Sorensen v. Hellas
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26 CAE 07 0071 & 26 CAE 07 0073
JudgeHoffman
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Sorensen v. Hellas, 2026-Ohio-4546.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
SORENSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC. Case Nos. 26 CAE 07 0071 & 26 CAE 07 0073
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 25CV H 01 112
HELLAS INVESTMENTS, LTD.
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: November 16, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: Dave Lackey, Sybert, Rhoad, Lackey & Swisher, LLC, for Plaintiff-
Appellant; Bryan M. Pritikin, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} In Delaware App. No. 26CAE070071, plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee
Sorensen Construction, Inc. (“Sorensen Construction”) appeals the April 23, 2026 Judgment
Entry entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which denied its motion for
summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee/cross-
appellant Hellas Investments LTD (“Hellas”), and the July 9, 2026 Judgment Entry, which
approved and adopted the magistrate’s June 24, 2026 decision awarding damages to Hellas.
In Delaware App. No. 26CAE070073, Hellas appeals the July 9, 2026 Judgment Entry, which
failed to award it attorney fees incurred prior to January 27, 2025.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} John Vlahos (“Vlahos”) contacted Don Sorensen and requested Sorensen
Construction perform renovation work on real property located at 7575 Riverside Drive,
Powell, Ohio (“the Property”). Don Sorensen, Sorensen Construction’s 30(B)(5)
representative, described the work as a “complete renovation” of the Property, “from the
ground up.” Deposition of Don Sorensen, pp. 12, 14, 16, 27, attached as Exhibit 3 to Hellas’
November 18, 2025 Motion for Summary Judgment. Don Sorensen testified Hellas never
contracted with Sorensen Construction. Vlahos and Don Sorensen discussed the oral contract
regarding the work at the Property, but a contract never materialized in writing.
{¶3} At the time Vlahos engaged Sorensen Construction, the Property was owned
by Hellas, a single-member entity controlled entirely by the John Vlahos Trust. The trustee
of the John Vlahos Trust was Vlahos. Hellas was “[b]asically. . . a holding company for the
rentals that [Vlahos] had.” Deposition of John A. VanSickle, p. 11, attached as Exhibit 1 to
Hellas’ November 18, 2025 Motion for Summary Judgment.
{¶4} Sorensen Construction performed some of the renovation work and obtained a
certificate of occupancy on March 24, 2023. After the certificate of occupancy was acquired,
Sorensen Construction was denied access to the Property and was not permitted to perform
any additional work on the Property. Vlahos placed tools and equipment belonging to
Sorensen Construction outside the residence. At that point, Vlahos had paid $292,000,
directly to Sorensen Construction and an additional $72,000, directly to subcontractors and
suppliers. According to Sorensen Construction, Vlahos, however, refused to pay the 20%
contractor’s fee. Sorensen Construction subsequently filed a mechanic’s lien against the
Property, claiming it was owed $32,250. When Don Sorensen attempted to file the mechanic’s
lien, he learned the Property was owned by Hellas.
{¶5} On June 30, 2023, Sorensen Construction filed a complaint against Hellas and
Vlahos for, inter alia, breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking damages in the
amount of $32,250 (“Prior Action”). Vlahos passed away on August 14, 2023, and Sorensen
Construction dismissed its claims against him individually. Sorensen Construction filed a
motion for summary judgment on January 22, 2024, which the trial court denied. Depositions
were taken and discovery exchanged. Sorensen Construction filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on November 20, 2024. Hellas filed a memorandum in opposition on
December 17, 2024. After the trial court denied its motion for partial summary judgment,
Sorensen Construction filed a notice of dismissal on January 27, 2025.
{¶6} Also on January 27, 2025, Sorensen Construction filed the complaint in the
instant action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking damages in the
amount of $72,800.00 (“Refiled Action”). The facts and issues in the Prior Action were
identical to the facts and issues in the Refiled Action. On March 14, 2025, Hellas filed an
answer and counterclaim for slander of title/falsification, quiet title, and declaratory
judgment. Sorensen Construction filed a reply to Hellas’ counterclaim on April 3, 2025.
{¶7} Sorensen Construction filed a motion for summary judgment on November 14,
2025. Hellas filed a motion for summary judgment on November 18, 2025. Via Judgment
Entry filed April 23, 2026, the trial court denied Sorensen Construction’s motion for summary
judgment and granted Hellas’ motion for summary judgment.
{¶8} In denying Sorensen Construction’s motion for summary judgment on its
claims, the trial court found a valid, enforceable contract did not exist between Sorensen
Construction and Hellas; therefore, a breach of contract could not occur. The trial court
further found Sorensen Construction failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish Hellas
was unjustly enriched or that Sorensen Construction suffered any loss. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Hellas on its counterclaims, finding Sorensen Construction
filed the mechanic’s lien on the Property without providing a “bona fide and evidence-backed
way to show the total cost of the Project;” without Hellas “being a party to the oral contract
and without any accounting on whether the Project had been paid if full.” April 23, 2026
Judgment Entry at p. 10. The trial court concluded Sorensen Construction filed the
mechanic’s lien with reckless or wanton disregard for its falsity. The trial court found the
invalid mechanic’s lien created a cloud of Hellas’ title; therefore, Hellas was entitled to
summary judgment on its slander of title claim. In addition, the trial court determined,
because the Property was unique and Hellas had no adequate remedy at law through which
to remove the cloud and clear the title, Hellas was entitled to summary judgment on its claims
for quiet title and declaratory judgment.
{¶9} The magistrate conducted a hearing on the issue of damages related to Hellas’
slander of title claim on June 3, 2026. Via decision filed June 24, 2026, the magistrate
awarded damages to Hellas in the amount $111,714.00. The total damage award consisted
of $28,796.00, for work performed by Jon VanSickle; $78,518.00, in attorney fees from
January 27, 2026, to date; and $4,400.00, in expert fees. Sorensen Construction filed
objections to the magistrate’s June 24, 2026 decision, arguing the award was excessive as
Hellas failed to mitigate damages as it could have filed an application pursuant to R.C.
1311.11(C) to discharge the lien. Hellas also filed objections to the magistrate’s decision,
asserting it should have been awarded attorney fees for work performed in defending the Prior
Action.
{¶10} Via Judgment Entry filed July 9, 2026, the trial court overruled the parties’
respective objections, and approved and adopted the magistrate’s June 24, 2026 decision as
judgment of the court.
{¶11} In Delaware App. No. 26CAE070071, Sorensen Construction appeals the trial
court’s April 23, 2026, and July 9, 2026 Judgment Entries, raising the following assignments
of error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS
UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM (AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ITS
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM).
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS
SLANDER OF TITLE AND QUIET TITLE CLAIMS.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
{¶12} In Delaware App. No. 26CAE070073, Hellas appeals the trial court’s July 9,
2026 Judgment Entry, assigning the following as error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING HELLAS AN
AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR HAVING TO
RESPOND TO SORENSEN’S BAD FAITH FIRST COMPLAINT, WHICH
SORENSEN ADMITTED TO FILING IN BAD FAITH. THE ERROR IS
REFLECTED IN THE TRIAL COURT’S ADOPTION OF THE
MAGISTRATE’S JUNE 24, 2026 DECISION. TR 39.
{¶13} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App. R. 11.1, which governs
accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part:
(E) Determination and judgment on appeal. The appeal will be
determined as provided by App. R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with
App. R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court's decision as to each
error to be in brief and conclusionary form. The decision may be by judgment
entry in which case it will not be published in any form.
Standard of Review
{¶14} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique
opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. The
Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 (1987). As such, this Court reviews an award of
summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996).
{¶15} Civ.R. 56 provides summary judgment may be granted only after the trial court
determines: 1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain to be litigated; 2) the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 3) it appears from the evidence that
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such evidence most strongly
in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion
is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977).
{¶16} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material facts concerning the essential
elements of the nonmoving party's case. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). The
moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record of the type
listed in Civil Rule 56(C). Id. at 292-293. However, the moving party need not support its
motion for summary judgment with evidence negating his opponent's claim, but may simply
point out that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claim. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
{¶17} If the moving party satisfies this burden, then the non-moving party has the
reciprocal burden to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial remains. Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at
293. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in her pleadings
but must point to or submit evidence of the type specified in Civ.R. 56(C). Id.; Civ.R. 56(E).
Types of evidence specified in Civ.R. 56 (C) are “pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations
of fact.” Civ.R. 56(C).
Delaware App. No. 26CAE070071
I
{¶18} In its first assignment of error, Sorensen Construction contends the trial court
erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim.
{¶19} “A contract is generally defined as a promise, or a set of promises, actionable
upon breach.” JLP-Orange, LLC v. Tuller Square Northpointe, LLC, 2024-Ohio-2236, ¶ 15 (5th
Dist.), “Essential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity,
consideration (the bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual
assent and legality of object and of consideration.” (Citations omitted.) Id. To prove the
existence of a contract, written or oral, “a plaintiff must show that both parties consented to
the terms of the contract, that there was a ‘meeting of the minds’ of both parties, and that the
terms of the contract are definite and certain.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)
Barlay v. Yoga's Drive-Thru, 2003-Ohio-7164, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.)
{¶20} “To successfully prosecute a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must present
evidence of (1) the existence of a contract, (2) plaintiff's performance of the contract, (3)
defendant's breach of the contract, and (4) plaintiff's loss or damage as a result of defendant's
breach.” Id., citing Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d 597, 600 (2d Dist. 1994).
{¶21} In its April 23, 2026 Judgment Entry, the trial court granted summary judgment
against Sorensen Construction and in favor of Hellas on Sorensen Construction’s breach of
contract claim, concluding a valid, enforceable contract did not exist between the parties. The
trial court explained:
[Sorensen Construction] claims it formed a contract with [Hellas] by
virtue of the relationship between [Hellas] and Vlahos. The Property was
owned by [Hellas] at the time Vlahos engaged Sorensen. [Sorensen
Construction] argues then that an agency relationship existed between [Hellas]
and Vlahos such that Vlahos’ actions bind [Hellas] to the terms of the oral
contract negotiated between Vlahos and [Sorensen Construction]. * * *
[Sorensen Construction] did not submit evidence to show that [Hellas] was ever
intended to be a party to the oral contract between [Sorensen Construction] and
Vlahos. The oral contract between [Sorensen Construction] and Vlahos never
materialized into writing and Vlahos’ understanding of those terms is now
unclear due to his passing. [Don Sorensen] states “For the projects that I work
on, my fee is twenty percent of the total costs for labor and material
incorporated into any project I work on.” (Sorensen Aff. ¶2.) This was not
memorialized in this specific Project. There is also no evidence that [Don
Sorensen or Sorensen Construction] had any previous course of conduct with
Vlahos or [Hellas] indicating otherwise.
[Hellas] argues that Vlahos personally contracted with [Sorensen
Construction]. [Hellas] cites numerous instances in [Don] Sorensen’s
deposition testimony that show [Don Sorensen] believed he never contracted
with [Hellas], never knew [Hellas] owned the Property, and never believed
[Hellas] to be a third-party beneficiary of the oral contract.” * * * (“Q: Did you
think you were contracting with Mr. Vlahos personally?” “A: Yes.” “Q: Okay.
You didn’t think you were contracting with Hellas?” “A: Never. Not one
time”) * * * (“I always thought I was building directly for John Vlahos,” “Q:
you’re not in contract with Hella” “A: No. As far as I know,”) * * * (“I never
thought I was dealing with Hellas. Not one point did I ever feel that I was
dealing with Hellas. I was dealing with John personally”) * * * It is clear from
the testimony, and it is uncontroverted, that [Sorensen Construction] believed
it was dealing with Vlahos personally on the Project, not [Hellas].
[Sorensen Construction] failed to show that Vlahos had either the ability
or intention to bind [Hellas] to this oral contract. [Sorensen Construction] has
not provided evidence such as a written agreement with [Hellas], payments
made to [Sorensen Construction] by [Hellas], interactions between [Sorensen
Construction] and [Hellas], or any course of dealings between [Sorensen
Construction] and [Hellas] that would create even a plausible argument that
[Hellas] should be a party to this oral contract. [Sorensen Construction’s]
arguments pursuant to R.C. 1311.02 do not relate to contract creation and are
unpersuasive here.
[Sorensen Construction] has failed to produce evidence that binds
[Hellas] to the purported oral contract made with Vlahos.
April 23, 2026 Judgment Entry at pp. 5-7.
{¶22} We agree with the trial court and find the evidence presented does not establish
the existence of a contract between Sorensen Construction and Hellas. Accordingly, we find
the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hellas on Sorensen
Construction’s breach of contract claim.
{¶23} Sorensen Construction’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶24} In its second assignment of error, Sorensen Construction maintains the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hellas on its unjust enrichment claim.
{¶25} The doctrine of unjust enrichment “applies when a benefit is conferred and it
would be inequitable to permit the benefitting party to retain the benefit without
compensating the conferring party.” KN Excavation, L.L.C. v. Rockmill Brewery, L.L.C., 2022-
Ohio-3414, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.), citing Garb-Ko, Inc. v. Benderson, 2013-Ohio-1249, ¶ 25 (10th
Dist.). The purpose of an unjust enrichment claim is not to compensate the plaintiff for loss
or damage suffered by the plaintiff, but to enable the plaintiff to recover the benefit he
conferred on the defendant when it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit.
Id., citing Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 2005-Ohio-4985, ¶ 20.
{¶26} The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) the plaintiff conferred a
benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant knew of the benefit; and (3) it would be unjust to
allow the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff. Id., citing Robinette
v. PNC Bank, 2016-Ohio-767, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). The damages for unjust enrichment are “the
amount the defendant benefited.” Id., citing Bollman v. Lavery Automotive Sales & Serv., LLC,
2019-Ohio-3879, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.). An unjust enrichment award is not intended to compensate
the plaintiff for any loss or damage suffered by it. Id. at ¶ 28, citing Certain Care, LLC v. Mikitka,
2020-Ohio-3544, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), citing Clifton v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-2702 (4th Dist.). Unjust
enrichment entitles a party only to restitution of the reasonable value of the benefit conferred.
(Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 27.
{¶27} In concluding Sorensen Construction was not entitled to summary judgment
on its unjust enrichment claim, the trial court found:
[Don] Sorensen testified in his deposition that “Vlahos paid for all
materials and all the labor.” * * * [Sorensen Construction] does not claim that
any balance remains outstanding regarding the costs of material and labor.
[Hellas] claims they not only paid the full amount but paid more than required
for the Project. [Sorensen Construction] did not maintain any bookkeeping for
the Project, and it is unclear how much it spent on materials or how much it
took in payments from Vlahos. Both parties agree that [Sorensen Construction]
received value of $364,000 for the Project, $292,000 directly and an additional
$72,000 paid directly to subcontractors and suppliers.
[Sorensen Construction] has not provided sufficient evidence to show
that [Hellas] has been unjustly enriched or what the actual loss, if any, is to
[Sorensen Construction]. Testimony by [Don] Sorensen suggests that all costs
for the project have been paid. Evidence of additional costs or even the total
cost of the project is lacking or inconclusive. [Hellas] has paid for benefits
conferred and the reasonable value of services that can be reasonably
ascertained by the evidence submitted. [Sorensen Construction’s] Motion for
Summary Judgment on this basis is denied. [Hellas’] Motion for Summary
Judgment on this basis is granted.
April 23, 2026 Judgment Entry at p 8.
{¶28} We agree with the trial court and find the evidence presented does not establish
Hellas was unjustly enriched as Sorensen Construction received $292,000 directly from
Vlahos and has not shown more monies were due and owing on the project. Accordingly, we
find the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hellas on Sorensen
Construction’s unjust enrichment claim.
{¶29} Sorensen Construction’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶30} In its third assignment of error, Sorensen Construct argues the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of Hellas on its slander of title quiet title claims.
Slander of Title
{¶31} “Slander of title is a tort action premised upon defamation of real property.”
Gasper v. Bank of America, N.A., 2019-Ohio-1150, ¶ 36 (9th Dist.). To prevail on a slander of
title claim, a plaintiff must prove “‘(1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement
disparaging claimant's title; (2) the statement was false; (3) the statement was made with
malice or made with reckless disregard of its falsity; and (4) the statement caused actual or
special damages.’” N. Royalton Ct. Condo. Owners' Ass'n v. Stadul, 2024-Ohio-1280, ¶ 27 (8th
Dist.), quoting Green v. Lemarr, 139 Ohio App.3d 414, 430 (2d Dist. 2000).
{¶32} “Generally, a claim for slander of title involves the wrongful recording of an
unfounded claim against the property of another.” Metzler v. Fifth Third Bank, 2017-Ohio-7088,
¶ 14 (10th Dist.). “Typically, slander of title cases involves documents such as liens or
mortgages ‘filed against a particular piece of property by parties who claim an interest in the
property.’” WWSD, LLC v. Woods, 2022-Ohio-952, ¶ 57 (10th Dist.), citing Green v. Lemarr,
139 Ohio App.3d at 431.
{¶33} “The wrongful filing for the record of a document which casts a cloud upon
another's title to or interest in realty is considered to be an act of publication which gives rise
to an action for slander of title.” (Citation omitted.) Gasper v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2019-Ohio-
1150 at ¶ 36. “The filing of mechanic's lien satisfies the publication element.” Prater v.
Dashkovsky, 2007-Ohio-6785, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing W. Prosser, The Law of Torts Section
122 (3rd Ed. 1964).
{¶34} The trial court found:
The element of publication is met through the “wrongful recording” of
an “unfounded claim.” (Citation omitted.) “The filing of a mechanic’s lien
satisfies the publication element.” (Citation omitted.) There is no argument that
[Don Sorensen and Sorensen Construction] filed a mechanic’s lien on the
Property. The question remains whether the recording of the lien [was] made
with malice or reckless disregard of its falsity. [Hellas] suggests that [Sorensen
Construction’s] filing of their mechanic’s lien was done without any accounting
in support. [Hellas] cites numerous portions of Sorensen’s Deposition where he
indicated a lack of knowledge regarding the total cost of the project. * * * (Mr.
Sorensen stating he did not know the total cost of the Project when he signed
the affidavit supporting the Lien) * * * (Mr. Sorensen was not even able to ball
part a total Project cost) * * * (Mr. Sorensen stating he spent two and a half
days with his wife “trying to figure this out” and was unsuccessful) * * * (Mr.
Sorensen stating he filed the Lien despite not have all costs in front of him) * *
* (“Q: Do you have anything reflecting the accounting you did to get to
[$32,250]?” “A: I don’t.”). [Hellas] contends the lien was filed with malice
because [Don Sorensen] was angry that Vlahos refused to pay him any more
money for the Project. [Sorensen Construction] simply argues that it would be
natural for someone to be angry, but that anger does not rise to the level of
malice. [Sorensen Construction] does not address the issue of recklessness.
[Don] Sorensen testified during his deposition on numerous occasions
that he could not ascertain the total cost of the Project when the lien was filed.
Even now, [Sorensen Construction] has not provided bona fide and evidence
backed way to show the total cost of the Project. And yet, [Sorensen
Construction] filed its lien against [Hellas] without [Hellas] being a party to the
oral contract and without any accounting on whether the Project had been paid
in full. [Sorensen Construction] filed the lien on the Property with reckless or
wanton disregard for its falsity. The remaining elements were not addressed by
[Sorensen Construction].
April 23, 2026 Judgment Entry at pp. 9-10.
{¶35} We agree with the trial court and find Sorensen Construction wrongfully
recorded an unfound claim, the mechanic’s lien, against the Property without a proper
accounting in support and with a disregard for the truth of the matter. Accordingly, we find
the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hellas on its slander of
title claim.
Quiet Title
{¶36} Quiet title actions are generally used to remove a cloud on one’s title to real
property and are considered equitable in nature. (Citations omitted.) Gasper v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 2019-Ohio-1150 at ¶ 31. “A cloud on the title to property is an outstanding claim or
encumbrance which, if valid, would affect or impair the title of the owner of a particular
estate, and on its face has that effect, but can be shown by extrinsic proof to be invalid or
inapplicable to the estate in question.” (Citation omitted.) Id. “Invalid mechanic's liens
recorded against another's property have been found to constitute clouds on title.” WWSD,
LLC v. Woods, 2022-Ohio-952 at ¶ 41.
{¶37} In its April 23, 2026 Judgment Entry, the trial court noted:
[Sorensen Construction] did not address these arguments * * *
The court has also previously determined that the mechanic’s lien filed
by [Sorensen Construction] is invalid. The invalid lien creates a cloud on
[Hellas’] title. [Hellas] is, therefore, entitled to have the cloud removed. The
Property is unique and [Hellas] has no adequate remedy at law by which to
remove the cloud and clear the title.
Id. at p. 11.
{¶38} We agree with the trial court. Because the invalid mechanic's lien created the
appearance of an encumbrance on the Property’s title where no encumbrance existed, we find
the trial court correctly found Hellas was entitled to a decree of quiet title.
{¶39} Sorensen Construction’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶40} In its final assignment of error, Sorensen Construction maintains the trial court
erred in awarding excessive damages to Hellas.
{¶41} A trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate amount of attorney's
fees to award in each case; therefore, a fee award is not generally overturned on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, paragraph one of
syllabus (1991). “Unless the amount of fees determined is so high or so low as to shock the
conscience, an appellate court will not interfere.” White v. Lima Auto Mall, Inc., 2009-Ohio-
411, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.) A trial court judge has “an infinitely better opportunity to determine the
value of services rendered by lawyers who have tried a case before him than does an appellate
court.” Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶42} The starting point for the determination of a reasonable amount of fees is the
number of hours spent by the attorney multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. Bittner at
145. “This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the
value of a lawyer's services.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d
40 (1983).
{¶43} The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. Sky v. Van Der Westhuizen,
2019-Ohio-1960, ¶ 73 (5th Dist.), citing City of Canton v. Irwin, 2012-Ohio-344 (5th Dist.). To
establish the number of hours reasonably expended, the party requesting the fees should
submit evidence to support the hours worked. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. A reasonable hourly
rate is “the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). Once the trial court calculates the “lodestar
figure,” it can modify the calculation by applying the factors listed in Rule 1.5 of the Ohio
Rules of Professional Conduct (formerly DR 2-106(B)). Van Der Westhuizen, citing Landmark
Disposal Ltd. v. Byler Flea Market, 2006-Ohio-3935 (5th Dist.).
{¶44} Rule 1.5 of the Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct lists the following factors to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services;
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
{¶45} “All factors may not be applicable in all cases and the trial court has the
discretion to determine which factors to apply, and in what manner that application will affect
the initial calculation.” City of Canton v. Irwin, 2012-Ohio-344, ¶ 15, citing Bittner v. Tri—
County Toyota, 58 Ohio St. 3d at 145-146.
{¶46} The trial court awarded damages to Hellas in the amount of $111,714.00. The
damages award included:
• $28,796.00 for work performed by John VanSickle, Trustee of the John Vlahos
Trust.
• $78,518.00 in attorney fees from January 27, 2025, until the completion of the
case.
• $4,400.00 in expert fees.
{¶47} The court noted “[t]he parties stipulated both the reasonableness of the rate
used and amount of time for the work performed.” June 24, 2026 Magistrate’s Decision, p.
4.
{¶48} Upon review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding Hellas damages in the amount of $111,714.00. Given the facts of this case, we
further find the award was not excessive.
{¶49} Sorensen Construction’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Delaware App. No. 26CAE070073
I
{¶50} In its sole assignment of error, Hellas asserts the trial court erred in failing to
grant an award of reasonable attorney fees associated with defending against Sorensen
Construction’s claims in the Prior Action
{¶51} As noted, supra, the decision regarding whether and how much to award for
attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Lake Breeze Condominium
Homeowners' Assn. v. Eastlake Ohio Developers, LLC, 2022-Ohio-3002, ¶ 54 (11th Dist.).
{¶52} Hellas submits the trial court should have awarded the attorney fees it incurred
in the prior, voluntarily dismissed action. We disagree. The trial court specifically found
Hellas did not file a counterclaim or other cognizable claim in the first action which would
entitle it to attorney fees incurred in that prior action. We find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to award fees incurred in the first action.
{¶53} Hellas’ sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶54} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶55} Costs assessed equally.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Baldwin, J. and
Popham, J. concur.