Xtrasaver, Inc. v. Klipsch Group, Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket26-71
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
XTRASAVER, INC., a California No. 26-71
Corporation, D.C. No.
2:25-cv-07052-RGK-JPR
Plaintiff-counter-defendant -
Appellant,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
DOES, 1-20, inclusive,
Defendant - Appellee,
KLIPSCH GROUP, INC., an Indiana
Corporation,
Defendant-counter-claimant -
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, OWENS, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Xtrasaver, Inc., appeals from the district court’s order dismissing its breach-
of-contract action against Klipsch Group, Inc., based on an arbitration clause in the
contract. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).
Diaz v. Macys W. Stores, Inc., 101 F.4th 697, 702 (9th Cir. 2024). We review de
novo a district court’s decision about arbitrability. Herrera v. Cathay Pac. Airways
Ltd., 104 F.4th 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm.
1. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the court’s role is limited to analyzing
“whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists” and “whether the agreement
encompasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc.,
207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see 9 U.S.C. § 4. Xtrasaver does not question
that the agreement encompasses this dispute, so we focus on whether a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists. The district court correctly determined that it does.
State law governs whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate. Berman v.
Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2022). Because California
and New York apply “substantially similar rules for determining whether the
parties have mutually assented to a contract term,” it is unnecessary to conduct a
choice-of-law analysis. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74
(2d Cir. 2017)). An online interaction establishes mutual assent to form a contract
if “(1) the website provides reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to which
the consumer will be bound; and (2) the consumer takes some action, such as
clicking a button or checking a box, that unambiguously manifests his or her assent
to those terms.” Id. at 856. Determining whether a webpage provided reasonably
conspicuous notice requires examining “the visual design of the webpages and the
context of the transaction.” Godun v. JustAnswer LLC, 135 F.4th 699, 709 (9th Cir.
2025).
Klipsch’s dealer application provided reasonably conspicuous notice of the
contract terms by hyperlinking the “Customer Terms and Conditions” and making
the hyperlink “readily apparent” by using a large font, a contrasting color, and a
“Click Here” button. See Berman, 30 F.4th at 857. In addition, filling out a dealer
application should have put Xtrasaver on notice to look for contractual terms
because “the context of the transaction reasonably implies a contractual
relationship.” Godun, 135 F.4th at 709. Even if no one at Xtrasaver read the Terms
and Conditions, it is still bound by the resulting agreement. Norcia v. Samsung
Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017).
Steven Na, the sales manager of Xtrasaver, clicked the checkbox stating
“[b]y selecting this checkbox, Customer indicates that it agrees to be bound by
these Terms and Conditions,” and thus manifested his assent to the terms. See
Berman, 30 F.4th at 858. Xtrasaver forfeited any argument that Na lacked authority
to enter into the contract by failing to raise that argument before the district court.
Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2018). Xtrasaver also forfeited any
3 26-71
argument that it revoked assent to the arbitration clause when it attempted to
revoke acceptance of the goods. See id.
2. The arbitration clause is not a material alteration to the purchase orders
under U.C.C. § 2-207. That provision addresses situations in which (1) an
agreement is reached orally or informally and one or both of the parties later sends
formal memoranda adding terms not discussed, or (2) a wire or letter expressed
and intended as an acceptance of an agreement adds further minor suggestions or
proposals. U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 1. Neither of these scenarios is present here.
Instead, the terms of the Master Agreement—including the arbitration clause—
expressly applied to the subsequent purchase orders.
3. Because the arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, Xtrasaver
cannot challenge the agreement as unconscionable without specifically challenging
the delegation clause. See Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc., 87 F.4th 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.
2023). Xtrasaver did not do so before the district court and has not done so on
appeal.
AFFIRMED.
4 26-71