Full Opinion

[Cite as Erie Island Carts, L.L.C. v. Put-in-Bay, 2026-Ohio-4619.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY Erie Island Carts, LLC, et al. Court of Appeals No. OT-25-045 Appellants Trial Court No. 25 CV 0155 v. Village of Put-In-Bay, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellees Decided: November 20, 2026 ***** Brodi J. Conover, Susan Keating Anderson, and Aaron Ross, for appellees. Marc E. Dann, Andrew M. Engel, and Jeffrey A. Crossman, for appellants. ***** SULEK, J. {¶ 1} Appellants Erie Island Carts, LLC and Island Bike Rental, LLC (collectively “Erie Island”) appeal the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, which granted appellees Village of Put-in-Bay’s and Courtney Blumensaadt’s (collectively “the Village”) motion to dismiss Erie Island’s complaint. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. I. Factual Background and Procedural History {¶ 2} The village of Put-in-Bay is a popular tourist destination located on South Bass Island in Ottawa County, Ohio. The village comprises only a portion of the island, the remainder is Put-in-Bay Township. Golf carts are the prevailing mode of transportation on the island and numerous golf cart rental businesses exist to serve the tourists. Several such businesses are located within the village. Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental are located in Put-in-Bay Township, outside of the village. {¶ 3} Traffic congestion and pedestrian safety have long been matters of concern due to the number of visitors the village receives. In response, the village has taken several steps to regulate the use of golf carts. Relevant here, it passed an ordinance that required “[o]wners of vehicles used for the transportation of persons or property, for hire and for use within the Village” to pay an annual “nontransferable vehicle license fee.” Put-in-Bay Codified Ordinance (“C.O.”) 858.01. Somewhat recently, that ordinance was challenged by golf cart rental businesses located within the village and was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in Put-in-Bay v. Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421. See also S.B. Carts, Inc. v. Put-in-Bay, 2005-Ohio-3065 (6th Dist.) (upholding C.O. 858.01 as a legitimate exercise of the village’s home rule taxing authority). {¶ 4} Subsequently, on May 14, 2024, the village passed Ordinance No. 1440-24, which in effect expanded the reach of C.O. 858.01 to “any person, firm or corporation engaging in business activity described in this chapter on South Bass Island,” thereby 2. imposing the vehicle license fee and other regulations on businesses located in the township outside of the village, such as Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental. (Emphasis added.) {¶ 5} Within a few weeks after passing Ordinance No. 1440-24, the village sent written notice to Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental stating that they must obtain a Golf Cart Business License from the village and pay the vehicle license fee by June 28, 2024. The notice informed them that failure to do so would result in criminal or civil liability. {¶ 6} On June 28, 2024, Island Bike Rental submitted the required paperwork along with a payment of $20,000, representing $100 for each of its 200 golf carts. It also included a letter protesting the fee as unlawful. Similarly, Erie Island Carts submitted its paperwork with a payment of $17,500 and a letter of protest. At the end of the year, both Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental also submitted a $175.00 business license renewal fee to the village for 2025. {¶ 7} In April 2025, both Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rental again paid the license fees under protest. This time, the accompanying letters of protest included a statement that both companies had commenced a lawsuit against the village regarding the fees. {¶ 8} Indeed, Erie Island initiated the present matter when it filed its six-count complaint against the Village. In the subsequently amended complaint, Count One sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is an unconstitutional tax on businesses located outside of the jurisdiction of the village. Count Two sought a declaratory 3. judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional in that it violates due process and the equal protection of the law. Count Three sought to enjoin the Village from levying and collecting the taxes imposed by the ordinance. Count Four sought a refund pursuant to R.C. 2723.03 of the amounts already paid. In the alternative, Count Five sought a refund of $50 per golf cart license fee paid in 2024 because the ordinance at that time imposed only a $50 fee, not a $100 fee. Finally, in Count Six, Erie Island asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for the unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law, seeking a refund of all the amounts paid to the village, as well as interest and attorney fees. {¶ 9} The Village moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6). It argued that the ordinance as amended does not exceed the village’s home rule authority to levy taxes as alleged in Count One, and does not violate due process or equal protection as alleged in Count Two. It argued that the ordinance is not “illegal” and does not warrant an injunction or refund as alleged in Counts Three, Four, and Five. Further, it asserted that the ordinance does not violate any constitutional rights as alleged in Count Six. {¶ 10} In addition to those arguments, the Village maintained that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Counts Four and Five because Erie Island did not fully comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2723.03 by failing to file a notice of intention to sue with their written protests. Relatedly, it argued that the trial court likewise lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Counts One and Two because a 4. declaratory judgment cannot be used to circumvent the statutory procedures for relief provided by R.C. Chapter 2723. {¶ 11} After briefing by the parties, on December 1, 2025, the trial court granted the Village’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. It first found that Counts One and Two should be dismissed because declaratory relief was not available as R.C. Chapter 2723 provided the exclusive means for challenging the illegality of a tax or licensing fee. It next found that the tax was not an unconstitutional exercise of the village’s home rule authority because it was taxing Erie Island for “the privilege of operating their rental vehicles on Village public roadways.” The trial court also found that the tax did not violate equal protection because Erie Island was not similarly situated to residents who owned golf carts or other private individuals who transported their golf carts onto the island since those individuals did not rent their golf carts. Likewise, Erie Island was not similarly situated to golf-cart rental businesses located off the island because the village could rationally speculate that the additional ferry transport cost would result in few people renting golf carts from off-island businesses. Therefore, finding that the tax was not unconstitutional, the trial court determined that all the counts should be dismissed. Finally, the trial court additionally found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Counts Four and Five as to the 2024 and 2025 payments by Island Bike Rental and the 2024 payments by Erie Island Carts because the plaintiffs failed to include a notice of intention to sue with their protest letters. 5. II. Assignments of Error {¶ 12} Erie Island timely appeals the judgment of the trial court, presenting five assignments of error for review: 1. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Counts 1 and 2 (Declaratory Judgment) on the Ground that Declaratory Relief Is Unavailable. 2. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Count 2 (Declaratory Judgment) on the Ground That The Ordinance Does Not Violate Appellants’ Constitutional Rights. 3. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Appellants’ Injunctive Relief Claim (Count 3). 4. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Tax Refund Claims (Counts 4 and 5). 5. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Takings Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 6). III. Analysis {¶ 13} The Village moved to dismiss Erie Island’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6). Civ.R. 12(B)(1) provides the defense of “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” “The standard for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether the complaint raises ‘any cause of action cognizable by the forum.’” State ex rel. Kellys Island School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-285, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). Civ.R. 12(B)(6) states the defense of “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, ‘it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought.’” Veller v. K.B., 2025-Ohio-687, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), quoting Ohio Bur. of 6. Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12. In both cases, this court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo. Kelleys Island at ¶ 20; Veller at ¶ 18. {¶ 14} The trial court’s decision and this appeal raise issues of subject matter jurisdiction and the merits of the claims. Erie Island’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, while its second and third assignments of error pertain to the merits of its claims. Finally, this court will separately address Erie Island’s arguments relative to its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in its fifth assignment of error. A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction {¶ 15} In its first, third, and fourth assignments of error, Erie Island argues that R.C. Chapter 2723 did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over its claims for declaratory relief in Counts One and Two, injunctive relief in Count 3, and the refund of the 2025 taxes. {¶ 16} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.” {¶ 17} Relevant here, R.C. Chapter 2723 differentiates between actions to enjoin the illegal levy of taxes, actions to enjoin the collection of taxes, and actions to recover taxes and assessments. R.C. 2723.01 grants the court of common pleas subject matter jurisdiction over all three when it states, “Courts of common pleas may enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes and assessments and entertain actions to recover them when 7. collected . . ..” R.C. 2723.02 and 2723.03 then describe who must be sued in each action: “Actions to enjoin the illegal levy of taxes and assessments must be brought against the corporation or person for whose use and benefit the levy is made;” “Actions to enjoin the collection of taxes and assessments must be brought against the officer whose duty it is to collect them;” and “Actions to recover taxes and assessments must be brought against the officer who made the collection, or if he is dead, against his personal representative.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 18} Additional requirements are placed on actions to recover taxes. R.C. 2723.01 requires that “no recovery shall be had unless the action is brought within one year after the taxes or assessments are collected.” R.C. 2723.03 further specifies, If a plaintiff in an action to recover taxes or assessments, or both, alleges and proves that he or the corporation or deceased person whose estate he represents, at the time of paying such taxes or assessments, filed a written protest as to the portion sought to be recovered, specifying the nature of his claim as to the illegality thereof, together with notice of his intention to sue under sections 2723.01 to 2723.05, inclusive, of the Revised Code, such action shall not be dismissed on the ground that the taxes or assessments, sought to be recovered, were voluntarily paid. {¶ 19} Thus, unless an exception exists,1 actions to recover taxes must be brought within one year after the taxes are collected, and the taxes must have been paid under written protest specifying the nature of the claimed illegality and including a notice of intention to sue. Those constraints, however, do not apply to actions to enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes. 1 See, for example, R.C. 5715.22 applying to complaints “against the valuation or assessment of real property.” 8. {¶ 20} On appeal, the parties do not present a dispute regarding whether the appropriate corporations, persons, or officers were named in the complaint. Instead, the parties argue whether (1) R.C. Chapter 2723 is the exclusive means of challenging the illegality of a tax, thereby precluding the declaratory relief sought in Counts One and Two, and (2) whether Erie Island complied with R.C. 2723.03’s requirement to include notice of an intention to sue, thereby precluding the injunctive relief sought in Count Three and the recovery of taxes paid sought in Counts Four and Five. These issues are interrelated and will be addressed together. {¶ 21} First, in this case, R.C. Chapter 2723 does not prevent Erie Island from pursuing a declaratory judgment that the Village’s ordinance is unconstitutional. In general, “the common pleas court possess[es] basic statutory jurisdiction over actions for declaratory judgment and injunction.” State ex rel. Blackwell v. Crawford, 2005-Ohio- 5124, ¶ 22, citing R.C. 2721.02 and 2727.03. “But while ‘declaratory judgment statutes provide an additional remedy which may be granted by a court . . . they do not extend the jurisdiction as to the subject matter upon which a court may act.’” State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 2016-Ohio-3529, ¶ 74, quoting State ex rel. Foreman v. Bellefontaine Mun. Court, 12 Ohio St.2d 26, 28 (1967); Ryan v. Tracy, 6 Ohio St.3d 363, 367 (1983). “For this reason, a common pleas court cannot use the declaratory-judgment statute to decide matters over which it otherwise has no jurisdiction.” Id., citing Makowski v. Limbach, 47 Ohio App.3d 129, 130 (10th Dist. 1988). {¶ 22} Here, R.C. 2723.01 grants jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas to enjoin the illegal levy and collection of taxes. As part of this, the trial court must 9. necessarily have the authority to determine whether the levy and collection of taxes are, in fact, illegal. As a result, the declaratory judgment sought in Counts One and Two that the ordinance is unconstitutional is not extending the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. {¶ 23} Arguing against this, the Village cites Ryan v. Tracy, 6 Ohio St.3d 363 (1983), for the proposition that declaratory relief is not available because R.C. Chapter 2723 is the exclusive means for challenging the illegality of a tax or licensing fee. Ryan, however, is distinguishable. {¶ 24} In that case, Ryan filed a class action complaint seeking the recovery of overpaid property taxes. Ryan believed that the county auditor improperly failed to deduct from the property description acreage of land committed to public highway use. Ryan at 364. On appeal before the Ohio Supreme Court, the parties concurred that if R.C. 2723.01 and 2723.03 were applicable, the claim would be barred because Ryan had not complied with the statutes. Id. at 365. {¶ 25} Ryan, however, maintained that his action was governed by R.C. 319.36, not R.C. Chapter 2723. Id. R.C. 319.36 provides that if the auditor discovers that erroneous taxes have been collected, he shall call it to the attention of the board of county commissioners. If the board of county commissioners finds that taxes have been erroneously charged or collected, it shall order the auditor to refund the full amount of the taxes so charged and collected. Ryan sought a declaratory judgment “in effect, to compel the county auditor to find that erroneous taxes have been collected, command the board to order the auditor to draw his warrant in appellant’s favor without their first having 10. found an improper assessment to have been made, and to mandate that the auditor draw his warrant before the board has so instructed him.” Ryan at 366. {¶ 26} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Ryan’s “disingenuous” workaround. Id. It found that “R.C. 2723.01 et seq. provide the exclusive means by which a taxpayer may, with the approbation of the court, demand that the county auditor refund erroneously collected taxes.” Id. R.C. 319.36, in contrast, “grants administrative prerogatives to both the auditor and the county commissioners over which a taxpayer exerts no influence.” (Emphasis added.) Id. It reasoned that “to permit [Ryan] to achieve through one statute that which he is empowered to do only through another would be to ignore legislative intent and abrogate legislative prerogative.” Id. Recognizing that the declaratory judgment statutes do not extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that “[m]erely because [Ryan] requests declaratory rather than monetary or injunctive relief is of no moment in saving his action.” Id. at 367. {¶ 27} Unlike Ryan, Erie Island is not entirely foreclosed from seeking relief under R.C. Chapter 2723. In Ryan, the plaintiff sought to recover taxes that were already paid but could not do so under R.C. 2723.03 because he did not pay the taxes under protest and with a notice of intention to sue. Here, in contrast, in Counts One and Two Erie Island is seeking a declaration that the ordinance is unconstitutional. That declaration is germane to its efforts in Count Three to enjoin the levy and collection of the license fee as provided for in R.C. 2723.02 and 2723.03. As discussed above, the procedural requirements of written protest and notice of intent to sue apply only to actions to recover taxes. Therefore, because nothing in R.C. Chapter 2723 prevents Erie 11. Island from pursuing an action to enjoin the levy and collection of the license fee, which would require a determination that the license fee is illegal, a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional does not expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. {¶ 28} Accordingly, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over Counts One, Two, and Three of Erie Island’s amended complaint. {¶ 29} Counts Four and Five present a separate issue as these counts seek to recover taxes that were already paid. Specifically, Count Four seeks to recover all the taxes paid in 2024 and 2025. Count Five alternatively seeks recovery of $50 per golf cart license fee paid in 2024. {¶ 30} For the taxes paid in 2024, it is undisputed that although Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rentals paid the taxes under written protest, they did not include a notice of intent to sue. “[T]he written protest and notice of intention to sue provisions of R.C. 2723.03 are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to if an action for the recovery of allegedly wrongfully collected taxes is to be maintained.” Ryan, 6 Ohio St.3d at 365; Shanahan v. Toledo, 2009-Ohio-5991, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.); Johnson v. Clark Cty. Auditor, 2020-Ohio-3201, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Consequently, Erie Island is barred from seeking recovery of the 2024 taxes under R.C. 2723.03. {¶ 31} For the taxes paid in 2025, Erie Island Carts included with its payment and written protest a notice that it had commenced suit against the Village for the 2024 license fee and “will seek recovery of the fees paid herewith in the lawsuit.” A copy of that written protest was attached to the amended complaint as Exhibit F. The complaint, 12. however, does not include a copy of Island Bike Rentals’ protest letter. Nevertheless, it alleges in paragraph 24 of the amended complaint that Island Bike Rentals submitted a “letter substantially similar to that attached as Exhibit F,” which “included language that the tax was being paid under protest and that Island Bike intended to seek recovery of the tax in this lawsuit.” The complaint, therefore, alleges facts that satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2723.03, and the claims of Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rentals for recovery of the 2025 license fees cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage on the grounds that those fees were voluntarily paid. {¶ 32} In sum, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Erie Island’s claims for declaratory judgment in Counts One and Two, its claim for injunctive relief in Count Three, and its claim for recovery of the 2025 license fees in Count Four. The claim for recovery of the 2024 license fees, whether in whole as stated in Count Four or in part as stated in Count Five, must be dismissed on the grounds that they were voluntarily paid. {¶ 33} Accordingly, Erie Island’s first assignment of error is well-taken. Its third assignment of error is well-taken to the extent that it addresses the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to consider its claim for injunctive relief. Finally, its fourth assignment of error is well-taken with respect to the claim for recovery of the 2025 license fees, and not well-taken to the extent that it applies to the recovery of the 2024 license fees. 13. B. Constitutionality of the Ordinance {¶ 34} In its second and third assignments of error, Erie Island challenges the trial court’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At issue is (1) whether the ordinance is unconstitutional as violative of due process because it exceeds the village’s home rule authority to tax, and (2) whether the ordinance is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it treats similarly situated persons differently. 1. Home Rule Authority {¶ 35} Erie Island argues that the village exceeded its home rule taxing authority when it expanded the license fee in C.O. 858.01 to businesses located outside the village.2 The Village, on the other hand, argues that the ordinance is not an extraterritorial tax, but is instead the same tax on “the privilege of renting [golf carts] to others for use within the village” that was approved in Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421, at ¶ 24. {¶ 36} The Supreme Court of Ohio’s reasoning in Mathys is critical to understanding the present issue before this court. {¶ 37} In that case, Mathys owned a golf cart rental business located within the village limits. He challenged the license fee as exceeding the village’s home rule authority, characterizing the fee as a license tax that was preempted by the State’s 2 Erie Island also argues that other regulations on its golf cart rental business similarly exceed the village’s home rule authority, for example, regulations prohibiting golf cart rental businesses from sharing locations or expanding their fleet of golf carts. Because the village’s authority to impose these regulations involve the same considerations as its authority to impose the license fee, this court will frame its analysis in terms of the license fee only. 14. vehicle-licensing tax scheme. Id. at ¶ 20. On the issue of preemption, the Ohio Supreme Court “largely agree[d].” Id. {¶ 38} “Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, also known as the Home Rule Amendment, grants municipalities the authority to ‘exercise all powers of local self-government.’ Included within this broad grant of authority is the right of local governments to levy taxes.” Id. at ¶ 12. “This right is not absolute, however. Article XVIII, Section 13, and Article XIII, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution enable the General Assembly to pass laws that limit municipal taxing authority.” Id. Because, however, “the rights conferred in the constitutional provisions exist on equal footing, . . . ‘[i]n the absence of an express statutory limitation demonstrating the exercise, by the General Assembly, of its constitutional power, acts of municipal taxation are valid,’ even when a municipal tax occupies the same field as a state tax.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St.3d 599, 606 (1998). {¶ 39} The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the State’s vehicle licensing tax scheme constituted such an express limitation. It noted that “R.C. 4503.02 imposes an annual statewide license tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public roads and highways,” and R.C. 4504.02 and 4504.06 allow county governments or municipalities to impose an additional $5 license tax. Id. at ¶ 21. It then recognized that “[b]y restricting how local governments may go about imposing a license tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public roads and by imposing a cap on how much they may tax, the General Assembly has expressly limited a municipality’s authority to tax the operation of motor vehicles.” Id. at ¶ 22. 15. {¶ 40} Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected Mathys’s arguments, finding that they rested “on the flawed assumption that the municipal tax imposed by Section 858.01 is the same as, or similar to, the state license tax.” Id. It reasoned, In contrast to the state vehicle-license tax imposed under R.C. 4503.02, and the additional local-government license taxes permitted by R.C. 4504.02 and 4504.06, Section 858.01 does not impose a license tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public highways. Rather, by its plain terms, Section 858.01 imposes a business tax on rental vehicles. . . . . . . Section 858.01’s tax on rental vehicles does not interfere with the operation of vehicles in the village. The ‘license fee’ referred to in Section 858.01 does nothing to authorize or prohibit a motor vehicle, including the rental vehicles at issue here, from being operated on a public roadway within the village. And nothing in the ordinance requires that the license fee be paid for vehicles that are not rented out by the owner. Put another way, Mathys and Islander Inn may drive their golf carts in the village and may even let others use the carts without charging for their use. But if Mathys and Islander Inn want the privilege of renting those vehicles to others for use within the village, they are required to pay the tax imposed by the ordinance on their rental vehicles. Id. at ¶ 23-24. Thus, as recognized in Mathys, C.O. 858.01 is a business tax “on the privilege of renting [golf carts] to others for use within the village.” {¶ 41} As an aside, the Village separately argues on appeal that C.O. 858.01 is authorized by R.C. 715.22, which permits a municipal corporation to “(A) Regulate the use of carts, drays, wagons, hackney coaches, omnibuses, automobiles, and carriages kept for hire or livery stable purposes,” and “(B) License and regulate the use of the streets by persons who use vehicles, or solicit or transact business thereon.” Courts that have examined C.O. 858.01, however, have always treated the ordinance as a tax imposed for the purpose of generating revenue, not a fee imposed pursuant to the village’s power to license and regulate vehicles for hire. See S.B. Carts, Inc. v. Put-in-Bay, 2005-Ohio- 16. 3065, ¶ 5-7 (6th Dist.); Mathys at ¶ 4, fn. 2. Indeed, the trial court in this case on page 11 of its judgment entry, also found that C.O. 858.01 “is not a fee imposed pursuant to the Village’s power to license and regulate vehicles for higher (sic) but is rather a tax imposed for the purpose of generating revenue.” This court likewise holds that C.O. 858.01 is a tax, not an exercise of the village’s power under R.C. 715.22. {¶ 42} The question then is whether the village has the authority to impose its tax on the privilege of renting golf carts on businesses located outside of its territorial jurisdiction. As a corollary, this court looks to the ability of a municipality to tax the income of nonresidents. {¶ 43} The Due Process clause “requires a municipality to have jurisdiction before imposing a tax.” Willacy v. Cleveland Bd. of Income Tax Review, 2020-Ohio-314, ¶ 21. It “establishes a ‘twofold test’ for determining whether a taxing authority exceeded its jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 22. First, there must be “‘some definite link, some minimum connection’ between the local taxing authority ‘and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’” Id., quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345 (1954). Second, there must be “a rational relationship between the income taxed by the jurisdiction and the income-producing activity or property within that jurisdiction.” Id. “These inquiries involve distinct but related concerns: While the former focuses on the presence of either in personam jurisdiction over the taxpayer or in rem jurisdiction over her income or property, the latter focuses on how much of a nonresident’s income the local taxing authority may fairly reach.” Id. 17. {¶ 44} This case involves the first inquiry. “It is well established that regardless of the taxpayer’s residency status, the first prong is satisfied when a state or locality imposes taxes on income arising from work performed within the jurisdiction. In such cases, there is a sufficient connection between the taxing entity and the taxed party.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 2015-Ohio-1623, ¶ 42 (“Beyond in personam taxing jurisdiction over residents, local authorities may tax nonresidents only if theirs is the jurisdiction ‘within which the income actually arises and whose authority over it operates in rem.’”). {¶ 45} The Village argues that its ordinance is not an extraterritorial tax because it only imposes a tax on activity that occurs within the village, namely the renting of golf carts that are used in the village. It cites City of Cincinnati v. Reed, 27 Ohio App.3d 115 (1st Dist. 1985), as an example of a valid ordinance taxing a towing business that was not located in its jurisdiction. In that case, the First District described that the Cincinnati municipal ordinance required that “anyone engaged in the business of offering towing services by use of a wrecker or other similar vehicle must obtain a license from the city treasurer before removing parked or disabled motor vehicles from any location within the city limits.” Reed at 115. In finding that the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of local police powers, the First District noted that the ordinance was “strictly limited to those engaged in the business of towing or removing parked or disabled motor vehicles from any places within Cincinnati where they have been parked or disabled.” Id. at 118. “The local government undeniably has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens by 18. regulations that require those engaged in towing services within the city limits to be financially responsible and to operate in an orderly fashion with safe equipment.” Id. {¶ 46} The present situation differs from Reed in that, at least at this stage of the litigation, Erie Island’s business activity does not occur within the village. The Village’s position to the contrary misconstrues the activity that is being taxed. The Village, and the trial court below, frame the tax as being on the privilege of operating rented golf carts on village streets. Mathys, however, would not countenance such a tax. It recognized that the General Assembly has imposed a statewide license tax under R.C. 4503.02 “on the operation of motor vehicles on public roads and highways,” and under R.C. 4504.02 and 4504.06 has expressly limited the authority of municipalities “to also impose a tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public roads and highways.” Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421, at ¶ 21. Indeed, C.O. 858.01 survived review because the Ohio Supreme Court directly found that it “[did] not impose a license tax on the operation of motor vehicles on public highways.” Id. at ¶ 23. “The ‘license fee’ referred to in Section 858.01 does nothing to authorize or prohibit a motor vehicle, including the rental vehicles at issue here, from being operated on a public roadway within the village.” Id. at ¶ 24. The taxed activity, therefore, cannot be the operation of rented golf carts on village streets. {¶ 47} Instead, the taxed activity is the privilege of renting golf carts. Id. at ¶ 24 (Mathys must pay the tax if it wants “the privilege of renting those vehicles to others for use within the village.” (Emphasis added.)). The operative inquiry then must identify where the business activity of renting the golf carts occurs. Due process requires that the 19. business activity must occur within the village for it to be subjected to the village’s tax. Hillenmeyer, 2015-Ohio-1623, at ¶ 42. {¶ 48} Here, it is undisputed that Erie Island Carts and Island Bike Rentals are located outside of the village’s jurisdiction. Further, they allege in their complaint that “[n]either operates any portion of their business in the Village.” At this stage of the proceedings, for purposes of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, this court must accept that fact as true. See Colt’s Neck Homeowners Assn. v. Franklin Cty., Ohio Bd. of Commrs., 2026-Ohio-2751, ¶ 41 (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint.”). {¶ 49} This court holds, therefore, that Erie Island can prove a set of facts establishing that C.O. 858.01 exceeds the village’s home rule authority to the extent that it imposes an unconstitutional extraterritorial tax in violation of due process. The trial court erred in granting the Village’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on that basis. 2. Equal Protection {¶ 50} Separately, Erie Island argues that C.O. 858.01 is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause found in the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. “Traditionally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution has been treated as providing the same protection as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.” Swiech v. Bd. of Edn. for Sylvania City School Dist., 2025-Ohio-405, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.), citing Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 2010-Ohio-4908, ¶ 17. Because Erie 20. Island does not argue that the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than the United States Constitution, this court will apply the traditional equal protection analysis. {¶ 51} “The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause ‘is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’” Swiech at ¶ 28, quoting Kinzel v. Ebner, 2023-Ohio-164, ¶ 79 (6th Dist.), quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “Simply stated, the Equal Protection Clauses require that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like circumstances.” Id., quoting Taxiputinbay, LLC v. Put-In-Bay, 2023-Ohio-1237, ¶ 33 (6th Dist.), quoting Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2008-Ohio- 2751, ¶ 30. {¶ 52} “The touchstone is whether the comparators are similar in all relevant aspects.” Id. at ¶ 29. “‘Although citizens are entitled to equal protection under the law, governments are “free to draw distinctions in how they treat certain citizens.”’” Id., quoting Ferguson v. State, 2017-Ohio-7844, ¶ 30, quoting Park Corp. v. Brook Park, 2004-Ohio-2237, ¶ 19. “The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Id., quoting Ferguson at ¶ 30. {¶ 53} In its amended complaint, Erie Island identifies several groups that it believes are similarly situated: (1) golf cart rental companies not located on South Bass Island; (2) privately owned golf carts or other motor vehicles; and (3) companies that rent cars or trucks that are used in the village. The parties do not dispute that this case does 21. not implicate a fundamental right or suspect classification and therefore the rational-basis test applies. {¶ 54} The Ohio Supreme Court has described the well-established framework for the rational-basis test: The rational basis test involves a two-step analysis. We must first identify a valid state interest. Second, we must determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational. A statute will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and this court will not invalidate a plan of classification . . ., unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus, provided that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it will be upheld. Sherman v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, 2020-Ohio-4960, ¶ 15, quoting McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 2005-Ohio-6505, ¶ 9. “[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’” Id., quoting McCrone at ¶ 8, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). {¶ 55} “Under the rational-basis standard, a state has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a . . . classification.” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-511, ¶ 91. “A state action may be based on ‘rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id., quoting State v. Thompson, 2002-Ohio-2124, ¶ 27, quoting Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). “The plaintiff ‘bears the burden to 22. negate every conceivable basis that might support the [action].’” Id., quoting Columbia Gas at ¶ 91. {¶ 56} “When an equal-protection claim analyzed under the rational-basis test is reviewed on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is important to remember that the motion-to-dismiss standard ‘is procedural, and simply allows the