Int'l Ass'n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transp. Workers - Local 16 v. Brawn Mechanical Corp.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-4867
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF No. 25-4867
SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL & D.C. No.
TRANSPORTATION WORKERS - 3:24-cv-01219-AN
LOCAL 16,
Plaintiff-ctr-defendant - MEMORANDUM*
Appellee,
v.
BRAWN MECHANICAL
CORPORATION,
Defendant-ctr-claimant -
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Adrienne C. Nelson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 28, 2026
Seattle, Washington
Before: M. SMITH and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and SYKES, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, United States District Judge
for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
Appellant Brawn Mechanical Corporation (Brawn) appeals a district court
order granting judgment on the pleadings to Appellee International Association of
Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers, Local 16 (Local 16), affirming
an arbitral award to Local 16, and further awarding Local 16 attorney fees, costs,
and interest pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
“A district court must grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when
there is no issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Unite Here Loc. 30 v. Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, 35
F.4th 695, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). We review orders granting judgment on the
pleadings de novo. Id.
1. Our “general rule” is that “[w]hen the collective bargaining agreement
contains a customary arbitration clause[,] acts of repudiation . . . must be submitted
to arbitration” when repudiation is at issue. Camping Constr. Co. v. Dist. Council
of Iron Workers, 915 F.2d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990) (hereinafter Camping)
(quoting Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 v. Interstate Distrib.
Co., 832 F.2d 507, 511 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (hereinafter Interstate Distributor)); see
also Int’l All. of Theatrical Stage Emp. (IATSE), It’s Trusted Loc. 720 L.V., Nev. v.
Insync Show Prods., Inc., 801 F.3d 1033, 1042–44 (9th Cir. 2015) (hereinafter
IATSE). “An agreement to arbitrate . . . ‘any differences that may arise regarding
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the meaning and enforcement of this Agreement,’ or any other broad arbitration
clause, such as ‘any dispute arising out of this Agreement,’ ordinarily requires us
to hold that the parties have provided for arbitration of disputes regarding”
repudiation. Camping, 915 F.2d at 1338–39. In short, “‘when [a] contract calls for
arbitral resolution of questions arising under the collective bargaining agreement,’
the equitable defense of repudiation is a matter to be decided in arbitration, not in
court.” Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Haw. Teamsters & Allied Workers Union,
Loc. 996, 302 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Bhd.
of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Loc. 70, 679 F.2d 1275, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982)).
The crux of Brawn’s argument is that because it attempted to repudiate the
CBA on March 27, 2023, and Local 16 did not grieve that repudiation attempt
within the timeframe contemplated by the CBA’s grievance procedure, Brawn
effectively extinguished the CBA and any rights Local 16 had to grieve Brawn’s
subsequent employment of nonunion employees. Because Brawn’s argument
hinges upon its assumption that Local 16 was required to grieve Brawn’s attempted
repudiation, the fundamental threshold question is whether Brawn effectively
repudiated the CBA. This implicates the rule articulated in Interstate Distributor
and Camping and reaffirmed in IATSE.
With language nearly identical to the broad language contemplated by
Camping, the CBA confers on the arbitral board the subject-matter jurisdiction to
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determine repudiation issues. Repudiation is an issue that Brawn itself argues
“plainly” falls within the “contractually agreed-upon” scope of the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction. Indeed, Brawn’s interpretation of the CBA and theory of its
termination depends on it.
Where, as here, the parties agree that an agreement existed to arbitrate
disputes over interpretation and enforcement, and their dispute concerns whether
the agreement has been repudiated, the district court’s task “is a fairly simple one.”
Camping, 915 F.2d at 1338. All it must do is examine whether the “arbitration
provision’s text is similar in scope to that of Interstate Distributor and Camping.”
IATSE, 801 F.3d at 1043. The district court correctly ended its inquiry upon
confirming repudiation was within the arbitral board’s subject-matter jurisdiction
without independently addressing Brawn’s argument that Local 16’s grievance was
untimely. “Once it is determined . . . that the parties are obligated to submit the
subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of
the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator.” John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964); see Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (finding applicability of “time limit
rule” was a procedural question for arbitrator).
2. The district court did not err by declining to address Brawn’s waived
affirmative defense that Local 16’s claim is time-barred because it did not file an
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unfair labor charge pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). A
“defendant’s failure to raise an affirmative defense in his answer effects a waiver
of that defense.” Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., 51 F.4th 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Adbox, Inc., 488 F.3d 836, 841
(9th Cir. 2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Brawn raised this affirmative
defense for the first time in its opposition to Local 16’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings and therefore waived it.
Moreover, we do not impute law governing statutory unfair labor charge
claims to CBA enforcement actions. See Beach Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc.
v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Loc. Union No. 102, 55 F.3d 474, 477 (9th Cir.
1995) (distinguishing employer’s “statutory right to walk away from the agreement
upon its expiration” pursuant to the NLRA from its contractual obligations
otherwise).
AFFIRMED.
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