Erie Island Carts, L.L.C. v. Put-in-Bay
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketOT-25-045
JudgeSulek
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Erie Island Carts, L.L.C. v. Put-in-Bay, 2026-Ohio-4619.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OTTAWA COUNTY
Erie Island Carts, LLC, et al. Court of Appeals No. OT-25-045
Appellants
Trial Court No. 25 CV 0155
v.
Village of Put-In-Bay, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellees Decided: November 20, 2026
*****
Brodi J. Conover, Susan Keating Anderson, and Aaron Ross, for appellees.
Marc E. Dann, Andrew M. Engel, and Jeffrey A. Crossman, for appellants.
*****
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellants Erie Island Carts, LLC and Island Bike Rental, LLC (collectively
“Erie Island”) appeal the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, which
granted appellees Village of Put-in-Bay’s and Courtney Blumensaadt’s (collectively “the
Village”) motion to dismiss Erie Island’s complaint. For the reasons that follow, the trial
court’s judgment is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The village of Put-in-Bay is a popular tourist destination located on South
Bass Island in Ottawa County, Ohio. The village comprises only a portion of the island,
the remainder is Put-in-Bay Township. Golf carts are the prevailing mode of
transportation on the island and numerous golf cart rental businesses exist to serve the
tourists. Several such businesses are located within the village. Erie Island Carts and
Island Bike Rental are located in Put-in-Bay Township, outside of the village.
{¶ 3} Traffic congestion and pedestrian safety have long been matters of concern
due to the number of visitors the village receives. In response, the village has taken
several steps to regulate the use of golf carts. Relevant here, it passed an ordinance that
required “[o]wners of vehicles used for the transportation of persons or property, for hire
and for use within the Village” to pay an annual “nontransferable vehicle license fee.”
Put-in-Bay Codified Ordinance (“C.O.”) 858.01. Somewhat recently, that ordinance was
challenged by golf cart rental businesses located within the village and was upheld by the
Ohio Supreme Court in Put-in-Bay v. Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421. See also S.B. Carts, Inc.
v. Put-in-Bay, 2005-Ohio-3065 (6th Dist.) (upholding C.O. 858.01 as a legitimate
exercise of the village’s home rule taxing authority).
{¶ 4} Subsequently, on May 14, 2024, the village passed Ordinance No. 1440-24,
which in effect expanded the reach of C.O. 858.01 to “any person, firm or corporation
engaging in business activity described in this chapter on South Bass Island,” thereby
2.
imposing the vehicle license fee and other regulations on businesses located in the
township outside of the village, such as Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 5} Within a few weeks after passing Ordinance No. 1440-24, the village sent
written notice to Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental stating that they must obtain a
Golf Cart Business License from the village and pay the vehicle license fee by June 28,
2024. The notice informed them that failure to do so would result in criminal or civil
liability.
{¶ 6} On June 28, 2024, Island Bike Rental submitted the required paperwork
along with a payment of $20,000, representing $100 for each of its 200 golf carts. It also
included a letter protesting the fee as unlawful. Similarly, Erie Island Carts submitted its
paperwork with a payment of $17,500 and a letter of protest. At the end of the year, both
Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental also submitted a $175.00 business license
renewal fee to the village for 2025.
{¶ 7} In April 2025, both Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental again paid the
license fees under protest. This time, the accompanying letters of protest included a
statement that both companies had commenced a lawsuit against the village regarding the
fees.
{¶ 8} Indeed, Erie Island initiated the present matter when it filed its six-count
complaint against the Village. In the subsequently amended complaint, Count One
sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is an unconstitutional tax on businesses
located outside of the jurisdiction of the village. Count Two sought a declaratory
3.
judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional in that it violates due process and the
equal protection of the law. Count Three sought to enjoin the Village from levying and
collecting the taxes imposed by the ordinance. Count Four sought a refund pursuant to
R.C. 2723.03 of the amounts already paid. In the alternative, Count Five sought a refund
of $50 per golf cart license fee paid in 2024 because the ordinance at that time imposed
only a $50 fee, not a $100 fee. Finally, in Count Six, Erie Island asserted a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim for the unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law,
seeking a refund of all the amounts paid to the village, as well as interest and attorney
fees.
{¶ 9} The Village moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and
12(B)(6). It argued that the ordinance as amended does not exceed the village’s home
rule authority to levy taxes as alleged in Count One, and does not violate due process or
equal protection as alleged in Count Two. It argued that the ordinance is not “illegal”
and does not warrant an injunction or refund as alleged in Counts Three, Four, and Five.
Further, it asserted that the ordinance does not violate any constitutional rights as alleged
in Count Six.
{¶ 10} In addition to those arguments, the Village maintained that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Counts Four and Five because Erie Island did not
fully comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2723.03 by failing to file a notice
of intention to sue with their written protests. Relatedly, it argued that the trial court
likewise lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Counts One and Two because a
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declaratory judgment cannot be used to circumvent the statutory procedures for relief
provided by R.C. Chapter 2723.
{¶ 11} After briefing by the parties, on December 1, 2025, the trial court granted
the Village’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. It first found that Counts One
and Two should be dismissed because declaratory relief was not available as R.C.
Chapter 2723 provided the exclusive means for challenging the illegality of a tax or
licensing fee. It next found that the tax was not an unconstitutional exercise of the
village’s home rule authority because it was taxing Erie Island for “the privilege of
operating their rental vehicles on Village public roadways.” The trial court also found
that the tax did not violate equal protection because Erie Island was not similarly situated
to residents who owned golf carts or other private individuals who transported their golf
carts onto the island since those individuals did not rent their golf carts. Likewise, Erie
Island was not similarly situated to golf-cart rental businesses located off the island
because the village could rationally speculate that the additional ferry transport cost
would result in few people renting golf carts from off-island businesses. Therefore,
finding that the tax was not unconstitutional, the trial court determined that all the counts
should be dismissed. Finally, the trial court additionally found that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction with respect to Counts Four and Five as to the 2024 and 2025
payments by Island Bike Rental and the 2024 payments by Erie Island Carts because the
plaintiffs failed to include a notice of intention to sue with their protest letters.
5.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 12} Erie Island timely appeals the judgment of the trial court, presenting five
assignments of error for review:
1. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Counts 1 and 2 (Declaratory
Judgment) on the Ground that Declaratory Relief Is Unavailable.
2. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Count 2 (Declaratory
Judgment) on the Ground That The Ordinance Does Not Violate
Appellants’ Constitutional Rights.
3. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Appellants’ Injunctive Relief
Claim (Count 3).
4. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Tax Refund Claims
(Counts 4 and 5).
5. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Takings Claim Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 6).
III. Analysis
{¶ 13} The Village moved to dismiss Erie Island’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6). Civ.R. 12(B)(1) provides the defense of “[l]ack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.” “The standard for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether
the complaint raises ‘any cause of action cognizable by the forum.’” State ex rel. Kellys
Island School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-285, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.),
quoting State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
states the defense of “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, ‘it must appear beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to
the relief sought.’” Veller v. K.B., 2025-Ohio-687, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), quoting Ohio Bur. of
6.
Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12. In both cases, this court reviews
the trial court’s decision de novo. Kelleys Island at ¶ 20; Veller at ¶ 18.
{¶ 14} The trial court’s decision and this appeal raise issues of subject matter
jurisdiction and the merits of the claims. Erie Island’s first, third, and fourth assignments
of error address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, while its second and third
assignments of error pertain to the merits of its claims. Finally, this court will separately
address Erie Island’s arguments relative to its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in its fifth
assignment of error.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
{¶ 15} In its first, third, and fourth assignments of error, Erie Island argues that
R.C. Chapter 2723 did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over its claims for
declaratory relief in Counts One and Two, injunctive relief in Count 3, and the refund of
the 2025 taxes.
{¶ 16} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he
courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over
all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative
officers and agencies as may be provided by law.”
{¶ 17} Relevant here, R.C. Chapter 2723 differentiates between actions to enjoin
the illegal levy of taxes, actions to enjoin the collection of taxes, and actions to recover
taxes and assessments. R.C. 2723.01 grants the court of common pleas subject matter
jurisdiction over all three when it states, “Courts of common pleas may enjoin the illegal
levy or collection of taxes and assessments and entertain actions to recover them when
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collected . . ..” R.C. 2723.02 and 2723.03 then describe who must be sued in each action:
“Actions to enjoin the illegal levy of taxes and assessments must be brought against the
corporation or person for whose use and benefit the levy is made;” “Actions to enjoin the
collection of taxes and assessments must be brought against the officer whose duty it is to
collect them;” and “Actions to recover taxes and assessments must be brought against the
officer who made the collection, or if he is dead, against his personal representative.”
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 18} Additional requirements are placed on actions to recover taxes. R.C.
2723.01 requires that “no recovery shall be had unless the action is brought within one
year after the taxes or assessments are collected.” R.C. 2723.03 further specifies,
If a plaintiff in an action to recover taxes or assessments, or both, alleges
and proves that he or the corporation or deceased person whose estate he
represents, at the time of paying such taxes or assessments, filed a written
protest as to the portion sought to be recovered, specifying the nature of his
claim as to the illegality thereof, together with notice of his intention to sue
under sections 2723.01 to 2723.05, inclusive, of the Revised Code, such
action shall not be dismissed on the ground that the taxes or assessments,
sought to be recovered, were voluntarily paid.
{¶ 19} Thus, unless an exception exists,1 actions to recover taxes must be brought
within one year after the taxes are collected, and the taxes must have been paid under
written protest specifying the nature of the claimed illegality and including a notice of
intention to sue. Those constraints, however, do not apply to actions to enjoin the illegal
levy or collection of taxes.
1
See, for example, R.C. 5715.22 applying to complaints “against the valuation or
assessment of real property.”
8.
{¶ 20} On appeal, the parties do not present a dispute regarding whether the
appropriate corporations, persons, or officers were named in the complaint. Instead, the
parties argue whether (1) R.C. Chapter 2723 is the exclusive means of challenging the
illegality of a tax, thereby precluding the declaratory relief sought in Counts One and
Two, and (2) whether Erie Island complied with R.C. 2723.03’s requirement to include
notice of an intention to sue, thereby precluding the injunctive relief sought in Count
Three and the recovery of taxes paid sought in Counts Four and Five. These issues are
interrelated and will be addressed together.
{¶ 21} First, in this case, R.C. Chapter 2723 does not prevent Erie Island from
pursuing a declaratory judgment that the Village’s ordinance is unconstitutional. In
general, “the common pleas court possess[es] basic statutory jurisdiction over actions for
declaratory judgment and injunction.” State ex rel. Blackwell v. Crawford, 2005-Ohio-
5124, ¶ 22, citing R.C. 2721.02 and 2727.03. “But while ‘declaratory judgment statutes
provide an additional remedy which may be granted by a court . . . they do not extend the
jurisdiction as to the subject matter upon which a court may act.’” State ex rel. Ford v.
Ruehlman, 2016-Ohio-3529, ¶ 74, quoting State ex rel. Foreman v. Bellefontaine Mun.
Court, 12 Ohio St.2d 26, 28 (1967); Ryan v. Tracy, 6 Ohio St.3d 363, 367 (1983). “For
this reason, a common pleas court cannot use the declaratory-judgment statute to decide
matters over which it otherwise has no jurisdiction.” Id., citing Makowski v. Limbach, 47
Ohio App.3d 129, 130 (10th Dist. 1988).
{¶ 22} Here, R.C. 2723.01 grants jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas to
enjoin the illegal levy and collection of taxes. As part of this, the trial court must
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necessarily have the authority to determine whether the levy and collection of taxes are,
in fact, illegal. As a result, the declaratory judgment sought in Counts One and Two that
the ordinance is unconstitutional is not extending the subject matter jurisdiction of the
trial court.
{¶ 23} Arguing against this, the Village cites Ryan v. Tracy, 6 Ohio St.3d 363
(1983), for the proposition that declaratory relief is not available because R.C. Chapter
2723 is the exclusive means for challenging the illegality of a tax or licensing fee. Ryan,
however, is distinguishable.
{¶ 24} In that case, Ryan filed a class action complaint seeking the recovery of
overpaid property taxes. Ryan believed that the county auditor improperly failed to
deduct from the property description acreage of land committed to public highway use.
Ryan at 364. On appeal before the Ohio Supreme Court, the parties concurred that if
R.C. 2723.01 and 2723.03 were applicable, the claim would be barred because Ryan had
not complied with the statutes. Id. at 365.
{¶ 25} Ryan, however, maintained that his action was governed by R.C. 319.36,
not R.C. Chapter 2723. Id. R.C. 319.36 provides that if the auditor discovers that
erroneous taxes have been collected, he shall call it to the attention of the board of county
commissioners. If the board of county commissioners finds that taxes have been
erroneously charged or collected, it shall order the auditor to refund the full amount of the
taxes so charged and collected. Ryan sought a declaratory judgment “in effect, to compel
the county auditor to find that erroneous taxes have been collected, command the board
to order the auditor to draw his warrant in appellant’s favor without their first having
10.
found an improper assessment to have been made, and to mandate that the auditor draw
his warrant before the board has so instructed him.” Ryan at 366.
{¶ 26} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Ryan’s “disingenuous” workaround. Id.
It found that “R.C. 2723.01 et seq. provide the exclusive means by which a taxpayer may,
with the approbation of the court, demand that the county auditor refund erroneously
collected taxes.” Id. R.C. 319.36, in contrast, “grants administrative prerogatives to both
the auditor and the county commissioners over which a taxpayer exerts no influence.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. It reasoned that “to permit [Ryan] to achieve through one statute
that which he is empowered to do only through another would be to ignore legislative
intent and abrogate legislative prerogative.” Id. Recognizing that the declaratory
judgment statutes do not extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded that “[m]erely because [Ryan] requests declaratory rather than
monetary or injunctive relief is of no moment in saving his action.” Id. at 367.
{¶ 27} Unlike Ryan, Erie Island is not entirely foreclosed from seeking relief
under R.C. Chapter 2723. In Ryan, the plaintiff sought to recover taxes that were already
paid but could not do so under R.C. 2723.03 because he did not pay the taxes under
protest and with a notice of intention to sue. Here, in contrast, in Counts One and Two
Erie Island is seeking a declaration that the ordinance is unconstitutional. That
declaration is germane to its efforts in Count Three to enjoin the levy and collection of
the license fee as provided for in R.C. 2723.02 and 2723.03. As discussed above, the
procedural requirements of written protest and notice of intent to sue apply only to
actions to recover taxes. Therefore, because nothing in R.C. Chapter 2723 prevents Erie
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Island from pursuing an action to enjoin the levy and collection of the license fee, which
would require a determination that the license fee is illegal, a declaratory judgment that
the ordinance is unconstitutional does not expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the
trial court.
{¶ 28} Accordingly, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over Counts
One, Two, and Three of Erie Island’s amended complaint.
{¶ 29} Counts Four and Five present a separate issue as these counts seek to
recover taxes that were already paid. Specifically, Count Four seeks to recover all the
taxes paid in 2024 and 2025. Count Five alternatively seeks recovery of $50 per golf cart
license fee paid in 2024.
{¶ 30} For the taxes paid in 2024, it is undisputed that although Erie Island Carts
and Island Bike Rentals paid the taxes under written protest, they did not include a notice
of intent to sue. “[T]he written protest and notice of intention to sue provisions of R.C.
2723.03 are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to if an action for the recovery of
allegedly wrongfully collected taxes is to be maintained.” Ryan, 6 Ohio St.3d at 365;
Shanahan v. Toledo, 2009-Ohio-5991, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.); Johnson v. Clark Cty. Auditor,
2020-Ohio-3201, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Consequently, Erie Island is barred from seeking
recovery of the 2024 taxes under R.C. 2723.03.
{¶ 31} For the taxes paid in 2025, Erie Island Carts included with its payment and
written protest a notice that it had commenced suit against the Village for the 2024
license fee and “will seek recovery of the fees paid herewith in the lawsuit.” A copy of
that written protest was attached to the amended complaint as Exhibit F. The complaint,
12.
however, does not include a copy of Island Bike Rentals’ protest letter. Nevertheless, it
alleges in paragraph 24 of the amended complaint that Island Bike Rentals submitted a
“letter substantially similar to that attached as Exhibit F,” which “included language that
the tax was being paid under protest and that Island Bike intended to seek recovery of the
tax in this lawsuit.” The complaint, therefore, alleges facts that satisfy the requirements
of R.C. 2723.03, and the claims of Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rentals for recovery
of the 2025 license fees cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage on the grounds that
those fees were voluntarily paid.
{¶ 32} In sum, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Erie Island’s
claims for declaratory judgment in Counts One and Two, its claim for injunctive relief in
Count Three, and its claim for recovery of the 2025 license fees in Count Four. The
claim for recovery of the 2024 license fees, whether in whole as stated in Count Four or
in part as stated in Count Five, must be dismissed on the grounds that they were
voluntarily paid.
{¶ 33} Accordingly, Erie Island’s first assignment of error is well-taken. Its third
assignment of error is well-taken to the extent that it addresses the subject matter
jurisdiction of the trial court to consider its claim for injunctive relief. Finally, its fourth
assignment of error is well-taken with respect to the claim for recovery of the 2025
license fees, and not well-taken to the extent that it applies to the recovery of the 2024
license fees.
13.
B. Constitutionality of the Ordinance
{¶ 34} In its second and third assignments of error, Erie Island challenges the trial
court’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. At issue is (1) whether the ordinance is unconstitutional as violative of due
process because it exceeds the village’s home rule authority to tax, and (2) whether the
ordinance is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it treats similarly
situated persons differently.
1. Home Rule Authority
{¶ 35} Erie Island argues that the village exceeded its home rule taxing authority
when it expanded the license fee in C.O. 858.01 to businesses located outside the village.2
The Village, on the other hand, argues that the ordinance is not an extraterritorial tax, but
is instead the same tax on “the privilege of renting [golf carts] to others for use within the
village” that was approved in Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421, at ¶ 24.
{¶ 36} The Supreme Court of Ohio’s reasoning in Mathys is critical to
understanding the present issue before this court.
{¶ 37} In that case, Mathys owned a golf cart rental business located within the
village limits. He challenged the license fee as exceeding the village’s home rule
authority, characterizing the fee as a license tax that was preempted by the State’s
2
Erie Island also argues that other regulations on its golf cart rental business similarly
exceed the village’s home rule authority, for example, regulations prohibiting golf cart
rental businesses from sharing locations or expanding their fleet of golf carts. Because
the village’s authority to impose these regulations involve the same considerations as its
authority to impose the license fee, this court will frame its analysis in terms of the
license fee only.
14.
vehicle-licensing tax scheme. Id. at ¶ 20. On the issue of preemption, the Ohio Supreme
Court “largely agree[d].” Id.
{¶ 38} “Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, also known as the
Home Rule Amendment, grants municipalities the authority to ‘exercise all powers of
local self-government.’ Included within this broad grant of authority is the right of local
governments to levy taxes.” Id. at ¶ 12. “This right is not absolute, however. Article
XVIII, Section 13, and Article XIII, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution enable the
General Assembly to pass laws that limit municipal taxing authority.” Id. Because,
however, “the rights conferred in the constitutional provisions exist on equal footing, . . .
‘[i]n the absence of an express statutory limitation demonstrating the exercise, by the
General Assembly, of its constitutional power, acts of municipal taxation are valid,’ even
when a municipal tax occupies the same field as a state tax.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting
Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St.3d 599, 606 (1998).
{¶ 39} The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the State’s vehicle licensing tax
scheme constituted such an express limitation. It noted that “R.C. 4503.02 imposes an
annual statewide license tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public roads and
highways,” and R.C. 4504.02 and 4504.06 allow county governments or municipalities to
impose an additional $5 license tax. Id. at ¶ 21. It then recognized that “[b]y restricting
how local governments may go about imposing a license tax on the operation of motor
vehicles on public roads and by imposing a cap on how much they may tax, the General
Assembly has expressly limited a municipality’s authority to tax the operation of motor
vehicles.” Id. at ¶ 22.
15.
{¶ 40} Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected Mathys’s arguments,
finding that they rested “on the flawed assumption that the municipal tax imposed by
Section 858.01 is the same as, or similar to, the state license tax.” Id. It reasoned,
In contrast to the state vehicle-license tax imposed under R.C. 4503.02, and
the additional local-government license taxes permitted by R.C. 4504.02
and 4504.06, Section 858.01 does not impose a license tax on the operation
of motor vehicles on public highways. Rather, by its plain terms, Section
858.01 imposes a business tax on rental vehicles. . . .
. . . Section 858.01’s tax on rental vehicles does not interfere with the
operation of vehicles in the village. The ‘license fee’ referred to in Section
858.01 does nothing to authorize or prohibit a motor vehicle, including the
rental vehicles at issue here, from being operated on a public roadway
within the village. And nothing in the ordinance requires that the license
fee be paid for vehicles that are not rented out by the owner. Put another
way, Mathys and Islander Inn may drive their golf carts in the village and
may even let others use the carts without charging for their use. But if
Mathys and Islander Inn want the privilege of renting those vehicles to
others for use within the village, they are required to pay the tax imposed
by the ordinance on their rental vehicles.
Id. at ¶ 23-24. Thus, as recognized in Mathys, C.O. 858.01 is a business tax “on the
privilege of renting [golf carts] to others for use within the village.”
{¶ 41} As an aside, the Village separately argues on appeal that C.O. 858.01 is
authorized by R.C. 715.22, which permits a municipal corporation to “(A) Regulate the
use of carts, drays, wagons, hackney coaches, omnibuses, automobiles, and carriages kept
for hire or livery stable purposes,” and “(B) License and regulate the use of the streets by
persons who use vehicles, or solicit or transact business thereon.” Courts that have
examined C.O. 858.01, however, have always treated the ordinance as a tax imposed for
the purpose of generating revenue, not a fee imposed pursuant to the village’s power to
license and regulate vehicles for hire. See S.B. Carts, Inc. v. Put-in-Bay, 2005-Ohio-
16.
3065, ¶ 5-7 (6th Dist.); Mathys at ¶ 4, fn. 2. Indeed, the trial court in this case on page 11
of its judgment entry, also found that C.O. 858.01 “is not a fee imposed pursuant to the
Village’s power to license and regulate vehicles for higher (sic) but is rather a tax
imposed for the purpose of generating revenue.” This court likewise holds that C.O.
858.01 is a tax, not an exercise of the village’s power under R.C. 715.22.
{¶ 42} The question then is whether the village has the authority to impose its tax
on the privilege of renting golf carts on businesses located outside of its territorial
jurisdiction. As a corollary, this court looks to the ability of a municipality to tax the
income of nonresidents.
{¶ 43} The Due Process clause “requires a municipality to have jurisdiction before
imposing a tax.” Willacy v. Cleveland Bd. of Income Tax Review, 2020-Ohio-314, ¶ 21.
It “establishes a ‘twofold test’ for determining whether a taxing authority exceeded its
jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 22. First, there must be “‘some definite link, some minimum
connection’ between the local taxing authority ‘and the person, property or transaction it
seeks to tax.’” Id., quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345 (1954).
Second, there must be “a rational relationship between the income taxed by the
jurisdiction and the income-producing activity or property within that jurisdiction.” Id.
“These inquiries involve distinct but related concerns: While the former focuses on the
presence of either in personam jurisdiction over the taxpayer or in rem jurisdiction over
her income or property, the latter focuses on how much of a nonresident’s income the
local taxing authority may fairly reach.” Id.
17.
{¶ 44} This case involves the first inquiry. “It is well established that regardless
of the taxpayer’s residency status, the first prong is satisfied when a state or locality
imposes taxes on income arising from work performed within the jurisdiction. In such
cases, there is a sufficient connection between the taxing entity and the taxed party.” Id.
at ¶ 23, citing Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 2015-Ohio-1623, ¶ 42 (“Beyond
in personam taxing jurisdiction over residents, local authorities may tax nonresidents only
if theirs is the jurisdiction ‘within which the income actually arises and whose authority
over it operates in rem.’”).
{¶ 45} The Village argues that its ordinance is not an extraterritorial tax because it
only imposes a tax on activity that occurs within the village, namely the renting of golf
carts that are used in the village. It cites City of Cincinnati v. Reed, 27 Ohio App.3d 115
(1st Dist. 1985), as an example of a valid ordinance taxing a towing business that was not
located in its jurisdiction. In that case, the First District described that the Cincinnati
municipal ordinance required that “anyone engaged in the business of offering towing
services by use of a wrecker or other similar vehicle must obtain a license from the city
treasurer before removing parked or disabled motor vehicles from any location within the
city limits.” Reed at 115. In finding that the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of local
police powers, the First District noted that the ordinance was “strictly limited to those
engaged in the business of towing or removing parked or disabled motor vehicles from
any places within Cincinnati where they have been parked or disabled.” Id. at 118. “The
local government undeniably has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens by
18.
regulations that require those engaged in towing services within the city limits to be
financially responsible and to operate in an orderly fashion with safe equipment.” Id.
{¶ 46} The present situation differs from Reed in that, at least at this stage of the
litigation, Erie Island’s business activity does not occur within the village. The Village’s
position to the contrary misconstrues the activity that is being taxed. The Village, and the
trial court below, frame the tax as being on the privilege of operating rented golf carts on
village streets. Mathys, however, would not countenance such a tax. It recognized that
the General Assembly has imposed a statewide license tax under R.C. 4503.02 “on the
operation of motor vehicles on public roads and highways,” and under R.C. 4504.02 and
4504.06 has expressly limited the authority of municipalities “to also impose a tax on the
operation of motor vehicles on public roads and highways.” Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421, at
¶ 21. Indeed, C.O. 858.01 survived review because the Ohio Supreme Court directly
found that it “[did] not impose a license tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public
highways.” Id. at ¶ 23. “The ‘license fee’ referred to in Section 858.01 does nothing to
authorize or prohibit a motor vehicle, including the rental vehicles at issue here, from
being operated on a public roadway within the village.” Id. at ¶ 24. The taxed activity,
therefore, cannot be the operation of rented golf carts on village streets.
{¶ 47} Instead, the taxed activity is the privilege of renting golf carts. Id. at ¶ 24
(Mathys must pay the tax if it wants “the privilege of renting those vehicles to others for
use within the village.” (Emphasis added.)). The operative inquiry then must identify
where the business activity of renting the golf carts occurs. Due process requires that the
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business activity must occur within the village for it to be subjected to the village’s tax.
Hillenmeyer, 2015-Ohio-1623, at ¶ 42.
{¶ 48} Here, it is undisputed that Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rentals are
located outside of the village’s jurisdiction. Further, they allege in their complaint that
“[n]either operates any portion of their business in the Village.” At this stage of the
proceedings, for purposes of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, this court must accept
that fact as true. See Colt’s Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty., Ohio Bd. of
Commrs., 2026-Ohio-2751, ¶ 41 (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, we accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint.”).
{¶ 49} This court holds, therefore, that Erie Island can prove a set of facts
establishing that C.O. 858.01 exceeds the village’s home rule authority to the extent that
it imposes an unconstitutional extraterritorial tax in violation of due process. The trial
court erred in granting the Village’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on that basis.
2. Equal Protection
{¶ 50} Separately, Erie Island argues that C.O. 858.01 is unconstitutional because
it violates the Equal Protection Clause found in the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. “Traditionally, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution has been treated as providing the same
protection as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.” Swiech v.
Bd. of Edn. for Sylvania City School Dist., 2025-Ohio-405, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.), citing
Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 2010-Ohio-4908, ¶ 17. Because Erie
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Island does not argue that the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than the
United States Constitution, this court will apply the traditional equal protection analysis.
{¶ 51} “The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause ‘is to secure every person
within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly
constituted agents.’” Swiech at ¶ 28, quoting Kinzel v. Ebner, 2023-Ohio-164, ¶ 79 (6th
Dist.), quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “Simply
stated, the Equal Protection Clauses require that individuals be treated in a manner
similar to others in like circumstances.” Id., quoting Taxiputinbay, LLC v. Put-In-Bay,
2023-Ohio-1237, ¶ 33 (6th Dist.), quoting Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2008-Ohio-
2751, ¶ 30.
{¶ 52} “The touchstone is whether the comparators are similar in all relevant
aspects.” Id. at ¶ 29. “‘Although citizens are entitled to equal protection under the law,
governments are “free to draw distinctions in how they treat certain citizens.”’” Id.,
quoting Ferguson v. State, 2017-Ohio-7844, ¶ 30, quoting Park Corp. v. Brook Park,
2004-Ohio-2237, ¶ 19. “The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It
simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in
all relevant respects alike.” Id., quoting Ferguson at ¶ 30.
{¶ 53} In its amended complaint, Erie Island identifies several groups that it
believes are similarly situated: (1) golf cart rental companies not located on South Bass
Island; (2) privately owned golf carts or other motor vehicles; and (3) companies that rent
cars or trucks that are used in the village. The parties do not dispute that this case does
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not implicate a fundamental right or suspect classification and therefore the rational-basis
test applies.
{¶ 54} The Ohio Supreme Court has described the well-established framework for
the rational-basis test:
The rational basis test involves a two-step analysis. We must first identify
a valid state interest. Second, we must determine whether the method or
means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational. A
statute will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and this court
will not invalidate a plan of classification . . ., unless it is clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable. Thus, provided that the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest, it will be upheld.
Sherman v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, 2020-Ohio-4960, ¶ 15, quoting
McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 2005-Ohio-6505, ¶ 9. “[A] State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If
the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality.’” Id., quoting McCrone at ¶ 8, quoting Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
{¶ 55} “Under the rational-basis standard, a state has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationality of a . . . classification.” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Columbia
Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-511, ¶ 91. “A state action may be based on
‘rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id., quoting State v.
Thompson, 2002-Ohio-2124, ¶ 27, quoting Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). “The plaintiff ‘bears the burden to
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negate every conceivable basis that might support the [action].’” Id., quoting Columbia
Gas at ¶ 91.
{¶ 56} “When an equal-protection claim analyzed under the rational-basis test is
reviewed on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is important to remember
that the motion-to-dismiss standard ‘is procedural, and simply allows the