Salazar v. Driver Provider Phoenix, LLC
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket24-6914
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KELLI SALAZAR; WAYNE Nos. 24-6575
CARPENTER; RODNEY LOPEZ; 24-6914
GREGORY HANNA; BRIAN
D.C. No.
HUSTED; KATHLEEN
2:19-cv-05760-
DARNELL; ANNETTE
SMB
HOWARD, individually and on
behalf of other similarly situated
individuals,
OPINION
Plaintiffs – Appellants /
Cross – Appellees,
v.
DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX,
LLC; DRIVER PROVIDER
MANAGEMENT, LLC; DRIVER
PROVIDER LEASING, LLC;
INNOVATIVE
TRANSPORTATION
SOLUTIONS OF SEDONA, LLC;
INNOVATIVE
TRANSPORTATION
SOLUTIONS OF TUCSON, LLC;
INNOVATIVE
TRANSPORTATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., of Arizona
and Utah; INNOVATIVE
2 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
TRANSPORTATION
SOLUTIONS, LLC; JASON
KAPLAN; KENDRA KAPLAN;
BARRY GROSS, husband;
DONNA GROSS, wife; STEPHEN
KAPLAN; BARBARA KAPLAN,
Defendants – Appellees /
Cross – Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 19, 2025
Phoenix, Arizona
Filed November 18, 2026
Before: Daniel P. Collins, Salvador Mendoza, Jr., and
Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Desai;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Collins
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 3
SUMMARY*
Labor Law
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor
of defendants in a collective and class action brought by
employee-chauffeurs for The Driver Provider under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Arizona Minimum Wage
Act (AMWA), and the Arizona Wage Act (AWA);
remanded for further proceedings; and dismissed
defendants’ cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs alleged that multiple business entities
operating as The Driver Provider as well as individual
owners and operators (collectively, “Driver Provider”)
violated the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA by failing to
adequately compensate them for hours spent performing
required work before and after scheduled trips. The district
court granted judgment on the pleadings for Driver Provider
on AWA overtime claims. The district court denied
certification of an AWA straight time class. It granted
judgment on the pleadings for Driver Provider on plaintiffs’
claims for civil penalties under the AMWA. The parties
settled their remaining claims, including the named
plaintiffs’ AWA straight time claims, but not the putative
class members’ AWA straight time claims.
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on the
pleadings in favor of Driver Provider as to plaintiffs’ AWA
overtime claims, and held that the FLSA does not preempt
AWA overtime claims. The panel held that Driver Provider
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
permissibly raised a federal preemption defense for the first
time in its motion for judgment on the pleadings because the
defense constituted a failure to state a claim, which can be
asserted at any time. The panel held that the AWA overtime
claims were not obstacle preempted, which occurs when
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purpose and objectives of
Congress. The panel concluded that the AWA’s more
generous remedies did not stand as an obstacle to the FLSA’s
stated purpose of protecting employees.
The panel held that the district court abused its discretion
by denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification of AWA
straight time claims based on a lack of commonality between
class members. The panel held that it had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the denial of class certification
because the parties engaged in significant litigation prior to
settlement, which tested the merits of the claims, and the
district court approved the settlement agreement and
terminated the case. The district court’s judgment approving
the settlement agreement and dismissing the case with
prejudice thus was a final judgment on the merits. The panel
held that the commonality requirement for class certification
was satisfied because all of the chauffeurs were paid under
the same commission plan, and they all contended that this
plan did not compensate them for pre- and post-trip duties.
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on the
pleadings in favor of Driver Provider as to plaintiffs’
AMWA civil penalties claim. The panel held that, under the
plain language of the statute, the AMWA allows private
parties to enforce its civil penalty provision.
The panel dismissed Driver Provider’s cross-appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because it challenged only the district
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 5
court’s summary judgment as to settled FLSA claims, and
therefore Driver Provider’s appeal of the district court’s
summary judgment order was moot.
Concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part,
Judge Collins concurred in the majority’s judgment
reversing the district court’s dismissal of the AWA overtime
claims as preempted. Applying different reasoning, Judge
Collins would hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Driver Provider to raise the federal
preemption defense absent prejudice to the opposing
parties. As to the merits of the defense, Judge Collins wrote
separately to underscore the narrowness of the issue before
the panel, which was whether Driver Provider was correct in
contending that the FLSA preempts any supplementation of
remedies with respect to the sort of overtime claim asserted
here.
Although Judge Collins did not disagree with the
majority’s ultimate determination that the cross-appeal is
jurisdictionally improper, he disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that the issues concerning the scope of the
FLSA’s overtime obligations are moot. He would rest the
conclusion that the cross-appeal is jurisdictionally improper
on the fact that defendants lacked standing to challenge a
judgment that, in all relevant respects, was favorable to
them.
Judge Collins dissented from the remainder of the
majority’s judgment. He wrote that the panel lacked
jurisdiction to review the denial of class certification with
respect to the AWA claims because the named plaintiffs’
settlement deprived them of standing, and intervenor-
plaintiffs also lacked the ability to appeal this issue. He also
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the district
6 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
court abused its discretion in denying class certification of
the straight time AWA claims because, in his view, plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the commonality requirement. Judge
Collins wrote that, based on his analysis of the AMWA’s
remedies provision, he would affirm the district court’s grant
of judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ claim for civil
penalties under the AMWA.
COUNSEL
Michael M. Licata (argued), Susan J. Martin, Jennifer Kroll,
and Daniel L. Bonnett, Martin & Bonnett PLLC, Phoenix,
Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Tracy A. Miller (argued) and J. Alexander Dattilo, Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Phoenix, Arizona, for
Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION
DESAI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs, employee-chauffeurs for The Driver Provider,
brought a collective and class action suit against multiple
business entities operating as “The Driver Provider” as well
as individual owners and operators (collectively, “Driver
Provider”). Plaintiffs allege that Driver Provider failed to
adequately compensate them for hours spent performing
required work before and after scheduled trips. They claim
that Driver Provider’s failure to pay them for this work
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 7
violated the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Arizona
Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”), and the Arizona Wage
Act (“AWA”). The district court granted Driver Provider’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiffs’ AWA
overtime claims and AMWA claims for civil penalties, and
it denied Rule 23 class certification for plaintiffs’ AWA
straight time claims. The parties settled their remaining
claims. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s
rulings on Driver Provider’s motions for judgment on the
pleadings and the denial of class certification.
We reverse and remand. We hold that: (1) the FLSA
does not preempt AWA overtime claims; (2) the district
court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification based on a lack of commonality between
class members; and (3) the AMWA allows private parties to
enforce its civil penalty provision. We dismiss Driver
Provider’s cross appeal because we lack jurisdiction to hear
issues arising from settled claims.
Background
Driver Provider is a car service that provides luxury
transportation and maintains a fleet of over 140 vehicles,
including buses, vans, sport utility vehicles, and sedans. It
operates in Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming, running fixed
routes, shuttle services, local charters, and point-to-point
ground transportation for groups and individuals.
Driver Provider hired chauffeurs and paid them
according to a “commission plan.” Under the commission
plan, chauffeurs were paid a percentage of the “base rate”
charged to customers, which was generally determined by
the type of vehicle driven, whether the customer was charged
a flat or hourly rate, and the chauffeur’s status in the
company—i.e., whether they were a Level 1, Level 2, or
8 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
Level 3 chauffeur. For example, a Sedan-Z1 was hired out at
a base rate of $70.40 per ride. A Level 1 chauffeur (the
highest paid driver) received a 34.00% commission to drive
the Sedan-Z1, resulting in a commission rate of $23.94 per
ride. If the customer paid for a flat-rate route (e.g., a trip from
the airport to a destination within 15 miles), the driver
received $23.94 for the drive. Chauffeurs did not receive
additional gratuity; they were required to tell customers that
the minimum gratuity was included in Driver Provider’s
rate.
Although all chauffeurs were paid according to the
commission plan, some chauffeurs did not understand how
they were compensated. For example, certain chauffeurs
understood they were paid pursuant to the commission plan,
while others believed they were paid on an hourly basis.
Driver Provider also paid chauffeurs for “additional
items.” One example was “Errand Pay,” which compensated
chauffeurs for “a non-revenue assignment” or “training
time” on an hourly basis at minimum wage. Several other
tasks were not covered by the commission plan and had
alternative payment schemes, including “Dry Runs,” “Meet
& Greets,” “Trainer Pay,” and “Multi-day Charters.”
Driver Provider required chauffeurs to perform
additional work beyond transporting customers to and from
their destinations. Chauffeurs were required to perform pre-
trip and post-trip duties including arriving at the Driver
Provider location an hour before the first ride of the day,
checking out or signing in vehicles, performing pre-trip
inspections, arriving at pick-up locations at least 15 minutes
early, fueling vehicles, cleaning vehicles, and performing
post-trip inspections. To record chauffeurs’ hours, Driver
Provider relies on software that tracks the time spent
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 9
transporting customers but not time spent on pre- and post-
trip work.
In December 2019, plaintiffs filed a class action
complaint alleging violations of the FLSA, AWA, and
AMWA. Plaintiffs alleged that they were not compensated
for pre- and post-trip work, were paid below minimum wage,
and were not paid overtime when they worked more than 40
hours a week. The complaint set forth two classes. First, the
FLSA class included chauffeurs who worked in Arizona,
Utah, and Wyoming “during the three (3) years prior to the
commencement of this lawsuit.” Second, the state-claim
class included chauffeurs who worked in Arizona “any time
within the maximum applicable statute of limitations.”
After plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, the
district court granted Driver Provider’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. In October 2020, plaintiffs filed their
third amended complaint, and in January 2021, Driver
Provider filed its answer, which asserted several affirmative
defenses but did not raise federal preemption.
In March 2021, the district court issued a scheduling
order and set the deadline to amend the pleadings to May 24,
2021. Before the deadline, plaintiffs filed an unopposed
motion to amend their complaint, which the court granted.
Driver Provider filed an answer that again raised numerous
affirmative defenses but did not raise preemption.
Although the parties moved to modify the scheduling
order several times to extend certain deadlines, neither party
moved to modify the deadline to amend the pleadings. On
September 21, 2022—a year and four months after the
deadline to amend the pleadings—Driver Provider filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ AWA
overtime claims based on a preemption defense that Driver
10 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
Provider had not previously raised. Around the same time,
plaintiffs filed a motion for Rule 23 class certification of
their state-law claims.
Plaintiffs objected to the newly asserted preemption
defense on waiver grounds, but the district court held that
plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the untimely assertion of
the defense. The district court granted Driver Provider’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the
AWA overtime claims were preempted by the FLSA. To
remedy any prejudice, the district court allowed plaintiffs to
file a fifth amended complaint and, there, plaintiffs added
their AWA straight time claims.
In January 2023, the district court certified a Rule 23
class for plaintiffs’ AMWA claims for unpaid minimum
wage and record-keeping violations. Driver Provider filed its
second motion for judgment on the pleadings three months
later, asserting that plaintiffs could not seek civil penalties
under the AMWA, and the district court granted the motion.
After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on
their FLSA and AMWA claims. The district court held that
there were genuine disputes of material fact as to plaintiffs’
straight time claims under the AWA.
The district court then certified the FLSA class. Plaintiffs
moved for Rule 23 class certification of their AWA straight
time claims, and the district court denied certification,
finding that plaintiffs did not show “commonality” under
Rule 23 because class members had different reasonable
expectations about their entitlement to pay for pre- and post-
trip work.
The court set a trial for April 2024 to determine the scope
of damages for the FLSA class members and the Rule 23
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 11
AMWA class, the scope of the individual defendants’
liability, and the named plaintiffs’ AWA straight time
claims. Before trial, the parties reached a partial settlement
resolving: (1) the FLSA claims for unpaid overtime and
minimum wages; (2) the named plaintiffs’ AWA straight
time claims; and (3) the Rule 23 class action claims for
AMWA minimum wage violations. The settlement did not
resolve or release the named plaintiffs’ and Rule 23 class
members’ AMWA claims for civil penalties, the named
plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ AWA overtime
claims, or the putative class members’ AWA straight time
claims.
Before the district court approved the settlement
agreement, plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to intervene
and amend their complaint to add three additional named
plaintiffs (“intervenors”). Because the intervenors did not
settle their AWA straight time claims, the parties expressly
included a term in the settlement agreement that confirmed
the intervenors have standing to appeal the denial of class
certification as putative class members of the AWA straight
time claims. The district court granted plaintiffs’ unopposed
motion, and plaintiffs filed their sixth amended complaint
adding the intervenors as named plaintiffs. The district court
subsequently granted final settlement approval and
dismissed the case with prejudice.
Plaintiffs timely appealed (1) the district court’s order
dismissing plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims on preemption
grounds; (2) the district court’s denial of class certification
for the AWA straight time claims; and (3) the district court’s
order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for civil penalties for
record keeping violations under the AMWA. Driver
Provider cross-appealed the district court’s order granting
plaintiffs summary judgment on the settled FLSA claims.
12 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
Standard of Review
We review de novo orders granting judgment on the
pleadings. Parker v. County of Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109,
1112 (9th Cir. 2023). We review for an abuse of discretion
the district court’s “decisions regarding the preclusive effect
of [its] pretrial order[s]” and its rulings on waiver. See
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607
(9th Cir. 1992); cf. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television
Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998).
We also review for an abuse of discretion the denial of
class certification. Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2023). “Underlying determinations of law are reviewed
de novo, and . . . determinations of fact are reviewed for clear
error.” Id. (citation modified). The district court abuses its
discretion when it “applie[s] an incorrect legal rule or if its
application of the correct legal rule [is] based on a factual
finding that [is] illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”
Id. (citation modified).
Analysis
I. Driver Provider is not entitled to judgment on the
pleadings on its Arizona Wage Act overtime claims.
The parties first dispute whether Driver Provider
permissibly raised a preemption defense when it did so for
the first time in its motion for judgment on the pleadings and,
if so, whether the FLSA preempts the plaintiffs’ AWA
overtime claims. We hold that Driver Provider may move for
judgment on the pleadings on preemption grounds, but it is
unable to succeed on the merits; that is, the FLSA does not
preempt AWA overtime claims.
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 13
A. Driver Provider permissibly raised a federal
preemption defense in its motion for judgment on
the pleadings.
Before reaching the merits of the preemption issue, we
address a threshold question: whether Driver Provider
properly raised a preemption defense for the first time in its
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiffs argue that Driver Provider waived its
preemption defense in this case by failing to expressly plead
it in its answer or otherwise assert it before filing its motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Central to plaintiffs’
argument is their assertion that preemption is an affirmative
defense, and defendants must plead and prove affirmative
defenses. See Cohen v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 16 F.4th 1283,
1289 (9th Cir. 2021); Durnford v. MusclePharm Corp., 907
F.3d 595, 603 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) (“FDCA preemption, like
all federal preemption, is an affirmative defense.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In plaintiffs’ view,
because Driver Provider did not identify preemption as a
defense in its answer, it must first amend its answer to assert
the defense. And given that the deadline to amend pleadings
had passed, plaintiffs argue that Driver Provider was
required to modify the scheduling order before moving to
amend its answer.
For its part, Driver Provider relies on our decision in
Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708,
713 (9th Cir. 2001), for the broad proposition that a
defendant may “raise an affirmative defense for the first time
in a motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . if the delay
does not prejudice the plaintiff.” We agree that a party may
raise a preemption defense for the first time in a motion for
14 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
judgment on the pleadings but not for the reason urged by
Driver Provider.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants
risk waiving defenses that they do not plead either in their
answer or a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12. Rule 12 identifies specific defenses that are
waived if a party fails to raise in its first motion under Rule
12 or fails to include in a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(1) (including defenses such as lack of personal
jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of
process).
But there are some defenses that cannot be waived at the
pleading stage. Relevant here, a defendant may raise failure
to state a claim at any point up to and including trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(2). And Rule 12(h)(2) specifically states that a
party may raise failure to state a claim in a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B).
Thus, the question we must consider is whether Driver
Provider’s preemption defense constitutes a failure to state a
claim, which can be asserted at any time. We conclude that
in this case, the answer is yes.
Plaintiffs cite several cases that generally state “federal
preemption[] is an affirmative defense” that a defendant is
required to plead and prove. See, e.g., Durnford, 907 F.3d at
603 n.8. While that is ordinarily true, our case law also
acknowledges that a complaint may, on its face, present a
preempted claim. See id. (“Only when the plaintiff pleads
itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an
impenetrable defense—may a complaint that otherwise
states a claim be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”). In other
words, if the complaint itself establishes a federal
preemption defense, the defendant need not specifically
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 15
plead preemption in its answer. See Lusnak v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 883 F.3d 1185, 1194 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018). Indeed,
“affirmative defenses such as preemption may . . . be raised
on a motion to dismiss . . . when the defense raises no
disputed issues of fact.” See id.
Here, Driver Provider’s preemption defense raises a
purely legal issue based only on the allegations in the
complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that Driver Provider failed to
accurately track the time plaintiffs worked, resulting in a
failure to pay overtime under the FLSA and the AWA. These
allegations form the basis of Driver Provider’s preemption
claim, and Driver Provider did not rely on any facts outside
the complaint in its motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Because the motion for judgment on the pleadings relied
only on the face of the complaint, it is properly construed as
raising a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(h)(2).1 As a
result, pursuant to Rule 12(h)(2), Driver Provider may raise
that argument at any time, including in a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.2
1
Our conclusion in this case does not give parties broad license to assert
otherwise unpled affirmative defenses in motions for judgment on the
pleadings. Indeed, even many other preemption claims would not fall
under Rule 12(h)(2) because they do not appear on the face of the
complaint and require additional discovery. See Scheibe v. ProSupps
USA, LLC, 141 F.4th 1094, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2025) (reversing grant
of motion to dismiss on preemption grounds because plaintiff did not
“plead facts that allow a court reasonably to infer . . . preemption”).
2
Because we find support for Driver Provider’s preemption defense in
Rule 12(h)(2), we need not rely on Owens to conclude the defense was
not waived. 244 F.3d at 711–12. This case is unlike Owens because there
the defendants moved to amend their answer and add their unpled
defense before the deadline to amend pleadings had passed. Id. Thus, if
Driver Provider was required to amend its answer to add a new defense,
16 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
B. The FLSA does not preempt Arizona Wage Act
overtime claims.
Because we find that Driver Provider’s preemption
defense was not waived, we turn to the merits of the claim.
The district court held that the FLSA preempts claims for
overtime under the AWA. We disagree.
Driver Provider argues that claims for timely overtime
pay under the AWA are preempted by the FLSA—under a
theory of obstacle preemption—because the AWA provides
greater remedies than the FLSA and may be brought under
Rule 23’s more generous opt-out class procedures. The
AWA requires that an employer timely pays its employees
“all wages due.” A.R.S. § 23-351(C). But the AWA does not
regulate what wages are due to an employee; instead, it
“borrows” its substantive standard from the FLSA, which
requires that employers pay overtime for all hours worked in
excess of a 40-hour work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). In
other words, the FLSA dictates what an employer owes its
employee, and the AWA dictates when those wages must be
paid. Id.; A.R.S. § 23-351(C).
Claims under the FLSA and claims under AWA differ in
three primary ways. First, a plaintiff who prevails on a FLSA
Owens would not excuse Driver Provider’s failure to file a motion to
modify the scheduling order under Rule 16. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at
607–08. We decline to read Owens as creating a sweeping exception
allowing a defendant to raise any defense in a motion for judgment on
the pleadings as long as the plaintiff is not prejudiced. Such an exception
is untethered from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8, 12, 15, 16. And extending Owens to cover untimely, unpled
defenses that fall outside the scope of Rule 12(h)(2) would create an
exception that swallows the rules. In any event, the Supreme Court has
recently granted certiorari on this issue. See Younge v. Fulton Jud. Cir.
Dist. Att’ys Off., Ga., 146 S. Ct. 1861 (2026).
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 17
claim may recover double the unpaid wages and attorney’s
fees, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), while the AWA provides for treble
damages, A.R.S. § 23-355(A). Second, the FLSA requires
parties to “opt-in” to a class-wide claim, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
preventing the use of a Rule 23 “opt-out” class action. The
AWA, on the other hand, contains no similar restriction on
class-wide claims. And third, under the FLSA, an
employee’s right to bring an action “terminate[s] upon the
filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor” to “restrain[]
any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum
wages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The AWA does not contain an
analogous limitation.
Driver Provider alleges that plaintiffs’ AWA overtime
claims fail based on obstacle preemption because the “FLSA
is the exclusive source of remedies to enforce rights it
creates.” Obstacle preemption occurs when “state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purpose and objectives of Congress.” Indus. Truck Ass’n
v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997). In Driver
Provider’s view, by bringing an AWA claim that borrows
the FLSA standard, plaintiffs “are trying to circumvent” the
FLSA’s more limited remedies and procedures “while
asserting what is purely an FLSA claim in substance.” But
Driver Provider fails to point to any “special features
warranting preemption” or explain why the AWA’s remedial
scheme acts as a barrier to the “purposes and objectives” of
the FLSA. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87
(1990) (citation modified); Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1149.
The Supreme Court has made clear that “even a
considerably detailed . . . federal regulatory or enforcement
scheme . . . does not by itself imply preemption of state
remedies.” See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 143 (1990) (citation modified). Instead, the question is
18 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
whether the scheme contains “special features warranting
preemption.” See id. (citation modified). Specifically, a
federal scheme may preempt state remedies when the
scheme is “comprehensive” and its balancing of competing
interests “would be completely undermined if” plaintiffs
“were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress
rejected.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54
(1987).
The FLSA does not contain these special features
warranting preemption. To start, nothing in the FLSA
suggests that it creates an exclusive set of remedies for wage
and hour law violations. To the contrary, it allows states to
create more generous minimum wage, overtime, and
maximum work week provisions, essentially setting “a floor
rather than a ceiling on protective legislation.” Wang v.
Chinese Daily News, Inc., 623 F.3d 743, 759 (9th Cir. 2010),
vacated on other grounds by Chinese Daily News, Inc. v.
Wang, 565 U.S. 801 (2011).3 Because the FLSA expressly
permits states to adopt more protective standards for
employees and enforce those standards through state causes
of action, it would be illogical to conclude the FLSA
impliedly forbids states from adopting identical standards
and enforcing those standards through state causes of action.
Nor does it follow that additional state remedies “completely
undermine[]” the entire FLSA scheme. See Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 481 U.S. at 54. If Congress intended to limit states from
3
We recognize that savings clauses should not be given broad effect
“where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established
by federal law.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870
(2000) (citation modified). Even if an act contains a savings clause, we
apply ordinary preemption principles. Here, the savings clause provides
evidence that Congress did not intend the FLSA to provide an exclusive
remedy. See Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1151.
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 19
providing different remedies to employees for failure to pay
overtime or timely pay overtime, it could have done so.
Moreover, the FLSA’s purpose is advanced—not
thwarted—by the AWA’s remedial scheme. The “principal
purpose of the FLSA is to protect all covered workers from
substandard wages and oppressive working hours.”
Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1150 (citing Adair v. City of
Kirkland, 185 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999)) (citation
modified). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “distinguished the
FLSA from other federal statutes designed to strike a balance
between employees and employers,” id., recognizing that
unlike acts “designed to minimize industrial strife,” such as
the Labor Management Relations Act, “the FLSA was
designed to give specific minimum protections to individual
workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the Act
would receive a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,”
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728,
739 (1981) (citation modified). Given the FLSA’s stated
purpose of protecting employees, we conclude that the
AWA’s more generous remedies do not stand as an obstacle
to that purpose.
To be sure, we previously reached the same result in
Wang. 923 F.3d at 760. There, we concluded that
independent state-law claims that parallel FLSA claims are
not preempted by the FLSA. Id. at 759 (holding that a
California Unfair Business Practices claim premised on
FLSA overtime violations was not preempted). The
plaintiff’s state-law claims in Wang “borrowed FLSA as the
substantive violation,” much like the plaintiffs’ claims here
“borrow” from the FLSA when determining the wages due
to an employee. See A.R.S. § 23-351(C). And we rejected
the very argument that Driver Provider raises here: that the
FLSA provides exclusive remedies for its violation. Wang,
20 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
623 F.3d at 760. Wang was vacated by the Supreme Court
on other grounds, but we find its reasoning persuasive and
reiterate its holding here.
There is no binding case law to the contrary. Driver
Provider points to a sentence in Williamson for the
proposition that the FLSA creates exclusive remedies that
preempt state-law claims. 208 F.3d at 1154. In that case, we
held that the FLSA did not preempt state fraud claims
premised on violations of the FLSA. Id. After conducting a
thorough preemption analysis, the panel concluded that the
“fraud claims do not conflict with [the] purpose of the FLSA
of protecting employees,” “[n]or do they upset . . . any
balance created by amendments to the statute.” Id. In
passing, the panel noted that “claims that are directly
covered by the FLSA (such as overtime and retaliation
disputes) must be brought under the FLSA.” Id. But this
language is not binding. First, it was made in passing and
without reasoning. See Wang, 623 F.3d at 759; United States
v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(dicta is only binding if “a panel confronts an issue germane
to the eventual resolution of the case” and “resolves it after
reasoned consideration”). And second, the remainder of
Williamson’s reasoning is inconsistent with this sentence. In
Williamson, we rejected as “incorrect” the district court’s
assumption that “FLSA is the exclusive remedy for claims
duplicated by or equivalent of rights covered by the FLSA.”4
208 F.3d at 1152.
4
In context, this sentence appears to summarize why Kendall v. City of
Chesapeake, Virginia, was inapplicable. 174 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999).
In Kendall, the Fourth Circuit rejected a § 1983 claim in which plaintiffs
attempted to enforce their FLSA rights. Id. at 443. We explained that
Kendall did not apply in the preemption context because “Kendall is not
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 21
In sum, we find no support in the text or purpose of the
FLSA for the proposition that employees cannot seek state-
law remedies for state-law violations that borrow a
substantive standard from the FLSA. Because such an
arrangement does not violate the “clear and manifest” intent
of Congress, see English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79
(1990) (citation modified), we hold that the FLSA does not
preempt plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims.5
II. The district court abused its discretion by denying
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
Next, we turn to the district court’s denial of the
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The parties agree
that we have jurisdiction. We nonetheless establish our
jurisdiction over the claim when we have an independent
obligation to do so. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife, Bureau of Land Mgmt., 273 F.3d 1229, 1235 (9th
Cir. 2001).
A. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We have appellate jurisdiction over “all final decisions
of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A decision is final
when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
a case about federal preemption of state law; rather, it is about whether
another federal statute (Section 1983) can support a claim that clearly
falls under the FLSA.” Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1153.
5
Driver Provider also argues that the AWA overtime claims fail as a
matter of law because overtime pay does not satisfy the definition of
“wages” under the Act. The district court expressly held that Driver
Provider waived this argument by failing to raise it until its reply. We
thus decline to consider this assertion. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 843
F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Generally, we do not entertain
arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the
district court.” (citation modified)).
22 SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC
for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) (citation
omitted). A district court’s final judgment terminating an
action after the parties enter a settlement agreement may
constitute a final judgment on the merits in the class action
context. See Brown v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 876 F.3d 1199,
1201 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that a settlement agreement
and stipulated dismissal established § 1291 jurisdiction over
a denial of class certification); Narouz v. Charter Commc’ns,
LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding there was
§ 1291 jurisdiction where the district court terminated the
case after the class representative settled his claims).
To be sure, whether a district court’s judgment
terminating a case post settlement is a final judgment on the
merits turns on the facts of the underlying class action. Only
when the parties have tested the merits of the claims through
litigation and subsequently settled the claims in a calculated
response to that litigation will the district court’s judgment
terminating the case be a final judgment on the merits. See
Brown, 876 F.3d at 1201 (individual plaintiffs settled after a
claim was dismissed, class certification was denied, and the
court tentatively partially granted summary judgment for
defendants); Narouz, 591 F.3d at 1263 (class representative
settled after “extensive discovery,” mediation, a denial of
class certification for settlement purposes, and a denial of a
class settlement).
Further, a district court’s approval of a settlement
agreement reinforces our conclusion that its subsequent
judgment terminating the case is a final judgment on the
merits. When a settlement agreement binds class members,
such as here, the district court must conduct a fairness
hearing to ensure the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate” for all parties before approving the agreement. See
SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC 23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Inherent in a district court’s Rule 23
fairness determination is its consideration of the merits of the
case. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that “[a] number of factors guide the
district court in making [a Rule 23 fairness] determination,
including . . . the strength of the plaintiffs’ case”). Thus, by
approving a class settlement agreement, a district court
confirms that the merits of the underlying claims have been
tested through the litigation. And a subsequent judgment
terminating the case is a final judgment on the merits.
Here, the parties litigated this case for over four years,
resulting in extensive discovery and multiple dispositive
rulings, including two separate grants of motion for
judgment on the pleadings, a partial grant of class
certification, and a partial grant of cross motions for
summary judgment. The AWA straight time claims
underlying the denial of class certification were litigated at
summary judgment, and the district court determined there
was a disputed issue of material fact. Settlement negotiations
began in September 2021, but the parties resumed litigation
to continue testing the merits of the claims, and trial was
rescheduled for April 2024. The parties ultimately reached
settlement before trial, and the district court approved the
s