Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FORMAN MOTORWORKS, LLC, an No. 25-5395 Arizona limited liability company, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-02554-ROS Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MEMORANDUM* SEMA LOGISTICS, INC., an Illinois corporation, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 26, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Sema Logistics, Inc. appeals a summary judgment in favor of Forman Motorworks, LLC on Forman’s claims under the Carmack Amendment to the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. Sema argues that the district court failed to apply the proper summary judgment standard by accepting “Forman’s version of events” and “disregarding all evidence produced by Sema.” See Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59 F.4th 424, 437 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The district court . . . may not judge credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes at summary judgment.”). This argument fails because the district court did not rely on disputed facts, weigh the evidence, or make credibility determinations. 2. Sema next contends that Forman lacks standing because Forman does not have a bill of lading. The Carmack Amendment makes motor carriers “liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). And courts “look to the bill of lading, rather than an abstract classification system,” to resolve questions of standing. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011). But the Carmack Amendment governs a transaction when it “requires a receiving carrier to issue a bill of lading, regardless of whether that carrier erroneously fails to issue such a bill.” Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 103 (2010) (interpreting substantively identical language in 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a) applicable to rail carriers). Sema was required to issue Forman a bill of lading, see OneBeacon, 2 25-5395 634 F.3d at 1097, and cannot escape liability by failing to do so. Alternatively, Sema argues that Forman does not have standing because Forman acted as a freight forwarder or broker in this transaction. Even assuming that a freight forwarder or broker cannot sue under the Carmack Amendment, the undisputed facts establish that Forman acted as a shipper, not a freight forwarder or broker. 3. Sema next argues that it raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the vehicle’s condition at delivery. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under the Carmack Amendment, “the shipper establishes his prima facie case when he shows delivery in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages.” Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 138 (1964). “[I]n the usual cargo-damage case[,] the shipper makes a showing of good condition on shipment sufficient for its prima facie case by introducing a ‘clean’ bill of lading.” Daido Line v. Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp., 299 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 1962). But, in the absence of a bill of lading, the delivery in good condition element of a prima facie case can be established by other evidence. Cutten v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Forman established delivery in good condition through the affidavit of Jack Foss, which stated that the vehicle “was in perfect showroom condition and had no 3 25-5395 damage” upon delivery. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Foss’s proposed lay testimony was admissible evidence properly considered at the summary judgment stage. See United States v. Torralba-Mendia, 784 F.3d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 2015); Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”), abrogated on other grounds by rule as stated in David v. Betts, 734 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1078 n.20 (D. Haw. 2024); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Forman was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability.1 4. “The general rule for determining the amount of damages [under the Carmack Amendment] is the difference between the market value of the property in the condition in which it should have arrived at its destination and its market value in the condition in which it did arrive.” Contempo Metal Furniture Co. of Cal. v. E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1981). Sema argues in its reply brief that the vehicle’s Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price or its previous sales price provide countervailing evidence regarding damages. But 1 We decline to consider Sema’s arguments regarding its affirmative defenses of inherent vice and possible shipper fault because Sema did not raise these arguments before the district court. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Ordinarily, arguments not raised before the district court are waived on appeal.”) 4 25-5395 Sema did not raise these arguments before the district court or in its opening brief on appeal. Accordingly, we decline to consider them. See Trigueros, 658 F.3d at 988; Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 858 n.4 (“Arguments not raised in opening brief are waived.”). 5. Finally, Sema argues that the district court improperly considered the proposed expert testimony of Jared Lowell and Franz Forman regarding the vehicle’s value. But the district court correctly applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the experts’ proposed testimony was admissible evidence properly considered at the summary judgment stage. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993); Orr, 285 F.3d at 773; Fed R. Evid. 702. AFFIRMED. 5 25-5395