Peak Oil Holdings LLC v. County of Ventura
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 4, 2026
Docket25-4114
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 4 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PEAK OIL HOLDINGS LLC; PEAK No. 25-4114
OPERATOR LLC, D.C. No.
2:21-cv-00734-DSF-AJR
Plaintiff-ctr-defendants -
Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
COUNTY OF VENTURA,
Defendant-ctr-claimant -
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 21, 2026
Pasadena, California
Before: N.R. SMITH and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK, District
Judge.**
Peak Oil Holdings LLC and Peak Operator LLC (Peak) appeal from the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable William Horsley Orrick, United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
district court’s entry of a default judgment against them. Peak seeks to reverse the
district court’s order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissing its
takings claim against the County of Ventura. But because Peak never filed a
motion in the district court under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) or 60(b)
to set aside the default judgment, we must dismiss the appeal. See Consorzio Del
Prosciutto di Parma v. Domain Name Clearing Co., 346 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.
2003); In re Lam, 192 F.3d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1999). Even if Peak had moved to
set aside the default judgment, it has not mentioned, let alone challenged, the
district court’s dismissal of its claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
as a sanction for violating a court order. See Brown v. Rawson–Neal Psychiatric
Hosp., 840 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that when a plaintiff’s claims
were originally dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) and then later under Rule 41(b), the
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was not reviewable because the plaintiff did not argue
“that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing [the plaintiff’s] federal
claims under Rule 41(b)”). So Peak’s claim on appeal that the district court erred
by dismissing its takings claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is not properly before this
Court.
DISMISSED.
2 25-4114