Full Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KELLI SALAZAR; WAYNE Nos. 24-6575 CARPENTER; RODNEY LOPEZ; 24-6914 GREGORY HANNA; BRIAN D.C. No. HUSTED; KATHLEEN 2:19-cv-05760- DARNELL; ANNETTE SMB HOWARD, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, OPINION Plaintiffs – Appellants / Cross – Appellees, v. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC; DRIVER PROVIDER MANAGEMENT, LLC; DRIVER PROVIDER LEASING, LLC; INNOVATIVE TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS OF SEDONA, LLC; INNOVATIVE TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS OF TUCSON, LLC; INNOVATIVE TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS, INC., of Arizona and Utah; INNOVATIVE 2 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS, LLC; JASON KAPLAN; KENDRA KAPLAN; BARRY GROSS, husband; DONNA GROSS, wife; STEPHEN KAPLAN; BARBARA KAPLAN, Defendants – Appellees / Cross – Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 19, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona Filed November 18, 2026 Before: Daniel P. Collins, Salvador Mendoza, Jr., and Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Desai; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Collins SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 3 SUMMARY* Labor Law The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of defendants in a collective and class action brought by employee-chauffeurs for The Driver Provider under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), and the Arizona Wage Act (AWA); remanded for further proceedings; and dismissed defendants’ cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs alleged that multiple business entities operating as The Driver Provider as well as individual owners and operators (collectively, “Driver Provider”) violated the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA by failing to adequately compensate them for hours spent performing required work before and after scheduled trips. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for Driver Provider on AWA overtime claims. The district court denied certification of an AWA straight time class. It granted judgment on the pleadings for Driver Provider on plaintiffs’ claims for civil penalties under the AMWA. The parties settled their remaining claims, including the named plaintiffs’ AWA straight time claims, but not the putative class members’ AWA straight time claims. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Driver Provider as to plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims, and held that the FLSA does not preempt AWA overtime claims. The panel held that Driver Provider * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. 4 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC permissibly raised a federal preemption defense for the first time in its motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defense constituted a failure to state a claim, which can be asserted at any time. The panel held that the AWA overtime claims were not obstacle preempted, which occurs when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress. The panel concluded that the AWA’s more generous remedies did not stand as an obstacle to the FLSA’s stated purpose of protecting employees. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification of AWA straight time claims based on a lack of commonality between class members. The panel held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the denial of class certification because the parties engaged in significant litigation prior to settlement, which tested the merits of the claims, and the district court approved the settlement agreement and terminated the case. The district court’s judgment approving the settlement agreement and dismissing the case with prejudice thus was a final judgment on the merits. The panel held that the commonality requirement for class certification was satisfied because all of the chauffeurs were paid under the same commission plan, and they all contended that this plan did not compensate them for pre- and post-trip duties. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Driver Provider as to plaintiffs’ AMWA civil penalties claim. The panel held that, under the plain language of the statute, the AMWA allows private parties to enforce its civil penalty provision. The panel dismissed Driver Provider’s cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it challenged only the district SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 5 court’s summary judgment as to settled FLSA claims, and therefore Driver Provider’s appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order was moot. Concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Judge Collins concurred in the majority’s judgment reversing the district court’s dismissal of the AWA overtime claims as preempted. Applying different reasoning, Judge Collins would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Driver Provider to raise the federal preemption defense absent prejudice to the opposing parties. As to the merits of the defense, Judge Collins wrote separately to underscore the narrowness of the issue before the panel, which was whether Driver Provider was correct in contending that the FLSA preempts any supplementation of remedies with respect to the sort of overtime claim asserted here. Although Judge Collins did not disagree with the majority’s ultimate determination that the cross-appeal is jurisdictionally improper, he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the issues concerning the scope of the FLSA’s overtime obligations are moot. He would rest the conclusion that the cross-appeal is jurisdictionally improper on the fact that defendants lacked standing to challenge a judgment that, in all relevant respects, was favorable to them. Judge Collins dissented from the remainder of the majority’s judgment. He wrote that the panel lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of class certification with respect to the AWA claims because the named plaintiffs’ settlement deprived them of standing, and intervenor- plaintiffs also lacked the ability to appeal this issue. He also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the district 6 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC court abused its discretion in denying class certification of the straight time AWA claims because, in his view, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality requirement. Judge Collins wrote that, based on his analysis of the AMWA’s remedies provision, he would affirm the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ claim for civil penalties under the AMWA. COUNSEL Michael M. Licata (argued), Susan J. Martin, Jennifer Kroll, and Daniel L. Bonnett, Martin & Bonnett PLLC, Phoenix, Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Tracy A. Miller (argued) and J. Alexander Dattilo, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees. OPINION DESAI, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs, employee-chauffeurs for The Driver Provider, brought a collective and class action suit against multiple business entities operating as “The Driver Provider” as well as individual owners and operators (collectively, “Driver Provider”). Plaintiffs allege that Driver Provider failed to adequately compensate them for hours spent performing required work before and after scheduled trips. They claim that Driver Provider’s failure to pay them for this work SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 7 violated the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”), and the Arizona Wage Act (“AWA”). The district court granted Driver Provider’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims and AMWA claims for civil penalties, and it denied Rule 23 class certification for plaintiffs’ AWA straight time claims. The parties settled their remaining claims. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s rulings on Driver Provider’s motions for judgment on the pleadings and the denial of class certification. We reverse and remand. We hold that: (1) the FLSA does not preempt AWA overtime claims; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification based on a lack of commonality between class members; and (3) the AMWA allows private parties to enforce its civil penalty provision. We dismiss Driver Provider’s cross appeal because we lack jurisdiction to hear issues arising from settled claims. Background Driver Provider is a car service that provides luxury transportation and maintains a fleet of over 140 vehicles, including buses, vans, sport utility vehicles, and sedans. It operates in Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming, running fixed routes, shuttle services, local charters, and point-to-point ground transportation for groups and individuals. Driver Provider hired chauffeurs and paid them according to a “commission plan.” Under the commission plan, chauffeurs were paid a percentage of the “base rate” charged to customers, which was generally determined by the type of vehicle driven, whether the customer was charged a flat or hourly rate, and the chauffeur’s status in the company—i.e., whether they were a Level 1, Level 2, or 8 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC Level 3 chauffeur. For example, a Sedan-Z1 was hired out at a base rate of $70.40 per ride. A Level 1 chauffeur (the highest paid driver) received a 34.00% commission to drive the Sedan-Z1, resulting in a commission rate of $23.94 per ride. If the customer paid for a flat-rate route (e.g., a trip from the airport to a destination within 15 miles), the driver received $23.94 for the drive. Chauffeurs did not receive additional gratuity; they were required to tell customers that the minimum gratuity was included in Driver Provider’s rate. Although all chauffeurs were paid according to the commission plan, some chauffeurs did not understand how they were compensated. For example, certain chauffeurs understood they were paid pursuant to the commission plan, while others believed they were paid on an hourly basis. Driver Provider also paid chauffeurs for “additional items.” One example was “Errand Pay,” which compensated chauffeurs for “a non-revenue assignment” or “training time” on an hourly basis at minimum wage. Several other tasks were not covered by the commission plan and had alternative payment schemes, including “Dry Runs,” “Meet & Greets,” “Trainer Pay,” and “Multi-day Charters.” Driver Provider required chauffeurs to perform additional work beyond transporting customers to and from their destinations. Chauffeurs were required to perform pre- trip and post-trip duties including arriving at the Driver Provider location an hour before the first ride of the day, checking out or signing in vehicles, performing pre-trip inspections, arriving at pick-up locations at least 15 minutes early, fueling vehicles, cleaning vehicles, and performing post-trip inspections. To record chauffeurs’ hours, Driver Provider relies on software that tracks the time spent SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 9 transporting customers but not time spent on pre- and post- trip work. In December 2019, plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging violations of the FLSA, AWA, and AMWA. Plaintiffs alleged that they were not compensated for pre- and post-trip work, were paid below minimum wage, and were not paid overtime when they worked more than 40 hours a week. The complaint set forth two classes. First, the FLSA class included chauffeurs who worked in Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming “during the three (3) years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit.” Second, the state-claim class included chauffeurs who worked in Arizona “any time within the maximum applicable statute of limitations.” After plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, the district court granted Driver Provider’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In October 2020, plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, and in January 2021, Driver Provider filed its answer, which asserted several affirmative defenses but did not raise federal preemption. In March 2021, the district court issued a scheduling order and set the deadline to amend the pleadings to May 24, 2021. Before the deadline, plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to amend their complaint, which the court granted. Driver Provider filed an answer that again raised numerous affirmative defenses but did not raise preemption. Although the parties moved to modify the scheduling order several times to extend certain deadlines, neither party moved to modify the deadline to amend the pleadings. On September 21, 2022—a year and four months after the deadline to amend the pleadings—Driver Provider filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims based on a preemption defense that Driver 10 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC Provider had not previously raised. Around the same time, plaintiffs filed a motion for Rule 23 class certification of their state-law claims. Plaintiffs objected to the newly asserted preemption defense on waiver grounds, but the district court held that plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the untimely assertion of the defense. The district court granted Driver Provider’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the AWA overtime claims were preempted by the FLSA. To remedy any prejudice, the district court allowed plaintiffs to file a fifth amended complaint and, there, plaintiffs added their AWA straight time claims. In January 2023, the district court certified a Rule 23 class for plaintiffs’ AMWA claims for unpaid minimum wage and record-keeping violations. Driver Provider filed its second motion for judgment on the pleadings three months later, asserting that plaintiffs could not seek civil penalties under the AMWA, and the district court granted the motion. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on their FLSA and AMWA claims. The district court held that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to plaintiffs’ straight time claims under the AWA. The district court then certified the FLSA class. Plaintiffs moved for Rule 23 class certification of their AWA straight time claims, and the district court denied certification, finding that plaintiffs did not show “commonality” under Rule 23 because class members had different reasonable expectations about their entitlement to pay for pre- and post- trip work. The court set a trial for April 2024 to determine the scope of damages for the FLSA class members and the Rule 23 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 11 AMWA class, the scope of the individual defendants’ liability, and the named plaintiffs’ AWA straight time claims. Before trial, the parties reached a partial settlement resolving: (1) the FLSA claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wages; (2) the named plaintiffs’ AWA straight time claims; and (3) the Rule 23 class action claims for AMWA minimum wage violations. The settlement did not resolve or release the named plaintiffs’ and Rule 23 class members’ AMWA claims for civil penalties, the named plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ AWA overtime claims, or the putative class members’ AWA straight time claims. Before the district court approved the settlement agreement, plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to intervene and amend their complaint to add three additional named plaintiffs (“intervenors”). Because the intervenors did not settle their AWA straight time claims, the parties expressly included a term in the settlement agreement that confirmed the intervenors have standing to appeal the denial of class certification as putative class members of the AWA straight time claims. The district court granted plaintiffs’ unopposed motion, and plaintiffs filed their sixth amended complaint adding the intervenors as named plaintiffs. The district court subsequently granted final settlement approval and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed (1) the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims on preemption grounds; (2) the district court’s denial of class certification for the AWA straight time claims; and (3) the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for civil penalties for record keeping violations under the AMWA. Driver Provider cross-appealed the district court’s order granting plaintiffs summary judgment on the settled FLSA claims. 12 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC Standard of Review We review de novo orders granting judgment on the pleadings. Parker v. County of Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2023). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s “decisions regarding the preclusive effect of [its] pretrial order[s]” and its rulings on waiver. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992); cf. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998). We also review for an abuse of discretion the denial of class certification. Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2023). “Underlying determinations of law are reviewed de novo, and . . . determinations of fact are reviewed for clear error.” Id. (citation modified). The district court abuses its discretion when it “applie[s] an incorrect legal rule or if its application of the correct legal rule [is] based on a factual finding that [is] illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Id. (citation modified). Analysis I. Driver Provider is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on its Arizona Wage Act overtime claims. The parties first dispute whether Driver Provider permissibly raised a preemption defense when it did so for the first time in its motion for judgment on the pleadings and, if so, whether the FLSA preempts the plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims. We hold that Driver Provider may move for judgment on the pleadings on preemption grounds, but it is unable to succeed on the merits; that is, the FLSA does not preempt AWA overtime claims. SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 13 A. Driver Provider permissibly raised a federal preemption defense in its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Before reaching the merits of the preemption issue, we address a threshold question: whether Driver Provider properly raised a preemption defense for the first time in its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs argue that Driver Provider waived its preemption defense in this case by failing to expressly plead it in its answer or otherwise assert it before filing its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Central to plaintiffs’ argument is their assertion that preemption is an affirmative defense, and defendants must plead and prove affirmative defenses. See Cohen v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 16 F.4th 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2021); Durnford v. MusclePharm Corp., 907 F.3d 595, 603 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) (“FDCA preemption, like all federal preemption, is an affirmative defense.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In plaintiffs’ view, because Driver Provider did not identify preemption as a defense in its answer, it must first amend its answer to assert the defense. And given that the deadline to amend pleadings had passed, plaintiffs argue that Driver Provider was required to modify the scheduling order before moving to amend its answer. For its part, Driver Provider relies on our decision in Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001), for the broad proposition that a defendant may “raise an affirmative defense for the first time in a motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . if the delay does not prejudice the plaintiff.” We agree that a party may raise a preemption defense for the first time in a motion for 14 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC judgment on the pleadings but not for the reason urged by Driver Provider. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants risk waiving defenses that they do not plead either in their answer or a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Rule 12 identifies specific defenses that are waived if a party fails to raise in its first motion under Rule 12 or fails to include in a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (including defenses such as lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process). But there are some defenses that cannot be waived at the pleading stage. Relevant here, a defendant may raise failure to state a claim at any point up to and including trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). And Rule 12(h)(2) specifically states that a party may raise failure to state a claim in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B). Thus, the question we must consider is whether Driver Provider’s preemption defense constitutes a failure to state a claim, which can be asserted at any time. We conclude that in this case, the answer is yes. Plaintiffs cite several cases that generally state “federal preemption[] is an affirmative defense” that a defendant is required to plead and prove. See, e.g., Durnford, 907 F.3d at 603 n.8. While that is ordinarily true, our case law also acknowledges that a complaint may, on its face, present a preempted claim. See id. (“Only when the plaintiff pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable defense—may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”). In other words, if the complaint itself establishes a federal preemption defense, the defendant need not specifically SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 15 plead preemption in its answer. See Lusnak v. Bank of Am., N.A., 883 F.3d 1185, 1194 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018). Indeed, “affirmative defenses such as preemption may . . . be raised on a motion to dismiss . . . when the defense raises no disputed issues of fact.” See id. Here, Driver Provider’s preemption defense raises a purely legal issue based only on the allegations in the complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that Driver Provider failed to accurately track the time plaintiffs worked, resulting in a failure to pay overtime under the FLSA and the AWA. These allegations form the basis of Driver Provider’s preemption claim, and Driver Provider did not rely on any facts outside the complaint in its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the motion for judgment on the pleadings relied only on the face of the complaint, it is properly construed as raising a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(h)(2).1 As a result, pursuant to Rule 12(h)(2), Driver Provider may raise that argument at any time, including in a motion for judgment on the pleadings.2 1 Our conclusion in this case does not give parties broad license to assert otherwise unpled affirmative defenses in motions for judgment on the pleadings. Indeed, even many other preemption claims would not fall under Rule 12(h)(2) because they do not appear on the face of the complaint and require additional discovery. See Scheibe v. ProSupps USA, LLC, 141 F.4th 1094, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2025) (reversing grant of motion to dismiss on preemption grounds because plaintiff did not “plead facts that allow a court reasonably to infer . . . preemption”). 2 Because we find support for Driver Provider’s preemption defense in Rule 12(h)(2), we need not rely on Owens to conclude the defense was not waived. 244 F.3d at 711–12. This case is unlike Owens because there the defendants moved to amend their answer and add their unpled defense before the deadline to amend pleadings had passed. Id. Thus, if Driver Provider was required to amend its answer to add a new defense, 16 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC B. The FLSA does not preempt Arizona Wage Act overtime claims. Because we find that Driver Provider’s preemption defense was not waived, we turn to the merits of the claim. The district court held that the FLSA preempts claims for overtime under the AWA. We disagree. Driver Provider argues that claims for timely overtime pay under the AWA are preempted by the FLSA—under a theory of obstacle preemption—because the AWA provides greater remedies than the FLSA and may be brought under Rule 23’s more generous opt-out class procedures. The AWA requires that an employer timely pays its employees “all wages due.” A.R.S. § 23-351(C). But the AWA does not regulate what wages are due to an employee; instead, it “borrows” its substantive standard from the FLSA, which requires that employers pay overtime for all hours worked in excess of a 40-hour work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). In other words, the FLSA dictates what an employer owes its employee, and the AWA dictates when those wages must be paid. Id.; A.R.S. § 23-351(C). Claims under the FLSA and claims under AWA differ in three primary ways. First, a plaintiff who prevails on a FLSA Owens would not excuse Driver Provider’s failure to file a motion to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607–08. We decline to read Owens as creating a sweeping exception allowing a defendant to raise any defense in a motion for judgment on the pleadings as long as the plaintiff is not prejudiced. Such an exception is untethered from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 12, 15, 16. And extending Owens to cover untimely, unpled defenses that fall outside the scope of Rule 12(h)(2) would create an exception that swallows the rules. In any event, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on this issue. See Younge v. Fulton Jud. Cir. Dist. Att’ys Off., Ga., 146 S. Ct. 1861 (2026). SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 17 claim may recover double the unpaid wages and attorney’s fees, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), while the AWA provides for treble damages, A.R.S. § 23-355(A). Second, the FLSA requires parties to “opt-in” to a class-wide claim, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), preventing the use of a Rule 23 “opt-out” class action. The AWA, on the other hand, contains no similar restriction on class-wide claims. And third, under the FLSA, an employee’s right to bring an action “terminate[s] upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor” to “restrain[] any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum wages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The AWA does not contain an analogous limitation. Driver Provider alleges that plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims fail based on obstacle preemption because the “FLSA is the exclusive source of remedies to enforce rights it creates.” Obstacle preemption occurs when “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.” Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997). In Driver Provider’s view, by bringing an AWA claim that borrows the FLSA standard, plaintiffs “are trying to circumvent” the FLSA’s more limited remedies and procedures “while asserting what is purely an FLSA claim in substance.” But Driver Provider fails to point to any “special features warranting preemption” or explain why the AWA’s remedial scheme acts as a barrier to the “purposes and objectives” of the FLSA. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87 (1990) (citation modified); Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1149. The Supreme Court has made clear that “even a considerably detailed . . . federal regulatory or enforcement scheme . . . does not by itself imply preemption of state remedies.” See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990) (citation modified). Instead, the question is 18 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC whether the scheme contains “special features warranting preemption.” See id. (citation modified). Specifically, a federal scheme may preempt state remedies when the scheme is “comprehensive” and its balancing of competing interests “would be completely undermined if” plaintiffs “were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). The FLSA does not contain these special features warranting preemption. To start, nothing in the FLSA suggests that it creates an exclusive set of remedies for wage and hour law violations. To the contrary, it allows states to create more generous minimum wage, overtime, and maximum work week provisions, essentially setting “a floor rather than a ceiling on protective legislation.” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 623 F.3d 743, 759 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated on other grounds by Chinese Daily News, Inc. v. Wang, 565 U.S. 801 (2011).3 Because the FLSA expressly permits states to adopt more protective standards for employees and enforce those standards through state causes of action, it would be illogical to conclude the FLSA impliedly forbids states from adopting identical standards and enforcing those standards through state causes of action. Nor does it follow that additional state remedies “completely undermine[]” the entire FLSA scheme. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54. If Congress intended to limit states from 3 We recognize that savings clauses should not be given broad effect “where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (citation modified). Even if an act contains a savings clause, we apply ordinary preemption principles. Here, the savings clause provides evidence that Congress did not intend the FLSA to provide an exclusive remedy. See Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1151. SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 19 providing different remedies to employees for failure to pay overtime or timely pay overtime, it could have done so. Moreover, the FLSA’s purpose is advanced—not thwarted—by the AWA’s remedial scheme. The “principal purpose of the FLSA is to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1150 (citing Adair v. City of Kirkland, 185 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999)) (citation modified). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “distinguished the FLSA from other federal statutes designed to strike a balance between employees and employers,” id., recognizing that unlike acts “designed to minimize industrial strife,” such as the Labor Management Relations Act, “the FLSA was designed to give specific minimum protections to individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the Act would receive a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (citation modified). Given the FLSA’s stated purpose of protecting employees, we conclude that the AWA’s more generous remedies do not stand as an obstacle to that purpose. To be sure, we previously reached the same result in Wang. 923 F.3d at 760. There, we concluded that independent state-law claims that parallel FLSA claims are not preempted by the FLSA. Id. at 759 (holding that a California Unfair Business Practices claim premised on FLSA overtime violations was not preempted). The plaintiff’s state-law claims in Wang “borrowed FLSA as the substantive violation,” much like the plaintiffs’ claims here “borrow” from the FLSA when determining the wages due to an employee. See A.R.S. § 23-351(C). And we rejected the very argument that Driver Provider raises here: that the FLSA provides exclusive remedies for its violation. Wang, 20 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 623 F.3d at 760. Wang was vacated by the Supreme Court on other grounds, but we find its reasoning persuasive and reiterate its holding here. There is no binding case law to the contrary. Driver Provider points to a sentence in Williamson for the proposition that the FLSA creates exclusive remedies that preempt state-law claims. 208 F.3d at 1154. In that case, we held that the FLSA did not preempt state fraud claims premised on violations of the FLSA. Id. After conducting a thorough preemption analysis, the panel concluded that the “fraud claims do not conflict with [the] purpose of the FLSA of protecting employees,” “[n]or do they upset . . . any balance created by amendments to the statute.” Id. In passing, the panel noted that “claims that are directly covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and retaliation disputes) must be brought under the FLSA.” Id. But this language is not binding. First, it was made in passing and without reasoning. See Wang, 623 F.3d at 759; United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (dicta is only binding if “a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case” and “resolves it after reasoned consideration”). And second, the remainder of Williamson’s reasoning is inconsistent with this sentence. In Williamson, we rejected as “incorrect” the district court’s assumption that “FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims duplicated by or equivalent of rights covered by the FLSA.”4 208 F.3d at 1152. 4 In context, this sentence appears to summarize why Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, Virginia, was inapplicable. 174 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999). In Kendall, the Fourth Circuit rejected a § 1983 claim in which plaintiffs attempted to enforce their FLSA rights. Id. at 443. We explained that Kendall did not apply in the preemption context because “Kendall is not SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 21 In sum, we find no support in the text or purpose of the FLSA for the proposition that employees cannot seek state- law remedies for state-law violations that borrow a substantive standard from the FLSA. Because such an arrangement does not violate the “clear and manifest” intent of Congress, see English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citation modified), we hold that the FLSA does not preempt plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims.5 II. The district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Next, we turn to the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The parties agree that we have jurisdiction. We nonetheless establish our jurisdiction over the claim when we have an independent obligation to do so. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, Bureau of Land Mgmt., 273 F.3d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001). A. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have appellate jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A decision is final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing a case about federal preemption of state law; rather, it is about whether another federal statute (Section 1983) can support a claim that clearly falls under the FLSA.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1153. 5 Driver Provider also argues that the AWA overtime claims fail as a matter of law because overtime pay does not satisfy the definition of “wages” under the Act. The district court expressly held that Driver Provider waived this argument by failing to raise it until its reply. We thus decline to consider this assertion. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 843 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Generally, we do not entertain arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the district court.” (citation modified)). 22 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) (citation omitted). A district court’s final judgment terminating an action after the parties enter a settlement agreement may constitute a final judgment on the merits in the class action context. See Brown v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 876 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that a settlement agreement and stipulated dismissal established § 1291 jurisdiction over a denial of class certification); Narouz v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding there was § 1291 jurisdiction where the district court terminated the case after the class representative settled his claims). To be sure, whether a district court’s judgment terminating a case post settlement is a final judgment on the merits turns on the facts of the underlying class action. Only when the parties have tested the merits of the claims through litigation and subsequently settled the claims in a calculated response to that litigation will the district court’s judgment terminating the case be a final judgment on the merits. See Brown, 876 F.3d at 1201 (individual plaintiffs settled after a claim was dismissed, class certification was denied, and the court tentatively partially granted summary judgment for defendants); Narouz, 591 F.3d at 1263 (class representative settled after “extensive discovery,” mediation, a denial of class certification for settlement purposes, and a denial of a class settlement). Further, a district court’s approval of a settlement agreement reinforces our conclusion that its subsequent judgment terminating the case is a final judgment on the merits. When a settlement agreement binds class members, such as here, the district court must conduct a fairness hearing to ensure the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” for all parties before approving the agreement. See SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Inherent in a district court’s Rule 23 fairness determination is its consideration of the merits of the case. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[a] number of factors guide the district court in making [a Rule 23 fairness] determination, including . . . the strength of the plaintiffs’ case”). Thus, by approving a class settlement agreement, a district court confirms that the merits of the underlying claims have been tested through the litigation. And a subsequent judgment terminating the case is a final judgment on the merits. Here, the parties litigated this case for over four years, resulting in extensive discovery and multiple dispositive rulings, including two separate grants of motion for judgment on the pleadings, a partial grant of class certification, and a partial grant of cross motions for summary judgment. The AWA straight time claims underlying the denial of class certification were litigated at summary judgment, and the district court determined there was a disputed issue of material fact. Settlement negotiations began in September 2021, but the parties resumed litigation to continue testing the merits of the claims, and trial was rescheduled for April 2024. The parties ultimately reached settlement before trial, and the district court approved the s