Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS META PLATFORMS, INC., a Delaware No. 25-1773 corporation; FKA Facebook, D.C. No. Inc. and INSTAGRAM, LLC, a Delaware 3:19-cv-07071-SI limited liability company, Northern District of California, San Francisco Plaintiffs - Appellees, ORDER AND AMENDED v. MEMORANDUM ONLINENIC, INC. and DOMAIN ID SHIELD SERVICE CO., LTD, Defendants, and LEASCEND TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., FKA: Xiamen 35.com Internet Technology Co., Ltd., Defendant - Appellant. Before: LEE, MENDOZA, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges. Petitioner’s petition for panel rehearing (Dkt. No. 54) is granted in part. The memorandum disposition filed on September 4, 2026 (Dkt No. 53) is amended by the Amended Memorandum Disposition filed concurrently with this order. The petition for panel rehearing is otherwise DENIED. The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc (Dkt. No. 54). The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 40. The petition rehearing en banc is DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc will be allowed. 2 25-1773 NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT META PLATFORMS, INC., a Delaware No. 25-1773 corporation; FKA Facebook, D.C. No. Inc.; INSTAGRAM, LLC, a Delaware 3:19-cv-07071-SI limited liability company, AMENDED MEMORANDUM* Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. LEASCEND TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., FKA: Xiamen 35.com Internet Technology Co., Ltd., Defendant - Appellant. and ONLINENIC, INC., DOMAIN ID SHIELD SERVICE CO., LTD, Defendants Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted August 13, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: LEE, MENDOZA JR., and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges Leascend Technology Co., Ltd. appeals the district court’s determination that it is the alter ego of OnlineNIC, Inc. and that the court thus has personal jurisdiction over it. Meta Platforms, Inc. sued OnlineNIC for cybersquatting and ultimately obtained a default judgment against it. Leascend also challenges the district court’s terminating sanctions, asset freeze order, and cost and fees award. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1. Alter ego finding. We review the district court’s determination that Leascend is the alter ego of OnlineNIC de novo to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. UA Loc. 343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Under California law, alter ego liability exists when organizations act as “a single business enterprise.” Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Prods., Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469, 479–80 (Ct. App. 2013). The analysis is based “on equitable principles” and results “vary according to the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 480 (quoting McLaughlin v. L. Bloom Sons Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (Ct. App. 1962)). ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 25-1773 Here, the district court did not err in determining that no genuine factual dispute exists that Leascend was the alter ego of OnlineNIC because the businesses (i) shared ownership and management structures, see Zoran Corp. v. Chen, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 606–07 (Ct. App. 2010), (ii) shared almost all of OnlineNIC’s employees, Toho-Towa Co., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480–81, (iii) comingled assets, id., and (iv) Leascend vigorously defended OnlineNIC’s misbehavior during discovery proceedings, aiding in the “concealment . . . of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest” of the business, Zoran Corp., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 607. Leascend offered only conclusory statements and did not point to any specific and material facts creating a triable dispute. 2. Jurisdiction over Leascend. Given our affirmance of the district court’s alter ego finding, we also find that the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Leascend. We review the district court’s personal jurisdiction determination de novo. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). If a company is subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over that company’s alter ego business. See Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a court “may attribute a parent company’s contacts with the forum state to its foreign subsidiary for the purpose of exercising general personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary . . . upon a showing that the subsidiary is an alter ego of its parent”). Here, exercise of specific 3 25-1773 personal jurisdiction over Leascend was proper as it purposefully directed its activities to the Northern District of California via its alter ego, OnlineNIC. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). While the district court determined that it possessed general personal jurisdiction over both Leascend and OnlineNIC, we need not address general personal jurisdiction because the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction was proper. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–24 (2011). 3. Terminating sanctions. The district court’s terminating sanctions and entry of default against Leascend were not contrary to due process. We review due process challenges to sanctions de novo. S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2003). The district court relied on factors outlined in Eitel v. McCool for reviewing default judgment, and the parties on appeal presumed that Eitel applies but disputed whether the factors were met.1 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering 1 To the extent that Leascend is challenging the terminating sanctions under Rule 37 that served as the basis for default judgment, we consider similar factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2007). The outcome would remain the same even under these factors. The district court appointed a Special Master to look into Leascend’s discovery. The Special Master found that Leascend and OnlineNIC “‘failed to preserve potentially relevant ESI for this matter pre-litigation, post complaint filing, during discovery, and even after the appointment of Special Master’ and that the defendants’ ‘behavior was intentional.’” There is clear evidence 4 25-1773 “the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff,” “the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim,” and “the sufficiency of the complaint”). The district court did not err, given its determination that Leascend and OnlineNIC failed to preserve, concealed, and actively spoliated evidence, which “significantly hampered” Meta’s “ability to prosecute this case on the merits.” 4. Freeze of assets and award of fees. We review the district court’s injunction order freezing Leascend’s assets and awarding fees for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1084–86 (9th Cir. 2009); Resurrection Bay Conservation All. v. City of Seward, 640 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). The district court considered bank statements, the pending sale of part of Leascend’s Chinese business, and evaluated Leascend and OnlineNIC’s history of obfuscation and failure to comply with court orders. The court found these factors weighed in favor of establishing an asset freeze and escrow order. Further, the fee award was proper as Meta’s expenses were largely attributable to Leascend and OnlineNIC’s litigation misbehavior. The facts here rise to the level of an “exceptional case[]” in which “reasonable attorney fees” can be awarded to the prevailing party under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). AFFIRMED. of “willfulness, bad faith, and fault,” so terminating sanctions were appropriate. Id. at 1096. 5 25-1773