred by deciding that the contract
provision that provided for an award of attorney fees related
to arbitration entitled plaintiffs to attorney fees as the pre-
vailing party in the litigation.
Award of Attorney Fees to Plaintiffs as Sanction for
Untimely Disclosure of Evidence. Defendants do not chal-
lenge the award of attorney fees to plaintiffs as a sanction
for defendants untimely disclosing a large QuickBooks file.
However, defendants argue that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in determining the appropriate amount of attorney
fees because, they argue, the expert witness fees requested
by plaintiffs were unrelated to the untimely disclosure or
1
Both the complaint and answer contain in their heading the phrase, “[n]ot
subject to mandatory arbitration.”
2
Both the complaint and answer assert that the pleading party is entitled
to attorney fees pursuant to the Third Operating Agreement, and neither party
initially challenged that aspect of the opposing parties’ arguments.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 174 (2026) 185
reflected inflationary billing practices. However, the trial
court has broad discretion in determining the appropri-
ate amount of attorney fees to be awarded as a sanction.
Northwest Pump & Equipment Co., 167 Or App at 69. The
trial court acted within its discretion in determining the
appropriate amount. Although some of the fees relied upon
predated the sanctionable conduct, those fees were reason-
ably related to the sanctionable conduct in that the untimely
disclosure required a reassessment of the evidence previ-
ously assessed by the expert. It was also not unreasonable
for fees to include the work of multiple attorneys and staff
members because the untimely disclosure required a quick
response on the eve of trial.
Portion of the judgment requiring defendants to pay
prevailing party attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.