Greater Dayton Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1385
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket30360; 30650
JudgeHanseman
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Greater Dayton Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1385, 2026-Ohio-
4601.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
GREATER DAYTON REGIONAL :
TRANSIT AUTHORITY : C.A. Nos. 30360; 30650
:
Appellant/Cross-Appellee : Trial Court Case No. 2018 CV 01904
:
v. : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, :
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1385 : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
Appellee/Cross-Appellant
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgments
of the trial court are vacated.
Costs to be paid by appellee/cross-appellant.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. Nos. 30360, 30650
RYAN A. CATES and LAUREN M. LARRICK, Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
JOSEPH S. PASS, Attorney for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Greater Dayton Regional Transit Authority (“RTA”) appeals from the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s judgment overruling its motion to dismiss and
motion for summary judgment and sustaining the motion for summary judgment of
Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO Local 1385 (“the Union”). The Union cross-appeals
from the trial court’s judgment that overruled its motion for attorney fees. For the following
reasons, the judgments of the trial court are vacated.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} RTA is a public employer and operates a mass transit system that provides the
Greater Dayton, Ohio, region with transportation services. In addition to regular fixed-route
bus service and electric trolley service, RTA offers Project Mobility Paratransit Service
(“PMOB”), the service relevant to this appeal.
{¶ 3} For many years, the Union and RTA have been parties to a series of collective
bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) that cover RTA’s bus operators and other employees. Of
relevance to this appeal, the CBA that was in effect between April 1, 2016, and March 31,
2019, contained a mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure that provided:
All claims or disputes of employees or the Union regarding the application,
interpretation, or violations of any provisions of this Agreement or the
imposition of any discipline, including discharge, shall be settled under
grievances.
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{¶ 4} The 2016-2019 CBA also provided that “should any difference or differences
arise between the parties which cannot be mutually adjusted under this agreement, the
same shall be submitted upon the written request of either party to arbitration . . . .” The
2016-2019 CBA stated that “[t]he powers of the impartial arbitrator are limited to that of
interpreting and applying the provisions of this agreement.”
{¶ 5} If informal or formal discussions regarding a disputed issue did not produce a
resolution, the CBA required arbitration by a single impartial arbitrator. The party seeking
arbitration was required to notify the other party, in writing, within 30 working days that the
party sought arbitration. The CBA also provided that if a grievance was not pursued within
the time limits specified, further pursuit of the grievance was prohibited, and the grievance
would be deemed settled. Additionally, the CBA provided that any written decision, with
opinion, rendered by an arbitrator within a reasonable time following a hearing was “final
and binding upon both parties."
{¶ 6} In 2017, the Union sought arbitration of a dispute regarding RTA’s
subcontracting of PMOB services to third-party vendors. After an evidentiary hearing, the
arbitrator issued a written opinion on March 12, 2018. The arbitrator found in favor of the
Union and against RTA. The arbitrator concluded that RTA violated Article IV –
Subcontracting, paragraph 9, of the CBA, which required the RTA to provide written notice
to the Union before subcontracting PMOB services with cabs.
{¶ 7} The arbitrator’s award provided:
ARBITRATION AWARD AND REMEDY
A. [RTA] is ordered to cease and desist all subcontracting of Union work,
including PMOB services, unless subcontracting is permitted by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
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B. If [RTA] plans to subcontract PMOB work, [RTA] will give prior written
notice to the Union. See, Joint exhibit 1, CBA: IV-Subcontracting.
C. [RTA] will make whole all PMOB operators for all wages lost as a result
of RTA’s contract violations in the total amount of $29,521.41 which
represents the following invoices paid by [RTA] for subcontracting PMOB
services:
Dayton Fast Club: Invoice #2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007:
$22,920.00
Lyft: Invoice #6169, 6468, 6498, 6497, 6707, 7484 and 7686:
$1,884.23
Anton’s Cab Service LLC: Invoice #5840, 2878 and 2879:
$4,717.18
Total: $29,521.41
The above amount, $29,521.41 shall be equally divided by the number of
Union employees, who are operators in PMOB services. [RTA] shall pay
each said Union employee his or her equal share.
{¶ 8} On July 19, 2018, on the Union’s request for confirmation, the trial court
confirmed the arbitration award. We affirmed the confirmation of the arbitration award on
February 8, 2019, in Greater Dayton Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union
AFL CIO Local 1385, 2019-Ohio-393 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 9} By that time, the 2016-2019 CBA was to expire on March 31, 2019, and a
successor CBA had not been agreed upon by the parties. On January 2, 2020, the successor
CBA (“2019-2022 CBA”) was ratified. In article I, section 1, of the 2019-2022 CBA, the
parties agreed that it was effective March 31, 2019, through April 2, 2022. The 2019-2022
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CBA provided for substantially similar grievance procedures, including the same arbitration
clause, which stated: “All claims or disputes of employees or the Union regarding the
application, interpretation, or violations of any provisions of this Agreement or the imposition
of any discipline, including discharge, shall be settled under grievances.” The power of the
arbitrator to interpret and apply the CBA remained the same as well. Of importance, the
2019-2022 CBA allowed RTA to subcontract PMOB work if it first exhausted all available
voluntary and mandatory work assignments.
{¶ 10} At some point in time, the Union had a dispute with RTA regarding RTA’s
subcontracting of PMOB work to third-party vendors. Crucially, the Union did not invoke the
grievance process contained in both versions of the CBA. Instead, on October 22, 2020, in
the civil case confirming the arbitration award, the Union filed a motion for the enforcement
of the final order confirming the arbitration award. The Union specifically argued that RTA
(1) failed to make the affected bargaining unit members whole for all lost wages incurred as
a result of its subcontracting PMOB work, and (2) failed to comply with the arbitration award’s
requirement to “cease and desist” subcontracting PMOB work in violation of the CBA.
{¶ 11} On December 21, 2020, RTA moved to dismiss the Union’s motion, arguing
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In an affidavit attached to RTA’s motion,
Mark Donaghy, then CEO of RTA, stated that, since the arbitration award, RTA had paid the
full $29,521.41 due under the award, with interest, which the Union accepted without issue.
In addition, Mr. Donaghy stated that every time RTA subcontracted for third-party cabs, it
provided the Union notice. Mr. Donaghy further stated that the Union had not filed a
grievance regarding any paratransit trips provided with notice.
{¶ 12} On June 21, 2021, the trial court granted RTA’s motion to dismiss, in part, as
it related to enforcing the RTA to pay the Union the $29,521.41 judgment. However, the trial
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court overruled RTA’s motion to dismiss regarding the “cease and desist” portion of the
Union’s motion to enforce. The trial court reasoned:
That leaves the enforcement of the cease and desist order. The Court follows
the City of Cleveland [v. Laborers Internatl. Union Local 1099, 2018-Ohio-161
(8th Dist.)] decision from the Eighth District. RTA’s motion to dismiss that part
of Local 1385’s motion is DENIED. The Court is limited to enforcement of the
alleged post-arbitration violations of the cease and desist order issued by the
arbitrator and confirmed by this Court as the judgment of this Court. That
enforcement requires an evidentiary hearing regarding whether RTA has
violated the order and, if so, what damages are owed, if any, from the
continued post-arbitration violations.
June 21, 2021, Decision, p. 5.
{¶ 13} After a number of scheduled trial dates and an unsuccessful mediation, on
July 7, 2023, RTA moved for summary judgment. RTA argued that there was no genuine
issue of material fact for trial, because the Union had failed to commence a grievance
procedure or arbitration procedures. According to RTA, the motion to determine RTA’s
alleged post-arbitration-award violations of subcontracting transit services to third parties
alleged new CBA violations that must be arbitrated.
{¶ 14} The Union filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 10, 2023,
claiming that it was entitled to summary judgment. The Union relied on RTA’s admission that
it had never stopped using third-party transit providers to perform bargaining-unit paratransit
work, including services in 2018 and 2019 after the arbitration award. On September 6,
2023, the trial court granted the Union’s motion on liability only.
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{¶ 15} Additional motions and cross-motions for summary judgment regarding
damages followed. On December 18, 2024, the trial court granted damages in favor of the
Union and against RTA totaling $495,859.33, together with pre- and post-judgment interest.
The trial court also awarded the Union attorney fees and costs but reserved the amount for
later determination. After further briefing from the parties, the trial court reconsidered the
issue of attorney fees. After providing the parties with notice and a hearing, on October 14,
2025, the trial court overruled the Union’s motion for attorney fees.
{¶ 16} RTA appeals from the trial court’s order overruling its motion to dismiss and
motion for summary judgment and sustaining the Union’s motion for summary judgment.
The Union cross-appeals from the trial court’s order overruling its motion for attorney fees.
II. Discussion
{¶ 17} RTA argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine
whether the RTA violated the confirmed arbitration award, which had ordered RTA to cease
and desist subcontracting Union work unless otherwise permitted by the CBA. RTA claims
that either the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”) or an arbitrator had exclusive
jurisdiction to consider RTA’s alleged instances of continued PMOB subcontracting, which
formed the basis of the alleged violations of the cease-and-desist order. The Union contends
that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce its own orders and determine whether RTA had
violated the collective bargaining agreement.
{¶ 18} RTA also claims that the trial court wrongly denied its motion for summary
judgment because the Union failed to prove that RTA had not provided notice to the Union
before subcontracting services. RTA also argues that only an arbitrator, not the trial court,
can interpret the CBA. RTA further claims that the trial court’s damages award exceeded
the scope of the CBA because it awarded damages up to the ratification date of the
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successor CBA instead of limiting the award to the March 31, 2019, effective date of the
successor CBA.
{¶ 19} Additional arguments are made by both parties, but in light of our analysis,
they do not need to be restated. For ease of discussion, the court begins with the issues
regarding subject matter jurisdiction and summary judgment because the issues intertwine
and both entail de novo review.
Standard of Review – Summary Judgment
{¶ 20} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on summary judgment is de novo.
See, e.g., Coterel v. Reed, 2016-Ohio-7411, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “In a de novo review, the trial
court’s decision is not given deference by the reviewing appellate court; the same standard
that the trial court should have used is applied, and we examine the evidence to determine
whether as a matter of law no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial.” (Footnote
omitted.) Id., citing Riverside v. State, 2016-Ohio-2881, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), citing Dupler v.
Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 116 (1980).
{¶ 21} Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment may be granted when the
moving party demonstrates that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that
conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66 (1978).
Standard of Review – Subject Matter Jurisdiction
{¶ 22} “Whether a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that
we review de novo.” Smith v. Ohio State University, 2024-Ohio-764, ¶ 11. In a de novo
review, an appellate court will conduct an independent review of the trial court’s decision
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without giving deference. State v. Wolfe, 2022-Ohio-215, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). The standard of
review for a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) dismissal is whether any cause of action has been raised in the
complaint or motion before the trial court. Tipp City Edn. Assn. v. Tipp City Exempted Village
School District Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-4000, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing State ex rel. Bush v.
Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). Stated another way, “‘[an action] may only be
dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) when it raises no cause of action that is cognizable by the
forum.’” Akron Assn. of Classified Personnel v. Akron City School Dist. Board of Edn., 2022-
Ohio-3216, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), quoting Jones v. Summit Cty. Job & Family Servs., 2016-Ohio-
4940, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.).
{¶ 23} “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a
court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-
5220, ¶ 14. “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court’s power to
adjudicate and render judgment in a case, and ‘in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction,
a court lacks the authority to do anything but announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.’”
State v. Hudson, 2022-Ohio-1435, ¶ 22, quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 21.
{¶ 24} “The Ohio Constitution provides that ‘[t]he courts of common pleas and
divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters . . . as may
be provided by law.’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting Ohio Const., art. IV, § 4(B). “Therefore, the general
subject-matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined statutorily by the
legislature.” Id.
{¶ 25} Turning to the relevant statutes, since RTA claims that SERB has exclusive
jurisdiction, we begin our analysis with Chapter 4117, which governs SERB.
Chapter 4117 and the State Employment Relations Board (SERB)
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{¶ 26} Citing R.C. 4117.10(A), RTA argues that all claims based on alleged violations
of a CBA fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB. R.C. 4117.10(A) provides, in part,
that “[a]n agreement between a public employer and an exclusive representative entered
into pursuant to this chapter governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public
employment covered by the agreement. If the agreement provides for a final and binding
arbitration of grievances, public employers, employees, and employee organizations are
subject solely to that grievance procedure and the state personnel board of review or civil
service commissions have no jurisdiction to receive and determine any appeals relating to
matters that were the subject of a final and binding grievance procedure.”
{¶ 27} By authorizing the common pleas courts to enforce arbitration awards
rendered under CBAs, the Revised Code empowers the courts to hear certain matters
involving CBAs. When a CBA has been executed, R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) requires the CBA to
“contain a provision that [p]rovides for a grievance procedure which may culminate with final
and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances, and disputed interpretations of
agreements, and which is valid and enforceable under its terms when entered into in
accordance with this chapter.” The statute further provides: “A party to the agreement may
bring suits for violation of agreements or the enforcement of an award by an arbitrator in the
court of common pleas of any county wherein a party resides or transacts business.”
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 4117.09(B)(1).
{¶ 28} “If a party asserts rights that are independent of Chapter 4117, the party’s
complaint may properly be heard in common pleas court. However, if a party asserts claims
that arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117,
the remedies provided in that chapter are exclusive.” Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn.
v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge, 59 Ohio St.3d 167 (1991), paragraph two of
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the syllabus. “The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) has exclusive jurisdiction to
decide matters committed to it pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117.” Id., paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶ 29} The test for SERB’s jurisdiction is “whether one of the parties filed charges
with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11 or whether one of the parties
filed a complaint before a common pleas court alleging conduct that constitutes an unfair
labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11.” Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
v. Lakewood, 2025-Ohio-2052, ¶ 30 (SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction when union’s
motion to compel arbitration did not allege an unfair labor practice).
{¶ 30} R.C. 4117.11 defines unfair labor practices of public employers and employee
organizations (e.g., unions). A public employer, its agents, or its representatives may not:
(1) Interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code or an employee
organization in the selection of its representative for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
(2) Initiate, create, dominate, or interfere with the formation or
administration of any employee organization, or contribute financial or other
support to it; except that a public employer may permit employees to confer
with it during working hours without loss of time or pay, permit the exclusive
representative to use the facilities of the public employer for membership or
other meetings, or permit the exclusive representative to use the internal mail
system or other internal communications system;
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(3) Discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment on the basis of the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code; . . .
(4) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under Chapter 4117. of the Revised
Code;
(5) Refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his
employees recognized as the exclusive representative or certified pursuant to
Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code;
(6) Establish a pattern or practice of repeated failures to timely process
grievances and requests for arbitration of grievances;
(7) Lock out or otherwise prevent employees from performing their
regularly assigned duties where an object thereof is to bring pressure on the
employees or an employee organization to compromise or capitulate to the
employer’s terms regarding a labor relations dispute;
(8) Cause or attempt to cause an employee organization, its agents, or
representatives to violate division (B) of this section.
R.C. 4117.11(A)(1) through (8).
{¶ 31} An employee organization, its agents or representatives, or public employees
may not:
(1) Restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code. . . . ;
(2) Cause or attempt to cause an employer to violate division (A) of this
section;
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(3) Refuse to bargain collectively with a public employer if the employee
organization is recognized as the exclusive representative or certified as the
exclusive representative of public employees in a bargaining unit;
(4) Call, institute, maintain, or conduct a boycott against any public
employer, or picket any place of business of a public employer, on account of
any jurisdictional work dispute;
(5) Induce or encourage any individual employed by any person to
engage in a strike in violation of Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code or refusal
to handle goods or perform services; or threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person where an object thereof is to force or require any public employee to
cease dealing or doing business with any other person, or force or require a
public employer to recognize for representation purposes an employee
organization not certified by the state employment relations board;
(6) Fail to fairly represent all public employees in a bargaining unit;
(7) Induce or encourage any individual in connection with a labor
relations dispute to picket the residence or any place of private employment of
any public official or representative of the public employer;
(8) Engage in any picketing, striking, or other concerted refusal to work
without giving written notice to the public employer and to the state
employment relations board not less than ten days prior to the action. The
notice shall state the date and time that the action will commence and, once
the notice is given, the parties may extend it by the written agreement of both.
R.C. 4117.11(B)(1) through (8).
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{¶ 32} “When a party does not allege an unfair labor practice or conduct that
constitutes an unfair labor practice but instead raises a claim that is independent of the rights
created by R.C. Ch. 4117, jurisdiction is not exclusive to SERB and may be exercised by a
common pleas court.” Lakewood, 2025-Ohio-2052, at ¶ 1. In this case, the Union’s motion
alleged that RTA violated the cease-and-desist order by continuing to subcontract PMOB
services to non-union contractors. Violating the cease-and-desist order of the confirmed
arbitration award, or even the CBA itself, is not defined as an unfair labor practice. There is
no indication in the record before us that RTA’s conduct, as alleged, constituted an unfair
labor practice. Instead, the Union’s motion to enforce the arbitration award stated:
RTA failed to comply with the Gardner Award’s requirement to “cease and
desist” subcontracting PMOB work in violation of the CBA. Rather, RTA
continued to subcontract PMOB work in violation of the parties’ contract, the
Gardner Award, the trial court’s July 19, 2018 order and the 2nd Appellate
District’s February 8, 2019 order. This continued violation resulted in further
economic damages. In order to make the affected bargaining unit members
whole for all lost wages sustained by RTA’s failure to cease and desist
subcontracting as required by the Gardner Award, the trial court, and the 2 nd
Appellate District Court, RTA owes the affected bargaining unit members no
less than $225,810.52 in back pay.
October 22, 2020, Union Motion, ¶ 30.
{¶ 33} In our view, applying Lakewood, we do not agree with RTA that SERB had
exclusive jurisdiction to hear the Union’s motion to enforce the arbitration award. However,
that does not end our inquiry. RTA further argues that the trial court did not have the subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the Union’s allegations that RTA had violated the CBA. RTA
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points out that to determine whether it had violated the “cease and desist” order, the trial
court was required to, and did, interpret the CBA, which was in the arbitrator’s exclusive
powers.
Arbitration and the CBAs
{¶ 34} While R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) provides the common pleas court with jurisdiction to
hear an action alleging a violation of agreements or seeking enforcement of an arbitration
award, nothing in that division, Chapter 4117, or Chapter 2711 provides a trial court with
jurisdiction to interpret a CBA to determine, in the first instance, whether a party violated the
CBA, as opposed to an arbitrator making that determination.
{¶ 35} In Lakewood, the Supreme Court of Ohio made clear that its decision “does
not mean that a party may bring any claim for a violation of a collective-bargaining
agreement in a court of common pleas.” (Emphasis in original.) Lakewood, 2025-Ohio-2052,
at ¶ 19. Rather, “under R.C. 4117.09(B)(1), if a collective-bargaining agreement contains an
arbitration provision, that provision governs and arbitration is required.” Id.
{¶ 36} The Union is correct in its general assertion that courts have jurisdiction to
enforce arbitration awards. R.C. 2711.12 (once a trial court grants an order confirming an
arbitration award, “the court must enter judgment in conformity therewith.”); R.C. 2711.14(C)
(“[t]he judgment so entered shall have in all respects the same effect as, and be subject to
all laws relating to, a judgment in an action [and] . . . may be enforced as if rendered in an
action in the court in which it is entered.”). Courts also have jurisdiction to enforce their own
orders in a contempt proceeding. R.C. 2705.02; State ex rel. Shoop v. Mitrovich, 4 Ohio
St.3d 220, 221 (1983) (“Clearly, the court of common pleas may enforce its own orders in a
contempt proceeding.”). But that is not what happened in this case. Here, the trial court did
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not conduct a contempt proceeding. It instead granted the Union damages for numerous
instances of subcontracting that were never arbitrated.
{¶ 37} Each party, in various sections of its brief, contends that the other party waived
the right to challenge the trial court’s decision because the court failed to file findings of fact
and conclusions of law. We do not agree, because the plain language of Civ.R. 52 applies
to trials to the court and expressly excludes summary judgment under Civ.R. 56. See
Civ.R. 52 (“Findings of fact and conclusions of law required by this rule and by
Civ.R. 41(B)(2) and Civ.R. 23(G)(3) are unnecessary upon all other motions including those
pursuant to Civ.R. 12, Civ.R. 55 and Civ.R. 56”); National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
2005-3 v. Dunlap, 2018-Ohio-2701, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 2002-
Ohio-6000, ¶ 47 (7th Dist.) (trial court not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions
of law on summary judgment); Paramount Supply Co. v. Sherlin Corp., 16 Ohio App.3d 176,
180 (8th Dist. 1984). Therefore, the arguments regarding waiver are without merit, and we
will not address them.
{¶ 38} There are four principles, common to both state and federal courts, applicable
to reviewing a dispute’s “arbitrability”: (1) “‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party
cannot be required to so submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to so
submit’”; (2) arbitrability is a legal question for a court to decide; (3) when deciding whether
a particular claim is arbitrable, a court may not rule on the potential merits of the underlying
claim; and (4) when a “‘contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of
arbitrability in the sense that “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”’” Council of Smaller Ents.
v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 661, 665-666 (1998), quoting AT&T Technologies,
16
Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-649, 650 (1986), quoting
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); Academy of
Medicine of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., 2006-Ohio-657.
{¶ 39} RTA argues that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because the CBA contained an arbitration clause
that required mandatory arbitration. This argument also runs to the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. The Union counters, in part, that the trial court’s judgment was correct and that
awarding damages up to January 2, 2020, was proper on account of the successor CBA’s
ratification date.
CBA’s Effective Date vs. Ratification Date
{¶ 40} It is undisputed that the 2016-2019 CBA expired March 31, 2019, and the
2019-2022 CBA was ratified on January 2, 2020. It is also undisputed that the trial court
awarded $495,859.33 in damages to the Union for subcontracting events that occurred
between March 2018 and December 2019. For the trial court to make this determination, it
necessarily believed the Union’s ratification assertion, which necessarily encompassed a
finding that there was no CBA in effect from March 31, 2019, to January 2, 2020, when the
successor CBA was ratified.
{¶ 41} “For purposes of determining arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as
critical as whether it was formed. That is the case where, as here, the date on which an
agreement was ratified determines the date the agreement was formed, and thus determines
whether the agreement’s provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the
parties’ dispute.” Granite Rock Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 304
(2010). Trial courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute at issue. Id. at 305 (court of appeals erred in holding that it was not necessary for
17
the district court to determine the CBA’s ratification date in order to decide whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate Granite Rock’s claim or the union’s ratification-date defense).
{¶ 42} Here, the 2019-2022 CBA provides:
LABOR AGREEMENT
March 31, 2019 through April 2, 2022
ARTICLE I – PARTIES AND RECOGNITION/MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Section 1
THIS AGREEMENT entered into on the 1st day of April, 2019 by and between
the GREATER DAYTON REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, its successors
or assigns, party of the first part, hereinafter called the “Authority” and the
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1385, its successors or
assigns, party of the second part, hereinafter called the "Union" witnesseth:
That the parties hereto, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements herein contained, contract and agree with each other that this
Agreement, which shall become effective as of the 31st day of March, 2019
shall thereafter constitute the complete entire Agreement between the parties
hereto.
{¶ 43} When a successor CBA contains an express statement of the parties—such
as “this Agreement, which shall become effective as of the 31st day of March, 2019”—even
if the CBA is ratified at a later date, the effective date of the CBA controls, and the terms
apply and govern the parties from the effective date. Lennox Industries, Inc. v. Clifton, 1974
WL 183892 (10th Dist. Apr. 30, 1974) (CBA effective on its effective date even though it was
ratified on a subsequent date); Summit Cty. Children’s Serv. Bd. v. Local No. 4546,
Communications Workers of Am., 2003-Ohio-726 (9th Dist.) (same); Local 377 v. Humility
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of Mary Health Partners, 296 F.Supp.2d 851 (N.D.Ohio 2003) (effective date stated in a CBA
applied and later execution date did not control); Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Assocs.,
101 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1996) (CBA’s effective date controlled instead of the execution date);
Flynn v. Interior Finishes, Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2006), citing Brewer v. Natl.
Sur. Corp., 169 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1948) (“It is competent for the parties to agree that
a written contract shall take effect as of a date earlier than that on which it was executed,
and when this is done, the parties will be bound by such agreement.”).
{¶ 44} Therefore, as stated in the 2019-2022 CBA, the agreement was effective on
March 31, 2019, and it governed the portion of the parties’ dispute between March 31, 2019,
to January 2, 2020. As a practical matter, while there was a gap between the expiration of
the 2016-2019 CBA and execution of the 2019-2022 CBA, by the time the Union filed its
motion to enforce the cease-and-desist order on October 22, 2020, the successor CBA had
been ratified, and its terms governed a portion of the alleged subcontracting violations. From
March 31, 2019, RTA was permitted to subcontract PMOB services under the 2019-2022
CBA. While the trial court lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the Union’s claims of post-arbitration
award violations, as discussed further below, as a matter of law, the trial court erred in
awarding damages to the Union for alleged subcontracting violations that occurred from
March 31, 2019, onward.
The 2016-2019 CBA and the 2019-2022 CBA Required Arbitration
{¶ 45} Regardless, the 2016-2019 CBA and the successor 2019-2022 CBA required
arbitration of the Union’s allegations that RTA violated the cease-and-desist order. RTA
claims that to determine a violation of the cease-and-desist order, the trial court had to look
to the CBA and apply it to the alleged subcontracting violations.
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{¶ 46} Here, both CBAs contain the same arbitration clause: “All claims or disputes
of employees or the Union regarding the application, interpretations or violations of any
provisions of this Agreement . . . shall be settled under grievances.”
{¶ 47} Both CBAs grant the same power to the arbitrator: “The powers of the impartial
arbitrator are limited to that of interpreting and applying the provisions of this agreement.”
{¶ 48} Both CBAs also contain a clause in article I, section 2, that provides: “Should
any difference or differences arise between the parties which cannot be mutually adjusted
under this Agreement, the same shall be submitted upon the written request of either party
to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Article XXXI herein.” Article XXXI of both
CBAs addresses grievances and arbitration.
{¶ 49} The relevant portion of the confirmed arbitration award stated:
A. [RTA] is ordered to cease and desist all subcontracting of Union work,
including PMOB services, unless subcontracting is permitted by the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
B. If [RTA] plans to subcontract PMOB work, [RTA] will give prior written notice
to the Union. See, Joint exhibit 1, CBA: IV-Subcontracting.
{¶ 50} The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of the Union’s
claims regarding the alleged instances of subcontracting that occurred between March 2018
and December 2019. Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., 2006-Ohio-
657, ¶ 5 (the question of whether a particular claim is arbitrable is one of law for the court to
decide). However, that was the limit of the trial court’s jurisdiction.
{¶ 51} The Union argues that it had arbitrated the subcontracting dispute in 2017, so
RTA’s continued subcontracting of PMOB services violated the arbitration award’s cease-
and desist order. The Union appears to assume that the award had a preclusive effect and
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that arbitrating later subcontracting issues was unnecessary, assumptions that the trial court
appears to have implicitly accepted without analysis. Regardless of whether the Union’s
pending grievances against RTA differ in any real way from those previously arbitrated in
2018, we conclude that the Union’s claims of continued PMOB subcontracting should have
been submitted to arbitration under the terms of the CBAs.
{¶ 52} On this point, we find the decision in AG Communications Systems Corp. v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 21, 2005 WL 731026 (N.D.Ill. 2005), to
be instructive, where the court explained:
It is “well-established that ‘the preclusive effect of the first arbitrator’s decision
is an issue for a later arbitrator to consider.’” [Indep. Lift Truc